Passive Gamma-Ray Imaging as a Verification Tool for Nuclear Weapons Treaties
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There are a number of current needs in the development of the Pu and Am separations that underpin larger interest areas including nuclear waste issues, nuclear weapons, nuclear forensics, nuclear fuels and similarly related fields. In the large areas of interest, there are a number of sub-fields that include corrosion chemistry, pyrochemistry, solution-phase chemistry, rapid separations, environmental speciation, and other similar efforts. However, in all of the these fields it is important to realize that the underlying chemistry that underpins these efforts is similar in that Pu and Am are bound to ligands that can be in the solid, aqueous, or gas phase and separations occurs due to the preferential binding of the ligand to Pu or Am based on a number of factors that include pH, concentration, oxidation state, etc. In the past, most of the Pu and Am chemistry has occurred in limited scope within universities where micro-scale and bench-top scale chemistry are the dominate investigative theme. At US national laboratory and their international counterparts, larger scale reactions have been attempted such that industrial scale chemistry has been completed. Some of this technology has been harnessed in radiopharmaceuticals and nuclear fuel reprocessing. However, such bench-top research is expensive to due to the safety and security that is concerned when dealing with Pu, and scale-up of reactions is even more resource intensive. In an effort to offset this expensive, it would be of interest to explore the ability to predict selectivity based on the computational modeling of actinide chemistry. This has historically been limited by the abilities of large supercomputers, but with the emphasis on developing exascale computers within the US and similar efforts by other countries this predictive modeling has potential to produce significant results that would yield improved understanding of actinide chemistry.
Additive manufacturing (AM) is a rapidly developing technology that allows industries to automate and simplify the production of highly complicated items. Recently, there are concerns that AM techniques have the potential to be utilized in the fields of nuclear weapons and nuclear enrichment technology. Presently, there are very few international or domestic export controls that apply to AM's role in the nuclear industry, constituting an unmanaged proliferation pathway. Pre-existing export controls focus on general concepts and processes and do not consider specific nuances of various techniques that are categorized as additive manufacturing. To introduce legislation and controls that will be effective in monitoring proliferation pathways, one must investigate and characterize AM techniques and their nuclear applications. This paper categorizes and ranks 33 AM techniques based on their potential impact on the nuclear fuel cycle and the development of nuclear weapons. Through this method of characterization and categorization, export controls would address specific AM nuclear proliferation risks without disrupting the entire industry and fuel cycle. Additionally, legislation employing this method would identify loopholes in export controls using a holistic approach to managing and monitoring proliferation pathways.
The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.
The DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP incorporates nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. The suite of data analyzed comes from activities including previous nuclear tests, stockpile surveillance, experimental research, and development and engineering programs. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and the computational capabilities to support the SSP missions. These component parts, in addition to an appropriately scaled production capability, enable NNSA to support stockpile requirements. The ultimate goal of the SSP, and thus of the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program, is to ensure that the U.S. maintains a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. The ASC program is a cornerstone of the SSP, providing simulation capabilities and computational resources to support the annual stockpile assessment and certification process, study advanced nuclear weapons design and manufacturing processes, analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging, and provide the tools to enable stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). This work requires a balance of resources, including technical staff, hardware, simulation software, and computer science solutions. The ASC program focuses on increasing the predictive capabilities in a three-dimensional (3D) simulation environment while maintaining support to the SSP. The Program continues to improve its unique tools for understanding and solving progressively more difficult stockpile problems (sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific details), and quantifying critical margins and uncertainties. Resolving each issue requires increasingly difficult analyses because the aging process has progressively moved the stockpile further from the original test base. While the focus remains on the U.S. nuclear weapons program, where possible, the Program also enables the use of high-performance computing (HPC) and simulation tools to address broader national security needs, such as foreign nuclear weapon assessments and nuclear counterterrorism. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) calls for NNSA to “deliver a modern, adaptive nuclear security enterprise based on an integrated strategy for risk management, production-based resilience, science and technology innovation, and workforce initiatives.” Furthermore, “NNSA will establish a Science and Technology Innovation Initiative to accelerate the integration of science and technology (S&T) throughout its activities.” Executing this strategy necessitates the continued emphasis on developing and sustaining high-quality scientific and engineering staff, as well as supporting computational and experimental capabilities. These components constitute the foundation of the nuclear weapons program. The continued success of the SSP and LEPs is predicated upon the ability to credibly certify the stockpile, without a return to underground nuclear tests (UGTs). Shortly after the nuclear test moratorium entered into force in 1992, the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) was established to provide an extensive simulation capability to underpin stockpile certification. While computing and simulation have always been essential to the success of the nuclear weapons program, the program goal of ASCI was to execute NNSA’s vision of using these tools in support of the stockpile stewardship mission. The ASCI program was essential to the successful demonstration of the SSP, providing critical nuclear weapons simulation and modeling capabilities. ASCI officially evolved into the ASC program in fiscal year (FY) 2005, but the mission remains essentially the same: provide the simulation and computational capabilities that underpin the ability to maintain a safe, secure, effective nuclear weapon stockpile, without returning to underground nuclear testing. The capabilities that the ASC program provides at the national laboratories play a vital role in the nuclear security enterprise and are necessary for fulfilling the stockpile stewardship and life extension requirements outlined for NNSA. The Program develops modern simulation tools that provide insights into stockpile aging issues, provide the computational and simulation tools that enable designers and analysts to certify the current stockpile and life-extended nuclear weapons, and inform the decision-making process when any modifications in nuclear warheads or the associated manufacturing processes are deemed necessary. Furthermore, ASC is enhancing the predictive simulation capabilities that are essential to evaluate weapons effects, design experiments, and ensure test readiness. The ASC program continues to improve its unique tools to solve stockpile problems— with a focus on sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific detail—to enable Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU) and to resolve the increasingly difficult analyses needed for stockpile stewardship. The needs of the Stockpile Management and Production Modernization programs (formerly Directed Stockpile Work) also drive the requirements for simulation and computational resources. These requirements include planned LEPs, stockpile support activities, and mitigation efforts against the potential for technical surprise. All of the weapons within the current stockpile are in some stage of the life extension process. The simulation and computational capabilities are crucial for successful execution of these life extensions and for ensuring NNSA can certify these life-extended weapons without conducting a UGT.
Improving technologies related to the wide area environmental sampling of nuclear materials supports the nuclear nonproliferation mission of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by monitoring nuclear weapons tests and detecting undeclared nuclear fuel cycle activities. Standoff, laser-based detection techniques such as laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy have the potential to offer robust, field-deployable methods that provide rapid element-specific and phase identifiable measurements over a wide range of materials. This work aims to elucidate the effects of atmospheric conditions and oxidation reactions on the highly complex and transient spectroscopic signatures of laser-induced plutonium surrogate plasmas. Time-resolved spectra of nanosecond laser ablation cerium plasmas were measured using laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy in a range of atmospheres containing low to high concentrations of oxygen. Here, the growth of strong CeO molecular emission bands was observed in the visible spectrum, where it was shown that the persistence of CeO is reduced from around 60 μs to 50 μs in oxygen rich atmospheric environments. To further investigate the growth and depletion of CeO in the laser-produced plasma, ratios of CeO-to-Ce emission were generated using integrated intensities corresponding to the Q-branch of the CeO D 1 -X 1 transitions and numerous strong atomic Ce peaks. It was determined that the fastest rate of formation of CeO in argon occurred for moderate oxygen mass fractions between 0.10 and 0.15 while the ratios were reduced at higher oxygen mass fractions (i.e., Y O 2 = 0.20) due to competing oxidation reactions and lower plasma temperatures.
LANL's priority roles are serving as a nuclear weapons design agency and a nuclear weapons production agency; addressing nuclear threats; and performing national security science, technology, and engineering. LANL’s Test Engineering organization serves the national mission of maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrent by providing high-quality, empirical evidence through the execution and assessment of weapons system and component testing. Shock and vibration environmental testing provides one key piece of evidence for evaluation and qualification of these systems and components in the service environments incurred during a lifetime in the stockpile. LANL’s Test Engineering group continuously pursues research and development in structural dynamics to improve shock and vibration testing capabilities, processes, and analysis techniques to increase the fidelity of service environment recreations in laboratory testing settings. This talk will highlight several ongoing projects to represent these R&D efforts.
