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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4

Development of A Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) Testbed for Cyber-Physical Security in Smart Buildings

As smart buildings move towards open communication technologies, providing access to the Building Automation System (BAS) through the building's intranet, or even remotely through the Internet, has become a common practice. However, BAS was historically developed as a closed environment and designed with limited cyber-security considerations. Thus, smart buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks with the increased accessibility. This study introduces the development and capability of a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIT) testbed for testing and evaluating the cyber-physical security of typical BASs in smart buildings. The testbed consists of three subsystems: (1) a real-time HIL emulator simulating the behavior of a virtual building as well as the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) equipment via a dynamic simulation in Modelica; (2) a set of real HVAC controllers monitoring the virtual building operation and providing local control signals to control HVAC equipment in the HIL emulator; and (3) a BAS server along with a web-based service for users to fully access the schedule, setpoints, trends, alarms, and other control functions of the HVAC controllers remotely through the BACnet network. The server generates rule-based setpoints to local HVAC controllers. Based on these three subsystems, the HIL testbed supports attack/fault-free and attack/fault-injection experiments at various levels of the building system. The resulting test data can be used to inform the building community and support the cyber-physical security technology transfer to the building industry.

Li, Guowen↗

Hardware-in-the-Loop Testbed for Cyber-Physical Security of Photovoltaic Farms

In the last decades, modem grids with distributed energy resources, such as photovoltaic (PV) farms, are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks that seriously affect the stability and performance of the power system. While cyber-physical security of smart grids is extensively studied, most of the existing work focuses on the grid level and neglects the modeling and features of device-level power electronics converters (PECs). Furthermore, establishing a high-fidelity simulation testbed that can simulate harmonic frequencies of the PV farm is in urgent need. In this paper, a high-fidelity and real-time hardware-in- the-loop testbed is built to simulate the harmonics of power electronics converters for cyber-physical security of PEC-enabled PV farms. Based on this testbed, the impact of typical cyber-attacks and physical faults on the PV converter can be analyzed, thus providing a foundation for cyber-attack detection, root cause diagnosis, and resilient control to mitigate the adverse effects of cyber-attacks.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Control system devices : architectures and supply channels overview.

This report describes a research project to examine the hardware used in automated control systems like those that control the electric grid. This report provides an overview of the vendors, architectures, and supply channels for a number of control system devices. The research itself represents an attempt to probe more deeply into the area of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) - the specialized digital computers that control individual processes within supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. The report (1) provides an overview of control system networks and PLC architecture, (2) furnishes profiles for the top eight vendors in the PLC industry, (3) discusses the communications protocols used in different industries, and (4) analyzes the hardware used in several PLC devices. As part of the project, several PLCs were disassembled to identify constituent components. That information will direct the next step of the research, which will greatly increase our understanding of PLC security in both the hardware and software areas. Such an understanding is vital for discerning the potential national security impact of security flaws in these devices, as well as for developing proactive countermeasures.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

SRAM-Based Digital Arbiter PUF

The increased use of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) in critical systems brings new challenges in securing the diversely programmable fabric from cyber-attacks. FPGAs are an inexpensive, efficient, and flexible alternative to Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), which are becoming increasingly expensive and impractical for low volume manufacturing as technology nodes continue to shrink. Unfortunately, FPGAs are not designed for high security applications, and their high-flexibility lends itself to low security and vulnerability to malicious attacks. Similar to securing an ASIC’s functionality, FPGA programmers can exploit the inherent randomness introduced into hardware structures during fabrication for security applications. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are one such solution that uses the die specific variability in hardware fabrication for both secret key generation and verification. PUFs strive to be random, unique, and reliable. Throughout recent years many PUF structures have been presented to try and maximize these three design constraints, reliability being the most difficult of the three to achieve. This thesis presents a new PUF structure that combines two elementary PUF concepts (a bi-stable SRAM PUF and a delay-based arbiter PUF) to create a PUF with increased reliability, while maintaining both random and unique qualities. Properties of the new PUF will be discussed as well as the various design modifications that can be made to tweak the desired performance and overhead.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Theoretical Analysis: Physical Unclonable Functions and The Software Protection Problem

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) or Physical One Way Functions (P-OWFs) are physical systems whose responses to input stimuli (i.e., challenges) are easy to measure (within reasonable error bounds) but hard to clone. This property of unclonability is due to the accepted hardness of replicating the multitude of uncontrollable manufacturing characteristics and makes PUFs useful in solving problems such as device authentication, software protection, licensing, and certified execution. In this paper, we focus on the effectiveness of PUFs for software protection and show that traditional non-computational (black-box) PUFs cannot solve the problem against real world adversaries in offline settings. Our contributions are the following: We provide two real world adversary models (weak and strong variants) and present definitions for security against the adversaries. We continue by proposing schemes secure against the weak adversary and show that no scheme is secure against a strong adversary without the use of trusted hardware. Finally, we present a protection scheme secure against strong adversaries based on trusted hardware.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

