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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Performance Testing and Assessment of Protection Scheme Using Real-Time Hardware-in-the-Loop and IEC 61850 Standard

The main challenge of the microgrid is to design a suitable protection scheme due to the complexity of the architecture of the microgrid. The importance of the proposed protection technique is threefold. First, it presents a co-simulation platform to integrate between a simulated model on power system computer aided design (PSCAD)/real time digital simulator computer aided design (RSCAD) software’s and physical devices schweitzer engineering laboratories (SEL) 421-7 relays to protect the microgrid that includes different resources connected based on inverter interface. Second, it presents a comprehensive hardware/software setup to test the protective relays in a closed loop system and shows how to configure the protective relay’s International Electrotechnical Commission 61850 communications. Third, IEEE 1588 standard is used to provide sub nanoseconds latency between the simulated model that emulated on real time digital simulator (RTDS) and the external devices. Also, the measurement signals are synchronized between RTDS and the external devices using giga-transceiver synchronization card (GTSYNC) interface card and SEL-2488 satellite-synchronized network clock. The results showed that the co-simulation infrastructure introduces a highly dependable design, analysis, and testing environment for cyber and physical data flow in the system. Besides that, the voltages at ac/dc sides and frequency at fault condition were maintained due to the energy storage device contributions at different modes of operation.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Electric Vehicle Extreme Fast Charging Infrastructure

This document is the Cybersecurity Framework Profile (Profile) developed for the Electric Vehicle Extreme Fast Charging (EV/XFC) ecosystem, including the four domains that relies on the ecosystem (i) Electric Vehicles (EV); (ii) Extreme Fast Charging (XFC); (iii) XFC Cloud or Third-Party Operations; and (iv) Utility and Building Networks. This Profile utilizes the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 and provides voluntary guidance to help relevant parties develop Profiles specific to their organization to understand, assess, and communicate their cybersecurity posture as a part of their risk management process. The Profile is intended to supplement, not replace, an existing risk management program or cybersecurity standards, regulations, and industry guidelines that are in current use by the EV/XFC industry.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2021

5G Zero Trust Architecture: A Testable and Phased Approach

With the emphasis being placed on Zero Trust Architecture in technology and by Executive Order (Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity ), an investigation was performed as to the feasibility of implementing this approach into 5G. Reference documents include NIST Special Publication 800-207 and Department of Defense (DoD) Zero Trust Reference Architecture , and these provided guidance as to the overall approach. Progress is being made within 5G to address the lack of Zero Trust Architecture; a June 2021 DoD press release indicated that “The prototype 5G network is built on the next generation of Open Radio Network standards and designed to comply with DOD specifications for zero-trust architecture for native security and secure connectivity with other networks.”

5G↗
DOE OSTI2024

Quantum Frequency Combs with Path Identity for Quantum Remote Sensing

Quantum sensing promises to revolutionize sensing applications by employing quantum states of light or matter as sensing probes. Photons are the clear choice as quantum probes for remote sensing because they can travel to and interact with a distant target. Existing schemes are mainly based on the quantum illumination framework, which requires quantum memory to store a single photon of an initially entangled pair until its twin reflects off a target and returns for final correlation measurements. Existing demonstrations are limited to tabletop experiments, and expanding the sensing range faces various roadblocks, including long-time quantum storage and photon loss and noise when transmitting quantum signals over long distances. We propose a novel quantum sensing framework that addresses these challenges using quantum frequency combs with path identity for remote sensing of signatures (“qCOMBPASS”). The combination of one key quantum phenomenon and two quantum resources—namely, quantum-induced coherence by path identity, quantum frequency combs, and two-mode squeezed light—allows for quantum remote sensing without requiring quantum memory. The proposed scheme is akin to a quantum radar based on entangled frequency-comb pairs that uses path identity to detect, range, or sense a remote target of interest by measuring pulses of one comb in the pair that never traveled to the target but that contains target information “teleported” by quantum-induced coherence by path identity from the other comb in the pair that traveled to the target but is not detected. We develop the basic qCOMBPASS theory, analyze the properties of the qCOMBPASS transceiver, and introduce the qCOMBPASS equation—a quantum analog of the well-known LIDAR equation in classical remote sensing. We also describe an experimental scheme to demonstrate the concept using two-mode squeezed quantum combs. qCOMBPASS can strongly impact various applications in remote quantum sensing, imaging, metrology, and communications. These applications include detection and ranging of low-reflectivity objects, measurement of small displacements of a remote target with precision beyond the standard quantum limit (SQL), standoff hyperspectral quantum imaging, discreet surveillance from space with low detection probability (detect without being detected), very-long-baseline interferometry, quantum Doppler sensing, quantum clock synchronization, and networks of distributed quantum sensors. Published by the American Physical Society 2024

