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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2003

Microcalorimeters with Germanium Thermistors for High Resolution Soft and Hard X-ray Astronomy

This is a progress report for the first year of a three year Space Research and Technology (SR&T) grant to continue the advancement of neutron transmutation doped (NTD-based) microcalorimeters. We have re-prioritized certain aspects of the statement of work and chose to emphasize issues of array development in the first year rather than wait until year two. Consequently, some of the projects scheduled for the first year were delayed to the second year. Here we report on our progress to: a) Build and test a 1 x 4 element array and to investigate electrical and thermal cross-talk; b) Build a multiplexed 4 channel analog pulse processor; c) Build a digital pulse processor that can accommodate 4 channels with independent triggers; d) Develop a proportional thermal baseline restoration system compatible with the constant voltage mode of microcalorimeter operation.

Silver, E.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Microcalorimeters with NTD and Expitaxial Germanium Thermistors for High Resolution X-Ray Spectroscopy

This is a progress report for the second year of a three year SR&T grant to continue the advancement of NTD-based microcalorimeters. We reported last year that we re-prioritized certain aspects of the statement of work and chose to emphasize issues of array development in the first year rather than wait until year two. Consequently, some of the projects scheduled for the first year were delayed to the second year and we report on those topics here. These include: a) Measurements that map out JFET , thermistor, l/f and feedback resistor noise; b) Investigations that evaluate the limits of the JFET preamplifier circuitry as it pertains to stability at the 2 eV level; The results of a) and b) have led to preliminary measurements that demonstrate 3.08 eV resolution at 6 keV. c) Calculations that can predict the current performance.

Silver, Eric↗
DOE OSTI2024

ARC-100 Reactor Security-by-Design Summary

This report applies the security-by-design methodology developed in a previous National Nuclear Security Administration–sponsored work to the Advanced Reactor Concepts 100 (ARC-100) sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) design. The report contains no proprietary information specific to the ARC 100 reactor. The insights developed in this report are high-level, and generally applicable to other sodium fast reactor designs. The information presented here is the result of a qualitative safety-based analysis and would not inform any potential adversary beyond what would be found in a docketed safety analysis report. The scope of this present report covers ARC-100’s reactor core, used fuel storage, and used fuel assembly wash station. These systems are also compared to a generic SFR design assumed in the previous study. The security assessment results show changes in structures, systems, and components (SSCs) safety importance relative to the generic SFR SSCs. However, the consequence assessment results are the similar to a previously assessed generic SFR. Several SSCs have higher importance rankings than others, and it is recommended that protection efforts are prioritized for these SSCs. This work will continue in the Fiscal Year 2025 for the remaining ARC-100 systems, including cesium trap, sodium cold trap, noble gas decay tanks (dewar bottles), and used fuel dry storage facility, to provide safety-and-security-by-design insights and recommendations on non-core systems. Results from this work will furnish a technical justification for the feasibility of these solutions for the ARC reactor's design and, where applicable, identify any regulatory benefits conferred by the proactive design aspect within a risk management framework. This initiative will contribute to a more secure design of the ARC reactor and support its licensing process.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
NASA NTRS1995

Training for Aviation Decision Making: The Naturalistic Decision Making Perspective

