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At least 73 records · Page 4

CFD Applications in Support of the Space Shuttle Risk Assessment

The paper describes a numerical study of a potential accident scenario of the space shuttle, operating at the same flight conditions as flight 51L, the Challenger accident. The interest in performing this simulation is derived by evidence that indicates that the event itself did not exert large enough blast loading on the shuttle to break it apart. Rather, the quasi-steady aerodynamic loading on the damaged, unbalance vehicle caused the break-up. Despite the enormous explosive potential of the shuttle total fuel load (both liquid and solid), the post accident explosives working group estimated the maximum energy involvement to be equivalent to about five hundreds of pounds of TNT. This understanding motivated the simulation described here. To err on the conservative side, we modeled the event as an explosion, and used the maximum energy estimate. We modeled the transient detonation of a 500 lbs spherical charge of TNT, placed at the main engine, and the resulting blast wave propagation about the complete stack. Tracking of peak pressures and impulses at hundreds of locations on the vehicle surface indicate that the blast load was insufficient to break the vehicle, hence demonstrating likely crew survivability through such an event.

Baum, Joseph D.↗

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Five

Volume V of the Report contains appendices that were not cited in VolumeI. These consist of documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in support of its inquiry into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia The contents include:. Appendix G.1 Requirements and Procedures for Certification of Flight Readiness; Appendix G.2 Appendix R, Space Shuttle Program Contingency Action Plan; Appendix G.3 CAIB Charter, with Revisions; Appendix G.4 Group 1 Matrix Brief on Maintenance, Material, and Management; Appendix G.5 Vehicle Data Mapping(VDM) Team Final Report, Jun 13, 2003; Appendix G.6 SRB Working Group Presentation to CAIB; Appendix G. 7 Starfire Team Final Report, Jun 3, 2003; Appendix G.8 Using the Data and Observations from Flight STS-107, Executive Summary; Appendix G.9 Contracts, Incentives, and Safety/Technical Excellence; Appendix G.10 Detailed Summaries: Rogers Commission Report, ASAP Report, SIAT Report; Appendix G.11 Foam Application and Production Chart; Appendix G.12 Crew Survivability Report; and Appendix G.12 Aero/Aerothermal/ Thermal/Structures Team FinalReport, August 6, 2003.

CAIB (COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD)↗

Constellation Space Suit System Development Status

The Constellation Program has initiated the first new flight suit development project since the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) was developed for the Space Shuttle Program in the 1970s. The Constellation suit system represents a significant challenge to designers in that the system is required to address all space suit functions needed through all missions and mission phases. This is in marked contrast to the EMU, which was designed specifically for micro-gravity space walks. The Constellation suit system must serve in all of the following scenarios: launch, entry and abort crew survival; micro-gravity extravehicular activity (EVA); and lunar (1/6th-gravity) surface EVA. This paper discusses technical efforts performed from May 2006 through February 2007 for the Constellation space suit system pressure garment.

Ross, Amy↗

Design of Launch Abort System Thrust Profile and Concept of Operations

This paper describes how the Abort Motor thrust profile has been tailored and how optimizing the Concept of Operations on the Launch Abort System (LAS) of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) aides in getting the crew safely away from a failed Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV). Unlike the passive nature of the Apollo system, the Orion Launch Abort Vehicle will be actively controlled, giving the program a more robust abort system with a higher probability of crew survival for an abort at all points throughout the CLV trajectory. By optimizing the concept of operations and thrust profile the Orion program will be able to take full advantage of the active Orion LAS. Discussion will involve an overview of the development of the abort motor thrust profile and the current abort concept of operations as well as their effects on the performance of LAS aborts. Pad Abort (for performance) and Maximum Drag (for separation from the Launch Vehicle) are the two points that dictate the required thrust and shape of the thrust profile. The results in this paper show that 95% success of all performance requirements is not currently met for Pad Abort. Future improvements to the current parachute sequence and other potential changes will mitigate the current problems, and meet abort performance requirements.

Litton, Daniel↗

Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation

This slide presentation provides an update on the Columbia accident response presented in 2005 with additional information that was not available at that time. It will provide information on the following topics: (1) medical response and Search and Rescue, (2) medico-legal issues associated with the accident, (3) the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team Report published in 2008, and (4) future NASA flight surgeon spacecraft accident response training.

Chandler, Mike↗

Space Shuttle Abort Evolution

This paper documents some of the evolutionary steps in developing a rigorous Space Shuttle launch abort capability. The paper addresses the abort strategy during the design and development and how it evolved during Shuttle flight operations. The Space Shuttle Program made numerous adjustments in both the flight hardware and software as the knowledge of the actual flight environment grew. When failures occurred, corrections and improvements were made to avoid a reoccurrence and to provide added capability for crew survival. Finally some lessons learned are summarized for future human launch vehicle designers to consider.

