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Submittal of SWMU Assessment Report for Building 9960 Surface Discharge

Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-purpose engineering and science laboratory owned by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration and managed and operated by Sandia Corporation (Sandia), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation. This Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) Assessment Report (SAR) for the Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM), Coyote Test Field, Building 9960 Surface Discharge, has been prepared in accordance with Section V of the Compliance Order on Consent (the Consent Order) between the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED), DOE, and Sandia (NMED April 2004). The DOE and Sandia formally notified the NMED of this newly identified or suspected SWMU or Area of Concern (AOC) by letter dated December 9, 2014. This SAR is being submitted in accordance with the NMED Hazardous Waste Bureau (HWB) letter dated February 16, 2015 letter (Kieling February 2015). This SAR presents the available information for the Building 9960 Surface Discharge, including location, designation of type and function, a general description, the operational dates, waste characteristics, and a summary of existing analytical wastewater and soil data

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RCRA PART B Permit Application Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for Waste Management Activities at the NNSS Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU)

This volume of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit application by the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) seeks continued operation of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Explosives, explosive materials, and unexploded ordnance are declared waste explosives if they are damaged, are defective, have exceeded their shelf life, are the result of environmental restoration (legacy), or are discarded explosive material from research or testing projects. This document provides a description of the regulated waste codes accepted for treatment (controlled detonations), the general design of the unit, and the processes used to safely detonate onsite-generated waste explosives and unexploded ordnance, which are defined as hazardous waste under specific regulations. The Area 11 EODU consists of a firing point (controlled access area where firing of explosives is conducted), firing pad (prepares site where explosives hazardous waste is fired), and ancillary equipment that includes an explosives magazine and firing point area. Additionally, live explosives training is conducted to ensure proficiency of the EODU operations personnel, explosives handlers, and the firing system components. Training detonations do not include waste explosives and are limited in respect to explosives volume and frequency personnel, explosives handlers, and the firing system components. Training detonations do not include waste explosives and are limited in respect to explosives volume and frequency. For safety and security reasons, some of the contents of the full application are not available for public viewing. This public version of the application contains most, but not all, of the contents as submitted to the regulatory agencies.

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PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF REMOVING SNF FROM SHUTDOWN SITES – 2016 UPDATE

An updated evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 13 shutdown nuclear power reactor sites was conducted during 2016. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites included in the evaluation were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, and Vermont Yankee. This paper provides summary information on the 13 shutdown sites as well detailed information gathered from site visits to San Onofre and Vermont Yankee. The evaluation was divided into four components: (1) characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory, (2) a description of the on-site infrastructure, (3) an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience, and (4) an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. Updates to the evaluation since 2015 include incorporating SNF data from the GC-859 database; updating of Google Earth imagery; incorporating revisions to transportation certificates of compliance; adding information obtained from site visits to the Pacific Sun Railroad and Camp Pendleton, California; adding rail assessments for Kewaunee, Crystal River, and San Onofre to the evaluation; and adding information obtained from the site visit to Vermont Yankee. As additional sites such as Fort Calhoun, Palisades, Clinton, Quad Cities, Pilgrim, Oyster Creek, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation.

gtcc waste, unf, used nuclear fuel, transportation↗

Modification of the Monte Carlo method for calculation of the influence of unknown placement of solid radioactive waste on the uncertainty of dose fields at different overall container dimensions

An approach to estimating the uncertainty of initial data in calculations by the Monte Carlo method is considered. The relative geometrical position of parts of the analyzed system is assumed to be unknown. The influence of different approximations in the description of the geometrical shape of system objects is studied. The effect of unknown location and approximate shape description of solid radioactive waste in the container on the magnitude of dose fields is considered for photon transport problems.

