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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2006

Design and Certification of the Extravehicular Activity Mobility Unit (EMU) Water Processing Jumper

The Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMUs) onboard the International Space Station (ISS) experienced a failure due to cooling water contamination from biomass and corrosion byproducts forming solids around the EMU pump rotor. The coolant had no biocide and a low pH which induced biofilm growth and corrosion precipitates, respectively. NASA JSC was tasked with building hardware to clean the ionic, organic, and particulate load from the EMU coolant loop before and after Extravehicular Activity (EVAs). Based on a return sample of the EMU coolant loop, the chemical load was well understood, but there was not sufficient volume of the returned sample to analyze particulates. Through work with EMU specialists, chemists, (EVA) Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) representation, safety and mission assurance, astronaut crew, and team engineers, requirements were developed for the EMU Water Processing hardware (sometimes referred to as the Airlock Coolant Loop Recovery [A/L CLR] system). Those requirements ranged from the operable level of ionic, organic, and particulate load, interfaces to the EMU, maximum cycle time, operating pressure drop, flow rate, and temperature, leakage rates, and biocide levels for storage. Design work began in February 2005 and certification was completed in April 2005 to support a return to flight launch date of May 12, 2005. This paper will discuss the details of the design and certification of the EMU Water Processing hardware and its components

Peterson, Laurie J.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Threads of Mission Success

This viewgraph presentation reviews the many parts of the JPL mission planning process that the project manager has to work with. Some of them are: NASA & JPL's institutional requirements, the mission systems design requirements, the science interactions, the technical interactions, financial requirements, verification and validation, safety and mission assurance, and independent assessment, review and reporting.

Industry Day↗
NASA NTRS2002

Probabilistic Design of a Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle Thermal Protection System

The driving requirement for design of a Mars Sample Return mission is to assure containment of the returned samples. Designing to, and demonstrating compliance with, such a requirement requires physics based tools that establish the relationship between engineer's sizing margins and probabilities of failure. The traditional method of determining margins on ablative thermal protection systems, while conservative, provides little insight into the actual probability of an over-temperature during flight. The objective of this paper is to describe a new methodology for establishing margins on sizing the thermal protection system (TPS). Results of this Monte Carlo approach are compared with traditional methods.

Dec, John A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Robust and Mass Efficient Thermal Protection Systems for Future Venus Missions

