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At least 73 records · Page 4

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because it can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of other cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

cyber-physical systems↗

A Cybersecurity Testbed for Smart Buildings

Smart buildings are equipped with a plethora of cyber-physical systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and building automation systems. These devices, especially in commercial buildings, use legacy communications and hardware that were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increasing cyber threats in recent years, smart buildings have become an increasing target for attacks, but not enough published data are available from these incidents to study or replicate the scenarios to defend buildings. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy-funded project focusing on developing the Building Intelligence with Layered Defense Using Security-Constrained Optimization and Security Risk Detection (BUILD-SOS) platform, we developed a cybersecurity test bed for smart buildings. This test bed includes a building simulation tool, virtual devices, emulated operational technology networks, and remote hardware-in-the-loop. Using this test bed, we performed different cyberattacks on the smart building model and collected both physical building data, to understand the impacts on the building, and network data, to aid in separating mechanical faults from cyberattacks during the detection. This test bed is a significant tool in protecting smart buildings from cyberattacks because they can aid in both cybersecurity analysis and the evaluation of cyberattack detection tools by testing the tools in a secure environment without impacting the building operations.

alfalfa↗

Machine Learning-based False Data Injection Attack Detection and Localization in Power Grids

Cyberattacks on critical infrastructures can be catastrophic and bring nations to their knees. Therefore, detecting these attacks is crucial and challenging. This paper presents a novel approach for detecting and locating cyberattacks affecting an electrical power system. The adversary employs a man-in-the-middle technique to inject false data into the communication between distributed energy resources (DER) and Microgrid Controller (MGC) with the goal of disrupting power delivery. The approach for detection and localization is based on integrating multiple machine learning-based anomaly detection models that combine network traffic data and grid measurements. Experiments are performed to assess the method's performance using a hardware-in-the-loop real-time simulation testbed which includes Modbus TCP/IP communication. Power system topology and operating conditions are based on actual topology and real-world data provided by the Holy Cross Energy utility network. Results confirm that the method can be successfully employed for detecting and localizing cyberattacks.

Leao, Bruno P.↗

SHARP-Net: Platform for Self-Healing and Attack Resilient PMU Networks

Synchrophasor technology plays a pivotal role in developing the next generation of wide-area monitoring, protection, and control in the smart grid environment. As technology and communications infrastructures evolve, however, so do the attack surfaces in the synchrophasor network that can be exploited by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors to affect power system stability and reliability. In this paper, we propose a novel platform for developing a self-healing and attack-resilient PMU network (SHARP-Net) by instituting a state-of-the-art intrusion detection system (IDS) with an intrusion mitigation system (IMS) and an alert management system (AMS). In particular, the proposed platform detects anomalies during cyberattacks on phasor data concentrators (PDCs) based on the rules defined in the IDS, then the generated alerts are published to the IMS through the AMS. The proposed IMS proceeds to take automated corrective responses to mitigate cyberattacks by reconfiguring the synchrophasor network to isolate the compromised PDCs, and it orchestrates new PDCs to prevent the future propagation of attacks. Further, the IMS restores the system's observability by reconnecting the new PDCs to make the grid attack-resilient. In this work, the SHARP-Net platform is developed by using Python-based libraries, minimega's software-defined network, and virtual machine orchestration. We implement and validate the proposed SHARP-Net architecture by testing a PMU network in the smart grid environment. SHARP-Net showed promising performance in detecting cyberattacks and mitigating them through the network reconfiguration.

computer architecture↗

Performing Numerical Analysis of Cybersecurity Options Using Dynamic Risk Analysis Tool EMRALD

