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At least 73 records · Page 4

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DOE OSTI2025

Determination of Constraint-Independent Crack Tip Opening Angle for Stable Crack Growth in High-Strength Ductile Steels

The crack tip opening angle (CTOA) is one of fracture toughness parameters that has been used for decades in describing large stable crack growth in thin-walled aerospace structures under the low-constraint conditions. Recently, the pipeline industry has developed a growing interest in using the CTOA parameter to serve as the minimum required fracture toughness to arrest dynamic crack propagation in modern gas transmission pipelines made of high-strength ductile steel. To meet this industrial need, the CTOA test standard ASTM E3039 was therefore developed for measuring the constant critical CTOA. ASTM E3039 recommends a drop weight tearing test (DWTT) specimen with a shallow crack for standard CTOA testing, but its CTOA may depend on the low constraint condition of the DWTT specimen at the crack tip. Verifying the constraint independence of the DWTT-measured CTOA thus becomes indispensable for applying CTOA toughness to the running fracture control in the pipeline design. For this purpose, the present paper evaluates critical CTOA values in a set of fracture toughness tests on single-edge notched bend (SENB) specimens with shallow and deep cracks, based on four CTOA estimation models. Among these, the Ln(P)-LLD linear fit model is similar to that recommended by ASTM E3039 for CTOA calculation. Fracture test data for X80 pipeline steel and HY80 structural steel were considered in the CTOA evaluation. The results showed that the four CTOA models were able to determine a constraint independent CTOA value for stable crack growth in the SENB specimens. As a result, a single, reliable, constant CTOA value could be determined regardless of the specimen geometry or the crack-tip constraint conditions. Therefore, the CTOA measured using ASTM E3039 is constraint-independent and transferable to use in cases of actual cracks propagating in gas transmission pipelines.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2021

A model-independent data assimilation (MIDA) module and its applications in ecology

Abstract. Models are an important tool to predict Earth system dynamics. An accurate prediction of future states of ecosystems depends on not only model structures but also parameterizations. Model parameters can be constrained by data assimilation. However, applications of data assimilation to ecology are restricted by highly technical requirements such as model-dependent coding. To alleviate this technical burden, we developed a model-independent data assimilation (MIDA) module. MIDA works in three steps including data preparation, execution of data assimilation, and visualization. The first step prepares prior ranges of parameter values, a defined number of iterations, and directory paths to access files of observations and models. The execution step calibrates parameter values to best fit the observations and estimates the parameter posterior distributions. The final step automatically visualizes the calibration performance and posterior distributions. MIDA is model independent, and modelers can use MIDA for an accurate and efficient data assimilation in a simple and interactive way without modification of their original models. We applied MIDA to four types of ecological models: the data assimilation linked ecosystem carbon (DALEC) model, a surrogate-based energy exascale earth system model: the land component (ELM), nine phenological models and a stand-alone biome ecological strategy simulator (BiomeE). The applications indicate that MIDA can effectively solve data assimilation problems for different ecological models. Additionally, the easy implementation and model-independent feature of MIDA breaks the technical barrier of applications of data–model fusion in ecology. MIDA facilitates the assimilation of various observations into models for uncertainty reduction in ecological modeling and forecasting.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS1976

The development of the Poincare-similar elements with eccentric anomaly as the independent variable

A new set of element differential equations for the perturbed two-body motion is derived. The elements are canonical and are similar to the classical canonical Poincare elements, which have time as the independent variable. The phase space is extended by introducing the total energy and time as canonically conjugated variables. The new independent variable is, to within an additive constant, the eccentric anomaly. These elements are compared to the Kustaanheimo-Stiefel (KS) element differential equations, which also have the eccentric anomaly as the independent variable. For several numerical examples, the accuracy and stability of the new set are equal to those of the KS solution. This comparable accuracy result can probably be attributed to the fact that both sets have the same time element and very similar energy elements. The new set has only 8 elements, compared to 10 elements for the KS set. Both sets are free from singularities due to vanishing eccentricity and inclination.

Bond, V. R.↗

NASA NTRS1977

Assessment of Relative Velocity as Independent Variable for Space Shuttle First Stage Guidance Attitude Command Tables

The selection of relative velocity as the independent variable for the space shuttle first stage guidance attitude command tables was assessed to support the first stage guidance point design. The criterion for selecting the independent variable for first stage open loop guidance is to reduce or minimize performance dispersions, primarily those affecting structural loads. The products of angle of attack and angle of sideslip times dynamic pressure are used as load indicators, and minimizing their dispersions will indicate a minimum loads dispersion. Relative velocity is shown to be an acceptable steering independent variable.