Several international Venus missions, both orbiter, and in-situ probe are in the works after a prolonged absence. Future missions are expected to be long-duration lander missions and balloon missions to investigate the cloud layer. The entry mass for these in-situ missions will be significantly higher, and the aeroshell will be larger, than previous missions. Two cardinal requirements govern the selection and use of thermal protection systems (TPS), namely, robustness to assure mission safety during entry and mass efficiency so that the useful mass for science is maximized. One cannot trade mission safety for mass when it comes to TPS. The robustness of the TPS is a paramount requirement as it is a single point of system failure. At the same time, TPS mass is carried for the entire mission duration prior to entry, and any excess TPS mass is at the cost of science payload. Future missions will benefit enormously from TPS options with mass and performance benefits far beyond advanced carbon-carbon (ACC) that is currently proposed for the DAVINCI mission. NASA STMD, and SMD jointly invested in the development of 3-D woven thermal protection systems in the last decade, and as a result, the Heat-shield for Extreme Entry Environment Technology (HEEET) TPS has been matured to TRL 6. It is ready for future mission use including Venus. The HEEET project focused on developing a broad technology base, applicable for missions not only to Venus, but also to Saturn, the Ice Giants, and higher speed sample return missions such as Mars Sample Return requiring extreme robustness due to bio-hazards. The dual-layer HEEET (DL-HEEET) is proven to be extremely robust. DL-HEEET performed well in arc jet and laser testing conditions where heritage carbon-phenolic failed. HEEET also proved to be more mass efficient compared to Carbon-Phenolic. Recently, the principal author was invited to present his perspectives to the 2023-2032 Planetary Sciences Decadal Venus subcommittee on the current state of TPS for future Venus missions [1]. In addition to pointing out successful TPS and other developments in the last decade in support of entry systems, the principal author made two findings: 1) importance of and need to sustain TPS capabilities that took nearly a decade to develop and 2) the opportunity to further optimize TPS mass without sacrificing robustness to further enable future in-situ missions. This talk will focus on the above two recommendations and provide the rationale for them. The intent of the talk is to seek advocacy from the VEXAG community for the criticality of TPS sustainment and the benefits of 3D woven TPS optimization. TPS Capability Sustainment: HEEET development was necessitated by the atrophy of heritage carbon-phenolic. Atrophy has impacted other TPS materials as well. Avcoat, the TPS that successfully allowed astronauts to explore the Moon in the 1960s and 70s, took nearly a decade and $10’sM to recover in support of Orion/Artemis. One of the most used TPS materials, SLA 561V, had to be recovered prior to its use on Mars Pathfinder. Phenolic Impregnated Carbon Ablator (PICA), the TPS that replaced SLA 561V on MSL, has undergone multiple replacements and recovery due to constituent rayon changes. Recently, NASA invested in a domestic rayon replacement program and also invested in FMI to consolidate PICA capability for NASA missions, as a result of FMI’s decision to discontinue commercial FiberForm, which is needed for PICA. TPS used for planetary missions are unique and have no other commercial or defense use. In addition, low mission cadence is also a driver for TPS atrophy. Hence, NASA, as the steward, must take steps to ensure and sustain TPS capabilities. In this talk, we outline steps NASA can take to keep abreast of emerging risks and target risk mitigation steps to ensure TPS capability sustainment for Venus and other extreme environment missions. Next Generation of Mass efficient and Robust TPS: NASA invested in an alternate TPS to PICA based on felt-technology called Conformal-PICA which has the potential to save 30% - 50% mass over PICA. The development was discontinued at a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of ~ 5. 3D Mid-Density Carbon Phenolic (3MDCP) is a single layer variant of HEEET, based on the insulating layer only (SL-HEEET) and currently baselined for the Mars Sample Return Mission Earth Entry System due to its mass efficiency (30% more mass efficient than DL- HEEET). Currently, SL-HEEET is limited to aeroshell diameters of < 1.3m. The SL-HEEET was compared to DL-HEEET in the recent ADVENT flag-ship class mission study in support of the Planetary Science Decadal. SL HEEET was the recommended TPS based on 30% mass savings for both the balloon and lander missions. Given C-PICA and SL-HEEET have superior reliability and mass efficiency, advocacy from VEXAG is sought for completing their further development to TRL 5/6 in this decade so as to enable TPS readiness for future missions.

Thermal Protection Systems↗
NASA NTRS2006

Capability Investment Strategy to Enable JPL Future Space Missions

The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) formulates and conducts deep space missions for NASA (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration). The Chief Technologist of JPL has responsibility for strategic planning of the laboratory's advanced technology program to assure that the required technological capabilities to enable future missions are ready as needed. The responsibilities include development of a Strategic Plan (Antonsson, E., 2005). As part of the planning effort, a structured approach to technology prioritization, based upon the work of the START (Strategic Assessment of Risk and Technology) (Weisbin, C.R., 2004) team, was developed. The purpose of this paper is to describe this approach and present its current status relative to the JPL technology investment.

investment strategies↗
NASA NTRS2005

Planetary Protection Technology for Mars Sample Return

The NASA Mars Exploration Program has recently adopted a plan that includes a first Mars sample return (MSR) mission proposed for launch in 2013. Such a mission would deal with two new categories of planetary protection requirements: (1) assuring a very low probability of inadvertent release of the sample in order to provide extra protection against the extremely unlikely possibility of biological hazards in the returned material and (2) keeping the samples free of round-trip Earth organisms to facilitate confirmation of safety after return to Earth. This paper describes the planetary-protection-related technical challenges awaiting any MSR mission and describes work in progress on technology needed to meet these challenges. New technology is needed for several functions. Containment assurance requires breaking the chain of contact with Mars: the exterior of the sample container must not be contaminated with Mars material either during the loading process or during launch from the Mars surface.

