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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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64 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Tree rings reveal the transient risk of extinction hidden inside climate envelope forecasts

Given the importance of climate in shaping species’ geographic distributions, climate change poses an existential threat to biodiversity. Climate envelope modeling, the predominant approach used to quantify this threat, presumes that individuals in populations respond to climate variability and change according to species-level responses inferred from spatial occurrence data—such that individuals at the cool edge of a species’ distribution should benefit from warming (the “leading edge”), whereas individuals at the warm edge should suffer (the “trailing edge”). Using 1,558 tree-ring time series of an aridland pine (Pinus edulis) collected at 977 locations across the species’ distribution, we found that trees everywhere grow less in warmer-than-average and drier-than-average years. Ubiquitous negative temperature sensitivity indicates that individuals across the entire distribution should suffer with warming—the entire distribution is a trailing edge. Species-level responses to spatial climate variation are opposite in sign to individual-scale responses to time-varying climate for approximately half the species’ distribution with respect to temperature and the majority of the species’ distribution with respect to precipitation. These findings, added to evidence from the literature for scale-dependent climate responses in hundreds of species, suggest that correlative, equilibrium-based range forecasts may fail to accurately represent how individuals in populations will be impacted by changing climate. A scale-dependent view of the impact of climate change on biodiversity highlights the transient risk of extinction hidden inside climate envelope forecasts and the importance of evolution in rescuing species from extinction whenever local climate variability and change exceeds individual-scale climate tolerances.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Motivation and Design of the OCPP Security Service

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is conducting in-depth research aimed at exploring how zero trust security principles can be effectively applied to electric vehicle charging infrastructure. This investigation seeks to enhance the resilience and reliability of these systems against cyber threats, ensuring secure and uninterrupted access to charging services for electric vehicle users and electric supply. Zero trust is a security concept centered on the belief that system operators should not automatically trust users or systems based on their location, whether inside or outside the organization, but instead must verify everything trying to connect to their systems before granting access. A key aspect of the project is to demonstrate and validate zero trust approaches targeted to electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. It has been observed that both open-source and commercial solutions often overlook the specific protocols employed in managing EV charging stations and proceeded with a general, protocol-agnostic approach. While these strategies effectively block non-authorized routes to the charging infrastructure, they do not tackle the situations where attackers may exploit legitimate access channels, such as the inattentive operator model posited by the Idaho National Laboratory. To address this gap, this paper proposes and discusses a new security service targeted to the Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP), which is the de facto protocol for the management of charging stations and serves a critical role in the broader adoption of electric vehicles. The design and architecture of the proposed OCPP security service are discussed in detail, outlining how it aims to safeguard charging station management system (CSMS) functions. The service is particularly important in scenarios where the charging station operator (CSO), responsible for the maintenance and operation of charging stations, and the charging network provider (CNP), which manages the charging network's accessibility and billing, are separate entities. This distinction is crucial because CSOs and CNPs often have different priorities, objectives, and operational responsibilities, which may not always align perfectly. For instance, a CSO might prioritize uptime and customer satisfaction, while a CNP might focus on maximizing revenue and network utilization. Such misalignment can create security vulnerabilities, as each entity might implement different policies and standards, potentially leaving gaps in the overall security posture.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Analysis of Solids Obtained from 201O, 201P, 202A, and 202B Contactors in the Salt Waste Processing Facility

In December 2022, Savannah River Mission Completion personnel recovered solids samples from four contractors (EXT-001, EXT-007, EXT-031, and EXT-040) employed at the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). These solids were submitted to Savannah River National Laboratory for analysis and characterization. This Technical Report outlines the analytical findings and observations associated with these samples and explores the potential source of solid generation within the SWPF. The following conclusions are offered as a result of this work: the light color solids recovered from EXT-007 are consistent with crystallized, soluble salt components (such as sodium nitrate, sodium hydroxide, and sodium carbonate), all of which can be easily re-dissolved in process water and do not represent a threat to SWPF CSSX processing. While the light solids from the top of EXT-040 were not analyzed, it is believed that they share similar characteristics to those recovered from EXT-007; The dark color solids recovered from EXT-001, EXT-031, and the inside of EXT-040 appear to be complex, consisting of several different types of solids: High concentrations of mercury (Hg, 40-75% by mass) partially present as elemental Hg are consistent with the precipitation of Hg 0 /Hg 2+ from disproportionation of Hg + species in pH swing conditions; Moderate concentrations of titanium (Ti) (2-7%, by mass) are also present, often co-located with Hg. This is consistent with co-precipitation, entrainment, and/or amalgamation of Ti and Hg; Moderate concentrations of iron (Fe) (1-3%, by mass) are observed in SWPF solids and are likely attributable to erosion of stainless-steel components within the CSSX process; Small concentrations of tungsten (W) and cobalt (Co) (<1%, by mass) are observed in SWPF solids. The presence of these solids is consistent with the erosion of components coated with W and Co (e.g., Stellite); Small concentrations of aluminum (Al) (<1%, by mass) are observed in the form of gibbsite and potentially sodium aluminosilicate. The presence of these compounds is likely attributable to the pH swing observed between the scrub and extraction cycles within the CSSX process. The following recommendations are made as a result of this work: Testing should be performed to determine the chemical drivers, process, and mechanism of Hg precipitation in CSSX processing. Special care should be taken to include titanium in tests to evaluate the potential for co-precipitation, entrainment, and amalgamation; Hg-mitigation options that would minimize or eliminate risks of Hg precipitation and solids accumulation (e.g., Hg-absorption techniques, ion exchange/adsorbents, flowsheet changes, etc.) should be assessed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Threat Sources for Creating Synthetic Urban Search Data