This paper describes the implications of a naturalistic decision making (NDM) perspective for training air crews to make flight-related decisions. The implications are based on two types of analyses: (a) identification of distinctive features that serve as a basis for classifying a diverse set of decision events actually encountered by flight crews, and (b) performance strategies that distinguished more from less effective crews flying full-mission simulators, as well as performance analyses from NTSB accident investigations. Six training recommendations are offered: (1) Because of the diversity of decision situations, crews need to be aware that different strategies may be appropriate for different problems; (2) Given that situation assessment is essential to making a good decision, it is important to train specific content knowledge needed to recognize critical conditions, to assess risks and available time, and to develop strategies to verify or diagnose the problem; (3) Tendencies to oversimplify problems may be overcome by training to evaluate options in terms of goals, constraints, consequences, and prevailing conditions; (4) In order to provide the time to gather information and consider options, it is essential to manage the situation, which includes managing crew workload, prioritizing tasks, contingency planning, buying time (e.g., requesting holding or vectors), and using low workload periods to prepare for high workload; (5) Evaluating resource requirements ("What do I need?") and capabilities ("'What do I have?" ) are essential to making good decisions. Using resources to meet requirements may involve the cabin crew, ATC, dispatchers, and maintenance personnel; (6) Given that decisions must often be made under high risk, time pressure, and workload, train under realistic flight conditions to promote the development of robust decision skills.

Orasanu, Judith↗
DOE OSTI2021

Securing Distributed Energy Resource Integration

The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
NASA NTRS2009

Determining the Relative Criticality of Diverse Exploration Risks in NASA's Human Research Program

The mission of NASA s Human Research Program (HRP) is to understand and reduce the risk to crew health and performance in exploration missions. The HRP addresses 27 specific risks, primarily in the context of Continuous Risk Management. Each risk is evaluated in terms of two missions (a six month stay on the Moon and a thirty month round trip to Mars) and three types of consequences (in-mission crew health, post-mission crew health, and in-mission performance). The lack of a common metric between the three consequence scales, such as financial costs or quality adjusted life years lost, makes it difficult to compare the relative criticality of the risks. We are, therefore, exploring the use of a ternary scale of criticality based on the common metric of influencing an operational decision. The three levels correspond to the level of concern the risk generates for a "go/no-go" decision to launch a mission: 1) no-go; 2) go with significant reservations; 3) go. The criticality of each of the 27 risks is scored for the three types of consequence in both types of mission. The scores are combined to produce an overall criticality rating for each risk. The overall criticality rating can then be used to guide the prioritization of resources to affect the greatest amount of risk reduction.

Kundrot, Craig E.↗
DOE OSTI2018

Stakeholder Engaged Structured Decision Making to Improve Performance and Reduce Costs While Protecting Human Health and the Environment - 18645

The objective of the Best Practice is to facilitate a paradigm shift when it comes to approaches to the decision making process for nuclear waste management, disposal, and remediation decisions. The stakeholder-engaged structured decision making (SDM) paradigm shift provides a transparent framework for developing optimal solutions to complex problems (Keeney, 1992, Gregory et al, 2012). This is a deliberative-analytical process. The deliberative side centers on understanding stakeholder concerns and values, and developing objectives while identifying options that may achieve those objectives. SDM is implemented with the aid of computer tools that are aimed specifically at capturing these deliberative aspects of a decision analysis. SDM captures this information in a structured format that allows access to the values, objectives, and options that have been identified to help. Through this approach we achieve transparency, traceability, and reproducibility. The goal of SDM at this stage is to provide a formal structure for capturing and processing deliberative information. The deliberative part sets the stage for the analytical part of SDM. A variety of Subject matter experts (SMEs) are engaged in how to evaluate the options through the objectives. Objectives often include minimizing human health risk and minimizing cost, but in the full scope of a sustainability-based approach to decision making, it can include objectives related to economic, environmental and social issues. Subject matter experts might provide other options for achieving the objectives, but their primary role is to evaluate/model the options to the endpoint defined by the objectives or in other words perform a consequence analysis. The structure of SDM makes it clear exactly what is needed from the SMEs, because the options are identified, and the endpoint (objectives) are defined - evaluations and/or models are needed to connect options to objectives. This consequence analysis completes the evaluation, and directly addresses which of the options is the best option. The same SDM approach to finding the best options can also be used for prioritization and resource allocation. Because all of the information is captured in a formal system with the help of computer tools (a software framework for implementing SDM), the decision models that are developed for an application can be fully evaluated numerically and for the insights gained from using a formal process for managing the multiple factors that need to be considered for complex decisions. This includes uncertainty and sensitivity analysis that can be used to guide the need for further data/information collection if the optimal decision is not adequately supported - that is, if there is insufficient confidence in the decision. Also, this feeds directly into adaptive management therefore if more data/information are collected then the efficacy of the current decision can be evaluated, potentially leading to a change in decisions if warranted. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Development of Integrated Safety and Security Models for Comprehensive Reliability and Resiliency Evaluation