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗
DOE OSTI2022

Broadband polarization-entangled source for C+L-band flex-grid quantum networks

The rising demand for transmission capacity in optical networks has motivated steady interest in expansion beyond the standard C-band (1530–1565 nm) into the adjacent L-band (1565–1625 nm) for an approximate doubling of capacity in a single stroke. However, in the context of quantum networking, the L-band has yet to be fully leveraged with the suite of advanced tools for characterization and management available from classical lightwave communications. In this work, we demonstrate an ultrabroadband two-photon source integrating both C- and L-band wavelength-selective switches for complete control of spectral routing and allocation across 7.5 THz in a single setup. Polarization state tomography of all 150 pairs of 25-GHz-wide channels reveals an average fidelity of 0.98 and total distillable entanglement greater than 181 kebits/s. This source is explicitly designed for flex-grid optical networks and can facilitate optimal utilization of entanglement resources across the full C+L-band.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Optimal filtering and generation of entangled photons for quantum applications in the presence of noise

Filtering is commonly used in quantum optics to reject noise photons, and also to enable interference between independent photons. However, filtering the joint spectrum of photon pairs can reduce the inherent coincidence probability or loss-independent heralding efficiency. Here we investigate filtering for multiphoton applications based on entanglement and interference (e.g., quantum teleportation). We multiplex C-band entangled photons and C-band classical communications into the same long-distance fibers, which enables scalable low-loss quantum networking but requires filtering of spontaneous Raman scattering noise from classical light. Using tunable-bandwidth filters, low-jitter detectors, and polarization filters, we distribute wavelength-degenerate time-bin entangled photons in the C band (1536.5 nm) over 25 km/25 km standard fibers (50 km) each carrying 10 Gbit/s C-band classical data signals. Narrow filtering enables milliwatt-level C-band power, which exceeds the power achieved by comparable studies by roughly an order of magnitude and could feasibly support terabit per second classical rates. We evaluate how performance depends on pump and filter bandwidths, multipair emission, filter shapes, loss, phase matching, and how quantum information is measured. We find a trade-off between reducing noise impact and increasing single-mode purity, and discuss mitigation methods toward optimal multiphoton applications. Importantly, these results apply to noise in free space and in quantum devices (sources, frequency converters, switches, detectors, etc.) and provide insight into filter-induced degradation of single-photon purity and rates even in noise-free environments.

Thomas, Jordan M. [Fermilab; Northwestern U.]↗
DOE OSTI2023

Trust Model System for the Energy Grid of Things Network Communications

Network communication is crucial in the Energy Grid of Things (EGoT). Without a network connection, the energy grid becomes just a power grid where the energy resources are available to the customer uni-directionally. A mechanism to analyze and optimize the energy usage of the grid can only happen through a medium, a communications network, that enables information exchange between the grid participants and the service provider. Security implementers of EGoT network communication take extraordinary measures to ensure the safety of the energy grid, a critical infrastructure, as well as the safety and privacy of the grid participants. With the dynamic nature of network communication of the EGoT, the information provided by the customer or the service provider can be falsified by a malicious attacker. Therefore, a trust model is necessary to monitor any abnormal activities. This paper describes a distributed trust model system that meets the need of the EGoT. This paper describes methods for evaluating and improving the distributed trust model using standard hypothesis testing metrics such as true positive, false positive, true negative, false negative, equal error rate, and F1 score. Example calculations are shown based on generated sample data.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2020

National-Tribal Critical Infrastructure Protection: Collaboration for Extraordinary National Security Benefit