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Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

A preliminary evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 14 shutdown nuclear power plant sites was performed. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, Vermont Yankee, and Fort Calhoun. The evaluation was divided into four components: (1) characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory, (2) a description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites, (3) an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience at the shutdown sites, and (4) an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of SNF and GTCC waste were the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel inventory database, industry publications such as StoreFUEL, and government sources such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The primary sources for information on the conditions of on-site infrastructure and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included information collected during site visits, information provided by managers at the shutdown sites, Facility Interface Data Sheets compiled for DOE in 2005, Services Planning Documents prepared for DOE in 1993 and 1994, industry publications such as Radwaste Solutions, and Google Earth. State representatives, State Regional Group representatives, Tribal representatives, and a Federal Railroad Administration representatives have participated in eleven of the shutdown site visits. Every shutdown site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its SNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. Additional conclusions from this evaluation include: The 14 shutdown sites use designs from 4 different suppliers involving 11 different (horizontal and vertical) dry storage systems that would require the use of 9 different transportation cask designs to remove the SNF and GTCC waste from the shutdown sites. Although some changes to transportation certificates of compliance will be required, the SNF at the initial 9 shutdown sites (Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion) is in dual purpose dry storage canisters that can be transported, including a small amount of high-burnup fuel. Most sites indicated that 2-3 years of advance time would be required for its preparations before shipments could begin. Some sites could be ready in less time. As additional sites such as Palisades, Pilgrim, Three Mile Island, Oyster Creek, Indian Point, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites - 2016 Update - 17086

An updated evaluation of removing used or spent nuclear fuel (SNF)2 from 13 shutdown nuclear power reactor sites was conducted during 2016. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites included in the evaluation were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, and Vermont Yankee. The evaluation was divided into four components: (1) characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory, (2) a description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites, (3) an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience, including identification of gaps in information, and (4) an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. Updates to the evaluation since 2015 include incorporating spent nuclear fuel data from the GC-859 database; updating of Google Earth imagery; incorporating revisions to transportation certificates of compliance; adding information obtained from site visits to the Pacific Sun Railroad and Camp Pendleton, California; adding rail assessments for Kewaunee, Crystal River, and San Onofre to the evaluation; and adding information obtained from the site visit to Vermont Yankee. As additional sites such as Fort Calhoun, Palisades, Clinton, Quad Cities, Pilgrim, Oyster Creek, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation. (authors)

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HYDROGEN AND VOC RETENTION IN WASTE BOXES

The Hanford Waste Management Project Master Documented Safety Analysis (MDSA) (HNF-14741, 2003) identifies derived safety controls to prevent or mitigate the risks of a single-container deflagration during operations requiring moving, venting or opening transuranic (TRU)-waste containers. The issue is whether these safety controls are necessary for operations involving TRU-waste boxes that are being retrieved from burial at the Hanford Site. This paper investigates the potential for a deflagration hazard within these boxes and whether safety controls identified for drum deflagration hazards should be applied to operations involving these boxes. The study evaluates the accumulation of hydrogen and VOCs within the waste box and the transport of these gases and vapors out of the waste box. To perform the analysis, there were numerous and major assumptions made regarding the generation rate and the transport pathway dimensions and their number. Since there is little actual data with regards to these assumptions, analyses of three potential configurations were performed to obtain some indication of the bounds of the issue (the concentration of hydrogen or flammable VOCs within a waste box). A brief description of each of the three cases along with the results of the analysis is summarized.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Radioactive Waste Storage Facility at the Armenian NPP - 12462