The security of the electric grid and supporting energy systems is crucial to national security. One of the complexities in analyzing the security of energy systems is the safety consequences that may result from accidents. For energy systems, the goal is to ensure that they operate as intended and that any consequences are mitigated or prevented. The integration of safety and security is paramount to protecting these systems from attacks and ensuring that large consequences are prevented. This report describes an integrated safety and security methodology to evaluate cybersecurity events that can lead to large consequences. This novel approach first describes how Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) provides a digital causal analysis for Bayesian Networks (BNs). The use of STPA causal analysis provides a systematic approach to constructing BNs that adequately model cyber scenarios that result in consequences. When combined with the technical principles described in Risk-Informed Management of Enterprise Systems (RIMES), a comprehensive risk-informed cybersecurity analysis results that allows decision-makers to prioritize systems that most impact risk.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2004

The NASA Continuous Risk Management Process

As an intern this summer in the GRC Risk Management Office, I have become familiar with the NASA Continuous Risk Management Process. In this process, risk is considered in terms of the probability that an undesired event will occur and the impact of the event, should it occur (ref., NASA-NPG: 7120.5). Risk management belongs in every part of every project and should be ongoing from start to finish. Another key point is that a risk is not a problem until it has happened. With that in mind, there is a six step cycle for continuous risk management that prevents risks from becoming problems. The steps are: identify, analyze, plan, track, control, and communicate & document. Incorporated in the first step are several methods to identify risks such as brainstorming and using lessons learned. Once a risk is identified, a risk statement is made on a risk information sheet consisting of a single condition and one or more consequences. There can also be a context section where the risk is explained in more detail. Additionally there are three main goals of analyzing a risk, which are evaluate, classify, and prioritize. Here is where a value is given to the attributes of a risk &e., probability, impact, and timeframe) based on a multi-level classification system (e.g., low, medium, high). It is important to keep in mind that the definitions of these levels are probably different for each project. Furthermore the risks can be combined into groups. Then, the risks are prioritized to see what risk is necessary to mitigate first. After the risks are analyzed, a plan is made to mitigate as many risks as feasible. Each risk should be assigned to someone in the project with knowledge in the area of the risk. Then the possible approaches to choose from are: research, accept, watch, or mitigate. Next, all risks, mitigated or not, are tracked either individually or in groups. As the plan is executed, risks are re-evaluated, and the attribute values are adjusted as necessary. Metrics are established and monitored as tools for risk tracking. Also a trigger or threshold should be set on the metric data that indicates when an action is needed. Results of this tracking are usually evaluated and reported in a relevant format at weekly or monthly meetings. Choosing controls is the subsequent step, which involves the effects of the tracking. The three basic controls are: close, continue tracking, and re- plan. Finally communicate & document is the last step, but occurs throughout the process. It is vital that main risks, plans, changes, and progress are known by everyone in the project. A good way to keep everyone updated and inform other projects of common issues is by thoroughly documenting project risks. NASA sees value in risk management and believes that projects have greater probability or success by using the NASA Continuous Risk Management Process.