Equivalent point source energy emission distributions were computed for various threat sources for use in simulating the detector responses for urban search scenarios. The sources include standard isotopic sources used in detector testing, medical and industrial sources occasionally encountered in urban searches, and several types of special nuclear materials. Most of the equivalent point source distributions represent small sources inside some amount of shielding, but the special nuclear material sources represent volumetrically distributed sources in spheres of metal. Text-based inputs for emission distributions are available for the Monte Carlo transport codes Monte Carlo N-Particle, SCALE/MAVRIC, and Omnibus/Shift, any of which can easily be converted to other formats. These sources were developed for use in the Radiological Anomaly Detection and Identification (RADAI) project and the follow-on project, the RADAI-Extended project, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

A cocrystal structure of dengue capsid protein in complex of inhibitor

Dengue virus (DENV) was listed as a top 10 public health threat by the World Health Organization in 2019. No clinically approved anti-DENV drug is currently available. Here we report the high-resolution cocrystal structure (1.5 Å) of the DENV-2 capsid protein in complex with an inhibitor that potently suppresses DENV-2 but not other DENV serotypes. The inhibitor induces a “kissing” interaction between two capsid dimers. The inhibitor-bound capsid tetramers are assembled inside virions, resulting in defective uncoating of nucleocapsid when infecting new cells. Resistant DENV-2 emerges through one mutation that abolishes hydrogen bonds in the capsid structure, leading to a loss of compound binding. Structure-based analysis has defined the amino acids responsible for the inhibitor’s inefficacy against other DENV serotypes. The results have uncovered an antiviral mechanism through inhibitor-induced tetramerization of the viral capsid and provided essential structural and functional knowledge for rational design of panserotype DENV capsid inhibitors.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Security Vulnerability and Mitigation in Photovoltaic Systems

Software and firmware vulnerabilities pose security threats to photovoltaic (PV) systems. When patches are not available or cannot be timely applied to fix vulnerabilities, it is important to mitigate vulnerabilities such that they cannot be exploited by attackers or their impacts will be limited when exploited. However, the vulnerability mitigation problem for PV systems has received little attention. This paper analyzes known security vulnerabilities in PV systems, proposes a multi-level mitigation framework and various mitigation strategies including neural network-based attack detection inside inverters, and develops a prototype system as a proof-of-concept for building vulnerability mitigation into PV system design.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Design and Evaluation of Zero Trust Architecture for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure: EVs @ Scale Series on EV Charging Station Cybersecurity

Implementing a zero trust architecture can significantly bolster the security of electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. EV charging infrastructure includes numerous networked interfaces, each of which can present potential vulnerabilities. When these vulnerabilities are exploited, they can compromise the entire system, leading to severe operational and security risks. Zero trust is a security model that operates on the principle of "never trust, always verify," which helps manage the attack surface and limit the scope of any potential compromises. Fundamentally, this model ensures that no entity, whether inside or outside the network, is trusted by default. The design principles of zero trust include continuous verification, strict deny-by-default access controls, and micro-segmentation. Continuous verification ensures that every request is thoroughly checked, regardless of its origin. Strict access controls enforce the principle of least privilege, allowing users and devices only the minimum necessary access to perform their functions. Micro-segmentation involves dividing the network into smaller, isolated segments to prevent lateral movement in case of a breach. In the context of EV charging infrastructure, zero trust can be implemented through various strategies. For example, multi-factor authentication (MFA) can be required for engineers to access the management interfaces and control systems of charging stations. Real-time monitoring and analysis of network traffic can help detect and respond to anomalies. Systems that do not need to communicate with each other can be micro-segmented to enhance security. All communications should adhere to predefined policies to be permitted. Additionally, encrypting communications can protect sensitive information exchanged between chargers and management systems. This paper presents a zero trust architecture specifically designed for EV charging infrastructure. Implementing zero trust not only mitigates risks but also builds a resilient infrastructure capable of withstanding and quickly recovering from cyber threats. The architecture addresses six defined security objectives. A comprehensive test plan is developed to assess the architecture against these objectives, and the results of the evaluation are reported. This approach is essential for maintaining the reliability and integrity of EV charging services in an increasingly interconnected and vulnerable digital landscape. This is the first in a planned series of papers exploring the implementation of zero trust in EV charging infrastructure. Each paper will delve into different aspects and applications of zero trust, highlighting how various work processes and requirements can lead to distinct architectural designs. These architectures will be tailored to address specific security challenges and operational needs within the EV charging ecosystem, ensuring a robust and adaptable security framework.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