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NASA NTRS2017

Towards Designing Graceful Degradation into Trajectory Based Operations: A Human-Machine System Integration Approach

One of the most fundamental changes to the air traffic management system in NextGen is the concept of trajectory based operations (TBO). With the introduction of such change, system safety and resilience is a critical concern, in particular, the ability of systems to gracefully degrade. In order to design graceful degradation into a TBO envrionment, knowledge of the potential causes of degradation, and appropriate solutions, is required. In addition, previous research has predominantly explored the technological contribution to graceful degradation, frequently neglecting to consider the role of the human operator, specifically, air traffic controllers (ATCOs). This is out of step with real-world operations, and potentially limits an ecologically valid understanding of achieving graceful degradation in an air traffic control (ATC) environment. The following literature review aims to identify and summarize the literature to date on the potential causes of degradation in ATC and the solutions that may be applied within a TBO context, with a specific focus on the contribution of the air traffic controller. A framework of graceful degradation, developed from the literature, is presented. It is argued that in order to achieve graceful degradation within TBO, a human-system integration approach must be applied.

trajectory based operations↗

NASA NTRS2006

What Happened, and Why: Toward an Understanding of Human Error Based on Automated Analyses of Incident Reports

The objective of the Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling (ASMM) project of NASA s Aviation Safety and Security Program was to develop technologies that will enable proactive management of safety risk, which entails identifying the precursor events and conditions that foreshadow most accidents. This presents a particular challenge in the aviation system where people are key components and human error is frequently cited as a major contributing factor or cause of incidents and accidents. In the aviation "world", information about what happened can be extracted from quantitative data sources, but the experiential account of the incident reporter is the best available source of information about why an incident happened. This report describes a conceptual model and an approach to automated analyses of textual data sources for the subjective perspective of the reporter of the incident to aid in understanding why an incident occurred. It explores a first-generation process for routinely searching large databases of textual reports of aviation incident or accidents, and reliably analyzing them for causal factors of human behavior (the why of an incident). We have defined a generic structure of information that is postulated to be a sound basis for defining similarities between aviation incidents. Based on this structure, we have introduced the simplifying structure, which we call the Scenario as a pragmatic guide for identifying similarities of what happened based on the objective parameters that define the Context and the Outcome of a Scenario. We believe that it will be possible to design an automated analysis process guided by the structure of the Scenario that will aid aviation-safety experts to understand the systemic issues that are conducive to human error.

Maille, Nicolas P.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Flame Retardant Fibers for Human Space Exploration - Past, Present, and Future

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has led the development of unique flame retardant fibers for the specific requirements of different space programs. Three of these fibers have greatly contributed to the safety of all the space missions since the Apollo program. Beta alumina-silica microfiber developed for the outer layer of the space suit after the Apollo 1 fire is no longer used and has been replaced by other glass fibers. Expanded polytetrafluoroethylene (e-PTFE) fiber used in the current spacesuit is mostly known today through its trade mark Gore-Tex®. Polybenzimidazole (PBI) filament fiber used in many applications from the Apollo to the Space Shuttle program is no longer available. More recently, TOR"TM" copolymer of polyimide fiber developed during the space shuttle program to resist the atomic oxygen present in Low Earth Orbit has been barely used. The high cost and narrow range of aeronautical and aerospace applications have, however, led to a limited production of these fibers. Only fibers that found niche markets survived. Yet, deep space exploration will require more of these inherently flame retardant fibers than what is available today. There is a need for new flame retardant fabrics inside the space vehicles as well as a need for logistics reduction for long term space missions. Materials like modacrylic and polyimide are good candidates for future flame retardant aerospace fabrics. New fabrics must be developed for astronauts' clothing, as well as crew quarters and habitat. Therefore, both staple and filament fibers of various linear densities are needed for a three years mission to Mars.

Orndoff, Evelyne↗

NASA NTRS2012

International Space Station as Analog of Interplanetary Transit Vehicle For Biomedical Research