planetary protection↗
NASA NTRS2011

Shooting the Moon

This story is about an unlikely NASA mission to the Moon. It was unlikely because it was started with far too little time and too-little money to complete. It was unlikely because it was able to take chances to accept risk of failure. It was unlikely because it was searching for the unthinkable: water-ice on the moon... Figure 1-1: LCROSS Mission. The mission of the Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) was to investigate the possibility of water ice in craters on the Moon s poles. This is certainly an interesting scientific topic in itself, but I intend to focus on the compelling experience of managing the LCROSS Project in the context of this storied Agency. Perhaps most interesting are the implications this story has for managing any development effort, lunar or not, and working a balance to achieve success. NASA is by design a risk-taking agency within the US Government. It could be argued that NASA s purpose in the aerospace community is to take on the really big challenges that either the corporate world can t afford, are not yet profitable endeavors, or are just too risky for private corporations to entertain. However, expectations of the Agency have evolved. A combination of grim human tragedies and some very public cost and schedule overruns have challenged the public s and Congress s tolerance for risk-taking within the Agency. NASA, which is supposed to be in the business of taking risks to do bold, difficult things, has become less and less able to do so within its cost framework. Yet effectively replacing prudent risk management with attempts to "risk-eliminate" is completely unaffordable. So where does risk-taking fit within the Agency, or within private/corporate organizations for that matter? Where astronauts play there is clearly concern about risk. When an organization puts humans in harm s way, it is understandably going to take extra effort to assure nobody gets hurt. Doing so, of course, costs money - a lot of money to pay for labor and hardware which is attempting to assure nothing will go wrong. Sophisticated designs, with doubly- or triply-redundant systems, extensive testing to verify those systems, and numerous engineering test units built to learn and evolve a hardware design, all drive the cost and time required to implement. Human spaceflight is an expensive business because of the exceptional system complexity and levels of assurance required for human space travel. What about missions that do not involve human spaceflight? What about missions whose potential failure will not take a human life, whose costs are small and whose urgency and importance are limited by design? A portfolio consisting of this type of mission can be designed to be risk tolerant, not requiring large expenditures to guarantee against failure. With the money saved, the number of missions that can be executed within the portfolio grows, or the total cost of the portfolio can be reduced. The NASA LCROSS mission is a pathfinder example of a low-cost, quick turn-around mission which struck a balance on mission risk, while accomplishing big objectives, like defining how we understand the Moon.

Andrews, Daniel R.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Motivational contracting in space programs - Government and industry prospectives

NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center has used incentive-free policies in contracting for Apollo's Saturn Launch vehicle hardware, as well as award-fee contracts for major development and early production programs in the case of the Space Shuttle Program. These programs have evolved to a point at which multiple incentive fees are useful in motivating cost reductions and assuring timely achievement of delivery requirements and flight mission goals. An examination is presently conducted of the relative success of these motivation-oriented techniques, drawing on the comments of both government and industry personnel.

Clough, D. R.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Cryogenic fluid management (base R/T): Cryogenic fluid systems, Cryogenic Orbital Nitrogen Experiment (CONE), Cryogenic Orbital Hydrogen Experiment (COHE). (Transportation focused technology)

The topics presented are covered in viewgraph form. The concluded remarks are: (1) advanced cryogenic fluid systems technology is enhancing or enabling to all known transportation scenarios for space exploration; (2) an integrated/coordinated program involving LeRC/MSFC has been formulated to address all known CFM needs - new needs should they develop, can be accommodated within available skills/facilities; (3) all required/experienced personnel and facilities are finally in place - data from initial ground-based experiments is being collected and analyzed - small scale STS experiments are nearing flight - program is beginning to yield significant results; (4) future proposed funding to primarily come from two sources; and (5) cryogenic fluid experimentation is essential to provide required technology and assure implementation in future NASA missions.

Symons, Pat↗
NASA NTRS1995

Product Assurance for Spaceflight Hardware

This report contains information about the tasks I have completed and the valuable experience I have gained at NASA. The report is divided into two different sections followed by a program summary sheet. The first section describes the two reports I have completed for the Office of Mission Assurance (OMA). I describe the approach and the resources and facilities used to complete each report. The second section describes my experience working in the Receipt Inspection/Quality Assurance Lab (RI/QA). The first report described is a Product Assurance Plan for the Gas Permeable Polymer Materials (GPPM) mission. The purpose of the Product Assurance Plan is to define the various requirements which are to be met through completion of the GPPM mission. The GPPM experiment is a space payload which will be flown in the shuttle's SPACEHAB module. The experiment will use microgravity to enable production of complex polymeric gas permeable materials. The second report described in the first section is a Fracture Analysis for the Mir Environmental Effects Payload (MEEP). The Fracture Analysis report is a summary of the fracture control classifications for all structural elements of the MEEP. The MEEP hardware consists of four experiment carriers, each of which contains an experiment container holding a passive experiment. The MEEP hardware will be attached to the cargo bay of the space shuttle. It will be transferred by Extravehicular Activity and mounted on the Mir space station. The second section of this report describes my experiences in the RVQA lab. I listed the different equipment I used at the lab and their functions. I described the extensive inspection process that must be completed for spaceflight hardware. Included, at the end of this section, are pictures of most of the equipment used in the lab. There is a summary sheet located at the end of this report. It briefly describes the valuable experience I have gained at NASA this summer and what I will be able to take with me as I return to college. I briefly discuss the experiences I mentioned in the previous three paragraphs along with training classes I attended and courses I completed at the Learning Lab.

