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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Quantum Computing and Cryptography: Analysis, Risks, and Recommendations for Decisionmakers

Some influential American policymakers, scholars, and analysts are extremely concerned with the effects that quantum computing will have on national security. Similar to the way space technology was viewed in the context of the US-Soviet rivalry in the Cold War, they view scientific advancement in quantum computing as a race with significant national security consequences and a part of the emerging US-China rivalry. It is claimed that the winner of this race will be able to thwart all the cryptographic efforts of the loser and gain unfettered access to any state secret of the losing government. Additionally, it is suggested that the winner will be able to protect their secrets with a higher level of security than contemporary cryptography guarantees at the moment. This paper argues that these three claims are considerably overstated, and that policymakers and scholars should shift focus to a different national security problem that quantum computing will create. Maintaining the long-term security of secret information secured by contemporary cryptographic protections, which will fail against an attack by a future quantum computer, is the predominant challenge needing attention. This paper takes a technically-informed approach to this issue. It first lays out the national security problems that are envisioned in much of the current discourse surrounding quantum computing. Then, it will assess the technical advantages that quantum computers will have over classical computers in the field of cryptography. Next, it will provide an explanation of the specific ways that the technical realities of quantum computing are inconsistent with the predominant areas of concern. Following, it will highlight the more pressing national security problem posed by quantum computing that the public discussion has, for the most part, missed. The piece will conclude with recommendations for how to mitigate this issue.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Simple, Secure, Internet Delivery of MOOSE-based Applications

Application packaging and distribution are the final steps for delivering software to end-users; both are frequently neglected when creating scientific software. Commercial businesses rely on electronic distribution systems that have rendered disk drives obsolete. Still, national laboratories continue to rely heavily on removable media to distribute and limit access to controlled applications. With increasing concerns of unauthorized copying of sensitive applications, a modern distribution system that utilizes cryptographically secure communication and authentication protocols has been developed. This new distribution system will secure the chain of custody for nuclear software while simultaneously simplifying access to these tools. This report summarizes four primary advancements made toward the secure distribution of Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS)-developed, Multiphysics Object Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE)-based applications: application installation, package distribution, automated package building, and distribution of documentation. NEAMS is currently developing more than ten separate applications based on the open-source MOOSE Framework. Distribution of these applications has primarily been accomplished by distributing source code, with end-users compiling the applications themselves. This work created a mechanism where MOOSE applications can be installed in a similar way to any other software. This allows both administrators and end-users simplified access to runnable executables. With this new installation capability, it was then possible to rethink distribution. A new, secure capability for delivering MOOSE-based applications over the internet has been created. This system requires unique cryptographic tokens for authentication, greatly securing the custody chain for software. Once granted access, installation of any NEAMS code can be accomplished with these terminal commands: "conda install ncrc" "ncrc install ncrc-bison." After these two commands (and authenticating) the BISON application will be securely down- loaded from Idaho National Laboratory (INL)’s servers, installed, and ready to use. To enable this new distribution capability to be successful, the open-source Continuous Integration, Verification, Enhancement, and Testing (CIVET) Continuous Integration (CI) capability was augmented to add Continuous Delivery (CD). CD enables the automated building and packaging of MOOSE-based applications as they are modified by development teams, ensuring that our customers can obtain up-to-date versions of the software at any time. The need for instruction on how to use these applications was addressed through modifications to the MOOSE documentation system. The MooseDocs capability, which enables robust documentation of MOOSE-based applications, has been extended to allow both for the installation of documentation and the packaging of documentation with installed applications. Together, these enhancements form the core of a new, secure distribution mechanism for nuclear simulation tools. In concert with the Nuclear Computational Resource Center (NCRC), NEAMS- developed applications will now be straightforward to obtain securely.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Pilot Demonstration of an Attestation and Anomaly Detection Framework using Distributed Ledger Technology for Power Grid Infrastructure

