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At least 73 records · Page 4

E-36: The First Proto-Megascience Experiment at NAL

E-36, an experiment on small-angle proton-proton scattering, began testing equipment at the National Accelerator Laboratory (NAL) using a newly achieved 100 GeV proton beam on February 12, 1972, marking the beginning of NAL’s experimental program. This experiment, which drew collaborators from NAL, the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (Dubna, USSR), the University of Rochester (Rochester, New York), and Rockefeller University (New York, New York) was significant not only as a milestone in Fermilab’s history but also as a model of cooperation between the East and West at a time when Cold War tensions still ran high. An examination of the origin, operation, and resolution of E-36 and the chain of experiments it spawned reveals the complex interplay of science and politics that drove these experiments as well as seeds of the megascience paradigm that has come to dominate high energy physics research since the 1970s.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Fissile Material Stockpile Declarations and Cooperative Nuclear Archaeology

With the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union quickly began to produce fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium, HEU) for military purposes on an industrial scale. By the mid-1950s, both countries were already making ton-quantities of fissile material per year to supply their growing nuclear arsenals. They were soon joined by the United Kingdom (1951), France (1955), China (1964), and Israel (1965)—and later by India, Pakistan, and finally North Korea. By the time most of these production efforts ended in the early 1990s, the global stockpile of military fissile material had reached fantastic levels. While the combined global nuclear weapon inventory had peaked at about 64,000 in 1986,1 the military fissile-material stockpile ultimately reached almost 2200 tons (240 tons of plutonium and 1960 tons of highly enriched uranium), which is sufficient to make about 200,000 simple nuclear weapons.2 Since the end of the Cold War, almost 700 tons of highly enriched uranium have been down-blended and other material is now reserved for naval fuel. Overall, the military material available for weapon purposes today is sufficient for more than 150,000 weapons (Figure 1).

Glaser, Alexander↗

Proven Technologies for the Solidification of Complex Liquid Radioactive Waste (LRW): Global Case Studies of Applications and Disposal Options - 20424

Legacy radioactive waste streams from the Cold War still exist and newly generated waste streams from nuclear power plants and research institutes go untreated and expose environmental hazards at many nuclear sites. The nature of the waste is diverse, depending upon the source or the process from which it originated. The most problematic waste streams include complex liquids such as organic (tri-butyl-phosphate TBP) solutions contaminated with Pu and U isotopes, mixed sludge types, high acid radioactive waste, H-3 contaminated organic and aqueous streams, etc. Technological, environmental and economic challenges exist for the treatment and disposal of such waste streams. A proven technology that has been applied to LRW on a global basis provides one option as a low-cost solution to legacy streams and small volume, highly complex LRW frequently found during decommissioning at nuclear power plants and weapons sites. The engineered polymer technology from Nochar, USA, is capable of solidifying standard and highly complex LLW and ILW waste streams for interim or final storage, or for incineration. (authors)

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Managing Records for the Long Term - 12363

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing vast amounts of information documenting historical and current operations. This information is critical to the operations of the DOE Office of Legacy Management. Managing legacy records and information is challenging in terms of accessibility and changing technology. The Office of Legacy Management is meeting these challenges by making records and information management an organizational priority. The Office of Legacy Management mission is to manage DOE post-closure responsibilities at former Cold War weapons sites to ensure the future protection of human health and the environment. These responsibilities include environmental stewardship and long-term preservation and management of operational and environmental cleanup records associated with each site. A primary organizational goal for the Office of Legacy Management is to 'Preserve, Protect, and Share Records and Information'. Managing records for long-term preservation is an important responsibility. Adequate and dedicated resources and management support are required to perform this responsibility successfully. Records tell the story of an organization and may be required to defend an organization in court, provide historical information, identify lessons learned, or provide valuable information for researchers. Loss of records or the inability to retrieve records because of poor records management processes can have serious consequences and even lead to an organisation's downfall. Organizations must invest time and resources to establish a good records management program because of its significance to the organization as a whole. The Office of Legacy Management will continue to research and apply innovative ways of doing business to ensure that the organization stays at the forefront of effective records and information management. DOE is committed to preserving records that document our nation's Cold War legacy, and the Office of Legacy Management will keep records management as a high priority. (authors)