Pokorny, Frank M.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 2 – Prioritizing Digital Assurance Challenges, Session 2

The second session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 10, 2025, focused on prioritizing digital assurance challenges at the intersection of data centers and the electric grid. Building on the foundational concepts introduced in Workshop 1, this session deepened the application of the Threat–Vulnerability–Consequence (TVC) framework and emphasized the urgency of addressing cybersecurity, supply chain integrity, and operational reliability. Participants explored the growing convergence of digital and physical systems, the expanding attack surface due to global supply chain dependencies, and the implications of AI-driven load behavior. Real-world incidents—including the Volt Typhoon campaign and vulnerabilities in Solarman and Deye platforms—were analyzed to illustrate the risks of unpatched systems, insecure APIs, and inadequate vendor oversight. Key themes included architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and human and procedural shortcomings. The workshop also examined the evolving regulatory landscape, highlighting new federal mandates around Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) compliance and large-load reliability standards. Through interactive exercises, stakeholders ranked and mapped digital assurance risks from their respective perspectives—utilities, operators, and vendors—laying the groundwork for mitigation strategies and shared accountability models to be developed in Workshop 3. Session 2 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2006

Aerocapture Systems Analysis for a Titan Mission

Performance projections for aerocapture show a vehicle mass savings of between 40 and 80%, dependent on destination, for an aerocapture vehicle compared to an all-propulsive chemical vehicle. In addition aerocapture is applicable to multiple planetary exploration destinations of interest to NASA. The 2001 NASA In-Space Propulsion Program (ISP) technology prioritization effort identified aerocapture as one of the top three propulsion technologies for solar system exploration missions. An additional finding was that aerocapture needed a better system definition and that supporting technology gaps needed to be identified. Consequently, the ISP program sponsored an aerocapture systems analysis effort that was completed in 2002. The focus of the effort was on aerocapture at Titan with a rigid aeroshell system. Titan was selected as the initial destination for the study due to potential interest in a follow-on mission to Cassini/Huygens. Aerocapture is feasible, and the performance is adequate, for the Titan mission and it can deliver 2.4 times more mass to Titan than an all-propulsive system for the same launch vehicle.

Lockwood, Mary K.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Current Practices in Distribution Utility Resilience Planning for Winter Storms

This report is part of a series of hazard-focused case studies examining common practices in electric utility resilience planning. We use standard terminology defining resilience as the ability to anticipate, withstand, absorb, and recover from hazards that cause long duration outages. We distinguish between reliability and resilience using Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 1366-2022, which defines major events as an event that exceeds reasonable design and/or operational limits of the electric power system. Resilience planning is focused on major event days and reliability planning is focused on nonmajor event days. Utility resilience plans are assessed according to common resilience components identified in existing resilience frameworks. The focus of this report is on winter storms in which the primary hazards are heavy snowfall, freezing rain, ice, extreme cold, severe wind, and flooding. These hazards can also contribute to generation shortages, resulting in bulk power system impacts that have consequences for the distribution system, such as load shedding. Stand-alone reports focusing on wildfires and nonwinter storms have been published in parallel with this report. This report can be used as a starting point for understanding potential investment prioritization processes and investment options. This report is intended to improve utility resilience planning by supporting constructive dialogue among utilities, regulators, and other stakeholders.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
NASA NTRS2005

Bridging the Divide between Safety and Risk Management for your Project or Program

This presentation will bridge the divide between these separate but overlapping disciplines and help explain how to use Risk Management as an effective management decision support tool that includes safety. Risk Management is an over arching communication tool used by management to prioritize and effectively mitigate potential problems before they concur. Risk Management encompasses every kind of potential problem that can occur on a program or project. Some of these are safety issues such as hazards that have a specific likelihood and consequence that need to be controlled and included to show an integrated picture of accepted) mitigated, and residual risk. Integrating safety and other assurance disciplines is paramount to accurately representing a program s or projects risk posture. Risk is made up of several components such as technical) cost, schedule, or supportability. Safety should also be a consideration for every risk. The safety component can also have an impact on the technical, cost, and schedule aspect of a given risk. The current formats used for communication of safety and risk issues are not consistent or integrated. The presentation will explore the history of these disciplines, current work to integrate them, and suggestions for integration for the future.