Monroe, Mike↗
NASA NTRS2009

Lunar Regenerative Fuel Cell (RFC) Reliability Testing for Assured Mission Success

NASA's Constellation program has selected the closed cycle hydrogen oxygen Polymer Electrolyte Membrane (PEM) Regenerative Fuel Cell (RFC) as its baseline solar energy storage system for the lunar outpost and manned rover vehicles. Since the outpost and manned rovers are "human-rated," these energy storage systems will have to be of proven reliability exceeding 99 percent over the length of the mission. Because of the low (TRL=5) development state of the closed cycle hydrogen oxygen PEM RFC at present, and because there is no equivalent technology base in the commercial sector from which to draw or infer reliability information from, NASA will have to spend significant resources developing this technology from TRL 5 to TRL 9, and will have to embark upon an ambitious reliability development program to make this technology ready for a manned mission. Because NASA would be the first user of this new technology, NASA will likely have to bear all the costs associated with its development.When well-known reliability estimation techniques are applied to the hydrogen oxygen RFC to determine the amount of testing that will be required to assure RFC unit reliability over life of the mission, the analysis indicates the reliability testing phase by itself will take at least 2 yr, and could take up to 6 yr depending on the number of QA units that are built and tested and the individual unit reliability that is desired. The cost and schedule impacts of reliability development need to be considered in NASA's Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) plans, since life cycle testing to build meaningful reliability data is the only way to assure "return to the moon, this time to stay, then on to Mars" mission success.

Bents, David J.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Lunar RFC Reliability Testing for Assured Mission Success

NASA's Constellation program has selected the closed cycle hydrogen oxygen Polymer Electrolyte Membrane (PEM) regenerative Fuel Cell (RFC) as its baseline solar energy storage system for the lunar outpost and manned rover vehicles. Since the outpost and manned rovers are "human-rated", these energy storage systems will have to be of proven reliability exceeding 99 percent over the length of the mission. Because of the low (TRL=5) development state of the closed cycle hydrogen oxygen PEM RFC at present, and because there is no equivalent technology base in the commercial sector from which to draw or infer reliability information from, NASA will have to spend significant resources developing this technology from TRL 5 to TRL 9, and will have to embark upon an ambitious reliability development program to make this technology ready for a manned mission. Because NASA would be the first user of this new technology, NASA will likely have to bear all the costs associated with its development. When well-known reliability estimation techniques are applied to the hydrogen oxygen RFC to determine the amount of testing that will be required to assure RFC unit reliability over life of the mission, the analysis indicates the reliability testing phase by itself will take at least 2 yr, and could take up to 6 yr depending on the number of QA units that are built and tested and the individual unit reliability that is desired. The cost and schedule impacts of reliability development need to be considered in NASA's Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) plans, since life cycle testing to build meaningful reliability data is the only way to assure "return to the moon, this time to stay, then on to Mars" mission success.

Bents, David J.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Modern Hardness Assurance: A Brand New Game Except When it Isn't

Mission success criteria at the device level and required device operation/availability can determine the risk posed by the radiation effects for a given device in a given environment, but rarely are the same from one mission to another. A large portion of New Space / SmallSat missions to date have benefitted from relatively short mission durations and chosen orbits that have less severe particle populations than their larger counterparts. As mission objectives grow and become reliant on their chosen devices operating for longer lives and in more harsh environments, requirements need to reflect the changing scope but not hinder design adoptions from previously successful missions that provide new capabilities. This presentation describes notable differences in radiation environments, the requirement changes that come with choice of orbit, and prioritizations for mission success criteria to be determined by the designers of the system and subsystems. Test methodologies based on radiation effect categories are explained briefly; when they are needed. Similarity data (and its limitations) are discussed so that caveats and short-comings are understood. Reliability and assurance quantification may not always be possible, but determining where risks are taken and how to classify them is the essential topic for the intended practice: to establish radiation requirements with the goal of getting to mission success.