This paper examines national and tribal collaborative opportunities to get ahead of the critical infrastructure insecurity problem. Recommendations are viewed through the lens of the Sandia Labs Tribal Cyber-Energy initiative and national security projects. Recommendations include 1) Collaboratively address national priority and shared challenges to gain faster and better solutions to national priority problems on a smaller yet comprehensive American Indian and Alaskan Native sovereign single-point of authority scale 2) Utilize newer standards-based technologies to provide scalable, capable, and manageable solutions for greatly expanded and connected national critical infrastructures 3) Employ Cyber-Physical-Resilient design preliminary analysis to define concept- to-disposition design requirements for preemptive critical infrastructure risk mitigation and baked-in security; 4) Develop data-centric protection to provide increased information asset protection as data shifts from data-owner operated on-premises infrastructure to virtual service provider data-steward owned and operated off-premises infrastructure; and 5) Balance shared solutions with the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity and Risk Management frameworks, and the System Security Engineering Guidelines. As yet unallocated federal funding would support research, development, the timely application of National-Tribal critical infrastructure protection, and critical infrastructure Cyber disruption response and recovery with extraordinary mutual benefits for the foreseeable future. The Critical Infrastructure Insecurity Problem: Rapid modernization and expansive connectivity are due to advances in Information and Communications Technologies that have sweeping cyber impact across all critical infrastructure sectors. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition and Industrial Control Systems are particularly impacted as systems long separated from the Internet are now being connected and computerized. Virtualization and mobility create a Data Everywhere-User Anywhere paradigm that has evaporated the enterprise network perimeter. There are multi-front technological challenges at play, where long depended on technologies simply don't scale to current needs resulting in a digital dichotomy of competing old and new standards. New standards-based technologies scale but are not as well-known or as widely deployed, which leaves decision makers, stakeholders, and the workforce in a quandary, caught mid-stream between the technological past and the virtual future. Rapid and expansive cyber threat accompanies disruptive change in connectivity and computational dependencies. A lack of action will exacerbate the problem if new technologies roll out without baked-in security design. The Risk: If National-Tribal CIP collaboration to design in security is not done, then an ongoing state of insufficient bolt-on security and elevated threat exposure will remain for years to come.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cyber–Physical System Security of Distribution Systems

The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) for control and monitoring of power systems is a layer on top of the physical power system infrastructure. The cyber system and physical power system components form a tightly coupled Cyber–Physical System (CPS). Sources of vulnerabilities arise from the computing and communication systems of the cyber–power grid. Cyber intrusions targeting the power grid are serious threats to the reliability of electricity supply that is critical to society and the economy. In a typical Information Technology environment, numerous attack scenarios have shown how unauthorized users can access and manipulate protected information from a network domain. The need for cyber security has led to industry standards that power grids must meet to ensure that the monitoring, operation, and control functions are not disrupted by cyber intrusions. Cyber security technologies such as encryption and authentication have been deployed on the CPS. Intrusion or anomaly detection and mitigation tools developed for power grids are emerging. Furthermore, this survey paper provides the basic concepts of cyber vulnerabilities of distribution systems and CPS security. The important ICT subjects for distribution systems covered in this paper include Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition, Distributed Energy Resources, including renewable energy and smart meters.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Data Exchange Interface for a Standards Based Data Integration Platform

The modern electrical grid is a complex and a data rich system, requiring several sub-systems to provide the capability and support needed to perform functions such as distributed energy resource management, outage management, and fault location and isolation, to name a few. There is a need to develop software solutions and platforms that provide an integrated infrastructure to allow interoperability between these subsystems, while leveraging the abundant data available from today’s grid. In this paper, we present the development and deployment of an application service to integrate GridAPPS-D which is an open source, standards-based software platform with SurvalentONE, a commonly used DNP3 based ADMS platform that allows operation, monitoring, analysis, restoration, and optimization of network operations. We present details of the integration architecture, including its implementation, and provide results from functional testing of the architecture on a 13 bus IEEE system. The results validate that the integration is successful and is able to provide a two-way exchange of communication and translation between different communication protocols.

Singh, Alka↗
DOE OSTI2022

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Topological and Dynamical Representations for Radio Frequency Signal Classification

Radio Frequency (RF) signals are found throughout our world, carrying over-the-air information for both digital and analog uses with applications ranging from WiFi to the radio. One area of focus in RF signal analysis is determining the modulation schemes employed in these signals which is crucial in many RF signal processing domains from secure communication to spectrum monitoring. This work investigates the accuracy and noise robustness of novel Topological Data Analysis (TDA) and dynamic representation based approaches paired with a small convolution neural network for RF signal modulation classification with a comparison to state-of-the-art deep neural network approaches. We show that using TDA tools, like Vietoris-Rips and lower star filtrations, and the Takens' embedding in conjunction with a standard shallow neural network we can capture the intrinsic dynamical, geometric, and topological features of the underlying signal's manifold, offering informative representations of the RF signals. Our approach is effective in handling the modulation classification task and is notably noise robust, outperforming the commonly used deep neural network approaches in mode classification. Moreover, our fusion of dynamical and topological information is able to attain similar performance to deep neural network architectures with significantly smaller training datasets.