Kimbrough, M.↗

NASA NTRS1983

Applicability of the independence principle to subsonic turbulent flow over a swept rearward-facing step

Prandtl (1946) has concluded that for yawed laminar incompressible flows the streamwise flow is independent of the spanwise flow. However, Ashkenas and Riddell (1955) have reported that for turbulent flow the 'independence principle' does not apply to yawed flat plates. On the other hand, it was also found that this principle may be applicable to many turbulent flows. As the sweep angle is increased, a sweep angle is reached which defines the interval over which the 'independence principle' is valid. The results obtained in the present investigation indicate the magnitude of the critical angle for subsonic turbulent flow over a swept rearward-facing step.

Selby, G. V.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Adaptive independent joint control of manipulators - Theory and experiment

The author presents a simple decentralized adaptive control scheme for multijoint robot manipulators based on the independent joint control concept. The proposed control scheme for each joint consists of a PID (proportional integral and differential) feedback controller and a position-velocity-acceleration feedforward controller, both with adjustable gains. The static and dynamic couplings that exist between the joint motions are compensated by the adaptive independent joint controllers while ensuring trajectory tracking. The proposed scheme is implemented on a MicroVAX II computer for motion control of the first three joints of a PUMA 560 arm. Experimental results are presented to demonstrate that trajectory tracking is achieved despite strongly coupled, highly nonlinear joint dynamics. The results confirm that the proposed decentralized adaptive control of manipulators is feasible, in spite of strong interactions between joint motions. The control scheme presented is computationally very fast and is amenable to parallel processing implementation within a distributed computing architecture, where each joint is controlled independently by a simple algorithm on a dedicated microprocessor.

Seraji, H.↗

NASA NTRS1989

A mass-independent sulfur isotope effect in the nonthermal formation

A nonmass-dependent sulfur isotope effect is present in the rotationally symmetric S2F10 molecule, produced in an electrical discharge through sulfur tetrafluoride. A similar isotopic fractionation was observed in the product S2F10 from the electrodissociation of SF5Cl and in the reaction between fluorine atoms produced by F2 photolysis and SF2, collectively ruling out the SF5 formation process as the source of the mass-independent fractionation. The secondary dissociation of S2F10 as a source of the mass-independent fractionation is ruled out by control S2F10 dissociation experiments which are shown to produce small mass-dependent fractionations. Mass-dependent effects such as sulfur isotopic exchange and secondary dissociation reactions are significant processes for the system under study, and have been quantitatively accounted for. The role of symmetry in nonmass-dependent isotope effects is strengthened by the present experiments, and the search and characterization of mass-independent effects is extended to sulfur-containing molecules.

Bains-Sahota, Swroop K.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power generation/fuel cell powerplant subsystem

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Generation (EPG)/Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP) hardware. The EPG/FCP hardware is required for performing functions of electrical power generation and product water distribution in the Orbiter. Specifically, the EPG/FCP hardware consists of the following divisions: (1) Power Section Assembly (PSA); (2) Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS); (3) Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS); and (4) Water Removal Subsystem (WRS). The IOA analysis process utilized available EPG/FCP hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Brown, K. L.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the rudder/speed brake subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism is documented. The function of the Rudder/Speedbrake (RSB) is to provide directional control and to provide a means of energy control during entry. The system consists of two panels on a vertical hinge mounted on the aft part of the vertical stabilizer. These two panels move together to form a rudder but split apart to make a speedbrake. The Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism consists of the following elements: (1) Power Drive Unit (PDU) which is composed of hydraulic valve module and a hydraulic motor-powered gearbox which contains differentials and mixer gears to provide PDU torque output; (2) four geared rotary actuators which apply the PDU generated torque to the rudder/speedbrake panels; and (3) ten torque shafts which join the PDU to the rotary actuators and interconnect the four rotary actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failures and causes. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical RSB failures which result in potential loss of vehicle control were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contaminators, and mechanical failures in gears and shafts.

Wilson, R. E.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power generation/power reactant storage and distribution subsystem

Gotch, S. M.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the guidance, navigation, and control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) is presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) Subsystem hardware are documented. The function of the GNC hardware is to respond to guidance, navigation, and control software commands to effect vehicle control and to provide sensor and controller data to GNC software. Some of the GNC hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed includes: hand controllers; Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA); Speed Brake Thrust Controller (SBTC); Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU); Star Tracker (ST); Crew Optical Alignment Site (COAS); Air Data Transducer Assembly (ADTA); Rate Gyro Assemblies; Accelerometer Assembly (AA); Aerosurface Servo Amplifier (ASA); and Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC). The IOA analysis process utilized available GNC hardware drawings, workbooks, specifications, schematics, and systems briefs for defining hardware assemblies, components, and circuits. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Trahan, W. H.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the nose wheel steering subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) hardware are documented. The NWS hardware provides primary directional control for the Orbiter vehicle during landing rollout. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The original NWS design was envisioned as a backup system to differential braking for directional control of the Orbiter during landing rollout. No real effort was made to design the NWS system as fail operational. The brakes have much redundancy built into their design but the poor brake/tire performance has forced the NSTS to upgrade NWS to the primary mode of directional control during rollout. As a result, a large percentage of the NWS system components have become Potential Critical Items (PCI).