Campola, Michael J.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Data Requirement (DR) MA-03: Payload missions integration

Project management and payload integration requirements definition activities are reported. Mission peculiar equipment; systems integration; ground operations analysis and requirement definition; safety and quality assurance; and support systems development are examined for payloads planned for the following missions: EOM-1; SL-2; Sl-3 Astro-1; MSL-2; EASE/ACCESS; MPESS; and the middeck ADSF flight.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1984

The First Spacelab Mission

The role of the mission manager in coordinating the payload with the space transportation system is studied. The establishment of the investigators working group to assist in achieving the mission objectives is examined. Analysis of the scientific requirements to assure compatibility with available resources, and analysis of the payload in order to define orbital flight requirements are described. The training of payload specialists, launch site integration, and defining the requirements for the operation of the integrated payload and the payload operations control center are functions of the mission manager. The experiences gained from the management of the Spacelab One Mission, which can be implemented in future missions, are discussed. Examples of material processing, earth observations, and life sciences advances from the First Spacelab Mission are presented.

Craft, H.↗
NASA NTRS2007

An Operational Land Imager for the Landsat Data Continuity Mission

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) released a request for proposals (RFP) on January 09, 2007 for an Operational Land Imager (OLI). The RFP specified the OLI as the principal sensor for the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), the successor mission to Landsat 7. The RFP provides requirements for OLI performance, special calibration tests, and mission assurance without specifying a particular technical design. The performance specifications derive from the heritage and societal benefits of data from the previous Landsat satellites, the high standards set by the performance of the Landsat 7 Enhanced Thematic Mapper-Plus, direction from the Executive Office of the President, cognizance of current technology, and an eye to the future of land remote sensing beyond the LDCM. The specification includes nine spectral bands (four visible, one near infrared, three shortwave infrared, and one panchromatic band), spatial resolution of 30 m with the exception of a 15 m panchromatic resolution, stringent radiometric performance and absolute calibration, and accurate image geolocation with precise band-to-band and multitemporal image-to-image registration. Proposals were due on February 23, 2007 with selection and contract award anticipated by June 2007. The RFP requires delivery of a well-characterized instrument for spacecraft integration within 39 months of contract award. This schedule leads to a target LDCM launch date of July, 2011.

Irons, James R.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Affordable Development and Qualification Strategy for Nuclear Thermal Propulsion

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) is a concept which uses a nuclear reactor to heat a propellant to high temperatures without combustion and can achieve significantly greater specific impulse than chemical engines. NTP has been considered many times for human and cargo missions beyond low earth orbit. A lot of development and technical maturation of NTP components took place during the Rover/NERVA program of the 60's and early 70's. Other NTP programs and studies followed attempting to further mature the NTP concept and identify a champion customer willing to devote the funds and support the development schedule to a demonstration mission. Budgetary constraints require the use of an affordable development and qualification strategy that takes into account all the previous work performed on NTP to construct an existing database, and include lessons learned and past guidelines followed. Current guidelines and standards NASA uses for human rating chemical rocket engines is referenced. The long lead items for NTP development involve the fuel elements of the reactor and ground testing the engine system, subsystem, and components. Other considerations which greatly impact the development plans includes the National Space Policy, National Environmental Policy Act, Presidential Directive/National Security Council Memorandum #25 (Scientific or Technological Experiments with Possible Large-Scale Adverse Environmental Effects and Launch of Nuclear Systems into Space), and Safeguards and Security. Ground testing will utilize non-nuclear test capabilities to help down select components and subsystems before testing in a nuclear environment to save time and cost. Existing test facilities with minor modifications will be considered to the maximum extent practical. New facilities will be designed to meet minimum requirements. Engine and test facility requirements are based on the driving mission requirements with added factors of safety for better assurance and reliability. Emphasis will be placed on small engines, since the smaller the NTP engine, the easier it is to transport, assemble/disassemble, and filter the exhaust during tests. A new ground test concept using underground bore holes (modeled after the underground nuclear test program) to filter the NTP engine exhaust is being considered. The NTP engine system design, development, test, and evaluation plan includes many engine components and subsystems, which are very similar to those used in chemical engines, and can be developed in conjunction with them Other less mature NTP engine components and subsystems (e.g., reactor) will be thoroughly analyzed and tested to acceptable levels recommended by the referenced standards and guidelines. The affordable development strategy also considers a prototype flight test, as a final step in the development process. Preliminary development schedule estimates show that an aggressive development schedule (without much margin) will be required to be flight ready for a 2033 human mission to Mars.

Gerrish, Harold P., Jr.↗