This report summarizes the design and pilot demonstration of a framework called Grid Guard that was created to provide increased data and device trustworthiness to electric grid devices by leveraging distributed ledger technology (DLT), specifically blockchain. Grid Guard contains a combination of core cryptographic methods such as the secure hash algorithm (SHA), and asymmetric cryptography, private permissioned blockchain, baselining configuration data, consensus algorithm (Raft) and the Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) framework. The system implements a low energy, fast, and robust enhancement to system trustworthiness within and across electric grid systems such as substations, control centers and metering infrastructures. Blockchain is a distributed database structured that provides a practically unalterable (immutable) timeline of stored transactions. By relying on hashing and the Raft consensus algorithm, if an entity tries to illegitimately alter a record at one instance of the database the other ledger nodes are not altered. They work to cross-reference each other and easily locate any incorrectly added data and remove it. The bulk raw data is stored in an off-chain storage (outside of the blockchain ledger) and a hash of this baseline data is stored in the Blockchain ledger via hashing windows of time-series and configuration data, after aggregation and filtering. The bulk off-chain data repository is then considered to be trust-anchored using the hashes stored in the blockchain. To secure the electric grid testbed devices and data, device configuration baselines were compared to those baselines that had been previously stored in the ledger. Statistical baselines for device configurations, network communication patterns, and high-speed sensor data are calculated and then stored off-chain and hashes stored in the ledger. Measurements such as three-phase voltage and current, frequency, breaker status, protection scheme settings, network configuration settings (and other device configuration artifacts) and network traffic features (packet interarrival times) are compared every minute or other selected time windows. During phase 1 of the Grid Guard DLT project different DLT technologies were studies, and an assessment was performed on DLT technology vulnerabilities, uses, and key characteristics. DLT consensus protocols were studies (e.g., RAFT, named after Reliable, Replicated, Redundant, And Fault-Tolerant). Also, cryptography, public, private and permissioned or permissionless systems were assessed. Grid Guard implements a permissioned private DLT. Consensus algorithm selection and choice of DLT implementation depended heavily on the use-case. For this use-case, parameters were selected to measure performance and existing tools for assessment. Benchmarking was performed theoretically and practically. During phase 2 hashed transactions/blocks were inserted into the ledger every second. During phase 2 of the Grid Guard DLT project, a prototype framework was developed and demonstrated for attestation of critical substation devices and data using precision timing systems that use PTP and IRIG-B protocols) on a testbed of operational devices that emulated a distribution substation, control center, and power metering infrastructure using real Operational Technology (OT). The testbed includes OT devices such as protective relays, human machine interfaces (HMI), and power meters. To determine when to collect and compare system and network baselines, an initial examination of an anomaly detection capability to identify malicious manipulation of data streams was conducted. The resulting anomaly detection was demonstrated in a set of experiments and leveraged to trigger device artifact attestation checks. Attestation checks occur against device configuration baselines when compared with the immutable blockchain-stored baselines, which provided a cryptographically supported means by which to store baselines. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created to test the Grid Guard framework. The testbed emulates the operations of a portion of a power grid and SCADA systems as closely as possible. The testbed integrates real protocols, mainly IEC 61850 standard protocols, such as the Sampled Value (SV) and the GOOSE protocols. The testbed also supports DNP3 and other layer 2 and layer 3 protocols such as Telnet, SSH, SFTP/FTP and other proprietary protocols needed to connect to industrial control system equipment. The testbed emulates real power conditions using the OpalRT hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) device which can create fault situations that cannot be easily tested on real systems. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created using real measurement, communication, and protection devices that electrical utilities commonly use.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Inventory of Public Key Cryptography in US Electric Vehicle Charging