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Implications of Non-Bingham Rheology

One of the key challenges now facing the US Department of Energy (DOE) is the fate of radioactive waste remaining from World War II and the Cold War which is stored underground in tanks some 75 feet in diameter and over 30 feet tall. Over time, the waste has segmented into multiple layers with sludges and slurries at the bottom with salt crust layers often at the top and liquid in between. DOE’s current official baseline plans call for remaining sludges and slurries to be removed from the tanks and converted into a more stable glass waste form. Minimizing worker exposure to radiation drives DOE to use slurry processing techniques to suspend, mobilize, transport, mix, and process the waste. Therefore, a clear and quantitative understanding of Hanford waste rheology is essential for the success of the DOE mission. Historically much of the waste has been characterized using Eugene Bingham’s model more than a century old that provides a straight line fit to higher shear rate data with the intercept suggesting a yield stress and the slope providing the consistency. Yet, Bingham fits overestimate the shear stress at a given shear rate for low to intermediate shear rates, exactly the range of shear rates typically encountered in pipe flow, where shear rates peak along the pipe wall and vanish in the center. This model produces a fictitious yield stress for some of the wastes that do not exhibit yield phenomena. While over estimating the yield stress may be prudent, safe, and conservative for some applications (e.g., pump sizing to ensure that pumps can handle yield stresses), over estimating the rheology may be inaccurate and non-conservative for other applications (e.g., eroding settled particle beds). Therefore, this paper evaluates the slurry rheology of Hanford and Savannah River wastes using a more modern rheological model that fits the full range of experimental data. Although a bias has been recognized and alternative models proposed, the magnitude of this bias and the implications for tank waste have only been qualitatively suggested. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate quantitatively implications of the poor quality of fit between a Bingham model for rheology and experimental data at modest shear rates. We first demonstrate the magnitude of the bias between the data and the Bingham extrapolation. We then evaluate quantitatively the velocity profile under laminar conditions. This analysis shows that the bias may be large (hundreds of percent or more) at modest shear rates and that modest shear rates dominate pipe velocity profiles.

Rheology, Radioactive waste↗

Site Management Guide (Blue Book)

The U.S. Department of Energy (Department) Office of Legacy Management (LM), established in 2003, manages the Department’s postclosure responsibilities and ensures the future protection of human health and the environment. During World War II and the Cold War, the Federal government developed and operated a vast network of industrial facilities for the research, production, and testing of nuclear weapons, as well as other scientific and engineering research. These processes left a legacy of radioactive and chemical waste, environmental contamination, and hazardous facilities and materials at well over 100 sites. Since 1989, the Department has taken an aggressive accelerated cleanup approach to reduce risks and cut costs. At most Departmental sites undergoing cleanup, some residual hazards will remain at the time cleanup is completed due to financial and technical impracticality. However, the Department still has an obligation to protect human health and the environment after cleanup is completed. LM fulfills DOE’s postclosure obligation by providing long-term management of postcleanup sites which do not have continuing missions. LM is also responsible for sites under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). Currently, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is responsible for site surveys and remediation at FUSRAP sites. Once remediation is completed, LM becomes responsible for long-term management. LM also has responsibility for uranium processing sites addressed by Title II of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA). UMTRCA Title II sites are sites that were commercially owned and are regulated under a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license. For license termination, the owner must conduct an NRC-approved cleanup of any on-site radioactive waste remaining from former uranium ore-processing operations. The site owner must also provide full funding for inspections and, if necessary, ongoing maintenance. Once site cleanup is complete, LM accepts title to these sites on behalf of the United States and assumes long-term management.

