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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1991

Lessons learned in the development of the STOL intelligent tutoring system

Lessons learned during the development of the NASA Systems Test and Operations Language (STOL) Intelligent Tutoring System (ITS), being developed at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center are presented. The purpose of the intelligent tutor is to train STOL users by adapting tutoring based on inferred student strengths and weaknesses. This system has been under development for over one year and numerous lessons learned have emerged. These observations are presented in three sections, as follows. The first section addresses the methodology employed in the development of the STOL ITS and briefly presents the ITS architecture. The second presents lessons learned, in the areas of: intelligent tutor development; documentation and reporting; cost and schedule control; and tools and shells effectiveness. The third section presents recommendations which may be considered by other ITS developers, addressing: access, use and selection of subject matter experts; steps involved in ITS development; use of ITS interface design prototypes as part of knowledge engineering; and tools and shells effectiveness.

Seamster, Thomas↗
NASA NTRS1990

Planning and scheduling lessons learned study, executive summary

The study was performed to document the lessons on planning and scheduling activities for a number of missions and institutional facilities in such a way that they can be applied to future missions; to provide recommendations to both projects and Code 500 that will improve the end-to-end planning and scheduling process; and to identify what, if any, mission characteristics might be related to certain lessons learned. The results are a series of recommendations of both a managerial and technical nature related to the underlying lessons learned.

Robinson, Toni↗
NASA NTRS1991

Lessons learned and their application to program development and cultural issues

The main objectives of space product assurance are, in effect, the same as those of Total Quality Management (TQM) or its many variants. The most significant ingredients are the lessons learned and their application to ongoing and future programs as they are affected by changes in the cultural environment. The cultural issues which affect almost everything done in technical programs and projects are considered. Understanding the lessons learned and the synergism which results from this combination of knowledge, culture, and lessons learned is identified as crucial. A brief discussion of the closed loop linkage that should exist between the world of hands on activities and that of educational institutions is presented.

Roth, Gilbert L.↗
NASA NTRS1992

The role of failure/problems in engineering: A commentary of failures experienced - lessons learned

The written version of a series of seminars given to several aerospace companies and three NASA centers are presented. The results are lessons learned through a study of the problems experienced in 35 years of engineering. The basic conclusion is that the primary cause of problems has not been mission technologies, as important as technology is, but the neglect of basic principles. Undergirding this is the lack of a systems focus from determining requirements through design, verification, and operations phases. Many of the concepts discussed are fundamental to total quality management (TQM) and can be used to augment this product enhanced philosophy. Fourteen principles are addressed with problems experienced and are used as examples. Included is a discussion of the implication of constraints, poorly defined requirements, and schedules. Design guidelines, lessons learned, and future tasks are listed. Two additional sections are included that deal with personal lessons learned and thoughts on future thrusts (TQM).

Ryan, R. S.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Scheduling lessons learned from the Autonomous Power System

The Autonomous Power System (APS) project at NASA LeRC is designed to demonstrate the applications of integrated intelligent diagnosis, control, and scheduling techniques to space power distribution systems. The project consists of three elements: the Autonomous Power Expert System (APEX) for Fault Diagnosis, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR); the Autonomous Intelligent Power Scheduler (AIPS) to efficiently assign activities start times and resources; and power hardware (Brassboard) to emulate a space-based power system. The AIPS scheduler was tested within the APS system. This scheduler is able to efficiently assign available power to the requesting activities and share this information with other software agents within the APS system in order to implement the generated schedule. The AIPS scheduler is also able to cooperatively recover from fault situations by rescheduling the affected loads on the Brassboard in conjunction with the APEX FDIR system. AIPS served as a learning tool and an initial scheduling testbed for the integration of FDIR and automated scheduling systems. Many lessons were learned from the AIPS scheduler and are now being integrated into a new scheduler called SCRAP (Scheduler for Continuous Resource Allocation and Planning). This paper will service three purposes: an overview of the AIPS implementation, lessons learned from the AIPS scheduler, and a brief section on how these lessons are being applied to the new SCRAP scheduler.