Electric vehicles (EVs) and charging infrastructure are networked systems, which employ high-level communications in support of charging and grid service decisions. Public key cryptography (PKC) underlies much of the security and privacy protections of the information exchange. We are entering a new epoch where quantum computing threats must be seriously considered. A sufficiently large quantum computer, so named Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (QRQC), will be able to perform the mathematical operations to efficiently attack the underpinnings of traditional PKC, thus jeopardizing the digital foundations for trust, communications security, and data security. Estimates suggest a QRQC can break public key encryption and digital signatures in the manner of tens to hundreds of hours, compared to traditional computing that would demand more than 10 18 years in a brute force-style attack. A consensus belief of quantum theorists, quantum experimenters, and cryptographers suggest that the quantum threat will be likely realized in the next twenty years. To address the threat, post-quantum cryptography, which is cryptosystems that are designed to be secure against both traditional and quantum computing threats, must be adopted. Migration from traditional PKC to quantum-resilient cryptography is a global undertaking and likely represents the largest transition in computing history. The nascent state of EV public key infrastructure, combined with limited adoption of the vehicle secure charging features, presents an opportunity to establish a preference for quantum-resistant cryptography as a step on the migration path. Delays will stunt the efforts as rapidly accelerating EVs sales and huge infrastructure investments will create large growing bases of long-lived vehicles and infrastructure. Migration preparations can commence while NIST continues the process to standardize post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which are quantum-resilient algorithms designed to be secure against traditional and quantum computing threats. The first step in preparing EV charging is to identify the presence of traditional public key cryptography algorithms and applications. With this objective in mind, this report is intended to advise the vehicle manufacturers, charging station manufacturers, charging station operators, charge network providers and other EV charging stakeholders with information on traditional PKC application and the potential risks when PKC becomes insecure. This report, the first in a series of reports discussing the topics existing at the confluence of post-quantum cryptography adoption and EV charging, identifies traditional public key applications employed and identifies potential consequences of leaving EV charging infrastructure vulnerable to quantum computing. The focus remains squarely on the of EV charging and infrastructure with respect to PKC and is believed by the authors to complement the NIST SP 1800-38 Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography. While the report is centered on infrastructure, there are implications to vehicles.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Gridtrust: Electricity Grid Root-of-Trust Decentralized Supply Chain Cyber-Security (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

GridTrust represents a departure from reliance on a single organization or a single person to multiple organizations and therefore multiple people across organizational structures. The motivating idea behind involving multiple organizations is the increase in security due to human factors. More specifically, the requirement that distinct people in different organizations sign off on a change or an update makes a cyberattack much less likely due to the inherent requirement that both organizations be penetrated and fooled. GridTrust focuses on the software update process as the primary exemplar for the research and development work. A novel hardware-based technology referred to as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) provides a microchip Root-of-Trust (RoT), i.e., a starting point for verifying that the hardware being communicated with is the hardware the control center believes the hardware to be. As a result, staff at power grid control centers can ensure the accurate and reliable identification of hardware devices from the outset. The GridTrust protocol introduces two key innovations, as detailed in this report. Firstly, the utilization of a PUF as a root-of-trust in the initial phase of a software or firmware update. Secondly, the application of multiple cryptographic signatures from two or more organizations to the update binary. These signatures are verified before implementing the update on a power grid device in the field. In terms of GridTrust hardware design, this report outlines two main components. The first is the GridTrust Native Device, integrating PUF technology intrinsically into the hardware device itself. The second is the GridTrust Interfacing Device, which incorporates PUF technology and multiple cryptographic signatures. These signatures are cross-checked within a separate hardware positioned between the power grid control center and the legacy power grid device, functioning as an intermediary. While the GridTrust Interfacing Device offers the advantage of being applicable to existing power grid equipment, it may have reduced security if the intermediary component is targeted. On the other hand, the GridTrust Native Device boasts increased security due to protocol integration within a unified form factor. The effectiveness of GridTrust technology has been extensively demonstrated, with multiple external red-team attackers unable to breach GridTrust's security measures. This was observed both in controlled laboratory settings during Phase 1 of the project and in real-world conditions within a City of Marietta substation during Phase 2 of the project.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Quantum Key Distribution for Critical Infrastructures: Towards Cyber-Physical Security for Hydropower and Dams

Hydropower facilities are often remotely monitored or controlled from a centralized remote control room. Additionally, major component manufacturers monitor the performance of installed components, increasingly via public communication infrastructures. While these communications enable efficiencies and increased reliability, they also expand the cyber-attack surface. Communications may use the internet to remote control a facility’s control systems, or it may involve sending control commands over a network from a control room to a machine. The content could be encrypted and decrypted using a public key to protect the communicated information. These cryptographic encoding and decoding schemes become vulnerable as more advances are made in computer technologies, such as quantum computing. In contrast, quantum key distribution (QKD) and other quantum cryptographic protocols are not based upon a computational problem, and offer an alternative to symmetric cryptography in some scenarios. Although the underlying mechanism of quantum cryptogrpahic protocols such as QKD ensure that any attempt by an adversary to observe the quantum part of the protocol will result in a detectable signature as an increased error rate, potentially even preventing key generation, it serves as a warning for further investigation. In QKD, when the error rate is low enough and enough photons have been detected, a shared private key can be generated known only to the sender and receiver. We describe how this novel technology and its several modalities could benefit the critical infrastructures of dams or hydropower facilities. The presented discussions may be viewed as a precursor to a quantum cybersecurity roadmap for the identification of relevant threats and mitigation.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