Russia’s nuclear saber rattling throughout the war in Ukraine, reports of China’s increasing nuclear modernization, and the 2023 release of Oppenheimer has reignited in the public talk of nuclear weapons. With the increasing prevalence of conversation around nuclear weapons comes increasing opportunity for mis- or disinformation to spread about them and the nuclear enterprise (NE). Mis- and disinformation are not new phenomena. However, the speed and reach offered by current digital communications technology is novel. What are the impacts of misinformation or disinformation about nuclear weapons to the American public?
Actinides are inherently unstable and undergo nuclear decay processes with a concurrent release of energy. Consequently, they are used for nuclear power generation, nuclear weapons, and nuclear medicine. However, the radioactive decay processes also pose significant technological problems for the safe treatment and storage of spent nuclear materials. Cost-effective extraction of the actinides is the key first step in the remediation of nuclear waste, but the appropriate chemical means have yet to be determined. Our present understanding of the chemistry of actinides is limited, with the role of the 5f electrons posing a set of particularly challenging questions. The work reported here is focused on the use of electronic spectroscopy to probe the bonding of small molecules in the gas phase that contains thorium or uranium. Analyses of these data, carried out within the framework of ligand field theory, reveal clear evidence that the 5f electrons are spectators that retain their atomic metal ion character.
Hecker is a professor emeritus (research) in the Department of Management Science and Engineering and a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. He served as the Lab’s fifth director from 1986 to 1997 and is a Los Alamos National Laboratory Medal recipient. He is an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction and nuclear security with wide research interests covering nuclear weapons policy, nuclear security, and the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy.
The societal perception of nuclear technology is ambivalent. Many people recognize the great benefits of nuclear technology such as the ability of nuclear power plants to generate massive amounts of electricity with very low carbon emissions as well as the contributions of nuclear medicine as a powerful means of diagnostics and treatment of many illnesses. However, there are profound fears and reservations concerning the use of nuclear power, mostly due to the connection with nuclear weapons, severe nuclear accidents (e.g., Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima), and legacy of nuclear wastes. Addressing the public concerns related to nuclear waste can have a big impact on the public acceptability of nuclear technology.
Nuclear technology has been pivotal in addressing some of the most pressing global challenges, ranging from energy production to combatting infectious diseases to agricultural security. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), as a leader in nuclear research and development including in the field of radioisotopes, is well situated to share lessons learned and enhance global collaboration from years of discoveries in the field. Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) sponsors specialized educational programs at ORNL, with support from the IAEA, focused on advancing peaceful nuclear applications and associated industries while upholding strong nuclear safety, security, and safeguards standards. The Joint U.S./IAEA International School on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Applications, launched in 2024, is a cornerstone of this collaboration. The school provides an opportunity for early-career professionals from around the globe to gain practical knowledge and skills in utilizing nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. This initiative demonstrates the United States’ commitment to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), specifically Article IV, which calls on nuclear-weapon states to facilitate access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while guarding against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this paper, we explore the curriculum, objectives, and global impact of the program. Participants of the ICARST-2025 conference are invited to learn more about this program, contribute to its development, and explore opportunities for collaboration. This school exemplifies how strategic partnerships, and educational initiatives can drive the peaceful and beneficial use of nuclear technology worldwide
NPAC R&D focus areas include: Advancing U.S. capabilities to detect and characterize nuclear weapon development activities globally, including material production, the movement of special nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, and the testing or use of nuclear weapons, Supporting the development and testing of policy options and technical capabilities for international nuclear safeguards, arms control / treaty verification, nuclear export controls, and nonproliferation initiatives consistent with U.S. Government goals and objectives to enable monitoring and verification, Utilizing uranium, lithium, and high explosives (HE) materials expertise to support national-level activities in nuclear forensics and nuclear detection technology testing and evaluation, Providing unique training and capacity-building programs, particularly with the Nuclear Detection and Sensor Testing Center (NDSTC), and Engaging internationally to promote nonproliferation and arms control norms and best practices through bilateral and multilateral work.
This dissertation discusses the impetus for, development of, and initial demonstration of NuSCAPTM: the Nuclear System-of-Systems Capabilities Analytic Process TM . NuSCAP is an approach executed via a Python® application that enables capabilities-based vulnerability analyses of military systems of systems (SOS) exposed to prompt nuclear weapon effects. The NuSCAP application calls on industry-standard, fast-running nuclear weapon effects tools and the Monte Carlo N-Particle®1 (MCNP®) code to evaluate the impact of nuclear weapon environments on the military capabilities of a complex and networked SOS.