Henderson, Edward M.↗

Constellation Program Human-System Integration Requirements

The Human-Systems Integration Requirements (HSIR) in this document drive the design of space vehicles, their systems, and equipment with which humans interface in the Constellation Program (CxP). These requirements ensure that the design of Constellation (Cx) systems is centered on the needs, capabilities, and limitations of the human. The HSIR provides requirements to ensure proper integration of human-to-system interfaces. These requirements apply to all mission phases, including pre-launch, ascent, Earth orbit, trans-lunar flight, lunar orbit, lunar landing, lunar ascent, Earth return, Earth entry, Earth landing, post-landing, and recovery. The Constellation Program must meet NASA's Agency-level human rating requirements, which are intended to ensure crew survival without permanent disability. The HSIR provides a key mechanism for achieving human rating of Constellation systems.

Dory, Jonathan↗

Evidence Report: Risk of Inadequate Human-Computer Interaction

Human-computer interaction (HCI) encompasses all the methods by which humans and computer-based systems communicate, share information, and accomplish tasks. When HCI is poorly designed, crews have difficulty entering, navigating, accessing, and understanding information. HCI has rarely been studied in an operational spaceflight context, and detailed performance data that would support evaluation of HCI have not been collected; thus, we draw much of our evidence from post-spaceflight crew comments, and from other safety-critical domains like ground-based power plants, and aviation. Additionally, there is a concern that any potential or real issues to date may have been masked by the fact that crews have near constant access to ground controllers, who monitor for errors, correct mistakes, and provide additional information needed to complete tasks. We do not know what types of HCI issues might arise without this "safety net". Exploration missions will test this concern, as crews may be operating autonomously due to communication delays and blackouts. Crew survival will be heavily dependent on available electronic information for just-in-time training, procedure execution, and vehicle or system maintenance; hence, the criticality of the Risk of Inadequate HCI. Future work must focus on identifying the most important contributing risk factors, evaluating their contribution to the overall risk, and developing appropriate mitigations. The Risk of Inadequate HCI includes eight core contributing factors based on the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS): (1) Requirements, policies, and design processes, (2) Information resources and support, (3) Allocation of attention, (4) Cognitive overload, (5) Environmentally induced perceptual changes, (6) Misperception and misinterpretation of displayed information, (7) Spatial disorientation, and (8) Displays and controls.

Kritina Holden↗

A Novel Method for Characterizing Spacesuit Mobility through Metabolic Cost

Spacesuit mobility has historically been defined and characterized by a combination of range of motion and joint torque of the individual anatomical joints when performing isolated motions meant to drive that joint only in a given orthogonal plane. While this has been the standard approach for several decades, there are numerous shortcomings that suit designers and engineers would like to see rectified. First, the lack of a standardized method for collecting both range of motion and joint torque translates to many different test setups, procedures and methods of data analysis. Second, all of these previously used methods for data collection lack some degree of repeatability, even within the same test setup and the same conductor; in addition, attempts at higher fidelity data collection techniques require high overhead and cost with minimal improvement. Lastly, isolated motions in standard anatomical planes are not representative of real‐world tasks that a crewmember would be performing during an EVA, be it microgravity or surface exploration based. To address these shortcomings, options are being explored within the Space Suit and Crew Survival Systems Branch to ascertain the feasibility of an alternative approach to defining mobility - one that is more repeatable, lower overhead, and more tied to functional EVA tasks. This paper serves to document the first attempt at such an alternative option - one that looks at the metabolic energy‐cost of a spacesuit. In other words, can we objectively compare the mobility of a spacesuit by evaluating the metabolic cost of that suit to the wearer while performing a battery of functional EVA tasks?

McFarland, Shane↗

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitive Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

SHM/FM theory has been successfully applied to the selection of the baseline set Abort Triggers for the NASA SLS center dot Quantitative assessment played a useful role in the decision process  M&FM, which is new within NASA MSFC, required the most "new" work, as this quantitative analysis had never been done before center dot Required development of the methodology and tool to mechanize the process center dot Established new relationships to the other groups  The process is now an accepted part of the SLS design process, and will likely be applied to similar programs in the future at NASA MSFC  Future improvements center dot Improve technical accuracy ‒Differentiate crew survivability due to an abort, vs. survivability even no immediate abort occurs (small explosion with little debris) ‒Account for contingent dependence of secondary triggers on primary triggers ‒Allocate "Δ LOC Benefit" of each trigger when added to the previously selected triggers. center dot Reduce future costs through the development of a specialized tool  Methodology can be applied to any manned/unmanned vehicle, in space or terrestrial