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Potential health hazards of radiation. Fact Sheet

During World War II and the Cold War, the federal government developed and operated industrial facilities for the research, production, and testing of nuclear weapons, as well as other scientific and engineering research. These processes left a legacy of radioactive and chemical waste, environmental contamination, and hazardous facilities and materials at well over 100 sites. Some of these sites processed uranium and vanadium, and upon closure, left behind millions of cubic yards of mill tailings on the sites and throughout the nearby communities. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) administers the cleanup of these areas to minimize the risks to the public and environment from exposure to the tailings and the radon gas they produce.

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Integrating repositories with fuel cycles: The airport authority model

The organization of the fuel cycle is a legacy of World War II and the cold war. Fuel cycle facilities were developed and deployed without consideration of the waste management implications. This led to the fuel cycle model of a geological repository site with a single owner, a single function (disposal), and no other facilities on site. Recent studies indicate large economic, safety, repository performance, nonproliferation, and institutional incentives to collocate and integrate all back-end facilities. Site functions could include geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) with the option for future retrievability, disposal of other wastes, reprocessing with fuel fabrication, radioisotope production, other facilities that generate significant radioactive wastes, SNF inspection (navy and commercial), and related services such as SNF safeguards equipment testing and training. This implies a site with multiple facilities with different owners sharing some facilities and using common facilities - the repository and SNF receiving. This requires a different repository site institutional structure. We propose development of repository site authorities modeled after airport authorities. Airport authorities manage airports with government-owned runways, collocated or shared public and private airline terminals, commercial and federal military facilities, aircraft maintenance bases, and related operations - all enabled and benefiting the high-value runway asset and access to it via taxi ways. With a repository site authority the high value asset is the repository. The SNF and HLW receiving and storage facilities (equivalent to the airport terminal) serve the repository, any future reprocessing plants, and others with needs for access to SNF and other wastes. Non-public special-built roadways and on-site rail lines (equivalent to taxi ways) connect facilities. Airport authorities are typically chartered by state governments and managed by commissions with members appointed by the state governor, county governments, and city governments. This structure (1) enables state and local governments to work together to maximize job and tax benefits to local communities and the state, (2) provides a mechanism to address local concerns such as airport noise, and (3) creates an institutional structure with large incentives to maximize the value of the common asset, the runway. A repository site authority would have a similar structure and be the local interface to any national waste management authority. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Ten Years of Legacy Management: U.S. DOE Office of Legacy Management Accomplishments - 13246

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) established the Office of Legacy Management (LM) to provide a long-term, sustainable solution to environmental impacts that remain from nuclear weapons production during World War II and the Cold War. The production activities created adverse environmental conditions at over 100 sites. When LM was established on December 15, 2003, it became responsible for 33 sites where active environmental remediation was complete. Currently, LM is responsible for long-term surveillance and maintenance of environmental remedies, promotion of beneficial reuse of land and buildings, and management of records and information at 89 sites in 29 states and Puerto Rico. LM is also responsible for meeting contractual obligations associated with former contractor workers' pensions and post-retirement benefits. Effectively addressing this environmental and human legacy will continue to require a focused and well-managed effort. (authors)

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The Walls Come Tumbling Down: Decontamination and Demolition of 29 Manhattan Project and Cold War-Era Buildings and Structures at Los Alamos National Laboratory-12301