Mediavilla, Anthony Scott↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the DPS subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) is presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to independently determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Data Processing System (DPS) hardware are documented. The DPS hardware is required for performing critical functions of data acquisition, data manipulation, data display, and data transfer throughout the Orbiter. Specifically, the DPS hardware consists of the following components: Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM); General Purpose Computer (GPC); Multifunction CRT Display System (MCDS); Data Buses and Data Bus Couplers (DBC); Data Bus Isolation Amplifiers (DBIA); Mass Memory Unit (MMU); and Engine Interface Unit (EIU). The IOA analysis process utilized available DPS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Due to the extensive redundancy built into the DPS the number of critical items are few. Those identified resulted from premature operation and erroneous output of the GPCs.

Lowery, H. J.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the atmospheric revitalization pressure control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Atmospheric Revitalization and Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS) are documented. The ARPCS hardware was categorized into the following subdivisions: (1) Atmospheric Make-up and Control (including the Auxiliary Oxygen Assembly, Oxygen Assembly, and Nitrogen Assembly); and (2) Atmospheric Vent and Control (including the Positive Relief Vent Assembly, Negative Relief Vent Assembly, and Cabin Vent Assembly). The IOA analysis process utilized available ARPCS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Saiidi, M. J.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the remote manipulator system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Remote Manipulator System (RMS) are documented. The RMS hardware and software are primarily required for deploying and/or retrieving up to five payloads during a single mission, capture and retrieve free-flying payloads, and for performing Manipulator Foot Restraint operations. Specifically, the RMS hardware consists of the following components: end effector; displays and controls; manipulator controller interface unit; arm based electronics; and the arm. The IOA analysis process utilized available RMS hardware drawings, schematics and documents for defining hardware assemblies, components and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 574 failure modes analyzed, 413 were determined to be PCIs.

Tangorra, F.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the orbiter main propulsion system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware are documented. The Orbiter MPS consists of two subsystems: the Propellant Management Subsystem (PMS) and the Helium Subsystem. The PMS is a system of manifolds, distribution lines and valves by which the liquid propellants pass from the External Tank (ET) to the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) and gaseous propellants pass from the SSMEs to the ET. The Helium Subsystem consists of a series of helium supply tanks and their associated regulators, check valves, distribution lines, and control valves. The Helium Subsystem supplies helium that is used within the SSMEs for inflight purges and provides pressure for actuation of SSME valves during emergency pneumatic shutdowns. The balance of the helium is used to provide pressure to operate the pneumatically actuated valves within the PMS. Each component was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticalities were assigned based on the worst possible effect of each failure mode. Of the 690 failure modes analyzed, 349 were determined to be PCIs.

Mcnicoll, W. J.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the instrumentation subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Instrumentation Subsystem are documented. The Instrumentation Subsystem (SS) consists of transducers, signal conditioning equipment, pulse code modulation (PCM) encoding equipment, tape recorders, frequency division multiplexers, and timing equipment. For this analysis, the SS is broken into two major groupings: Operational Instrumentation (OI) equipment and Modular Auxiliary Data System (MADS) equipment. The OI equipment is required to acquire, condition, scale, digitize, interleave/multiplex, format, and distribute operational Orbiter and payload data and voice for display, recording, telemetry, and checkout. It also must provide accurate timing for time critical functions for crew and payload specialist use. The MADS provides additional instrumentation to measure and record selected pressure, temperature, strain, vibration, and event data for post-flight playback and analysis. MADS data is used to assess vehicle responses to the flight environment and to permit correlation of such data from flight to flight. The IOA analysis utilized available SS hardware drawings and schematics for identifying hardware assemblies and components and their interfaces. Criticality for each item was assigned on the basis of the worst-case effect of the failure modes identified.

Howard, B. S.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the ascent thrust vector control actuator subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC) Actuator hardware are documented. The function of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuators (ATVC) is to gimbal the main engines to provide for attitude and flight path control during ascent. During first stage flight, the SRB nozzles provide nearly all the steering. After SRB separation, the Orbiter is steered by gimbaling of its main engines. There are six electrohydraulic servoactuators, one pitch and one yaw for each of the three main engines. Each servoactuator is composed of four electrohydraulic servovalve assemblies, one second stage power spool valve assembly, one primary piston assembly and a switching valve. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical failures resulting in loss of ATVC were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contamination and mechanical failures.

Wilson, R. E.↗