System and method for key generation in security tokens

Functional randomness in security tokens (FRIST) may achieve improved security in two-factor authentication hardware tokens by improving on the algorithms used to securely generate random data. A system and method in one embodiment according to the present invention may allow for security of a token based on storage cost and computational security. This approach may enable communication where security is no longer based solely on onetime pads (OTPs) generated from a single cryptographic function (e.g., SHA-256).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Insecurity of Wireless Networks

Wireless is a powerful core technology enabling our global digital infrastructure. Wi-Fi networks are susceptible to attacks on Wired Equivalency Privacy, Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), and WPA2. These attack signatures can be profiled into a system that defends against such attacks on the basis of their inherent characteristics. Wi-Fi is the standard protocol for wireless networks used extensively in US critical infrastructures. Since the Wired Equivalency Privacy (WEP) security protocol was broken, the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) protocol has been considered the secure alternative compatible with hardware developed for WEP. However, in November 2008, researchers developed an attack on WPA, allowing forgery of Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) packets. Subsequent enhancements have enabled ARP poisoning, cryptosystem denial of service, and man-in-the-middle attacks. Open source systems and methods (OSSM) have long been used to secure networks against such attacks. This article reviews OSSMs and the results of experimental attacks on WPA. These experiments re-created current attacks in a laboratory setting, recording both wired and wireless traffic. The article discusses methods of intrusion detection and prevention in the context of cyber physical protection of critical Internet infrastructure. The basis for this research is a specialized (and undoubtedly incomplete) taxonomy of Wi-Fi attacks and their adaptations to existing countermeasures and protocol revisions. Ultimately, this article aims to provide a clearer picture of how and why wireless protection protocols and encryption must achieve a more scientific basis for detecting and preventing such attacks.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Reimagining Codesign for Advanced Scientific Computing: Report for the ASCR Workshop on Reimagining Codesign

In March 2021, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Advanced Scientific Computing Research program convened the Workshop on Reimagining Codesign. The workshop, also known as ReCoDe, was organized around discussions on eight topic areas: (1) codesign for traditional high-performance computing workloads; (2) codesign of memory/storage systems; (3) codesign of machine learning, neuromorphic, quantum, and other non-von Neumann accelerators; (4) codesign for edge computing and processing at experimental instruments; (5) codesign for security and privacy; (6) hardware design tools and open-source hardware for high-productivity codesign; (7) tools, software stack, and programming languages for high-productivity codesign; and (8) quantitative tools and data collection for modeling and simulation for codesign. The panels identified four Priority Research Directions from these deliberations: (1) breakthrough computing capabilities with targeted heterogeneity and rapid design; (2) software and applications that embrace radical architecture diversity; (3) engineered security and integrity, from transistors to applications; and (4) design with data-rich processes.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere was heightened from Airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDSsIPSs. In addition I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, policies and procedures.

computer information security↗

Performance Analysis of Scientific Computing Workloads on Trusted Execution Environments

Scientific computing sometimes involves computation on sensitive data. Depending on the data and the execution environment, the HPC (high-performance computing) user or data provider may require confidentiality and/or integrity guarantees. To study the applicability of hardware-based trusted execution environments (TEEs) to enable secure scientific computing, we deeply analyze the performance impact of AMD SEV and Intel SGX for diverse HPC benchmarks including traditional scientific computing, machine learning, graph analytics, and emerging scientific computing workloads. We observe three main findings: 1) SEV requires careful memory placement on large scale NUMA machines (1x -3.4x slowdown without and 1x -1.15x slowdown with NUMA aware placement), 2) virtualization - a prerequisite for SEV - results in performance degradation for workloads with irregular memory accesses and large working sets (1x -4x slowdown compared to native execution for graph applications) and 3) SGX is inappropriate for HPC given its limited secure memory size and inflexible programming model (1.2x -126x slowdown over unsecure execution). Finally, we discuss forthcoming new TEE designs and their potential impact on scientific computing.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APT's) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning, and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDS's/IPS's. In addition, I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, and conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.

security↗

Investigating Formal Methods Tools and their Applicability for Hardware Vulnerability Remediation

Formal methods use mathematical logic and equations to prove that a system or code is secure. In this poster, I examine existing formal methods tools and their application for projects working to remediate vulnerabilities in hardware and hardware description language. This poster is focused on the tools ReWire and AutoGenILA and I hope to evaluate their benefits and weaknesses with the intention of creating an internal report on the application and weaknesses of existing formal methods tools and identifying gaps for future formal methods tool creation.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cyber security using multi-threaded architecture data diode at the NBSR - 114

Ongoing upgrades for the control room of the National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR) located at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) require the ability to collect sensor data from the secured reactor network and transfer to the outside network for trend analysis, while maintaining the security of the reactor network. To accomplish this, a data diode was created to provide a physical barrier that prevents any outside data from reaching the secured reactor network. The hardware of the data diode consists of two embedded computers, running Unix based operating systems, connected by three DB-9 serial cables. The serial cables have been modified so that only two wires, a ground and a transmission line, provide connection between the computers. The data diode relies on a multi-threaded architecture to collect and simultaneously transfer data over three serial connections. A software program, implemented in Java, has been written to request data from the digital recorders installed to monitor the NBSR process instrumentation and transfer that data across the serial connections. The data diode can collect over 1200 data points from multiple digital recorders each second. The collected data can then be stored in a relational database for later analysis. The source codes for the software are available open source on GitHub. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