Cyberattacks can have many different attack paths, durations, and goals. There are also many different mitigation options involving hardware, software, and/or humans. Considering a cyber threat should involve defense-in-depth methods and a quantitative or numerical evaluation of overall effectiveness against dynamic, time-dependent attacks to make cost and risk-informed decisions. Typical cyberattack modeling methods only provide a qualitative evaluation. The main areas of cybersecurity are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For companies with cyber-physical systems such as advanced nuclear reactors, cyber-related safety is a requirement set by North American Electric Reliability and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. They are also concerned about availability or reliability as a business case. As cyber threats are evolving to a business-for-hire structure, more attacks may focus on disrupting business success and reliability, causing financial and economic stability risk. Companies want to know business reliability and recovery from those threats, and that requires modeling physical behavior of the targets. Dynamic-state-based and Markov-based modeling provides a method for better cyber scenario modeling with different tools having issues such as state-base explosion. Dynamic modeling enables time and conditional features not found in other numerical evaluation methods. EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Lined Diagrams) is a dynamic risk analysis modeling and simulation tool and has features that reduce modeling issues. It has been used to model different time-dependent events including plant behavior and operator procedures. As a general modeling tool, EMRALD can also be used to model cyberattack scenarios with varying mitigation options and quantify effectiveness, producing numerical data for risk-informed decisions. This paper uses EMRALD to demonstrate that dynamic numerical risk analysis can be used for cyber threat modeling to provide insights for design decision-making and optimize defense strategies. Keywords: cyber modeling; cyber-physical systems; numerical cyber modeling

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Employing a User-Centered Design Process for Cybersecurity Awareness in the Power Grid

In this paper, we discuss the process we are using in the design and implementation of a tool to improve the situation awareness of cyberattacks in the power grid. We provide details on the steps we have taken to date and describe the steps that still need to be accomplished. The focus of this work is to provide situation awareness (SA) (Endsley, 1995) of the power grid to staff from different, non-overlapping roles in an electrical transmission organization in order to facilitate an understanding of a possible occurrence of a cyberattack. Our approach follows a user-centered design process and includes determining the types of information to display, the format of the displays, and the personnel to whom the display should be shown. Additionally there is the issue of how much help the tool can provide in the way of assessing the probability of a cyberattack given the current status of various portions of the power grid. Regardless, the ability to provide a common operating picture should enable the various groups to collaborate on a response.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Attack-resilient algorithms and testbed federation for wide-area protection and control in smart grid

Today’s energy infrastructure is undergoing a massive transformation across all generation, transmission, and distribution systems to provide reliability, efficiency, and sustainability to the power system network. During the past 10 years, there has been a remarkable enhancement in developing close-loop wide-area protection and control (WAPAC) applications, such as automatic generation control (AGC), wide-area protection scheme (WAPS), synchrophasor-based wide-area voltage control system (WAVCS), etc., in the energy management system (EMS) to provide an adequate situational awareness to control center operators during physical disturbances and natural events. The rapid digitalization, unencrypted communication, and numerous data-sharing devices have increased digital access points that have exposed the grid network to countless cyberattacks pertinent to the WAPAC cybersecurity. Given the amount of complex grid network coupled with legacy infrastructures, it is untrustworthy to completely rely on information technology (IT)-based conventional security measures to defend against evolving cyberattacks. Hence, there is a compelling need to go beyond the traditional paradigm of ‘security by obscurity’ and ‘bolt-on’ security measures, and develop a suite of innovative security solutions at multiple layers to transform the current “fault-resilient” grid into “fault and attack-resilient” grid of the future. This dissertation specifically focuses on developing application-specific attack-resilient solutions for critical WAPAC applications in the smart grid. The first part of the study, Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Protection Scheme, presents a cyber-physical attack-resilient system (CPARS) for WAPS, where two anomaly detection methods are proposed to detect multi-level cyberattacks followed by the rules-based intrusion mitigation system (RIMS) to initiate effective mitigation strategies, tailored to these attacks, to restore the normal grid operation after disturbances. The first anomaly detection component, Machine learning-based Anomaly Detection for Centralized WAPS, discusses a novel architecture and methodology for developing a machine-learning-based anomaly detection system (ADS) for the centralized wide-area protection system (CWAPS) by applying the variational mode decomposition (VMD) technique and decision tree (DT) algorithms using cyber logs and synchrophasor measurements. The second component, Multi-Agent-based Anomaly Detection for Decentralized WAPS, presents a two-level hierarchical multi-agent-based decentralized WAPS against the system-aware stealthy cyber-attacks. Finally, for the RIMS, the state transition diagram-based mitigation measures are defined based on the grid operation states and experimental testing and evaluation are presented in a cyber-physical testbed environment. The second part of the study, Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Voltage Control System, addresses the existing vulnerabilities in the wide-area voltage control system (WAVCS), presents the methodology for performing an impact analysis during data integrity attacks, and proposes a data-driven attackresilient system (DARS) by incorporating machine learning-based ADS and rules-based anomaly mitigation system (RAMS) to detect these attacks and provide necessary mitigation actions to maintain the transient voltage stability after disturbances. Finally, the third part, Networked Federation Testbed (NEFTSec) for Smart Grid Cybersecurity, focuses on developing an interconnected federated testbed through a common network like the internet, describes its conceptual architectures, and also presents its design components for experimental testing, validation, and evaluation. Further, it presents the co-simulation interface algorithm (CIA) to facilitate the geographically-dispersed real-time distributed simulation (GD-RTDS) during the cyber-physical federation. In general, this dissertation presents innovative attack-resilient solutions for WAPAC applications that are experimentally tested and evaluated using the PowerCyber testbed and NEFTSec platform to accelerate the transition of state-of-the-art research works to the real-field deployments.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

