Addressing Human Error in International Space Station Flight Control Teams: Advances in Ground Training for Science Operators
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Human error is a primary or contributing factor in about two-thirds of commercial aviation accidents worldwide. With the ultimate goal of reducing pilot error accidents, this contract effort is aimed at understanding the factors underlying error events and reducing the probability of certain types of errors by modifying underlying factors such as flight deck design and procedures. A review of the literature relevant to error classification was conducted. Classification includes categorizing types of errors, the information processing mechanisms and factors underlying them, and identifying factor-mechanism-error relationships. The classification scheme developed by Jens Rasmussen was adopted because it provided a comprehensive yet basic error classification shell or structure that could easily accommodate addition of details on domain-specific factors. For these purposes, factors specific to the aviation environment were incorporated. Hypotheses concerning the relationship of a small number of underlying factors, information processing mechanisms, and error types types identified in the classification scheme were formulated. ASRS data were reviewed and a simulation experiment was performed to evaluate and quantify the hypotheses.
Human factors and ergonomics have played an essential role in increasing the safety and performance of operators in the nuclear energy industry. In this critical review, we examine how artificial intelligence (AI) technologies can be leveraged to mitigate human errors, thereby improving the safety and performance of operators in nuclear power plants (NPPs). First, we discuss the various causes of human errors in NPPs. Next, we examine the ways in which AI has been introduced to and incorporated into different types of operator support systems to mitigate these human errors. We specifically examine (1) operator support systems, including decision support systems, (2) sensor fault detection systems, (3) operation validation systems, (4) operator monitoring systems, (5) autonomous control systems, (6) predictive maintenance systems, (7) automated text analysis systems, and (8) safety assessment systems. Finally, we provide some of the shortcomings of the existing AI technologies and discuss the challenges still ahead for their further adoption and implementation to provide future research directions.
Nearly all activities that involve human interaction with nuclear power plant systems are guided by procedures, instructions, or checklists. Paper-based procedures (PBPs) currently used by most utilities have a demonstrated history of ensuring safety; however, improving procedure use could yield significant savings in increased efficiency, as well as improved safety through human performance gains. The nuclear industry is constantly trying to find ways to decrease human error rates, especially human error rates associated with procedure use. As a step toward the goal of improving field workers’ procedure use and adherence and hence improve human performance and overall system reliability, the U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program researchers, together with the nuclear industry, have been investigating the possibility and feasibility of replacing current paper-based procedures with computer-based procedures (CBPs). PBPs have ensured safe operation of plants for decades, but limitations in paper-based systems do not allow them to reach the full potential for procedures to prevent human errors. The environment in a nuclear power plant is constantly changing, depending on current plant status and operating mode. PBPs, which are static by nature, are being applied to a constantly changing context. This constraint often results in PBPs that are written in a manner that is intended to cover many potential operating scenarios. Hence, the procedure layout forces the operator to search through a large amount of irrelevant information to locate the pieces of information relevant for the task and situation at hand, which has potential consequences of taking up valuable time when operators must be responding to the situation, and potentially leading operators down an incorrect response path. Other challenges related to use of PBPs are management of multiple procedures, place-keeping, finding the correct procedure for a task, and relying on other sources of additional information to ensure a functional and accurate understanding of the current plant status (Converse, 1995; Fink, Killian, Hanes, and Naser, 2009; Le Blanc, Oxstrand, and Waicosky, 2012). This report provides design guidance to be used when designing the human-system interaction and the design of the graphical user interface for a CBP system. The guidance is based on human factors research related to the design and usability of CBPs conducted by Idaho National Laboratory, 2012 - 2016.
Human reliability analysis (HRA) evaluates human errors and provides human error probabilities (HEPs) for application in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), which is a comprehensive safety assessment method for nuclear power plants (NPPs). Generally, HRA methods estimate HEPs based on human reliability data collected from actual historical measurement, simulator experiments, or expert judgement. Most recent HRA data collection studies focus on collecting data via full-scope main control room (MCR) simulators with actual licensed reactor operators. Contrary to this, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has adopted a different approach, which attempts to collect HRA data based on experiment using simplified simulators and student participants by following the Simplified Human Error Experimental Program (SHEEP). This approach has a couple of advantages compared to full-scope data collection. Representatively, it has relatively low entry point for collecting HRA data, and secures large sample sizes with reasonable cost and labor. In the previous studies, we developed the SHEEP framework, then verified whether the data collected through the framework could support a representative full-scope data collection study, i.e., the Human Reliability Data Extraction (HuREX) study. Also, we analyzed human performance measurements depending on participant type (i.e., student vs. operator). In this paper, we analyze human performance data collected from an experiment comparing operator expertise and simulator complexity when using the more simplified simulator developed by INL, i.e., Rancor Microworld and the less simplified simulator, i.e., Compact Nuclear Simulator (CNS) developed by Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests and correlation analysis are used for analyzing the experimental data.