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with its quinquennial review conferences (RevCons), has become the foundation of the international nonproliferation regime over the course of its 50-year history. With more states parties than any other arms control agreement (currently 191), the Treaty provides a legally binding framework for all states parties, constraining proliferation of nuclear weapons and committing the five recognized states who possess nuclear weapons to work toward disarmament. The NPT has enjoyed wide success in constraining the spread of nuclear weapons. Only one state party has left the agreement and gone on to acquire these weapons, and the overall track record of compliance with IAEA safeguards has been robust. However, for all its effectiveness in the area of nonproliferation, its achievements on the disarmament front have been relatively unimpressive. While the NWS – most notably the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia – have decreased the overall size of their nuclear arsenals significantly since 1970, these arsenals have remained an important feature of NWS security policies. The limited progress towards disarmament has created friction between the NNWS and NWS and has been the source of mounting tension within the NPT regime. The 2020 RevCon, the 50th anniversary of the NPT and 25th anniversary of its indefinite extension, faces a range of contentious challenges, old and new, which call into question the Treaty’s future viability.
Diversion of nuclear materialsfrom legitimate commercial processes for use by nefarious actors is a frightening and surreptitious problem. Smuggled nuclear material can be used to manufacture a simple radiological dispersion device (RDD) and potentially incorporated into the development of a nuclear weapon. With some frequency, smuggled nuclear material is interdicted in foreign countries as actors cross border checkpoints. Nuclear material interdicted in this way can be analyzed using a variety of tools. Plutonium-239 is commonly used as the fissile material in nuclear weapon production as an alternative to uranium-235. Plutonium in a production, refining, or finishing facility will exist in many forms including oxide precursors (PuF4, PuF3, Pu oxalate, etc.), oxide, and metal. The ability to identify plutonium in each of these forms and determine properties, characteristics, or history of these materials is crucial for determining if the processes occurring in a nuclear facility are legitimate or not. This presentation will focus on the development and application ofspectroscopic tools developed at SRNL using doubled-walled cells (DWC) to characterize Pu-bearing compounds. Advances in the use of vibrational spectroscopy techniques (Raman and IR), UV-VIS-SWIR diffuse reflectance spectroscopy, gamma emission spectroscopy, luminescence spectroscopy, laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy in conjunction with XRD and SEM in the characterization of Pu-bearing compounds will be presented with emphasis in material processing history.
We ensure nuclear weapon safety, security, and reliability. To date, Los Alamos has designed and certified 46 of the 63 nuclear weapon systems put into the U.S. Stockpile.
Here, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear tests worldwide. As part of treaty compliance, the concentration of radioactive nuclides in the atmosphere is monitored to detect nuclear weapons tests. Radioactive noble gas fission products, specifically radioxenon, can vent into the atmosphere after a nuclear weapons test, even if the test is well contained underground or underwater. Radioxenon thus serves as a signal for nuclear weapons tests. All atmospheric monitoring systems require samples of radioxenon isotopes for detector calibration, quality control, and certification. Here, we present a novel, improved method for creating samples of 133m Xe via neutron irradiation of 132 Xe in the Washington State University TRIGA reactor. 132 Xe neutron absorption results in either 133 Xe or 133m Xe—thermal neutron absorption results in 133m Xe 12% of the time, while fast neutron absorption (above ~1 MeV) results in 133m Xe ~50% of the time. To optimize the production of 133m Xe via neutron absorption in 132 Xe in the thermal TRIGA reactor, spectral tuning using an irradiation chamber is required to maximize the fraction of fast neutrons being absorbed and minimize the number of thermal neutrons interacting with the 132 Xe. We used MCNP to tally 132 Xe absorptions with the isotopic tally function, flux tallies and neutron attenuation to estimate the number of neutrons reaching the 132 Xe through the irradiation chamber, and the adjoint importance function to improve the source strength estimate. Additionally, we performed a heat transfer analysis for safety considerations. It was determined that the use of a 96% enriched 10 B boron carbide chamber, placed next to the fuel elements in reactor position D8, increases the 133m Xe/ 133 Xe activity ratio from a baseline value of 0.3 to 1.0, a 233% increase. Additionally, it was determined that the alpha heating produced in the boron does not become an unmanageable problem in the Washington State University reactor.