Lutomski, Mike↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Baseline Medical System Translation for the Impact Medical Database

NASA has developed a new evidence-based data-driven probabilistic risk assessment and tradespace analysis tool as a successor to the Integrated Medical Model (IMM). This updated decision support tool is known as IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces). Whereas IMM focuses on the resources and risks associated with International Space Station (ISS) and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) missions, IMPACT estimates the frequency and consequences of medical conditions that might arise during exploration missions. One of the services offered by IMM is a series of generic or baseline medical systems associated with typical mission types or DRMs (Design Reference Missions), such that requestors may prioritize questions pertaining to the mission itself over the medical supplies indicated by the model outputs for that DRM. In a mission focused request, the appropriate baseline medical system is used in place of a prepared or optimized medical kit. In preparation, an effort was undertaken to create baseline systems of medical resources within IMPACT suitable for typical DRMs. Using an existing baseline medical system within IMM’s Integrated Medical Evidence Database (iMED) as a starting point, the resources found within the medical kit were compared to and substituted for equivalent resources available within the IMPACT MD (Medical Database). In consultation with clinicians with knowledge of IMPACT’s MD, each resource was matched as closely as possible to a similarly purposed resource in IMPACT, seeking to preserve the treatment capabilities and procedures offered by the IMM medical system while reconciling the differences in modeled resources and medical conditions between the models. To demonstrate the efficacy of this work, a prototype ISS medical system in IMPACT was translated from the baseline used in the IMM. The appropriate medical system was then run through its associated medical model to compare and validate the resultant risks and risk mitigation provided by each baseline ISS medical kit.

S Schwartz↗
DOE OSTI2017

Prioritization of Stockpile Maintenance with Layered Pareto Fronts

Difficult choices are required for a decision-making process where resources and budgets are increasingly constrained. This study demonstrates a structured decision-making approach using layered Pareto fronts to identify priorities about how to allocate funds between munitions stockpiles based on their estimated reliability, the urgency of needing available units, and the consequences if adequate numbers of units are not available. This case study, while specific to the characteristics of a group of munitions stockpiles, illustrates the general process of structured decision-making based on first identifying appropriate metrics that summarize the important dimensions of the decision, and then objectively eliminating non-contenders from further consideration. Finally, the final subjective stage incorporates user priorities to select the four stockpiles to receive additional maintenance and surveillance funds based on understanding the trade-offs and robustness to various user priorities.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Modeling and simulation functional needs for molten salt reactor licensing

The modeling and simulation functional needs to license and design molten salt reactor concepts were assessed and an evaluation methodology was developed using a licensing-focused approach considering the modeling and simulation components that contribute to a molten salt reactor safety analysis report. These functional needs were prioritized by identifying the relationships between functional needs and using a quantitative weighting method to identify the most critical components to build a licensing case. This novel weighting method provided a list of functional needs prioritized relative to key advanced reactor licensing outcomes. In addition, functional need inputs were ranked to reveal those that feed the most modeling and simulation components. The findings from this prioritization effort were used to inform the modeling and simulation goals of the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Molten Salt Reactor campaign.Modeling and simulation needs were grouped into three main categories: (1) source term definition, material accountancy, and radiological consequences, (2) safety analysis, and (3) steady-state neutronics and thermal hydraulics. Here, five near-term goals were identified among these focus areas that add value: (1) deploying a systems and safeguards analysis computational tool, (2) defining source terms for molten salt reactor analysis and interfacing with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission on accident progression analysis, (3) developing point designs for liquid-fueled thermal-spectrum and fast-spectrum molten salt reactors, (4) building safety analysis specifications and reference solutions for Molten Salt Reactor Experiment transients, and (5) interfacing with the thermophysical and thermodynamic salt chemistry databases.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Qualification Testing Versus Quantitative Reliability Testing of PV - Gaining Confidence in a Rapidly Changing Technology: Preprint

