APPLICATION OF O-RING STUDIES TO THE EXTENDED MAINTENANCE CYCLE OF TYPE B RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES
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Radioactive Material (RAM) Packagings Used to transport radioactive material • Weapons components • Medical isotopes • Spent nuclear fuel • Etc. • Packages must adhere to 10 CFR 71 which drive to NUREGs, ASME codes, etc. • Transport Index (A2 values) determine if a package is Type A, Type AF, Type B, Type B(U)F
The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) Packaging Technology group proposed a closure design for the outer packaging of a prototype Type B shipping package being developed for the Department of Energy (DOE). The closure design provides an efficient means of securing the containment vessel (CV) within the radioactive material packaging. This design has a simplified operation, requires less components, and less maintenance when compared to current radioactive material package closure methods. This paper will review and discuss the materials, designs, processes, and testing activities that were considered and pursued in the development of the novel closure for the outer packaging of new radioactive material shipping packages.
This paper describes a new Graduate Certificate in Nuclear Packaging (GCNP). Nuclear materials are currently used for large-scale production of electricity without greenhouse gas generation, advanced medical treatments, food sterilization, and sophisticated measurement technologies. In order to benefit from these uses, nuclear materials packaging must be developed, manufactured, inspected, and maintained for storage, transfer, transport, and disposal that protect the public and the environment. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program (PCP) originally offered the following ten, one-day to ten-day training courses. 1. Methods for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages and Performing Confirmatory Analysis; 2. Welding Criteria for Shipping Containers; 3. Structural Analysis and Acceptance Criteria; 4. Quality Assurance (QA) for Radioactive Material Packaging Training; 5. Application of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code to Radioactive Material Transportation Packaging; 6. ARG-US Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) System for Management of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials; 7. Packaging Operations and Maintenance; 8. Packaging Leakage Test Training; 9. Management of SARP Preparation; 10. Transport Security of Radioactive Material. These courses were designed in accordance with DOE standards. They were taught at a rigorous graduate-university level by experienced technical staff who are coordinated by Argonne, Lawrence Livermore, and Savannah River National Laboratories. The courses were taught at these Laboratories or nearby locations. The PCP courses are attended by personnel from government agencies, national laboratories, and the nuclear industry, from both inside and outside the United States. Students in these classes have generally earned undergraduate or higher degrees. These courses are designed to assist student with specialized job duties, and may provide them a competitive advantage when seeking employment or promotion in the nuclear packaging and other related fields. (authors)
Over 5,500 containers of excess plutonium-bearing materials have been packaged for long-term storage following the requirements of DOE-STD- 3013. Knowledge of the chemical impurities in the packaged materials is important because certain impurities, such as chloride salts, affect the behavior of the material in storage leading to gas generation and corrosion when sufficient moisture also is present. In most cases, the packaged materials are not well characterized, and information about the chemical impurities is limited to knowledge of the material’s processing history. The alpha-particle activity from the plutonium and americium isotopes provides a method of nondestructive self-interrogation to identify certain light elements through the characteristic, prompt gamma rays that are emitted from alpha-particle-induced reactions with these elements. Gamma-ray spectra are obtained for each 3013 container using a highresolution, coaxial high-purity germanium detector. These gamma-ray spectra are scanned from 800 to 5,000 keV for characteristic, prompt gamma rays from the detectable elements, which include lithium, beryllium, boron, nitrogen, oxygen, fluorine, sodium, magnesium, aluminum, silicon, phosphorus, chlorine, and potassium. The lower limits of detection for these elements in a plutonium-oxide matrix increase with atomic number and range from 100 or 200 ppm for the lightest elements such as lithium and beryllium, to 19,000 ppm for potassium. The peak areas from the characteristic, prompt gamma rays can be used to estimate the concentration of the light-element impurities detected in the material on a semiquantitative basis. The use of prompt gamma analysis to assess impurity concentrations avoids the expense and the risks generally associated with performing chemical analysis on radioactive materials. The analyzed containers are grouped by impurity content, which helps to identify high-risk containers for surveillance and in sorting materials before packaging.
As directed in the Consolidation Appropriations Act, 2016, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) initiated the preconceptual design and development of a Lifecycle Cost Estimate for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Dilute and Dispose Program. Based on August 2016 Program Requirements Document and subsequent supplemental guidance, LANL prepared the Lifecycle Cost Estimate under key assumptions that meet the program’s requirements. For Dilute and Dispose, the program would disposition surplus Pu by diluting oxide produced at LANL with inhibitor materials, packaging the materials in containers, and shipping the containers to a deep geologic repository for permanent disposal. The base assumption is that LANL would disassemble pits, convert the Pu metal to oxide, and characterize and package the material for shipment to SRS, where it would be diluted prior to geologic disposal at the WIPP site in New Mexico. Another major assumption for the Dilute and Dispose option is that LANL would increase the current oxide production rate (or throughput) to 1500 kg/year, 5 times higher than the maximum annual production of ~300 Kgs executed by the ARIES Oxide Production Program at LANL. Analysis based on the ARIES program’s throughput model revealed that 15 pieces of equipment would need to be installed within PF-4 and certain facility improvements would need to be accomplished in order to meet the desired throughput levels. The additional equipment would be essentially identical to equipment already used within PF-4 for existing operations.
This paper describes the computational models for the thermal analyses for 9975 nuclear material package under the Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and the Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC). The package 9975 is a DOE certified package that has been used in the DOE complex for transportation and long term storage of radioactive material. The NCT and HAC thermal analyses for the 9975 package were performed here by taking a computational heat transfer method. The HAC thermal models described here are identical to the models in the current DOE certified 9975 package. Thermal models in this work are for an undamaged package to meet all the regulatory requirements during an HAC thermal event. The model was created using modified shielding where the lead was encapsulated in a 0.036 inches stainless steel casing. The impact of this casing was studied earlier when the modification was proposed and it was found to have minimal impact on the component temperatures. Therefore, the analyses in this paper are good for packages with or without the shielding modifications. Analytical studies show that the realistic value for the solar absorptivity for the stainless steel surface fabricated from the rolling operation is about 0.5. The NCT analyses documented in this report use an absorptivity value of 0.5 to get more realistic component temperature results. Sensitivity studies were also performed to assess the impact of variability in the solar absorptivity for drum surface in the previous work for the NRC certification. The analysis in this paper is based on PuO{sub 2} in a food can. The food can is considered uncredited convenience containers inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) of the 9975 package. PCV is located inside Secondary Containment Vessel (SCV). PuO{sub 2} has a density of 2 g/cc and a heat generation rate of 19 watts. This calculation evaluates the thermal performance for 9975 package with food can configuration during NCT and HAC per NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 71. The objective of the calculation is to demonstrate that the maximum component temperatures are below their design limits. (authors)