Lo, Yunnhon↗

Conceptual Launch Vehicle and Spacecraft Design for Risk Assessment

One of the most challenging aspects of developing human space launch and exploration systems is minimizing and mitigating the many potential risk factors to ensure the safest possible design while also meeting the required cost, weight, and performance criteria. In order to accomplish this, effective risk analyses and trade studies are needed to identify key risk drivers, dependencies, and sensitivities as the design evolves. The Engineering Risk Assessment (ERA) team at NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) develops advanced risk analysis approaches, models, and tools to provide such meaningful risk and reliability data throughout vehicle development. The goal of the project presented in this memorandum is to design a generic launch 7 vehicle and spacecraft architecture that can be used to develop and demonstrate these new risk analysis techniques without relying on other proprietary or sensitive vehicle designs. To accomplish this, initial spacecraft and launch vehicle (LV) designs were established using historical sizing relationships for a mission delivering four crewmembers and equipment to the International Space Station (ISS). Mass-estimating relationships (MERs) were used to size the crew capsule and launch vehicle, and a combination of optimization techniques and iterative design processes were employed to determine a possible two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO) launch trajectory into a 350-kilometer orbit. Primary subsystems were also designed for the crewed capsule architecture, based on a 24-hour on-orbit mission with a 7-day contingency. Safety analysis was also performed to identify major risks to crew survivability and assess the system's overall reliability. These procedures and analyses validate that the architecture's basic design and performance are reasonable to be used for risk trade studies. While the vehicle designs presented are not intended to represent a viable architecture, they will provide a valuable initial platform for developing and demonstrating innovative risk assessment capabilities.

Launch Vehicle↗

An Overview of the Launch Vehicle Blast Environments Development Efforts

NASA has been funding an ongoing development program to characterize the explosive environments produced during a catastrophic launch vehicle accident. These studies and small-scale tests are focused on the near field environments that threaten the crew. The results indicate that these environments are unlikely to result in immediate destruction of the crew modules. The effort began as an independent assessment by NASA safety organizations, followed by the Ares program and NASA Engineering and Safety Center and now as a Space Launch Systems (SLS) focused effort. The development effort is using the test and accident data available from public or NASA sources as well as focused scaled tests that are examining the fundamental aspects of uncontained explosions of Hydrogen and air and Hydrogen and Oxygen. The primary risk to the crew appears to be the high-energy fragments and these are being characterized for the SLS. The development efforts will characterize the thermal environment of the explosions as well to ensure that the risk is well understood and to document the overall energy balance of an explosion. The effort is multi-path in that analytical, computational and focused testing is being used to develop the knowledge to understand potential SLS explosions. This is an ongoing program with plans that expand the development from fundamental testing at small-scale levels to large-scale tests that can be used to validate models for commercial programs. The ultimate goal is to develop a knowledge base that can be used by vehicle designers to maximize crew survival in an explosion.

Richardson, Erin↗

An Empirical Non-TNT Approach to Launch Vehicle Explosion Modeling

In an effort to increase crew survivability from catastrophic explosions of Launch Vehicles (LV), a study was conducted to determine the best method for predicting LV explosion environments in the near field. After reviewing such methods as TNT equivalence, Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) theory, and Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD), it was determined that the best approach for this study was to assemble all available empirical data from full scale launch vehicle explosion tests and accidents. Approximately 25 accidents or full-scale tests were found that had some amount of measured blast wave, thermal, or fragment explosion environment characteristics. Blast wave overpressure was found to be much lower in the near field than predicted by most TNT equivalence methods. Additionally, fragments tended to be larger, fewer, and slower than expected if the driving force was from a high explosive type event. In light of these discoveries, a simple model for cryogenic rocket explosions is presented. Predictions from this model encompass all known applicable full scale launch vehicle explosion data. Finally, a brief description of on-going analysis and testing to further refine the launch vehicle explosion environment is discussed.

Blackwood, James M.↗

Implications of Operational Pressure on CSSE PGS Design

The Constellation Spacesuit Element (CSSE) was required to support crew survival (CS); launch, entry, and abort (LEA) scenarios; zero gravity (0-g) extravehicular activity (EVA) (both unscheduled and contingency); and planetary EVA. Operation of the CSSE in all of these capacities required a pressure garment subsystem (PGS) that would operate efficiently through various pressure profiles. The PGS team initiated a study to determine the appropriate operational pressure profile of the CSSE and how this selection would affect the design of the CSSE PGS. This study included an extensive review of historical PGS operational pressure selection and the operational effects of those pressures, the presentation of four possible pressure paradigm options for use by the CSSE, the risks and design impacts of these options, and the down-selected pressure option.