NLR HPC Eagle Jobs Data and Additional Energy Metrics

Overview: Anonymized job-level records from the Eagle high-performance computing (HPC) system at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR). Each record represents a Slurm batch job with scheduling metadata, resource requests, resource utilization, CPU/GPU energy consumption, and efficiency metrics. Sensitive fields (user, account, job name) are replaced with cryptographic hashes. System & Timeframe: Eagle was a 2,000-node, 8-petaflop system operated at NLR from 2019–2024. Data covers the full operational lifetime of the system. Slurm data was processed nightly; timestamps are in Mountain Time. Funding provided by the U.S. Department of Energy, EERE. Files: esif.hpc.eagle.job-anon.zip — Core anonymized job records (Hive-partitioned Parquet) esif.hpc.eagle.job-anon-energy-metrics.zip — Same records with additional iLO and Ganglia energy metrics datacard.md — Full dataset documentation ~13.8 million rows, 62 variables. Readable with PyArrow, pandas, DuckDB, Apache Spark, or any Parquet-compatible tool. Data Collection: Jobs collected via sacct through a pipeline: Eagle Jobs API → Redpanda → StreamSets → HPCMON API → PostgreSQL. Node-level power from iLO (HP Integrated Lights-Out); GPU power from Ganglia monitoring, joined to jobs via node lists and time ranges. Preprocessing: Anonymization of name, user, and account fields via cryptographic hashing Derived columns: queue_wait, cpu_eff, max_mem_eff Simplified job state mapping (e.g., "CANCELLED BY 12345" → "CANCELLED") QoS accounting rules (buy-in, standby, or Slurm QoS value) CPU energy estimated from TDP (200W, Intel Xeon Gold 6154, 18 cores) Timezone-aware columns (_tz) sourced from LEX accounting database to correctly handle DST transitions Key Variables: Scheduling: job_id, partition, state_simple, submit_time_tz, start_time_tz, end_time_tz, queue_waitResources: nodes_req/used, processors_req/used, memory_req, wallclock_req/used, gpus_requested Efficiency: cpu_eff, max_mem_eff Energy: cpu_energy_tdp_estimated_max/used_watt_hours, node_energy_total_watt_hours (iLO), gpu0/1_energy_total_watt_hours (Ganglia) Partitions: bigmem, bigmem-8600, bigscratch, csc, dav, ddn, debug, gpu, haswell, long, mono, short, standard Job States: CANCELLED, COMPLETED, FAILED, NODE_FAIL, OUT_OF_MEMORY, PENDING, RUNNING, TIMEOUT QoS Levels: Unknown, normal, buy-in, debug, penalty, high, standby Important Notes: Non-_tz timestamp columns may be off by one hour across DST boundaries; use _tz columns for time difference calculations Energy fields are null for jobs without monitoring coverage Job step records and raw Slurm JSONB fields are excluded from this extract Do not attempt to re-identify individuals from hashed fields

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS1996

A Secure Key Distribution System of Quantum Cryptography Based on the Coherent State

The cryptographic communication has a lot of important applications, particularly in the magnificent prospects of private communication. As one knows, the security of cryptographic channel depends crucially on the secrecy of the key. The Vernam cipher is the only cipher system which has guaranteed security. In that system the key must be as long as the message and most be used only once. Quantum cryptography is a method whereby key secrecy can be guaranteed by a physical law. So it is impossible, even in principle, to eavesdrop on such channels. Quantum cryptography has been developed in recent years. Up to now, many schemes of quantum cryptography have been proposed. Now one of the main problems in this field is how to increase transmission distance. In order to use quantum nature of light, up to now proposed schemes all use very dim light pulses. The average photon number is about 0.1. Because of the loss of the optical fiber, it is difficult for the quantum cryptography based on one photon level or on dim light to realize quantum key-distribution over long distance. A quantum key distribution based on coherent state is introduced in this paper. Here we discuss the feasibility and security of this scheme.