Astronaut missions lasting up to six months aboard the International Space Station (ISS) have much in common with interplanetary flights, especially the outbound, Earth-to-Mars transit portion of a Mars mission. Utilization of ISS and other appropriate platforms to prepare for crewed expeditions to planetary destinations including Mars has been the work of NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) since 2005. HRP is charged specifically to understand and reduced the risks to astronaut health and performance in space exploration missions: everything HRP does and has done is directly related to that responsibility. Two major categories of human research have capitalized on ISS capabilities. The first category centers on the biomedical aspects of long-duration exposure to spaceflight factors, including prolonged weightlessness, radiation exposure, isolation and confinement, and actual risk to life and limb. These studies contribute to astronaut safety, health and efficiency on any long-duration missions, whether in low Earth orbit (LEO) or beyond. Qualitatively, weightlessness is weightlessness, whether in LEO or en route to Mars. The HRP sponsors investigations into losses in muscle and bone integrity, cardiovascular function, sensory-motor capability, immune capacity and psychosocial health, and development and demonstration of appropriate treatments and preventative measures. The second category includes studies that are focused on planetary expeditions beyond LEO. For these, ISS offers a high fidelity analog to investigate the combined effects of spaceflight factors (described above) plus the isolation and autonomy associated with simulated increasing distance from Earth. Investigations address crew cohesion, performance and workload, and mission control performance. The behavioral health and performance and space human factors aspects of planetary missions dominate this category. Work has already begun on a new investigation in this category which will examine the effects of a simulated lag in communications (mimicking that expected in transit to Mars) on astronaut performance aboard ISS. Extension of the current ISS increment duration from six months to nine or even twelve months would provide opportunities for expanded research relevant to long duration missions, albeit at the cost of fewer astronauts as subjects for those investigations. Given the possible limited access to ISS after 2020, if ISS is intended to facilitate future exploration missions, then the in-flight human investigations should focus on those that clearly enable future exploration missions.

Charles, John B.↗

NASA NTRS2021

Resilience Engineering's Potential for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM)

The national airspace (NAS) will rapidly evolve in the next ten to twenty years. Plans for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) during that period envision highly automated airspace management systems and electrically powered vehicles. AAM concepts also anticipate limited human roles. The goal of limiting the human role is to minimize the potential for misadventures, yet how the human role is limited needs to be carefully considered in order to also preserve the potential for human successes. The field of resilience engineering (RE) focuses on how systems can change in order to seize an opportunity or withstand an unforeseen challenge. RE methods rely on the use of empirical data to optimize the ability of any system to adapt. RE studies have shown how individual and team initiatives ensure resilient system performance by creating safety through flexibility. Benefits of the RE approach include improved awareness of operational circumstances and how system elements depend on each other, and the ability to allocate limited resources and prepare for surprise. RE offers the ability to account for and incorporate the human role as an essential element in order to ensure NAS systems’ resilient performance. Data on the human contribution to safe and resilient system performance, which is termed “work as done,” are available but are not being considered as the NAS evolves. We present an approach that describes how use of RE can enable the evolving NAS to adapt, and perform, in a resilient manner.

Aviation Safety↗

DOE OSTI2022

A framework to implement human reliability analysis during early design stages of advanced reactors

Nuclear power plants require human actions throughout their lifecycle from design, construction, operation, and decommissioning. However, for advanced reactors (e.g., Generation IV), the reliance on human intervention in safety-related actions is expected to be reduced or completely replaced by automated actions. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Standard for Advanced Non-LWR Nuclear Power Plants requires that the impacts of all operator actions are captured and incorporated in the risk of the modeled plant. Moreover, the Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing Advanced Reactors requires human reliability analysis (HRA) to be included throughout all design and PRA development stages. However, due to the lack of details during the early design stages, HRA is often postponed until the design is mature enough. Conducting HRA in later design stages, though it may be adequate in capturing pre-, at-, and post-initiators comes short of informing the design itself in the iterative design lifecycle. Hence, this paper presents a framework to include HRA during the design's early stages, pre-conceptual or conceptual. The proposed framework provides a process for the removal of operator actions that do not contribute to the risk and the identification of all key operator actions that are critical to the safety of the design. The results of this framework are then used to inform the design of those safety-related operator actions to update the design further. Then, using information from the updated design, this framework can be reapplied to investigate the impact of the design update on human reliability. The PRA model of the X-energy's pre-conceptual Xe-100 high-temperature gas-cooled pebble-bed reactor (HTGR-PB) design is used to demonstrate the approach. In the pre-conceptual Xe-100 PRA model, also called Phase 0 PRA model, human actions were considered an integral part of analyzing the plant response to different initiating events. Hence, in this paper, all possible human actions in the Xe-100 PRA model are identified, analyzed, and removed to emulate a design relying only on the available automated control systems. The preliminary results of this assessment show how safe the Xe-100 design is even without crediting any human actions. The results also list necessary sequences in which operator actions are critical to the risk profile of the design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRS2014