Ringer, Mark J.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Lessons learned for composite structures

Lessons learned for composite structures are presented in three technology areas: materials, manufacturing, and design. In addition, future challenges for composite structures are presented. Composite materials have long gestation periods from the developmental stage to fully matured production status. Many examples exist of unsuccessful attempts to accelerate this gestation period. Experience has shown that technology transition of a new material system to fully matured production status is time consuming, involves risk, is expensive and should not be undertaken lightly. The future challenges for composite materials require an intensification of the science based approach to material development, extension of the vendor/customer interaction process to include all engineering disciplines of the end user, reduced material costs because they are a significant factor in overall part cost, and improved batch-to-batch pre-preg physical property control. Historical manufacturing lessons learned are presented using current in-service production structure as examples. Most producibility problems for these structures can be traced to their sequential engineering design. This caused an excessive emphasis on design-to-weight and schedule at the expense of design-to-cost. This resulted in expensive performance originated designs, which required costly tooling and led to non-producible parts. Historically these problems have been allowed to persist throughout the production run. The current/future approach for the production of affordable composite structures mandates concurrent engineering design where equal emphasis is placed on product and process design. Design for simplified assembly is also emphasized, since assembly costs account for a major portion of total airframe costs. The future challenge for composite manufacturing is, therefore, to utilize concurrent engineering in conjunction with automated manufacturing techniques to build affordable composite structures. Composite design experience has shown that significant weight savings have been achieved, outstanding fatigue and corrosion resistance have been demonstrated, and in-service performance has been very successful. Currently no structural design show stoppers exist for composite structures. A major lesson learned is that the full scale static test is the key test for composites, since it is the primary structural 'hot spot' indicator. The major durability issue is supportability of thin skinned structure. Impact damage has been identified as the most significant issue for the damage tolerance control of composite structures. However, delaminations induced during assembly operations have demonstrated a significant nuisance value. The future challenges for composite structures are threefold. Firstly, composite airframe weight fraction should increase to 60 percent. At the same time, the cost of composite structures must be reduced by 50 percent to attain the goal of affordability. To support these challenges it is essential to develop lower cost materials and processes.

Whitehead, R. S.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Lessons learned applying CASE methods/tools to Ada software development projects

This paper describes the lessons learned from introducing CASE methods/tools into organizations and applying them to actual Ada software development projects. This paper will be useful to any organization planning to introduce a software engineering environment (SEE) or evolving an existing one. It contains management level lessons learned, as well as lessons learned in using specific SEE tools/methods. The experiences presented are from Alpha Test projects established under the STARS (Software Technology for Adaptable and Reliable Systems) project. They reflect the front end efforts by those projects to understand the tools/methods, initial experiences in their introduction and use, and later experiences in the use of specific tools/methods and the introduction of new ones.

Blumberg, Maurice H.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Lessons Learned from the Clementine Mission

According to BMDO, the Clementine mission achieved many of its technology objectives during its flight to the Moon in early 1994 but, because of a software error, was unable to test the autonomous tracking of a cold target. The preliminary analyses of the returned lunar data suggest that valuable scientific measurements were made on several important topics but that COMPLEX's highest-priority objectives for lunar science were not achieved. This is not surprising given that the rationale for Clementine was technological rather than scientific. COMPLEX lists below a few of the lessons that may be learned from Clementine. Although the Clementine mission was not conceived as a NASA science mission exactly like those planned for the Discovery program, many operational aspects of the two are similar. It is therefore worthwhile to understand the strengths and faults of the Clementine approach. Some elements of the Clementine operation that led to the mission's success include the following: (1) The mission's achievements were the responsibility of a single organization and its manager, which made that organization and that individual accountable for the final outcome; (2) The sponsor adopted a hands-off approach and set a minimum number of reviews (three); (3) The sponsor accepted a reasonable amount of risk and allowed the project team to make the trade-offs necessary to minimize the mission's risks while still accomplishing all its primary objectives; and (4) The development schedule was brief and the agreed-on funding (and funding profile) was adhered to. Among the operational shortcomings of Clementine were the following: (1) An overly ambitious schedule and a slightly lean budget (meaning insufficient time for software development and testing, and leading ultimately to human exhaustion); and (2) No support for data calibration, reduction, and analysis. The principal lesson to be learned in this category is that any benefits from the constructive application of higher risk for lower cost and faster schedule will be lost if the schedule does not allow adequate time for the development of all essential systems or makes no allowance for human frailties. Another lesson to be drawn is that despite its limitations, if judged strictly as a science mission, Clementine attested that significant scientific information can be gathered during a technology-demonstration mission. In the current era of limited funds, when science missions will be infrequent, the opportunity to fly scientific instruments aboard missions whose objectives might be other than science must be seized and, indeed, encouraged. During such opportunities it would be inexcusable to do second-class science. Thus the scientific community must be actively involved in such projects from their initiation.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1998