Guo, Guang-Can↗
NASA NTRS2007

Wide-Band, High-Quantum-Efficiency Photodetector

A design has been proposed for a photodetector that would exhibit a high quantum efficiency (as much as 90 percent) over a wide wavelength band, which would typically be centered at a wavelength of 1.55 m. This and similar photodetectors would afford a capability for detecting single photons - a capability that is needed for research in quantum optics as well as for the practical development of secure optical communication systems for distribution of quantum cryptographic keys. The proposed photodetector would be of the hot-electron, phonon-cooled, thin-film superconductor type. The superconducting film in this device would be a meandering strip of niobium nitride. In the proposed photodetector, the quantum efficiency would be increased through incorporation of optiA design has been proposed for a photodetector that would exhibit a high quantum efficiency (as much as 90 percent) over a wide wavelength band, which would typically be centered at a wavelength of 1.55 m. This and similar photodetectors would afford a capability for detecting single photons - a capability that is needed for research in quantum optics as well as for the practical development of secure optical communication systems for distribution of quantum cryptographic keys. The proposed photodetector would be of the hot-electron, phonon-cooled, thin-film superconductor type. The superconducting film in this device would be a meandering strip of niobium nitride. In the proposed photodetector, the quantum efficiency would be increased through incorporation of opti-

Jackson, Deborah↗
NASA NTRS2013

Autonomous Byte Stream Randomizer

Net-centric networking environments are often faced with limited resources and must utilize bandwidth as efficiently as possible. In networking environments that span wide areas, the data transmission has to be efficient without any redundant or exuberant metadata. The Autonomous Byte Stream Randomizer software provides an extra level of security on top of existing data encryption methods. Randomizing the data s byte stream adds an extra layer to existing data protection methods, thus making it harder for an attacker to decrypt protected data. Based on a generated crypto-graphically secure random seed, a random sequence of numbers is used to intelligently and efficiently swap the organization of bytes in data using the unbiased and memory-efficient in-place Fisher-Yates shuffle method. Swapping bytes and reorganizing the crucial structure of the byte data renders the data file unreadable and leaves the data in a deconstructed state. This deconstruction adds an extra level of security requiring the byte stream to be reconstructed with the random seed in order to be readable. Once the data byte stream has been randomized, the software enables the data to be distributed to N nodes in an environment. Each piece of the data in randomized and distributed form is a separate entity unreadable on its own right, but when combined with all N pieces, is able to be reconstructed back to one. Reconstruction requires possession of the key used for randomizing the bytes, leading to the generation of the same cryptographically secure random sequence of numbers used to randomize the data. This software is a cornerstone capability possessing the ability to generate the same cryptographically secure sequence on different machines and time intervals, thus allowing this software to be used more heavily in net-centric environments where data transfer bandwidth is limited.

Paloulian, George K.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Network Security via Biometric Recognition of Patterns of Gene Expression

Molecular biology provides the ability to implement forms of information and network security completely outside the bounds of legacy security protocols and algorithms. This paper addresses an approach which instantiates the power of gene expression for security. Molecular biology provides a rich source of gene expression and regulation mechanisms, which can be adopted to use in the information and electronic communication domains. Conventional security protocols are becoming increasingly vulnerable due to more intensive, highly capable attacks on the underlying mathematics of cryptography. Security protocols are being undermined by social engineering and substandard implementations by IT (Information Technology) organizations. Molecular biology can provide countermeasures to these weak points with the current security approaches. Future advances in instruments for analyzing assays will also enable this protocol to advance from one of cryptographic algorithms to an integrated system of cryptographic algorithms and real-time assays of gene expression products.