Simulation Technology at NASA

NASA Ames Research Center is home to several high-fidelity research flight and air-traffic control simulation facilities which, together with an experienced workforce, produce high-quality research data and findings that have proven to be applicable in the real world. These assets include the Vertical Motion Simulator (VMS), Crew Vehicle Systems Research Facility (CVSRF), Future Flight Central (FFC) air traffic control tower simulator, and several air-traffic control (ATC) simulators. The VMS combines a high-fidelity simulation capability with an adaptable simulation environment, enabling customization for numerous human-in-the-loop research applications. The distinctive feature of the VMS is its unparalleled large amplitude, high-fidelity motion capability. In over 30 years of continuous operation, the VMS has contributed significantly to the body of knowledge in a range of disciplines directly benefiting several aerospace programs and flight safety, including the design and development of flight control systems for the Joint Strike Fighter, Space Shuttle Orbiter, and rotorcraft. It continues to be used for researching new vehicle configurations, vehicle control and safety, transfer-of-training, etc., by NASA, other government agencies, and Industry.The CVSRF includes two motion-based flight simulators: a Boeing 747-400 full flight simulator and the reconfigurable Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator (ACFS). These simulators are primarily used to research air-traffic management concepts and procedures, advanced navigation and avionics concepts, and cockpit human factors. FFC is a full-sized control tower simulator with a 360-degree external field-of-view display system and reconfigurable system architecture. FFC and the ATC simulators are used for testing air-traffic management automation and decision support tools and demonstrate their feasibility in a realistic environment prior to technology transfer for implementation in the National Airspace System (NAS).To support integrated simulations and flight-tests for NASA's Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project, NASA developed a distributed test environment incorporating Live, Virtual, Constructive, (LVC) concepts. Development of the software enabling the LVC is conducted primarily at the Distributed Simulation Research Lab (DSRL) at NASA Ames. The LVC components provide the core infrastructure supporting simulation of UAS operations by integrating live and virtual aircraft in a realistic air traffic environment. This provides the ability to conduct tests more efficiently by promoting the use of existing distributed assets. The LVC infrastructure was used in several human-in-the-loop simulations to evaluate acceptance of Detect and Avoid (DAA) advisories used by UAS pilots to maintain well clear of other virtual traffic and to negotiate maneuvers with air traffic control. It is currently being used to support testing of self-separation algorithms between unmanned and manned aircraft in live flight. Further simulations with more comprehensive air traffic scenarios mixing live and virtual aircraft is planned.In the current fiscal environment, maintaining and upgrading these high-fidelity simulation assets and retaining the skilled workforce necessary to meet future research needs is the primary non-technical challenge.

CVSRF↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Error Analysis for Human-Rated Space Systems

Humans bring unique capabilities to space systems and contribute to mission success in a manner that cannot be matched by machines. Nevertheless, from time to time, human error can present a threat to system performance, and system designers must anticipate and manage this risk. NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems call for program managers to conduct a human error analysis (HEA) during system development but does not specify how to do this. In 2018, NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center asked the authors to develop a guidance document on HEA. The resulting position paper outlines a suggested method for HEA and makes it clear that error analysis is about identifying and mitigating problems at a system level, and not about finding fault with individuals. Error management strategies must be directed at error-producing conditions, thereby reducing the likelihood of human error, while retaining the positive contribution that humans make to system operations.

human error human-rated space↗

NASA NTRS1993

EMS helicopter incidents reported to the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

The objectives of this evaluation were to: Identify the types of safety-related incidents reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in Emergency Medical Service (EMS) helicopter operations; Describe the operational conditions surrounding these incidents, such as weather, airspace, flight phase, time of day; and Assess the contribution to these incidents of selected human factors considerations, such as communication, distraction, time pressure, workload, and flight/duty impact.

Connell, Linda J.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Shared Problem Models and Crew Decision Making

The importance of crew decision making to aviation safety has been well established through NTSB accident analyses: Crew judgment and decision making have been cited as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents in commercial air transport, general aviation, and military aviation. Yet the bulk of research on decision making has not proven helpful in improving the quality of decisions in the cockpit. One reason is that traditional analytic decision models are inappropriate to the dynamic complex nature of cockpit decision making and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions. A new model of dynamic naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove more useful for training or aiding cockpit decision making. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulation and National Transportation Safety Board accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good decisions. In brief, good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation and reflect the crew's metacognitive skill. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relation between communication that serves to build performance. Implications of these findings for crew training will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

NASA NTRS1991

Human factors of flight-deck checklists: The normal checklist

Although the aircraft checklist has long been regarded as the foundation of pilot standardization and cockpit safety, it has escaped the scrutiny of the human factors profession. The improper use, or the non-use, of the normal checklist by flight crews is often cited as the probable cause or at least a contributing factor to aircraft accidents. An attempt is made to analyze the normal checklist, its functions, format, design, length, usage, and the limitations of the humans who must interact with it. The development of the checklist from the certification of a new model to its delivery and use by the customer are discussed. The influence of the government, particularly the FAA Principle Operations Inspector, the manufacturer's philosophy, the airline's culture, and the end user, the pilot, influence the ultimate design and usage of this device. The effects of airline mergers and acquisitions on checklist usage and design are noted. In addition, the interaction between production pressures and checklist usage and checklist management are addressed. Finally, a list of design guidelines for normal checklists is provided.