PSA 2025 DPRA for Cyber Optimization

Cyberattacks can have many different attack paths, durations, and goals. There are also many different mitigation options involving hardware, software, and/or humans. Evaluating defense options should include quantitative evaluation of overall effectiveness to make cost and risk-informed decisions. Typical cyberattack modeling methods only provide a qualitative evaluation and have difficulty with time dependent scenarios. The main areas of cybersecurity are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For companies with cyber-physical systems such as advanced nuclear reactors, cyber-related integrity is a requirement set by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. But companies are also concerned about availability or reliability as a business case. As cyber threats are evolving to a business-for-hire structure, more attacks focus on disrupting business success and reliability, causing financial and economic stability risk. Companies want reliability analysis while optimizing cost, which requires more than safety modeling methods. Dynamic-state-based and Markov-based modeling provides a method for better cyber scenario modeling with timing and conditional features not found in other numerical evaluation methods. EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Lined Diagrams) is a dynamic risk analysis modeling and simulation tool and has features that reduce modeling issues such as state-base explosion found in Markov-based tools. It has been used to model different time-dependent events including plant behavior and operator procedures. As a general modeling tool, EMRALD can also be used to model cyberattack scenarios with varying mitigation options and quantify effectiveness, producing numerical data for risk-informed decisions. This paper uses EMRALD to demonstrate that dynamic risk analysis can be used for cyber threat modeling to provide insights for design decision-making and optimize defense strategies.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Stability Impact of IEEE 1547 Operational Mode Changes Under High DER Penetration in the Presence of Cyber Adversary

The IEEE 1547 standard addresses the integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) into Area Electric Power Systems (AEPS). The updated standard, released in 2018 with revisions ongoing, specifies the need for more flexible settings, requiring the DER to remain connected during certain disturbances and provide voltage support via active and reactive power modes. With these increased capabilities comes increased risks, and our analysis of the standard has produced potential settings combinations, which, while allowable under the standard, may actually create instability. This contradicts the main purpose of the revised standard. Since the DER must support a communication interface through which the AEPS operator can change settings, adversarial mode changes are possible via a cyberattack. This concern is heightened as DER penetration increases, where under a reasonable threat model, an attacker could affect multiple DER simultaneously. We have conducted a simulation analysis of potentially adverse combinations of mode change and ridethrough parameters on a hypothetical AEPS with varying degrees of DER penetration. We conclude that certain adverse mode changes, whether through error or cyberattack, can lead to unstable conditions with DER penetrations as low as 24% of the AEPS system capacity.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