When the nation's top scientists and military leaders converged on Los Alamos, New Mexico in the 1943, to work on the Manhattan Project, the facilities they used to conduct their top-secret work were quickly constructed and located in the middle of what eventually became the Los Alamos town site. After one of these early facilities caught on fire, it seemed wise to build labs and production facilities farther away from the homes of the town's residents. They chose to build facilities on what was then known as Delta Prime (DP) Mesa and called it Technical Area 21, or TA-21. With wartime urgency, a number of buildings were built at TA-21, some in as little as a few months. Before long, DP Mesa was populated with several nondescript metal and cinder-block buildings, including what became, immediately following the war, the world's first plutonium production facility. TA-21 also housed labs that used hazardous chemicals and analyzed americium, tritium and plutonium. TA-21 was a bustling center of research and production for the next several decades. Additional buildings were built there in the 1960's, but by the 1990's many of them had reached the end of their service lives. Labs and offices were moved to newer, more modern buildings. When Los Alamos National Laboratory received $212 million in funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in July 2009 for environmental cleanup projects, about $73 million of the funds were earmarked to decontaminate and demolish 21 of the old buildings at TA-21. Although some D and D of TA-21 buildings was performed in the 1990's, many of the facilities at DP Site remained relatively untouched for nearly three decades following their final operational use. In 2006, there were over three dozen buildings or structures on the mesa to be removed so that soil cleanup could be completed (and the land made available for transfer and reuse). The total footprint of buildings across the mesa was approximately 18,580 m{sup 2} (200,000 ft{sup 2}). The initially approved baseline for the ARRA D and D Project was to remove 22 buildings and structures that included approximately 14,680 m{sup 2} (158,000 ft{sup 2}) of footprint. By employing efficiencies during subcontracting, demolition, and waste segregation, the savings allowed an additional 1,580 m{sup 2} (17,000 ft{sup 2}) of footprint to be removed using ARRA funds. Additionally, the lessons learned from this experience were used to apply NNSA funding to the removal of six additional non-contaminated buildings and structures. In the end, 29 buildings and structures, including stacks, cooling towers and tanks, were removed from the mesa. The entire DP East area was cleared of buildings and sub-grade structures and the soils cleaned to residential standards. The total footprint reduction at TA-21 as a result of this effort was in excess of 17,650 m{sup 2} (190,000 ft{sup 2}). The use of a Laboratory self-performance team to start demolition of non-contaminated structures resulted in steady work performance early in the project while subcontracts were being put in place to perform more complicated abatement and contaminated demolition activities. Most importantly, there were no serious worker injuries and the minor injuries recorded were those common to construction type activities. Extensive monitoring along the site boundary demonstrated that no hazardous chemicals or radioactive contamination were released and radiological dose to the public was negligible. The ARRA demolition activities were completed six months in advance of the deadline for employing ARRA funds. Additionally, over 17,585 m{sup 3} (23,000 yds{sup 3}) of building demolition debris was safely removed from DP Mesa. All of the major buildings have been removed, unencumbered access to the SWMUs that are required to be cleaned up by the Consent Order with the state of New Mexico, has been achieved, and a significant portion of the mesa has been prepared to support a process that will eventually transfer this land from federal government control for further use. (authors)

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Evaluation of the Effects of Microbes on Autunite Dissolution and the Spectral Induced Polarization Response in Hanford Vadose Zone Sediment - 18440

As a result of the U.S. nuclear weapons program during the second World War and throughout the Cold War, there now exists a significant amount of uranium contamination at the U.S. Department of Energy Hanford site located in Washington State. Much of this contamination is in the form of mobile uranyl carbonates species within the vadose zone, which at Hanford varies up to 100 m thick in the Central Plateau. In-situ immobilization of mobile uranium via injections of a soluble sodium tripolyphosphate amendment may prove effective in the formation of low-solubility uranyl phosphate solid phases, autunite. However, the injected polyphosphate undergoes hydrolysis in aqueous solutions to form orthophosphate, which serves as a readily available nutrient for the various microorganisms in the sediment. Sediment-filled column experiments conducted under saturated oxygen restricted conditions using a geophysical technique known as spectral induced polarization (SIP) have shown the impact of microbes on the dissolution of synthetic autunite. Two sets of experiments were conducted using test columns. Each experiment had a pair of columns inoculated with microbes (with a glucose solution acting as a nutrient source) which were monitored using SIP in conjunction with regular sampling of pore-water. Columns were built with two silver/silver chloride (Ag/AgCl) coiled current electrodes at either end and four Ag potential electrodes along the side, which allowed the measurement of three distinct points along the length of the column. SIP measures phase which is the time delay between an injected current and measured voltage, in this case measured in radians. Three sampling ports were added to correspond with the geophysical measurements. Pore-water samples taken over the course of the experiment were analyzed for dissolved elements including uranium, iron, phosphorous, calcium, and magnesium. SIP results were plotted over time in order to determine correlations between changes in electrical phase and changes in pore-water chemistry. It was determined that changes in the phase and bulk resistivity detected with SIP corresponded to changes in the pore-water chemistry due to the growth of microbes. The first experiment ran for five months and had measurements done once a week, the second only ran one month but had measurements taken five times a week in order to understand initial changes in column chemistry in greater detail. SIP may be an effective way to remotely track changes indicative of bacterial activities on the surrounding environment. This method has the potential for field application at a larger scale for the purpose of tracking microbe growth in response to tripolyphosphate amendment. (authors)