Dependence in human reliability analysis (HRA) is the concept that once an initial human error has occurred, subsequent human errors are more likely. The approach almost universally adopted in HRA was first introduced in the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP). In THERP, calculated human error probabilities (HEPs) are adjusted for dependence in the final step of quantification. This final adjustment for dependence involves anchoring the HEP to a set of values corresponding to low through complete dependence. The effect is to increase the HEP. In this paper, we propose formative dependence, which occurs at the onset of quantification. We demonstrate that dependence should be considered earlier in the calculation process, because it is not actually necessary to calculate the HEP when it is subsequently overridden by the dependence anchors. By applying dependence first in the calculation, processing steps can be eliminated, making for more efficient analysis.
For many decades, PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) or PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) techniques have been used to enhance the operational safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs) based on the consideration of potential hazards that could result in an unexpected consequence. As human error is one of the potential hazards, diverse human reliability analysis (HRA) methods have been proposed to provide a systematic way to estimate the likelihood of human errors (i.e., human error probability, HEP) in specific task contexts. Accordingly, it is evident that the quality of HRA results strongly depends on the credibility of HEP estimations. This implies that, in terms of enhancing this credibility, the collection of raw information (HRA data) that is helpful for understating when and why human errors occur is a crucial issue. In order to address this issue, in this study, the feasibility of a framework to integrate HRA data obtained from different sources is investigated based on the complexity of proceduralized tasks.
Methods, computer-readable media, and systems for automatically performing Human Factors Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for a process are provided. At least one task involved in a process is identified, where the task includes at least one human activity. The human activity is described using at least one verb. A human error potentially resulting from the human activity is automatically identified, the human error is related to the verb used in describing the task. A likelihood of occurrence, detection, and correction of the human error is identified. The severity of the effect of the human error is identified. The likelihood of occurrence, and the severity of the risk of potential harm is identified. The risk of potential harm is compared with a risk threshold to identify the appropriateness of corrective measures.
Aerospace electrical systems are required to withstand and adequately operate in extremely harsh environments that include, for example, high radiation exposure, temperature extremes, intense vibrational stress and drastic temperature cycling. The nature of aerospace electronics also demands high reliability since, with very few exceptions, there is no chance for hardware servicing or repairs. Common risk mitigation techniques for this type of situation are to perform a Reliability Analysis of the system throughout the development cycle, and to use electrical components that are regarded as “high reliability” because of additional controls and requirements applied in their design, manufacturing and testing. Unfortunately, studies have shown that even though these techniques are used, many systems fail to meet mission requirements well before the predicted lifetimes. This paper presents the analysis of failures of electrical parts, experienced during various stages of system development, at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt MD, between the years 2001 and 2013. These components were subjected to qualification, screening and testing in which the goal was to ensure that the components would survive the stresses of the mission. The analysis categorizes failures by part type and failure mechanisms. One of the results of the analysis was the realization that a surprising proportion of failures experienced during system integration and testing were caused by human error (i.e. human induced defect). Further analysis included the determination of root failure mechanisms and any influencing factors contributing to these failures. The major causes of these defects were attributed to electrostatic damage (ESD), electrical overstress (EOS), mechanical overstress (MOS), and thermal overstress (TOS). Finally, the study proposes a risk analysis tool which incorporates these major causes for the failures, termed error-producing conditions (EPCs), and a proportionality factor representing the number of each type of failure that has occurred at the facility under study. These factors are quantified and used to communicate the risk of human induced defects for the assembly, integration and testing of space hardware based on the system’s electrical parts list. The new risk identification can trigger risk-mitigating actions more effectively, based on the presence of component categories or other hazardous conditions that have a history of failure due to human error.