Lee, Ryan↗

Evidence Report: Risk of Acute Radiation Syndromes Due to Solar Particle Events

Crew health and performance may be impacted by a major solar particle event (SPE), multiple SPEs, or the cumulative effect of galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and SPEs. Beyond low-Earth orbit, the protection of the Earth's magnetosphere is no longer available, such that increased shielding and protective mechanisms are necessary in order to prevent acute radiation sickness and impacts to mission success or crew survival. While operational monitoring and shielding are expected to minimize radiation exposures, there are EVA scenarios outside of low-Earth orbit where the risk of prodromal effects, including nausea, vomiting, anorexia, and fatigue, as well as skin injury and depletion of the blood-forming organs (BFO), may occur. There is a reasonable concern that a compromised immune system due to high skin doses from a SPE or due to synergistic space flight factors (e.g., microgravity) may lead to increased risk to the BFO. The primary data available at present are derived from analyses of medical patients and persons accidentally exposed to acute, high doses of low-linear energy transfer (LET) (or terrestrial) radiation. Data more specific to the space flight environment must be compiled to quantify the magnitude of increase of this risk and to develop appropriate protection strategies. In particular, information addressing the distinct differences between solar proton exposures and terrestrial exposure scenarios, including radiation quality, dose-rate effects, and non-uniform dose distributions, is required for accurate risk estimation.

Carnell, Lisa↗

Design and Analysis of a Flexible, Reliable Deep Space Life Support System

This report describes a flexible, reliable, deep space life support system design approach that uses either storage or recycling or both together. The design goal is to provide the needed life support performance with the required ultra reliability for the minimum Equivalent System Mass (ESM). Recycling life support systems used with multiple redundancy can have sufficient reliability for deep space missions but they usually do not save mass compared to mixed storage and recycling systems. The best deep space life support system design uses water recycling with sufficient water storage to prevent loss of crew if recycling fails. Since the amount of water needed for crew survival is a small part of the total water requirement, the required amount of stored water is significantly less than the total to be consumed. Water recycling with water, oxygen, and carbon dioxide removal material storage can achieve the high reliability of full storage systems with only half the mass of full storage and with less mass than the highly redundant recycling systems needed to achieve acceptable reliability. Improved recycling systems with lower mass and higher reliability could perform better than systems using storage.

reliability↗

NASA Platform for Autonomous Systems (NPAS)

NASA Platform for Autonomous Systems (NPAS) is a disruptive software platform and processes being developed by SSC Autonomous Systems Laboratory (ASL). Autonomous operations are critical for the success, safety and crew survival of NASA deep space missions beyond low Earth orbit, including Lunar Orbital Platform-Gateway, and for the future of cost-effective ground mission operations. NPAS represents the embodiment of an innovative implementation for "thinking" autonomy in contrast to brute-force autonomy. It also uniquely addresses the requirements and integrates five primary functionalities for autonomous operations including: (1) Integrated System Health Management (ISHM), (2) autonomy, guided by health and system concepts of operations; (3) knowledge models of applications; (4) infrastructure to create, schedule, and execute mission plans; and (5) infrastructure to integrate distributed autonomous applications across networks.

Figueroa, Fernando↗

NASA Platform for Autonomous Systems (NPAS)

NASA Platform for Autonomous Systems (NPAS) is a disruptive software platform and processes being developed by the NASA Stennis Space Center (SSC) Autonomous Systems Laboratory (ASL). Autonomous operations are critical for the success, safety and crew survival of NASA deep space missions beyond low Earth orbit, including the Gateway, and for the future of cost-effective ground mission operations. NPAS represents the embodiment of an innovative paradigm for “thinking” autonomy in contrast to brute-force autonomy. NPAS uniquely addresses the requirements and integrates the primary functionalities for autonomous operations, in one platform that includes: (1) Integrated System Health Management (ISHM); (2) autonomy strategies, guided by system health and concepts of operations; (3) domain objects (system elements) and infrastructure to create complete application domain knowledge models (4) infrastructure to create, schedule, and execute mission plans; (5) infrastructure to develop user interfaces for comprehensive awareness; and (6) infrastructure to integrate distributed autonomous applications across networks. NPAS is a single platform that can be used to make any system operate with any desirable degree of autonomy, as well as provide comprehensive system awareness to operators and users.

Figueroa, Fernando↗