NASA/Mir Phase 1: A Lesson Learned in Long Duration Mission Planning and Operations

The NASA/Mir Phase I Program is a precursor to the assembly and operations of the International Space Station (ISS). The Phase I Program covers a four-year period and encompasses over ten shuttle flights to the Mir, culminating with the flight of STS-91 in June 1998. The Mir-Orbiting Station (Mir-OS) provides an excellent environment, both onboard and on the ground, for learning and studying the characteristics associated with crew-tended operations on long duration missions. By the end of the Phase I program, NASA astronauts will have accumulated over two years of continuous operations experience working and living onboard the Mir-OS. Ground controllers, working in Russia and at remote sites in the United States, will have gained valuable experience in the generation, maintenance, and coordination of the information and products required to support the long duration crew members onboard the Mir-OS. The experience gained by the crew and ground support personnel in the area of long duration mission operations has resulted in a number of factors that need to be considered in the definition and implementation of the processes and products for the ISS. While there are many areas in which experience has been gained, this paper focuses on the lessons learned regarding the level of detail and flexibility of crew timelines. Provided in this paper is an overview of the characteristics associated with long duration mission timeline development and execution, a summary of applicable lessons learned identified and documented through participation in the NASA/Mir Phase I Program, a detailed discussion of "Gross Timelines" as implementation which addresses the lessons learned. Also discussed are the challenges that must be overcome in getting the ISS program to recognize, evaluate, and learn from the crew and ground controller experience gained through participation in the NASA/Mir Phase I Program.

Hagopian, Jeff↗
NASA NTRS2000

Development of X-33/X-34 Aerothermodynamic Data Bases: Lessons Learned and Future Enhancements

A synoptic of programmatic and technical lessons learned in the development of aerothermodynamic data bases for the X-33 and X-34 programs is presented in general terms and from the perspective of the NASA Langley Research Center Aerothermodynamics Branch. The format used is that of the "aerothermodynamic chain," the links of which are personnel, facilities, models/test articles, instrumentation, test techniques, and computational fluid dynamics (CFD). Because the aerodynamic data bases upon which the X-33 and X-34 vehicles will fly are almost exclusively from wind tunnel testing, as opposed to CFD, the primary focus of the lessons learned is on ground-based testing. The period corresponding to the development of X-33 and X-34 aerothermodynamic data bases was challenging, since a number of other such programs (e.g., X-38, X-43) competed for resources at a time of downsizing of personnel, facilities, etc., outsourcing, and role changes as NASA Centers served as subcontractors to industry. The impact of this changing environment is embedded in the lessons learned. From a technical perspective, the relatively long times to design and fabricate metallic force and moment models, delays in delivery of models, and a lack of quality assurance to determine the fidelity of model outer mold lines (OML) prior to wind tunnel testing had a major negative impact on the programs. On the positive side, the application of phosphor thermography to obtain global, quantitative heating distributions on rapidly fabricated ceramic models revolutionized the aerothermodynamic optimization of vehicle OMLs, control surfaces, etc. Vehicle designers were provided with aeroheating information prior to, or in conjunction with, aerodynamic information early in the program, thereby allowing trades to be made with both sets of input; in the past only aerodynamic data were available as input. Programmatically, failure to include transonic aerodynamic wind tunnel tests early in the assessment phase led to delays in the optimization phase, as OMLs required modification to provide adequate transonic aerodynamic performance without sacrificing subsonic and hypersonic performance. Funding schedules for industry, based on technical milestones, also presented challenges to aerothermodynamics seeking optimum flying characteristics across the subsonic to hypersonic speed regimes and minimum aeroheating. This paper is concluded with a brief discussion of enhancements in ground-based testing/CFD capabilities necessary to partially/fully satisfy future requirements.