We present a detailed contaminant transfer dynamics model for radionuclide in geosphere and biosphere medium. The model describes the transport of radionuclides using full equation for the processes of advection, diffusion, decay and sorption. The overall objective is to establish, from a post-closure radiological safety point of view, whether it is practical to convert an existing radioactive waste storage facility at Armenian NPP, to a waste disposal facility. The calculation includes: - Data sources for: the operational waste-source term; options for refurbishment and completion of the waste storage facility as a waste disposal facility; the site and its environs; - Development of an assessment context for the safety assessment, and identification of waste treatment options; - A description of the conceptual and mathematical models, and results calculated for the base case scenario relating to the release of contaminants via the groundwater pathway and also precipitation especially important for this site. The results of the calculations showed that the peak individual dose is < 7 E-8 Sv/y arising principally from I-129 after 700 years post closure. Other significant radionuclides, in terms of their contribution to the total dose are I-129, Tc-99 and in little C-14 (U- 234 and Po-210 are not relevant). The study does not explore all issues that might be expected to be presented in a safety case for a near surface disposal facility it mainly focuses on post- closure dose impacts. Most emphasis has been placed on the development of scenarios and conceptual models rather than the presentation and analyses of results and confidence building (only deterministic results are presented). The calculations suggest that, from a perspective the conversion of the waste-storage facility is feasible such that all the predicted doses are well below internationally recognized targets, as well as provisional Armenian regulatory objectives. This conclusion applies to the disposal of the ANPP present and future arising of L/ILW operating wastes. (authors)

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In Situ Decommissioning Sensor Network, Meso-Scale Test Bed - Phase 3 Fluid Injection Test Summary Report

The DOE Office of Environmental management (DOE EM) faces the challenge of decommissioning thousands of excess nuclear facilities, many of which are highly contaminated. A number of these excess facilities are massive and robust concrete structures that are suitable for isolating the contained contamination for hundreds of years, and a permanent decommissioning end state option for these facilities is in situ decommissioning (ISD). The ISD option is feasible for a limited, but meaningful number of DOE contaminated facilities for which there is substantial incremental environmental, safety, and cost benefits versus alternate actions to demolish and excavate the entire facility and transport the rubble to a radioactive waste landfill. A general description of an ISD project encompasses an entombed facility; in some cases limited to the blow-grade portion of a facility. However, monitoring of the ISD structures is needed to demonstrate that the building retains its structural integrity and the contaminants remain entombed within the grout stabilization matrix. The DOE EM Office of Deactivation and Decommissioning and Facility Engineering (EM-13) Program Goal is to develop a monitoring system to demonstrate long-term performance of closed nuclear facilities using the ISD approach. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has designed and implemented the In Situ Decommissioning Sensor Network, Meso-Scale Test Bed (ISDSN-MSTB) to address the feasibility of deploying a long-term monitoring system into an ISD closed nuclear facility.

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Technology Applicable to Remote Hazardous Constituents and Waste Stream Grouping

Originally, Rocky Flats transuranic (TRU) waste was managed from waste streams that were composed of similar chemical constituents and were generated from identical processes. Early waste processing at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) maintained the Rocky Flats record until INL began generating their own item description codes (IDCs). Ultimately TRU waste management at INL was driven to combine wastes from all IDCs that were assigned by Rocky Flats to a summary category group regardless of whether the chemical constituents in the waste were known or not. At this point, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) certified program requirements to process the TRU waste according to waste streams was nearly eliminated. In April 2018, operations in the Sludge Repackage Project (SRP) area were halted by a radiological materials release accident in which drums containing waste experienced a loss of containment after over-pressurization occurred. Four SRP drums, repackaged in the Accelerated Retrieval Project (ARP) V area, had an adverse, delayed chemical reaction event occur when prohibited materials from one container were mixed with chemically-incompatible materials from other containers in the repackaging process. This incident was the direct result of processing unknowns under a protocol where the components of the waste were added to incompatible materials resulting in a run-away reaction. After a Difficult Waste Team (DWT) and Los Alamos National Laboratory – Carlsbad Operations (LANL-CO) subject matter expert (SME) visit in September 2019, it was determined by the team that all of the work observed on the September visit was performed upstream of the certified program and that the Visual Examination (VE) and other methods typically used by the certified program were being used for Acceptable Knowledge (AK) augmentation. This augmentation was needed in order to determine what the constituents in the waste might be, and is based primarily on collections of VE results. The waste at INL that is being processed in what is considered to be the Priority 2 (yellow) and Priority 3 (red) lists either needs AK to be completed before certified characterization can occur or is waiting to be processed because the waste has been mixed with unknown wastes resulting in a lack of information that could have impact of the ability to certify and ship the waste to the WIPP.