Abstract This study addressed the cognitive impacts of providing correct and incorrect machine learning (ML) outputs in support of an object detection task. The study consisted of five experiments that manipulated the accuracy and importance of mock ML outputs. In each of the experiments, participants were given the T and L task with T-shaped targets and L-shaped distractors. They were tasked with categorizing each image as target present or target absent. In Experiment 1, they performed this task without the aid of ML outputs. In Experiments 2–5, they were shown images with bounding boxes, representing the output of an ML model. The outputs could be correct (hits and correct rejections), or they could be erroneous (false alarms and misses). Experiment 2 manipulated the overall accuracy of these mock ML outputs. Experiment 3 manipulated the proportion of different types of errors. Experiments 4 and 5 manipulated the importance of specific types of stimuli or model errors, as well as the framing of the task in terms of human or model performance. These experiments showed that model misses were consistently harder for participants to detect than model false alarms. In general, as the model’s performance increased, human performance increased as well, but in many cases the participants were more likely to overlook model errors when the model had high accuracy overall. Warning participants to be on the lookout for specific types of model errors had very little impact on their performance. Overall, our results emphasize the importance of considering human cognition when determining what level of model performance and types of model errors are acceptable for a given task.
The nuclear industry is constantly trying to find ways to decrease the human error rate, especially the human errors associated with procedure use. As a step toward the goal of improving procedure use performance, researchers, together with the nuclear industry, have been looking at replacing the current paper-based procedures with computer-based procedure systems. The concept of computer-based procedures is not new by any means; however most research has focused on procedures used in the main control room. Procedures reviewed in these efforts are mainly emergency operating procedures and normal operating procedures. Based on lessons learned for these previous efforts we are now exploring a more unknown application for computer based procedures - field procedures, i.e. procedures used by nuclear equipment operators and maintenance technicians. The Idaho National Laboratory and participants from the U.S. commercial nuclear industry are collaborating in an applied research effort with the objective of developing requirements and specifications for a computer-based procedure system to be used by field workers. The goal is to identify the types of human errors that can be mitigated by using computer-based procedures and how to best design the computer-based procedures to do so. This paper describes the development of a Model of Procedure Use and the qualitative study on which the model is based. The study was conducted in collaboration with four nuclear utilities and five research institutes. During the qualitative study and the model development requirements and for computer-based procedures were identified.
The nuclear industry is constantly trying to find ways to decrease the human error rate, especially the human errors associated with procedure use. As a step toward the goal of improving procedure use performance, researchers, together with the nuclear industry, have been looking at replacing the current paper-based procedures with computer-based procedure systems. The concept of computer-based procedures is not new by any means; however most research has focused on procedures used in the main control room. Procedures reviewed in these efforts are mainly emergency operating procedures and normal operating procedures. Based on lessons learned for these previous efforts we are now exploring a more unknown application for computer based procedures - field procedures, i.e. procedures used by nuclear equipment operators and maintenance technicians. The Idaho National Laboratory, the Institute for Energy Technology, and participants from the U.S. commercial nuclear industry are collaborating in an applied research effort with the objective of developing requirements and specifications for a computer-based procedure system to be used by field operators. The goal is to identify the types of human errors that can be mitigated by using computer-based procedures and how to best design the computer-based procedures to do this. The underlying philosophy in the research effort is “Stop – Start – Continue”, i.e. what features from the use of paper-based procedures should we not incorporate (Stop), what should we keep (Continue), and what new features or work processes should be added (Start). One step in identifying the Stop – Start – Continue was to conduct a baseline study where affordances related to the current usage of paper-based procedures were identified. The purpose of the study was to develop a model of paper based procedure use which will help to identify desirable features for computer based procedure prototypes. Affordances such as note taking, markups, sharing procedures between fellow coworkers, the use of multiple procedures at once, etc. were considered. The model describes which affordances associated with paper based procedures should be transferred to computer-based procedures as well as what features should not be incorporated. The model also provides a means to identify what new features not present in paper based procedures need to be added to the computer-based procedures to further enhance performance. The next step is to use the requirements and specifications to develop concepts and prototypes of computer-based procedures. User tests and other data collection efforts will be conducted to ensure that the real issues with field procedures and their usage are being addressed and solved in the best manner possible. This paper describes the baseline study, the construction of the model of procedure use, and the requirements and specifications for computer-based procedures that were developed based on the model. It also addresses how the model and the insights gained from it were used to develop concepts and prototypes for computer based procedures.