Degani, Asaf↗

NASA NTRS2016

Piloted Well Clear Performance Evaluation of Detect and Avoid Systems with Suggestive Guidance

Regulations to establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being developed by a consortium of government, industry and academic institutions (RTCA, 2013). Those requirements will apply to the new detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate UAS with the United States (U.S) National Airspace System (NAS) and will be determined according to their contribution to the overall safety case. That safety case requires demonstration that DAA-equipped UAS collectively operating in the NAS meet an airspace safety threshold (AST). Several key gaps must be closed in order to link equipment requirements to an airspace safety case. Foremost among these is calculation of the systems risk ratio, the degree to which a particular system mitigates violation of an aircraft separation standard (FAA, 2013). The risk ratio of a DAA system, in combination with risk ratios of other collision mitigation mechanisms, will determine the overall safety of the airspace measured in terms of the number of collisions per flight hour. It is not known what the effectiveness is of a pilot-in-the-loop DAA system or even what parameters of the DAA system most improve the pilots ability to maintain separation. The relationship between the DAA system design and the overall effectiveness of the DAA system that includes the pilot, expressed as a risk ratio, must be determined before DAA operational and performance requirements can be finalized. Much research has been devoted to integrating UAS into non-segregated airspace (Dalamagkidis, 2009, Ostwald, 2007, Gillian, 2012, Hesselink, 2011, Santiago, 2015, Rorie 2015 and 2016). Several traffic displays intended for use as part of a DAA system have gone through human-in-the-loop simulation and flight-testing. Most of these evaluations were part of development programs to produce a deployable system, so it is unclear how to generalize particular aspects of those designs to general requirements for future traffic displays (Calhoun, 2014). Other displays have undergone testing to collect data that may generalize to new displays, but have not been evaluated in the context of the development of an overall safety case for UAS equipped with DAA systems in the NAS (Bell, 2012). Other research efforts focus on DAA surveillance performance and separation standards. Together with this work, they are expected to facilitate validation of the airspace safety case (Park, 2014 and Johnson, 2015). The contribution of the present work is to quantify the effectiveness of the pilot-automation system to remain well clear as a function of display features and surveillance sensor error. This quantification will help enable selection of a minimum set of DAA design features that meets the AST, a set that may not be unique for all UAS platforms. A second objective is to collect and analyze pilot performance parameters that will improve the modeling of overall DAA system performance in non-human-in-the-loop simulations. Simulating the DAA-equipped UAS in such batch experiments will allow investigation of a much larger number of encounters than is possible in human simulations. This capability is necessary to demonstrate that a particular set of DAA requirements meets the AST under all foreseeable operational conditions.

detect and avoid↗

NASA NTRS2017

National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Partnered Development of Cryogenic Life Support Technologies

Cryogenic life support technology, used by NASA to protect crews working around hazardous gases soon could be called on for a number of life-saving applications as well as the agency's new human spaceflight endeavors. This technology under development in Kennedy Space Center's Biomedical Laboratory has the potential to store more than twice the amount of breathable air than traditional compressed gas systems. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is contributing to the funding for this project in the hopes that the liquid air-based systems could change the way workers dependent on life support technologies accomplish their mission, improving their safety and efficiency.