EUREICA: Efficient UltRa Endpoint IoT-enabled Coordinated Architecture

The electricity grid has evolved from a physical system to a cyber-physical system with digital devices that perform measurement, control, communication, computation, and actuation. The increased penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) that include renewable generation, flexible loads, and storage provides extraordinary opportunities for improvements in efficiency and sustainability. However, they can introduce new vulnerabilities in the form of cyberattacks, which can cause significant challenges in ensuring grid resilience. The purpose of this project was to develop a framework ((Efficient, Ultra-REsilient, IoT-Coordinated Assets, or EUREICA)for achieving grid resilience through suitably coordinated assets including a network of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, and a local electricity market (LEM) to identify trustable assets and carry out this coordination. Situational Awareness (SA) of locally available DERs with the ability to inject power or reduce consumption is enabled by the market, together with a monitoring procedure for their trustability and commitment. Experiments conducted during this project demonstrated that, with this SA, a variety of cyberattacks can be mitigated using local trustable resources without stressing the bulk grid. The demonstrations were carried out using a variety of high-fidelity co-simulation platforms, real-time hardware-in-the-loop validation, and a utility-friendly simulator.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Adaptive anomaly detection for identifying attacks in cyber-physical systems: A systematic literature review

Modern cyberattacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) rapidly evolve and cannot be deterred effectively with most current methods, which focus on characterizing past threats. Adaptive anomaly detection (AAD) is among the most promising techniques to detect evolving cyberattacks, with an emphasis on fast data processing and model adaptation. AAD has been researched extensively; however, to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first systematic literature review (SLR) on current research in this field. We present a comprehensive SLR, gathering 397 relevant papers and systematically analyzing 65 of them (47 research and 18 survey papers) on AAD in CPS from 2013 to November 2023. We introduce a novel taxonomy considering attack types, CPS application, learning paradigm, data management, and algorithms. Our findings show that most studies addressed either model adaptation or data processing, but rarely both simultaneously. This indicates a research gap in fully adaptive solutions. We also categorize algorithms, datasets, and attack characteristics, and summarize strengths and weaknesses across the literature. Our review provides a structured and accessible reference for researchers and practitioners, offering insights into key trends and highlighting limitations in current approaches. Finally, we outline several future research directions, including the need for integrated real-time processing and adaptive learning, explainability, and uncertainty quantification in AAD for CPS.

Adaptation↗

Assessing the Impact of Cybersecurity Attacks on Energy Systems

This paper investigates the cyber resiliency of future power systems with high penetration of distributed energy resources using advanced distributed and (or) hierarchical control architectures. Specifically, we simulate cyberattacks on three prototypical use cases, and we identify attack scenarios that are the most damaging to the overall system performance. We show that these attacks can have a significant impact on grid operation. Results provide additional insights into the robustness of the system to the most common cyberattacks.

buildings↗

On Anomaly Detection for Transactive Energy Systems with Competitive Market

Two anomaly-detection criteria are proposed for transactive energy systems with competitive markets. Participants of transactive energy systems seek an optimal power allocation through hybrid economic-control methods to facilitate the integration of various types of distributed energy resources to power distribution systems. In transactive energy systems, every participant is assumed to be a rational entity, and consumers have diminishing marginal utility and suppliers have increasing marginal cost. With the first proposed anomaly-detection criterion, the monotonicity of marginal cost and marginal utility are examined. The impact of line flow constraints is also taken into consideration. Then, the second anomaly-detection criterion is proposed for TESs with marginal cost and marginal utility which change faster than a certain rate. The second criterion is more accurate than the first one for TES with marginal cost and marginal utility which change faster than a certain rate, but it requires the knowledge of that rate. Neither criteria requires more data than those necessary to find the optimal power allocation and the market-clear price in a transactive energy system. Therefore, the proposed criteria do not disclose any more data than necessary. As the monotonicity of marginal cost and marginal utility in a TES with competitive markets results in convex objective functions in an optimization problem and strongly convex ones when marginal cost and marginal utility changes faster than a certain rate, the two detection criteria are also applicable to anomaly detection of general convex optimization problems. Simulations are carried out to show the efficacy of the proposed criteria to detect anomalies caused by cyberattacks.