cybersecurity↗
NASA NTRS2016

Network Security via Biometric Recognition of Patterns of Gene Expression

Molecular biology provides the ability to implement forms of information and network security completely outside the bounds of legacy security protocols and algorithms. This paper addresses an approach which instantiates the power of gene expression for security. Molecular biology provides a rich source of gene expression and regulation mechanisms, which can be adopted to use in the information and electronic communication domains. Conventional security protocols are becoming increasingly vulnerable due to more intensive, highly capable attacks on the underlying mathematics of cryptography. Security protocols are being undermined by social engineering and substandard implementations by IT organizations. Molecular biology can provide countermeasures to these weak points with the current security approaches. Future advances in instruments for analyzing assays will also enable this protocol to advance from one of cryptographic algorithms to an integrated system of cryptographic algorithms and real-time expression and assay of gene expression products.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2012

Analog Video Authentication and Seal Verification Equipment Development

Under contract to the US Department of Energy in support of arms control treaty verification activities, the Savannah River National Laboratory in conjunction with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, the Idaho National Laboratory and Milagro Consulting, LLC developed equipment for use within a chain of custody regime. This paper discussed two specific devices, the Authentication Through the Lens (ATL) analog video authentication system and a photographic multi-seal reader. Both of these devices have been demonstrated in a field trial, and the experience gained throughout will also be discussed. Typically, cryptographic methods are used to prove the authenticity of digital images and video used in arms control chain of custody applications. However, in some applications analog cameras are used. Since cryptographic authentication methods will not work on analog video streams, a simple method of authenticating analog video was developed and tested. A photographic multi-seal reader was developed to image different types of visual unique identifiers for use in chain of custody and authentication activities. This seal reader is unique in its ability to image various types of seals including the Cobra Seal, Reflective Particle Tags, and adhesive seals. Flicker comparison is used to compare before and after images collected with the seal reader in order to detect tampering and verify the integrity of the seal.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Deterrence of device counterfeiting, cloning, and subversion by substitution using hardware fingerprinting

Deterrence of device subversion by substitution may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a computing device for authenticating a hardware platform of the computing device. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes a physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware platform. The PUF circuit is used to generate a PUF value. A key generator is coupled to generate a private key and a public key based on the PUF value while a decryptor is coupled to receive an authentication challenge posed to the computing device and encrypted with the public key and coupled to output a response to the authentication challenge decrypted with the private key.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2014

Multi-factor authentication

Detection and deterrence of spoofing of user authentication may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a hardware device for authenticating a user of the hardware device. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes an internal physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generates a PUF value. Combining logic is coupled to receive the PUF value, combines the PUF value with one or more other authentication factors to generate a multi-factor authentication value. A key generator is coupled to generate a private key and a public key based on the multi-factor authentication value while a decryptor is coupled to receive an authentication challenge posed to the hardware device and encrypted with the public key and coupled to output a response to the authentication challenge decrypted with the private key.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dynamic signature generation from keystroke dynamics

Described herein are various technologies pertaining to extracting cryptographic keys from user behavioral biometrics, specifically keystroke dynamics. Such cryptographic keys can be used for, among other things, user authentication throughout computer sessions. Keystroke dynamics are timing data indicating when keys were pressed and when they were released.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Communication-efficient certificate revocation management for Advanced Metering Infrastructure and IoT Integration

Advanced Metering Infrastructure forms a communication network for the collection of power data from smart meters in Smart Grid. As the communication between smart meters could be secured utilizing public-key cryptography, however, public-key cryptography still has certain challenges in terms of certificate revocation and management particularly related distribution and storage overhead of revoked certificates. To address this challenge, in this work, we propose a novel revocation management approach by utilizing cryptographic accumulators which reduces the space requirements for revocation information significantly and thus enables efficient distribution of such information to all smart meters. We implemented the proposed approach on both ns-3 network simulator and a testbed. We demonstrated its superior performance with respect to traditional methods for revocation management.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2016

Sebastien Philippe Discusses the Zero-Knowledge Protocol

A system that can compare physical objects while potentially protecting sensitive information about the objects themselves has been demonstrated experimentally at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL). This work, by researchers at Princeton University and PPPL, marks an initial confirmation of the application of a powerful cryptographic technique in the physical world. Graduate student Sébastien Philippe discusses the experiment.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