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Hanford Site Waste Management Units Report

The Hanford Site Waste Management Units Report (HSWMUR) has been created to meet the requirements of the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) Action Plan, Section 3.5, which states: “The Hanford Site Waste Management Units Report shall be generated, in a format agreed upon by the Parties, as a calendar year report and issued annually by the DOE by the end of February of each year, and posted electronically for regulator and public access. This report shall reflect all changes made in waste management unit status during the previous year.” This February 2012 version of the HSWMUR contains a comprehensive inventory of the 3389 sites and 540 subsites in the Waste Information Data System (WIDS). The information for each site contains a description of each unit and the waste it contains, where applicable. The WIDS database provides additional information concerning the sites contained in this report and is maintained with daily changes to these sites.

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Hanford Site Waste Management Units Report

The Hanford Site Waste Management Units Report (HSWMUR) has been created to meet the requirements of the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) Action Plan, Section 3.5, which states: “The Hanford Site Waste Management Units Report shall be generated, in a format agreed upon by the Parties, as a calendar year report and issued annually by the DOE by the end of February of each year, and posted electronically for regulator and public access. This report shall reflect all changes made in waste management unit status during the previous year.” This February 2013 version of the HSWMUR contains a comprehensive inventory of the 3427 sites and 564 subsites in the Waste Information Data System (WIDS). The information for each site contains a description of each unit and the waste it contains, where applicable. The WIDS database provides additional information concerning the sites contained in this report and is maintained with daily changes to these sites.

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Hanford Site Waste Management Units Report

The Hanford Site Waste Management Units Report (HSWMUR) has been created to meet the requirements of the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) Action Plan, Section 3.5, which states: “The Hanford Site Waste Management Units Report shall be generated, in a format agreed upon by the Parties, as a calendar year report and issued annually by the DOE by the end of February of each year, and posted electronically for regulator and public access. This report shall reflect all changes made in waste management unit status during the previous year.” This February 2013 version of the HSWMUR contains a comprehensive inventory of the 3438 sites and 569 subsites in the Waste Information Data System (WIDS). The information for each site contains a description of each unit and the waste it contains, where applicable. The WIDS database provides additional information concerning the sites contained in this report and is maintained with daily changes to these sites.

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Declaration of the Chemical Composition of Waste-products for the German Repository Konrad Using Substance Vectors - 20500

The waste acceptance criteria of the German repository Konrad require beside a radiological declaration a compositional declaration to be able to avoid negative impact on the groundwater by a presumed leakage into the groundwater after complete corrosion of the containers in the future. The declaration of the composition has to specify compounds and substances not element analyses, because the chemical behavior and toxicity especially of organic compounds varies strongly The relevant compounds have to be described and quantified using defined substance codes provided by the operator. For simple waste types like pure concrete or steel components, the definition of the composition is rather simple. The composition of more complex waste streams is generally declared using producer specific material vectors, which can be derived for defined waste types (e.g. grouted fluids, ash from combustion, super-compacted mixed waste etc.). Additional substance vectors exist for containers, drums and grout, which together with the waste composition yield the total composition of the waste packages. The substance vectors for homogeneous waste streams like cementitious demolition waste, solidified fluids and ash are mostly based on analyses provided by the waste owner. In some cases, analyses from non-radioactive analogues or data sheets can also be used to demonstrate the composition. For each qualified treatment of radioactive waste streams the material composition is described and balanced on the basis of specific material vectors, which are composed of material codes from the material and cask list provided by the Federal company for radioactive waste disposal. For mixed waste streams like super-compacted or grouted mixed waste or materials simply packed in containers an analyses cannot be used. In these cases, the compositional information from the bookkeeping can be used for the entire waste stream to calculate a mean composition including a compositional range (min / max composition). Only waste packages with an approved material description can be delivered to Konrad. Therefore, the material declaration of all waste streams and the resulting waste products is crucial for all waste owners in Germany to be able to have enough waste packages ready, when the repository is going to open in 2027. (authors)