Continued growth of PV system deployment would be enhanced by quantitative, low-uncertainty predictions of the degradation and failure rates of PV modules and systems. The intended product lifetime (decades) far exceeds the product development cycle (months), limiting our ability to reduce the uncertainty of the predictions for this rapidly changing technology. Yet, business decisions (setting insurance rates, analyzing return on investment, etc.) require quantitative risk assessment. Moving toward more quantitative assessments requires consideration of many factors, including the intended application, consequence of a possible failure, variability in the manufacturing, installation, and operation, as well as uncertainty in the measured acceleration factors, which provide the basis for predictions based on accelerated tests. As the industry matures, it is useful to periodically assess the overall strategy for standards development and prioritization of research to provide a technical basis both for the standards and the analysis related to the application of those. To this end, this paper suggests a tiered approach to creating risk assessments. Recent and planned potential improvements in international standards are also summarized.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

A Review of Value of Solar Studies In Theory and In Practice

This brief summarizes a collection of state- and utility-commissioned value-of-solar (VoS) studies and related literature, with a focus on who commissioned the study, which value and cost categories were discussed and/or quantified, and the methods used. Our objective is to compile information on prior VoS studies to inform state regulators and other stakeholders that may pursue related studies or integrate findings into rate design. The brief is organized into three parts: 1) an introduction to distributed solar photovoltaic (DPV) compensation; 2) a review of theoretical research on VoS; and 3) a review of VoS studies. The vast majority of VoS studies have served an informational role of quantifying the net benefits of PV. Three studies were commissioned in states or utility service territories that subsequently implemented VoS tariffs in California, New York, and Austin, Texas. When applied as a tariff, VoS aims to compensate PV output as efficiently as possible by doing so at rates that reflect the marginal benefits and costs of PV through value and cost categories that may vary temporally and/or geographically. This could lead to higher compensation in locations and times where more PV output is more valuable and consequently drive adoption in those locations to provide more societal benefits. Value and cost factors can be broadly grouped into five categories: generation, transmission, distribution, other utility, and other social categories. Those conducting VoS studies must weigh various tradeoffs when deciding which categories to include and quantify. Tradeoffs include prioritizing values based on their magnitude of value or cost impact, as well as taking into account the feasibility of data collection and accurate quantification. Values of higher magnitude and estimation feasibility are quantified in the majority of studies, including the earliest of studies conducted in the 2000s and 2010s. Additionally, some values of higher magnitude but low feasibility in the earliest of studies have become quantifiable in recent years. There are some values with low average system-wide levels but very high magnitude in specific locations or hours. The value magnitude in some cases can be tied to DPV penetration with low value in areas with little congestion and/or low penetration and vice versa. In these cases, values that are easier to quantify are often incorporated, while those that are more difficult are often addressed via a placeholder value. The placeholder value is paired with a discussion around data needs and methods to improve future estimates, as well as a conversation about when these value categories may increase in magnitude and necessitate more rigorous quantification. This brief summarizes findings from two meta-analyses of VoS studies that took place between 2005 and 2018, as well as findings from four additional studies published from 2018 to 2023. Table ES-1 summarizes the various value and cost categories included in each respective study and whether they were quantified, discussed, or omitted. Values such as avoided energy, capacity, transmission capacity, line losses, and avoided environmental costs are quantified in every study. Some categories were deemed harder to quantify and less impactful at the time of the study, so they were discussed but not quantified (e.g., ancillary services). Other categories, including many at the distribution level, were very locationally and/or temporally specific and dependent on high DPV penetration. These were sometimes quantified and at other times discussed. Notably, when it came to utility costs, integration costs were discussed in all cases, though they were deemed to have a small impact. Other utility costs were omitted for the most part; however, the utility-commissioned study (by NorthWestern Energy in Montana) included both lost utility revenue and programmatic/administrative cost categories. While there are some similarities across studies, each had fairly unique methods that are detailed in the body of this brief.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