Miller, C. G.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Unpressurized Logistics Carriers for the International Space Station: Lessons Learned

The International Space Station has been in development since 1984, and has recently begun on orbit assembly. Most of the hardware for the Space Station has been manufactured and the rest is well along in design. The major sets of hardware that are still to be developed for Space Station are the pallets and interfacing hardware for resupply of unpressurized spares and scientific payloads. Over the last ten years, there have been numerous starts, stops, difficulties and challenges encountered in this effort. The Space Station program is now entering the beginning of orbital operations. The Program is only now addressing plans to design and build the carriers that will be needed to carry the unpressurized cargo for the Space Station lifetime. Unpressurized carrier development has been stalled due to a broad range of problems that occurred over the years. These problems were not in any single area, but encompassed budgetary, programmatic, and technical difficulties. Some lessons of hindsight can be applied to developing carriers for the Space Station. Space Station teams are now attempting to incorporate the knowledge gained into the current development efforts for external carriers. In some cases, the impacts of these lessons are unrecoverable for Space Station, but can and should be applied to future programs. This paper examines the progress and problems to date with unpressurized carrier development identifies the lessons to be learned, and charts the course for finally accomplishing the delivery of these critical hardware sets.

Robbins, William W., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2001

NASA's Lessons Learned and Technical Standards: A Logical Marriage

Lessons Learned have been the basis for our accomplishments throughout the ages. They have been passed down from father to son, mother to daughter, teacher to pupil, and older to younger worker. Lessons Learned have also been the basis for NASA's accomplishments for more than forty years. Both government and industry have long recognized the need to systematically document and utilize the knowledge gained from past experiences in order to avoid the repetition of failures and mishaps. Lessons Learned have formed the foundation for discoveries, inventions, improvements, textbooks, and Technical Standards.

Gill, Paul↗
NASA NTRS2002

Lessons Learned In Developing Multiple Distributed Planning Systems for the International Space Station

The planning processes for the International Space Station (ISS) Program are quite complex. Detailed mission planning for ISS on-orbit operations is a distributed function. Pieces of the on-orbit plan are developed by multiple planning organizations, located around the world, based on their respective expertise and responsibilities. The "pieces" are then integrated to yield the final detailed plan that will be executed onboard the ISS. Previous space programs have not distributed the planning and scheduling functions to this extent. Major ISS planning organizations are currently located in the United States (at both the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) and NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)), in Russia, in Europe, and in Japan. Software systems have been developed by each of these planning organizations to support their assigned planning and scheduling functions. Although there is some cooperative development and sharing of key software components, each planning system has been tailored to meet the unique requirements and operational environment of the facility in which it operates. However, all the systems must operate in a coordinated fashion in order to effectively and efficiently produce a single integrated plan of ISS operations, in accordance with the established planning processes. This paper addresses lessons learned during the development of these multiple distributed planning systems, from the perspective of the developer of one of the software systems. The lessons focus on the coordination required to allow the multiple systems to operate together, rather than on the problems associated with the development of any particular system. Included in the paper is a discussion of typical problems faced during the development and coordination process, such as incompatible development schedules, difficulties in defining system interfaces, technical coordination and funding for shared tools, continually evolving planning concepts/requirements, programmatic and budget issues, and external influences. Techniques that mitigated some of these problems will also be addressed, along with recommendations for any future programs involving the development of multiple planning and scheduling systems. Many of these lessons learned are not unique to the area of planning and scheduling systems, so may be applied to other distributed ground systems that must operate in concert to successfully support space mission operations.