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Uranium Partitioning upon Ammonia Gas Treatment on Phyllosilicate Minerals

In the past, > 200,000 kg of U was released to the Hanford Site vadose zone from disposal and leakage of waste byproducts from plutonium production during World War II and the Cold War (Zachara et al., 2007). U is highly mobile due to the presence of carbonates and oxidizing conditions, with K{sub d} of 0.1 - 8 mL/g at the site (Zachara et al., 2007; Szecsody et al., 2013; Serne et al., 2008). NH{sub 3} (gas) injection is being investigated as a remediation technique as it is an in situ method that will not introduce additional liquid that could drive contaminants deeper into vadose zone towards groundwater. Objectives: To understand the impact of alkaline injection on geochemical processes in the Hanford Site vadose zone, including: 1)Long-term fate of uranium (U); 2)Dissolution and re-precipitation of secondary minerals. Apparent K{sub d}'s increase significantly with NH{sub 3} gas treatment, especially for six-month aging. - K{sub d} decreases after aeration, primarily due to U desorption at lower pH. U removal is still significantly greater than natural conditions (K{sub d} < 8 vs. > 100 mL/g). - Three-day aeration has higher loading than six-month after ammonia gas treatment and aeration. However, significantly greater desorption of U occurs with aeration in the six-month aged sample potentially due to transformation into different, more soluble solid phases with longer term aging. - U removal is primarily due to (1) co-precipitation of U with secondary minerals and (2) adsorption to minerals' surface, although further research is required to identify dominant mechanisms. Future experiments will focus on garnering a better understanding of the solid phase U speciation. Solids will be characterized using SEM-EDS, EMPA, XPS, XAFS, and TEM to better understand the effects of basic treatments on initial minerals and formation of secondary precipitates.

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Iodine Speciation Across the Length of the Hanford 200-UP-1 Operable Unit Radioiodine Plume and Biogeochemical Drivers of Speciation - 17270

In 1943, construction began on the first of nine nuclear reactors at the Hanford Site to produce plutonium for the development of atomic weapons for the Manhattan Project during World War II and throughout the Cold War. Over a production period lasting from 1944 to 1987, approximately 110,000 tons of nuclear fuel was processed. During the production period, billions of gallons of liquid nuclear waste and millions of tons of solid waste were produced. Approximately 4.7 Ci of radioiodine (I-129) was discharged to liquid disposal sites, during disposition of the waste. Following percolation of the liquid waste through the vadose zone, three large I-129 groundwater plumes have formed beneath Central Plateau Facilities including both 200 East and 200 West Areas. Analysis of I-129 plumes in the 200-ZP-1 Operable Unit (OU) (200 West Area) showed iodine speciation that was dominated by iodate even though iodide was thought to be dominant species in waste. Experimental results demonstrated that iodate interacts with calcite via a co-precipitation and/or adsorption mechanism. From sorption experiments performed on Hanford sediments, iodate interacted more strongly than iodide during adsorption experiments. These results would indicate that iodate migration would be retarded compared to iodide, but results from groundwater samples obtained from eight wells in the 200 ZP-1 OU did not support this hypothesis. Due to different chemical processes used during plutonium processing, iodine species in other plumes such as in the 200-UP-1 OU (200 West Area) may be different. In addition, species distribution may change longitudinally between the source area and the distal end of the plume. Groundwater samples will be taken at a location near the source, in the middle of the plume and at the distal end of the plume. These samples will be analyzed for iodine speciation using ion chromatography coupled to an inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer. Results from the different samples will be compared to give an initial determination of species distribution at different locations along the plume. Data generated from these samples can then be used to inform the conceptual model that is being developed for iodine as part of an evaluation of remediation options for the 200-UP-1 OU. (authors)