NIOSH↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

ATTRACTOR: Toward Trustworthy and Trusted Autonomous Systems

The question of what it means and what it takes for an autonomous system to consider another autonomous system justifiably trustworthy must be addressed by all who seek to integrate intelligent machine agents into real-world operations. A satisfactory answer to this question is an essential component in accepting autonomous machine decision-making in safety-critical and time-critical environments, such as aviation. Historically, simulation platforms for test and evaluation of complex systems have proven to be effective in assessing performance and contributing to decisions on the fitness of systems to operate in current general and commercial aviation airspace. Moreover, simulations have informed the definition of safety-critical constraints. However, as machine systems progressively take on responsibilities for decision-making traditionally supplied by humans, simulations require enhancement. Mixed reality simulation that integrates real-world platforms and data or high-fidelity simulation data in a sim-to-flight paradigm provides insight into agent interaction and the rationale behind autonomous agent decision-making as well as the capacity for seamless integrated implementation, testing, and operation of systems. Strong simulation capabilities are especially important in the presence of algorithms that hold great promise in decision-making yet increase the uncertainty in the system. Autonomy Teaming and TRAjectories for Complex Trusted Operational Reliability (ATTRACTOR) is a subproject of NASA’s Convergent Aeronautics Solutions (CAS) Project. ATTRACTOR’s objective is to build a basis for understanding trust and trustworthiness in multi-agent autonomous teams, and thus to inform future certification of safety-critical and time-critical autonomous systems in aviation. Because the concepts of trust and trustworthiness must be addressed in a context, ATTRACTOR has chosen Search and Rescue (SAR) in dynamic and unstructured environments, with emphasis on search, as its design reference mission (DRM). During dynamic planning and execution of trajectory-based operations, autonomous agents determine their trajectories given an assigned mission or missions and call for assistance from an appropriate teammate when needed. This experience along with the attendant human-machine and machine-machine interactions, serve as a platform for developing approaches to identifying and measuring trustworthiness and increasing trust. In this paper, we give an overview of some of ATTRACTOR’s research and development activities, findings, and ongoing work.

ATTRACTOR↗

NASA NTRS2014

A Comprehensive Analysis of the X-15 Flight 3-65 Accident

The November 15, 1967, loss of X-15 Flight 3-65-97 (hereafter referred to as Flight 3-65) was a unique incident in that it was the first and only aerospace flight accident involving loss of crew on a vehicle with an adaptive flight control system (AFCS). In addition, Flight 3-65 remains the only incidence of a single-pilot departure from controlled flight of a manned entry vehicle in a hypersonic flight regime. To mitigate risk to emerging aerospace systems, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) proposed a comprehensive review of this accident. The goal of the assessment was to resolve lingering questions regarding the failure modes of the aircraft systems (including the AFCS) and thoroughly analyze the interactions among the human agents and autonomous systems that contributed to the loss of the pilot and aircraft. This document contains the outcome of the accident review.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Development of a Laboratory for Improving Communication between Air Traffic Controllers and Pilots

Runway incursions and other surface incidents are known to be significant threats to aviation safety and efficiency. Though the number of near mid-air collisions in U.S. air space has remained unchanged during the last five years, the number of runway incursions has increased and they are almost all due to human error. The three most common factors contributing to air traffic controller and pilot error in airport operations include two that involve failed auditory communication. This project addressed the problems of auditory communication in air traffic control from an acoustical standpoint, by establishing an acoustics laboratory designed for this purpose and initiating research into selected topics that show promise for improving voice communications between air traffic controllers and pilots.

Brammer, Anthony↗

NASA NTRS2016

Commercial Crew Program and the Safety Technical Review Board

The Commercial Crew Program (CCP) is unique to any other program office at NASA. After the agency suffered devastating budget cuts and the Shuttle Program retired, the U.S. gave up its human spaceflight capabilities. Since 2011 the U.S. has been dependent on Russia to transport American astronauts and cargo to the International Space Station (ISS) and back. NASA adapted and formed CCP, which gives private, domestic, aerospace companies unprecedented reign over America's next ride to space. The program began back in 2010 with 5 companies and is now in the final phase of certification with 2 commercial partners. The Commercial Crew Program is made up of 7 divisions, each working rigorously with the commercial providers to complete the certification phase. One of these 7 divisions is Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) which is partly comprised of the Safety Technical Review Board (STRB). The STRB is primarily concerned with mitigating improbable, but catastrophic hazards. It does this by identifying, managing, and tracking these hazards in reports. With the STRB being in SE&I, it significantly contributes to the overall certification of the partners' vehicles. After the partners receive agency certification approval, they will have the capability to provide the U.S. with a reliable, safe, and cost-effective means of human spaceflight and cargo transport to the ISS and back.

crew transportation system↗

DOE OSTI2020

The 20th Gray lecture 2019: Health and heavy ions

Particle radiobiology has contributed new understanding of radiation safety and underlying mechanisms of action to radiation oncology for the treatment of cancer, and to planning of radiation protection for space travel. This manuscript will highlight the significance of precise physical and biologically effective dosimetry to this translational research for the benefit of human health. This review provides a brief snapshot of the evolving scientific basis for, and the complex current global status, and remaining challenges of hadron therapy for the treatment of cancer. The need for particle radiobiology for risk planning in return missions to the Moon, and exploratory deep-space missions to Mars and beyond are also discussed.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