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Waste Inventory for Near Surface Repository (NSR) - 13482

The main characteristics, physical, chemical as well as radiological of the waste intended to be disposed of in the planned NSR are described. This description is mainly based on the waste inventory investigations performed by the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP). The four different waste streams to be disposed of in the NSR are described and investigated. (authors)

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Cleanup at Los Alamos National Laboratory - the challenges - 9493

This paper provides an overview of environmental cleanup at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and some of the unique aspects and challenges. Cleanup of the 65-year old Department of Energy Laboratory is being conducted under a RCRA Consent Order with the State of New Mexico. This agreement is one of the most recent cleanup agreements signed in the DOE complex and was based on lessons learned at other DOE sites. A number of attributes create unique challenges for LANL cleanup -- the proximity to the community and pueblos, the site's topography and geology, and the nature of LANL's on-going missions. This overview paper will set the stage for other papers in this session, including papers that present: Plans to retrieve buried waste at Material Disposal Area B, across the street from oen of Los Alamos' commercial districts and the local newspaper; Progress to date and joint plans with WIPP for disposal of the remaining inventory of legacy transuranic waste; Reviews of both groundwater and surface water contamination and the factors complicating both characterization and remediation; Optimizing the disposal of low-level radioactive waste from ongoing LANL missions; A stakeholder environmental data transparency project (RACER), with full public access to all available information on contamination at LANL, and A description of the approach to waste processing cost recovery from the programs that generate hazardous and radioactive waste at LANL.

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Field-Scale Lysimeter Studies of Low-Activity Waste Form Degradation

Before vitrified and cementitious nuclear waste can be disposed of at the U.S. Department of Energy’s Hanford Site Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF), a performance assessment (PA) must be conducted. A field lysimeter is one method capable of confirming that laboratory experiments provide reasonable model parameter estimates for PA release models. Field lysimeters are also useful in demonstrating that release models can accurately predict material degradation in a field environment. This report describes the implementation plan for a study of LAW waste form degradation using the Field Lysimeter Test Facility (FLTF) on the Hanford Site. This facility provides an opportunity to study glass and cementitious waste forms that will be produced during Hanford cleanup activities in field-relevant conditions. Results from this study will: 1) provide field experimental data on degradation of various waste forms; 2) be used to refine process model descriptions of contaminant (source term) release from the waste forms; 3) reduce uncertainties about the representativeness of laboratory testing results for determining long-term waste form performance under field conditions; and 4) improve confidence in the IDF PA by providing data that verify parameters and assumptions used in the PA modeling. It is expected that this study will lead to improved stakeholder confidence in the safe disposal of LAW at the IDF and aid in the adoption of informed facility designs with the potential to reduce operational costs.

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Impacts of Leaching and Uncertainties on Projected Hanford Low-Activity Waste Glass Amounts

Analyses were performed to evaluate leaching impacts on low-activity waste glass mass projections, both with and without uncertainties. A preliminary set of advanced glass models, constraints, and uncertainty descriptions was used. The maximum allowable waste oxide loading (WOL) was estimated for waste compositions while simultaneously satisfying all applicable glass property and composition constraints with sufficient confidence. Prediction and composition/process uncertainties were included in some of the calculations to evaluate their impacts on glass mass. Two sets of waste compositions were used in calculations, one with caustic leaching of solids and one without leaching. In addition, glass formulation estimates either included or did not include ad hoc constraints to limit WOL, known as “line rules.” Calculation results are shown below. Application of both process and prediction uncertainties increased the glass mass projections by only 0.28 to 1.03 relative percent when line rules were used. Leaching of high-level waste sludge resulted in a roughly 21 relative percent increase in projected glass mass.

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