Myers, Audun D.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems may become more widely deployed throughout the country, and so it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity of the facility, and the company that owns the facility. The two main ways bad actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when companies conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks associated with a generic hydrogen storage system by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems are becoming more widely deployed throughout the country, and as their presence continues to grow, it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity, and to the company that owns the facility. The two main mechanisms malicious actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when facility managers conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks applicable to a wide variety of hydrogen storage systems by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2026

Uncovering Hidden Entanglement in Twin Beams

Proper characterization of quantum correlations in multimode optical quantum states is critical for applications in quantum information science. However, standard entanglement measurements can lead to incomplete state reconstruction and characterization. Here, we implement a resonator-based detection system that reveals entanglement between sideband modes of twin beams, achieving full tomography and retrieving often ignored quantum correlations. Unlike standard spectral measurements such as homodyne detection, resonator detection can independently address the sidebands of each beam, thereby accessing these hidden correlations. Additionally, we show how phase shifts between the carrier and the sideband modes of the involved fields redistribute information and modify the observation of entanglement for different witnesses. The ability of the resonant detection to independently address sideband modes of entangled states can contribute to enhancing the capacity for secure communication and quantum networking protocols.

Rincon Celis, Raul [University of Sao Paulo, Brazi↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Framework for Neural Network Inference on FPGA-Centric SmartNICs

FPGA-based SmartNICs offer great potential to significantly improve the performance of high-performance computing and warehouse data processing by tightly coupling support for reconfigurable data-intensive computation with cross-node communication, thereby mitigating the von Neumann bottleneck. Existing work, however, has been generally been limited in that it assumes an accelerator model where kernels are offloaded to SmartNICs, but most control tasks are left to the CPUs. This leads to frequent waiting, inferior performance, and scaling challenges. In this work, we propose a new distributive data-centric computing framework, named FCsN, for reconfigurable SmartNIC-based systems. Through a lightweight task circulation execution model and its implementation architecture, FCsN allows the complete detaching of kernel execution, control logic, system scheduling, and network communication to the SmarNICs. This boosts performance by: (i) avoiding the control dependency with CPUs and (ii) supporting streaming kernel execution and network communication at line rate and in a very fine-grained manner. We demonstrate the efficiency and flexibility of FCsN using various types of neural network applications including graph neural networks; as these last are both irregular and data intensive they offer an especially robust demonstration. Evaluations using commonly-used neural network models and graph datasets show that a system with the support of FCsN can achieve, on average, 144 speedups over the MPI-based standard CPU baselines.

Guo, Anqi↗
DOE OSTI2020

Recommendations for Data-in-Transit Requirements for Securing DER Communications

With the adoption of Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interoperability standards, common communication protocols are now being deployed between power system operators and DER devices. In 2018, a revision to the US interconnection and interoperability standard, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std. 1547, required DER equipment to have an IEEE 2030.5, IEEE 1815, or SunSpec Modbus communication exchange interface. This change supports the future transition to secure connection and exchange of information between the DER equipment and implementing parties, such as grid operators. Adoption of standardized communication protocols and associated information models is a critical step toward interoperability between power system operators and DER, such as photovoltaic (PV) and energy storage systems. However, security requirements for these standardized communication protocols are not comprehensive, resulting in non-standard and vendor-specific implementation that may leave DER equipment susceptible to cyberattacks. This paper examines the data-in-flight security requirements for standardized DER communication protocols, per IEEE 1547-2018 revision, as it relates to device authentication, key management, and encryption. The state of the art for these security features is also explored, addressing their impact on communication and performance of low-cost single board computers, which are typical of DER devices. In conclusion, a recommendation is provided to adopt a common set of communication requirements, which are intended to achieve interoperability and implement data security over DER network pathways, while ensuring reliable, secure, and real-time information delivery.

42 ENGINEERING↗