This report documents the scoping study of developing generic simplified fuel damage risk models for quantitative analysis from inadvertent reactivity insertion events during shutdown (SD) in light water pressurized and boiling water reactors. In the past, nuclear fuel reactivity accidents have been analyzed both mainly deterministically and probabilistically for at-power and SD operations of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Since then, many NPPs had power up-rates and longer refueling intervals, which resulted in fuel configurations that may potentially respond differently (in an undesirable way) to reactivity accidents. Also, as shown in a recent event, several inadvertent operator actions caused potential nuclear fuel reactivity insertion accident during SD operations. The set inadvertent operator actions are likely to be plant- and operation-state specific and could lead to accident sequences. This study is an outcome of the concern which arose after the inadvertent withdrawal of control rods at Dresden Unit 3 in 2008 due to operator actions in the plant inadvertently three control rods were withdrawn from the reactor without knowledge of the main control room operator. The purpose of this Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) Model development project is to develop simplified SPAR Models that can be used by staff analysts to perform risk analyses of operating events and/or conditions occurring during SD operation. These types of accident scenarios are dominated by the operator actions, (e.g., misalignment of valves, failure to follow procedures and errors of commissions). Human error probabilities specific to this model were assessed using the methodology developed for SPAR model human error evaluations. The event trees, fault trees, basic event data and data sources for the model are provided in the report. The end state is defined as the reactor becomes critical. The scoping study includes a brief literature search/review of historical events, developments of a small set of comprehensive event trees and fault trees and recommendation for future work.
Purpose: Systems to ensure patient safety are of critical importance. The electronic incident reporting systems (IRS) of 2 large academic radiation oncology departments were evaluated for events that may be suitable for submission to a national reporting system (NRS). Methods and Materials: All events recorded in the combined IRS were evaluated from 2007 through 2010. Incidents were graded for potential severity using the validated French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) 5-point scale. These incidents were categorized into 7 groups: (1) human error, (2) software error, (3) hardware error, (4) error in communication between 2 humans, (5) error at the human-software interface, (6) error at the software-hardware interface, and (7) error at the human-hardware interface. Results: Between the 2 systems, 4407 incidents were reported. Of these events, 1507 (34%) were considered to have the potential for clinical consequences. Of these 1507 events, 149 (10%) were rated as having a potential severity of ≥2. Of these 149 events, the committee determined that 79 (53%) of these events would be submittable to a NRS of which the majority was related to human error or to the human-software interface. Conclusions: A significant number of incidents were identified in this analysis. The majority of events in this study were related to human error and to the human-software interface, further supporting the need for a NRS to facilitate field-wide learning and system improvement.
Most activities that involve human interaction with systems in a nuclear power plant are guided by procedures. Traditionally, the use of procedures has been a paper-based process that supports safe operation of the nuclear power industry. However, the nuclear industry is constantly trying to find ways to decrease the human error rate, especially the human errors associated with procedure use. Advances in digital technology make computer-based procedures (CBPs) a valid option that provides further enhancement of safety by improving human performance related to procedure use. The transition from paper-based procedures (PBPs) to CBPs creates a need for a computer-based procedure system (CBPS). A CBPS needs to have the ability to perform logical operations in order to adjust to the inputs received from either users or real time data from plant status databases. Without the ability for logical operations the procedure is just an electronic copy of the paper-based procedure. In order to provide the CBPS with the information it needs to display the procedure steps to the user, special care is needed in the format used to deliver all data and instructions to create the steps. The procedure should be broken down into basic elements and formatted in a standard method for the CBPS. One way to build the underlying data architecture is to use an Extensible Markup Language (XML) schema, which utilizes basic elements to build each step in the smart procedure. The attributes of each step will determine the type of functionality that the system will generate for that step. The CBPS will provide the context for the step to deliver referential information, request a decision, or accept input from the user. The XML schema needs to provide all data necessary for the system to accurately perform each step without the need for the procedure writer to reprogram the CBPS. The research team at the Idaho National Laboratory has developed a prototype CBPS for field workers as well as the underlying data structure for such CBPS. The objective of the research effort is to develop guidance on how to design both the user interface and the underlying schema. This paper will describe the result and insights gained from the research activities conducted to date.
Human error is a major contributor to accidents and performance losses in complex engineered systems. If one examines these human error caused failures further, a specific cause, the lack of situation awareness, has dominated as a major cause of human errors that instigate latent or catastrophic failures in complex systems. Studies of aviation accidents involving major air carriers revealed that situation awareness was the root cause of around 90% of accidents involving pilot error. Another study explored offshore drilling accidents involving human error and found that 40% of accidents were directly attributed to the loss of situation awareness. Studies of human errors in other domains such as nuclear power, air traffic control, process industry, and advanced driving show that loss of SA was a root cause in a majority of the events. Situation awareness-related failures are not only common but also costly and fatal (e.g., Bhopal Gas Leak, Air France 447 Flight Crash). Thus, the concept of situation awareness has emerged as an important construct in human factors, resulting in numerous models and measurement methods to aid in promoting appropriate levels of situation awareness.