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Nuclear Weapons and the Atmospheric Test Era

The era of atmospheric testing defies a simple description. Beginning with the goal of proving fission, the United States’ test program grew in complexity as scientists explored thermonuclear reactions, met the military demand for a variety of weapons for an increasing number of delivery platforms, and reacted to the ever-growing public fear of fallout. And, of course, political considerations were always present, first in the prosecution of World War II and later in the Cold War. To understand the atmospheric test program, then, is to understand how science, politics, and the public shaped our society in ways that are still difficult to fully understand.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Integrity Monitoring, Prediction and Assessment, Corrosion Control, and Repair of the Hanford Storage Tanks – 25213

The Hanford Nuclear Reservation site contains approximately 211 million liters of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste arising from nuclear weapons production, beginning with World War II, and continuing through the Cold War [1]. The waste is stored in 177 carbon-steel underground storage tanks, of which 149 are single-shell tanks (SSTs) and the remaining are double-shell tanks (DSTs). The mission of an ongoing River Protection Project is to retrieve the waste from the underground storage tanks and then treat and immobilize (i.e., vitrify) it for disposal. Waste from the older SSTs is being progressively retrieved into the newer DSTs for storage pending treatment, immobilization, and disposal. Figure 1 depicts a typical DST design [2]. The tank is approximately 23 m in diameter and 9 m high and has a domed structure and has a capacity of 4000 m3. The tank wall and floor vary in thickness between approximately 10 mm and 25 mm depending on location. The thicker wall sections are near the curved transition between the tank wall and the floor, while the thinner sections are located near the top of the tank wall. The tank floor thickness varies from 25 mm at the tank center to 10 mm near the tank wall. The tanks were constructed of either ASTM A516 Grade 65 or ASTM A537 Class 1 carbon steel and were post-weld heat treated to reduce the risk of SCC.

Shukla, Pavan K. [Savannah River National Laborato↗

Obama Signs New START Treaty With Russians

Prague, Czech Republic President Obama: Finally, this day demonstrates the determination of the United States and Russia -- the two nations that hold over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons -- to pursue responsible global leadership. Together, we are keeping our commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which must be the foundation for global non-proliferation. While the New START treaty is an important first step forward, it is just one step on a longer journey. As I said last year in Prague, this treaty will set the stage for further cuts. And going forward, we hope to pursue discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and tactical weapons, including non-deployed weapons. President Medvedev and I have also agreed to expand our discussions on missile defense. This will include regular exchanges of information about our threat assessments, as well as the completion of a joint assessment of emerging ballistic missiles. And as these assessments are completed, I look forward to launching a serious dialogue about Russian-American cooperation on missile defense. But nuclear weapons are not simply an issue for the United States and Russia -- they threaten the common security of all nations. A nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist is a danger to people everywhere -- from Moscow to New York; from the cities of Europe to South Asia. So next week, 47 nations will come together in Washington to discuss concrete steps that can be taken to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years. And the spread of nuclear weapons to more states is also an unacceptable risk to global security -- raising the specter of arms races from the Middle East to East Asia. Earlier this week, the United States formally changed our policy to make it clear that those non-nuclear weapons states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and their non-proliferation obligations will not be threatened by America’s nuclear arsenal. This demonstrates, once more, America’s commitment to the NPT as a cornerstone of our security strategy. Those nations that follow the rules will find greater security and opportunity. Those nations that refuse to meet their obligations will be isolated, and denied the opportunity that comes with international recognition. That includes accountability for those that break the rules -- otherwise the NPT is just words on a page. That’s why the United States and Russia are part of a coalition of nations insisting that the Islamic Republic of Iran face consequences, because they have continually failed to meet their obligations. We are working together at the United Nations Security Council to pass strong sanctions on Iran. And we will not tolerate actions that flout the NPT, risk an arms race in a vital region, and threaten the credibility of the international community and our collective security. While these issues are a top priority, they are only one part of the U.S.-Russia relationship. Today, I again expressed my deepest condolences for the terrible loss of Russian life in recent terrorist attacks, and we will remain steadfast partners in combating violent extremism. We also discussed the potential to expand our cooperation on behalf of economic growth, trade and investment, as well as technological innovation, and I look forward to discussing these issues further when President Medvedev visits the United States later this year, because there is much we can do on behalf of our security and prosperity if we continue to work together. When one surveys the many challenges that we face around the world, it’s easy to grow complacent, or to abandon the notion that progress can be shared. But I want to repeat what I said last year in Prague: When nations and peoples allow themselves to be defined by their differences, the gulf between them widens. When we fail to pursue peace, then it stays forever beyond our grasp. This majestic city of Prague is in many ways a monument to human progress. And this ceremony is a testament to the truth that old adversaries can forge new partnerships. I could not help but be struck the other day by the words of Arkady Brish, who helped build the Soviet Union’s first atom bomb. At the age of 92, having lived to see the horrors of a World War and the divisions of a Cold War, he said, We hope humanity will reach the moment when there is no need for nuclear weapons, when there is peace and calm in the world. It’s easy to dismiss those voices. But doing so risks repeating the horrors of the past, while ignoring the history of human progress. The pursuit of peace and calm and cooperation among nations is the work of both leaders and peoples in the 21st century. For we must be as persistent and passionate in our pursuit of progress as any who would stand in our way. Once again, President Medvedev, thank you for your extraordinary leadership.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Feasibility Study for Cathodic Protection of Waste Tanks at Hanford

