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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1989

Compact finite volume methods for the diffusion equation

The paper describes an approach to treating initial-boundary-value problems by finite volume methods in which the parallel between differential and difference arguments is closely maintained. By using intrinsic geometrical properties of the volume elements, it is possible to describe discrete versions of the div, curl, and grad operators which lead, using summation-by-parts techniques, to familiar energy equations as well as the div curl = 0 and curl grad = 0 identities. For the diffusion equation, these operators describe compact schemes whose convergence is assured by the energy equations and which yield both the potential and the flux vector with second-order accuracy. A simplified potential form is especially useful for obtaining numerical results by multigrid and ADI methods.

Rose, Milton E.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Unmanned Aircraft Hazards and their Implications for Regulation

Use of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) has been characterized as the next great step forward in the evolution of civil aviation. Indeed, UASs are in limited civil use in the United States today, and many believe that the time is rapidly approaching when they will move into the commercial marketplace, too. To make this a reality, a number of challenges must be overcome to develop the necessary regulatory framework for assuring safe operation of this special class of aircraft. This paper discusses some of what must be done to establish that framework. In particular, we examine hazards specific to the design, operation, and flight crew of UASs, and discuss implications of these hazards for existing policy and guidance. Understanding unique characteristics of UASs that pose new hazards is essential to developing a cogent argument, and the corresponding regulatory framework, for safely integrating these aircraft into civil airspace.

Hayhurst, Kelly J.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Evaluation of the concept of pressure proof testing fuselage structures

The FAA and NASA have recently completed independent technical evaluations of the concept of pressure proof testing the fuselage of commercial transport airplanes. The results of these evaluations are summarized. The objectives of the evaluations were to establish the potential benefit of the pressure proof test, to quantify the most desirable proof test pressure, and to quantify the required proof test interval. The focus of the evaluations was on multiple-site cracks extending from adjacent rivet holes of a typical fuselage longitudinal lap splice joint. The FAA and NASA do not support pressure proof testing the fuselage of aging commercial transport aircraft. The argument against proof testing is as follows: (1) a single proof test does not insure an indefinite life; therefore, the proof test must be repeated at regular intervals; (2) for a proof factor of 1.33, the required proof test interval must be below 300 flights to account for uncertainties in the evaluation; (3) conducting the proof test at a proof factor of 1.5 would considerably exceed the fuselage design limit load; therefore, it is not consistent with accepted safe practices; and (4) better safety can be assured by implementing enhanced nondestructive inspection requirements, and adequate reliability can be achieved by an inspection interval several times longer than the proof test interval.

Harris, Charles E.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Enough Is Enough

The spacecraft was nearly integrated and had passed some of its early mechanical and electrical testing. One of its instruments, the Proportional Counter Array (PCA), had a gas leak in one of the five proportional counter modules that made up the array. The science division where the instrument was being developed wanted a gas replenishment system added to assure the PCA would last for the entire mission. Adding a gas replenishment system would mean interrupting spacecraft integration and testing; developing a new subsystem and integrating it onto the spacecraft; modifying all the PCA modules; including a complex integration of the instrument onto the spacecraft; and implementing a more complex performance and environmental test process. It was the wrong answer because it made a simple design more complex and added little value to the mission at a major cost in time and dollars. Our mission couldn't afford the additional budget and schedule risks. XTE was the latest of a long line of projects being managed by my Explorer Program Office, but it was unique in being the first project we had agreed to do for a fixed price. NASA HQ agreed, in return, to provide us with the funding profile we needed to make it happen. We were both trying to break the unhealthy spiral in the Explorer program that saw current missions overrunning and pushing subsequent missions downstream to the point where their science was becoming marginal. The science community was upset and wanted better performance from NASA. I summarized my arguments to the director. The Engineering Directorate had taken responsibility for the spacecraft development when we established XTE as an in-house project at Goddard Space Flight Center, and also was supporting the PCA development. "It adds complexity," I reiterated. "It's a significant cost impact for only a marginal reliability increase". His response was music to my ears, "Jim, I won't stand in your way, but you'll have to convince the scientists and engineers."

Barrowman, James↗