Maxwell, Theresa G.↗
NASA NTRS2003

MC-1 Engine Valves, Lessons Learned

Many lessons were learned during the development of the valves for the MC-1 engine. The purpose of this report is to focus on a variety of issues related to the engine valves and convey the lessons learned. This paper will not delve into detailed technical analysis of the components. None of the lessons learned are new or surprising, but simply reinforce the importance of addressing the details of the design early, at the component level. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Huntsville, Alabama developed the MC-1 engine, a LOX / FW-1, 60,000 pound thrust engine. This engine was developed under the Low Cost Boost Technology office at MSFC and proved to be a very successful project for the MSFC Propulsion team and the various subcontractors working the development of the engine and its components.

Laszar, John↗
NASA NTRS2002

Lessons Learned in Developing Multiple Distributed Planning Systems for the International Space Station

The planning processes for the International Space Station (ISS) Program are quite complex. Detailed mission planning for ISS on-orbit operations is a distributed function. Pieces of the on-orbit plan are developed by multiple planning organizations, located around the world, based on their respective expertise and responsibilities. The pieces are then integrated to yield the final detailed plan that will be executed onboard the ISS. Previous space programs have not distributed the planning and scheduling functions to this extent. Major ISS planning organizations are currently located in the United States (at both the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) and NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)), in Russia, in Europe, and in Japan. Software systems have been developed by each of these planning organizations to support their assigned planning and scheduling functions. Although there is some cooperative development and sharing of key software components, each planning system has been tailored to meet the unique requirements and operational environment of the facility in which it operates. However, all the systems must operate in a coordinated fashion in order to effectively and efficiently produce a single integrated plan of ISS operations, in accordance with the established planning processes. This paper addresses lessons learned during the development of these multiple distributed planning systems, from the perspective of the developer of one of the software systems. The lessons focus on the coordination required to allow the multiple systems to operate together, rather than on the problems associated with the development of any particular system. Included in the paper is a discussion of typical problems faced during the development and coordination process, such as incompatible development schedules, difficulties in defining system interfaces, technical coordination and funding for shared tools, continually evolving planning concepts/requirements, programmatic and budget issues, and external influences. Techniques that mitigated some of these problems will also be addressed, along with recommendations for any future programs involving the development of multiple planning and scheduling systems. Many of these lessons learned are not unique to the area of planning and scheduling systems, so may be applied to other distributed ground systems that must operate in concert to successfully support space mission operations.

Maxwell, Theresa G.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Engineering Lessons Learned and Technical Standards Integration: Capturing Key Technologies for Future Space Missions

Capturing engineering lessons learned derived from past experiences and new technologies, then integrating them with technical standards, provides a viable process for enhancing engineering capabilities. The development of future space missions will require ready access, not only to the latest technical standards, but also to lessons learned derived from past experiences and new technologies. The integration of this information such that it is readily accessible by engineering and programmatic personnel is a key aspect of enabling technology. This paper addresses the development of a new and innovative Lessons Learned/Best Practices/Applications Notes--Standards Integration System, including experiences with its initial implementation as a pilot effort within the NASA Technical Standards Program. Included are metrics on the Program, feedbacks from users, future plans, and key issues that are being addressed to expand the System's utility. The objective is the enhancement of engineering capabilities on all aspects of systems development applicable to the success of future space missions.

Mellen, Daniele P.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Lessons Learned (3 Years of H2O2 Propulsion System Testing Efforts at NASA's John C. Stennis Space Center)

John C. Stennis Space Center continues to support the Propulsion community in an effort to validate High-Test Peroxide as an alternative to existing/future oxidizers. This continued volume of peroxide test/handling activity at Stennis Space Center (SSC) provides numerous opportunities for the SSC team to build upon previously documented 'lessons learned'. SSC shall continue to strive to document their experience and findings as H2O2 issues surface. This paper is intended to capture all significant peroxide issues that we have learned over the last three years. This data (lessons learned) has been formulated from practical handling, usage, storage, operations, and initial development/design of our systems/facility viewpoint. The paper is intended to be an information type tool and limited in technical rational; therefore, presenting the peroxide community with some issues to think about as the continued interest in peroxide evolves and more facilities/hardware are built. These lessons learned are intended to assist industry in mitigating problems and identifying potential pitfalls when dealing with the requirements for handling high-test peroxide.

Taylor, Gary O.↗