The Hanford Nuclear Reservation site contains approximately 211 million liters of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste arising from nuclear weapons production, beginning with World War II, and continuing through the Cold War. The waste is stored in 177 carbon-steel underground storage tanks, of which 149 are single-shell tanks (SSTs) and the remaining are double-shell tanks (DSTs). The mission of an ongoing River Protection Project is to retrieve the waste from the underground storage tanks and then treat and immobilize (i.e., vitrify) it for disposal. Waste from the older SSTs is being progressively retrieved into the newer DSTs for storage pending treatment, immobilization, and disposal. Waste chemistry controls are in place to mitigate general corrosion, pitting corrosion, and stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and minimize corrosion risks to the carbon steel tank liners of DST at the Hanford Site. The chemistry control program focuses on preserving liner integrity while balancing the need for caustic/nitrite additions that have large downstream impacts on vitrification. Some of the DSTs store salt cake or sludge waste layers contain out-of-specification interstitial liquids that contact the primary tank bottom or sidewall. Remediation of such layers through chemical additions is not practical. At the present time, the most significant leak integrity concern at Hanford is for corrosion of the tank bottoms of DSTs where the solids layer is out of specification because of hydroxide ion depletion and consequently, pH values that are less than 12. Cathodic protection (CP) has been proposed as a possible way to protect the liners of such tanks against corrosion. The objective of this project was to investigate the feasibility of applying CP to Hanford DSTs to mitigate internal corrosion of the carbon steel tank primary liners. The scope of the project included (1) a literature review on the application of CP to storage tank systems, in general, and to waste tanks at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Hanford, (2) a review of the finite element analysis (FEA) model recently developed to evaluate potentials for a DST, and (3) the development of a boundary element analysis (BEA) model for CP for a DST. Tank AN-107, one of the Hanford DSTs, was selected for this work because (1) the bottommost waste layer in the tank is out-of-specification, and (2) electrochemical and resistivity data, based on recent waste sampling and testing, are available for this tank. The overarching conclusion of this study is that, based on the available information, it is feasible to apply CP to mitigate internal corrosion of the primary liners of the Hanford DSTs. However, significant additional information and work are required before a CP system can be designed. Recommendations for next steps in the design of the CP system will be presented.

WIERSMA, BRUCE↗

Progress Update: P-Reactor Grout

A progress update, the Recovery Act at work at the Savannah River Site. The new phase of work on the permanent closure of two cold war nuclear reactors.

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