3D printed graphene-based self-powered strain sensors for smart tires in autonomous vehicles

The transition of autonomous vehicles into fleets requires an advanced control system design that relies on continuous feedback from the tires. Smart tires enable continuous monitoring of dynamic parameters by combining strain sensing with traditional tire functions. Here, we provide breakthrough in this direction by demonstrating tire-integrated system that combines direct mask-less 3D printed strain gauges, flexible piezoelectric energy harvester for powering the sensors and secure wireless data transfer electronics, and machine learning for predictive data analysis. Ink of graphene based material was designed to directly print strain sensor for measuring tire-road interactions under varying driving speeds, normal load, and tire pressure. A secure wireless data transfer hardware powered by a piezoelectric patch is implemented to demonstrate self-powered sensing and wireless communication capability. Combined, this study significantly advances the design and fabrication of cost-effective smart tires by demonstrating practical self-powered wireless strain sensing capability.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

NA-IM TGESC Mobile Device Secure Sled [Slides]

SafeCase provides essential controls such as: 1) Audio masking and 2) camera blocking capabilities if a mobile device has been compromised. This exoskeleton phone case provides a solution in secure spaces at a hardware level providing key attack surface reductions and potential exposures from an audio and visual standpoint.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Morpheus 1.5A Lander Failure Investigation Results

On August 9th, 2012, the Morpheus 1.5 Vertical Testbed (VTB) crashed during Free Flight 2 (FF2) at KSC SLF, resulting in the loss of 1.5 VTB hardware. JSC/KSC Morpheus team immediately executed the pre‐rehearsed Emergency Action Plan to protect personnel and property, so damage was limited to 1.5 VTB hardware. JSC/KSC Morpheus team secured data and mapped & recovered debris. Project had pre‐declared loss of VTB to be a test failure, not a mishap.

Munday, Steve↗

Verifiable process monitoring through enhanced data authentication.

To ensure the peaceful intent for production and processing of nuclear fuel, verifiable process monitoring of the fuel production cycle is required. As part of a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-EURATOM collaboration in the field of international nuclear safeguards, the DOE Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) and Directorate General-Energy (DG-ENER) developed and demonstrated a new concept in process monitoring, enabling the use of operator process information by branching a second, authenticated data stream to the Safeguards inspectorate. This information would be complementary to independent safeguards data, improving the understanding of the plant's operation. The concept is called the Enhanced Data Authentication System (EDAS). EDAS transparently captures, authenticates, and encrypts communication data that is transmitted between operator control computers and connected analytical equipment utilized in nuclear processes controls. The intent is to capture information as close to the sensor point as possible to assure the highest possible confidence in the branched data. Data must be collected transparently by the EDAS: Operator processes should not be altered or disrupted by the insertion of the EDAS as a monitoring system for safeguards. EDAS employs public key authentication providing 'jointly verifiable' data and private key encryption for confidentiality. Timestamps and data source are also added to the collected data for analysis. The core of the system hardware is in a security enclosure with both active and passive tamper indication. Further, the system has the ability to monitor seals or other security devices in close proximity. This paper will discuss the EDAS concept, recent technical developments, intended application philosophy and the planned future progression of this system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Real-Time Testbed for Smart Inverter Cyber Security Studies

Distributed energy resources (DER) have become a popular solution to modern-day issues surrounding the efficiency and reliability of power generation, as well as climate change concerns. Energy centers are shifting towards incorporating smart inverters with embedded functionalities such as high voltage ride through (HVRT), low voltage ride through (LVRT), active and reactive power compensation. However, the integration of smart inverters leave DER systems highly vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. The distributed network protocol 3 (DNP3) is a common method of communication between grid-tied hardware. Despite its popularity, the level of security leaves all hardware connected to the grid at risk of severe cyber-attacks. Thus, it is important to study any potential cybersecurity threats towards grid-tied smart inverters to mitigate cybersecurity vulnerabilities and refine existing cyber-security protections. This report describes the proposed testbed design to study cybersecurity threats to smart inverters. The testbed utilizes a real-time simulation case in RSCAD that includes a grid-tied wind turbine (WT) topology featuring two back-to-back two-level voltage source converters (BTB,2L-VSCs) and a permanent magnet synchronous machine (PMSM). The simulated case runs within the NovaCor real time digital simulator (RTDS). This report focuses on the design and implementation of a single module of the GTNETx2 card as a distributed network protocol and the configuration of an IEEE 1518 DNP database file that includes input and output variables mapped to different connection points in the grid that transmit and receive discrete, analog, and binary signals on command. This allows realistic emulation of the communication between the smart inverter and the grid for cybersecurity studies.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