Wang, Peng↗

Survey of Space Professionals’ Perception of Satellite Cybersecurity from 2012 to 2022: Decision-Makers’ Thoughts on Satellite Cybersecurity Evolving

Cyberattacks on space assets are often portrayed in vague terms of doubt and mystery. Several claims depict satellites being compromised or attacked, but little corroboration has been published or made publicly available. As the commercial space industry is growing, commercial satellite decision makers will need to analyze the unacknowledged risk of cyberattacks against satellites. This paper identifies and characterizes what a cybersecurity risk to a space asset could look like and why space professionals might not prioritize cybersecurity. Additional information was captured from a decadal survey of space professionals in 2012 and 2022. Comparing the decadal results shows a rise in the perceived risk of satellites to cybersecurity threats from a sample of space professionals. This growing notable shift of perspective is not fully defined or agreed upon.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity for Electric Vehicle Fast-Charging Infrastructure

The integration of electric vehicles (EVs) into electric grid operations can potentially leave the grid vulnerable to cyberattacks from both legacy and new equipment and protocols, including extreme fast-charging infrastructure. This paper introduces a co-simulation platform to perform cyber vulnerability analysis of EV charging infrastructure and its dependencies on communications and control systems. Grid impact scenarios through linkages to power system simulation tools such as OpenDSS and vehicle infrastructure-specific attack paths are discussed. An adaptive platform that assists with predicting and solving evolving cybersecurity challenges is demonstrated with a cyber-energy emulation that accelerates the analysis of cyberattacks and system behavior.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

A Trilevel Model for Segmentation of the Power Transmission Grid Cyber Network

Network segmentation of a power grid's communication system can make the grid more resilient to cyberattacks. Here we develop a novel trilevel programming model to optimally segment a grid communication system, taking into account the actions of an information technology (IT) administrator, attacker, and grid operator. The IT administrator is allowed to segment existing networks, and the attacker is given a budget to inflict damage on the grid by attacking the segmented communication system. Finally, the grid operator can redispatch the grid after the attack to minimize damage. The resulting problem is a trilevel interdiction problem that we solve using a branch and bound algorithm for bilevel problems. We demonstrate the benefits of optimal network segmentation through case studies on the 9-bus Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) system and the 30-bus IEEE system. These examples illustrate that network segmentation can significantly reduce the threat posed by a cyberattacker.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Impact of Blockchain Delay on Grid-Tied Solar Inverter Performance

This paper investigates the impact of the delay resulting from a blockchain, a promising security measure, for a hierarchical control system of inverters connected to the grid. The blockchain communication network is designed at the secondary control layer for resilience against cyberattacks. To represent the latency in the communication channel, a model is developed based on the complexity of the blockchain framework. Taking this model into account, this work evaluates the plant’s performance subject to communication delays, introduced by the blockchain, among the hierarchical control agents. In addition, this article considers an optimal model-based control strategy that performs the system’s internal control loop. The work shows that the blockchain’s delay size influences the convergence of the power supplied by the inverter to the reference at the point of common coupling. In the results section, real-time simulations on OPAL-RT are performed to test the resilience of two parallel inverters with increasing blockchain complexity.

41 EE - Solar Energy Technologies Office (EE-4S)↗

CPS Testbed Architectures for WAMPAC using Industrial Substation and Control Center Platforms and Attack-Defense Evaluation

Advanced persistent threats and cyberattacks can impact wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) system operation. Many cyber-physical system (CPS) testbeds have been developed for attack-defense experimentation and attack-resiliency tools evaluation for WAMPAC, but they are limited to a simulation-and-emulation based environment. This paper presents a quasi-realistic CPS attack-defense testbed-based framework for WAMPAC applications using the industrial substation and control center platforms such as eTerra integrated with the hardware-in-the-loop CPS smart grid testbed available at Iowa State University. The proposed framework includes various combinations of industry-grade substation and control center platforms, communication topologies, real-time digital simulators, and a novel cyber-physical distributed intrusion-and-anomaly detection system (D-IADS) for WAMPAC applications. The D-IADS includes a master at the control center and geographically distributed sensor devices at each substation. Each D-IADS sensor deployed at a substation or control center network monitors ingress and egress traffic, detect intrusions, and dispatch alerts to the D-IADS master. The D-IADS master centrally monitors and analyze the alerts and controls D-IADS sensors. We considered an EMP60 synthetic CPS grid as a case study to demonstrate the framework and proposed D-IADS for WAMPAC applications against cyberattack vectors such as Man-in-the-Middle DNP3 attack, denial-of-service, and data-integrity attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