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NASA NTRS2011

Reusable Solid Rocket Motor - Accomplishments, Lessons, and a Culture of Success

The Reusable Solid Rocket Motor represents the largest solid rocket motor ever flown and the only human rated solid motor. Each Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) provides approximately 3-million lb of thrust to lift the integrated Space Shuttle vehicle from the launch pad. The motors burn out approximately 2 minutes later, separate from the vehicle and are recovered and refurbished. The size of the motor and the need for high reliability were challenges. Thrust shaping, via shaping of the propellant grain, was needed to limit structural loads during ascent. The motor design evolved through several block upgrades to increase performance and to increase safety and reliability. A major redesign occurred after STS-51L with the Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor. Significant improvements in the joint sealing systems were added. Design improvements continued throughout the Program via block changes with a number of innovations including development of low temperature o-ring materials and incorporation of a unique carbon fiber rope thermal barrier material. Recovery of the motors and post flight inspection improved understanding of hardware performance, and led to key design improvements. Because of the multidecade program duration material obsolescence was addressed, and requalification of materials and vendors was sometimes needed. Thermal protection systems and ablatives were used to protect the motor cases and nozzle structures. Significant understanding of design and manufacturing features of the ablatives was developed during the program resulting in optimization of design features and processing parameters. The project advanced technology in eliminating ozone-depleting materials in manufacturing processes and the development of an asbestos-free case insulation. Manufacturing processes for the large motor components were unique and safety in the manufacturing environment was a special concern. Transportation and handling approaches were also needed for the large hardware segments. The reusable solid rocket motor achieved significant reliability via process control, ground test programs, and postflight assessment. Process control is mandatory for a solid rocket motor as an acceptance test of the delivered product is not feasible. Process control included process failure modes and effects analysis, statistical process control, witness panels, and process product integrity audits. Material controls and inspections were maintained throughout the sub tier vendors. Material fingerprinting was employed to assess any drift in delivered material properties. The RSRM maintained both full scale and sub-scale test articles. These enabled continuous improvement of design and evaluation of process control and material behavior. Additionally RSRM reliability was achieved through attention to detail in post flight assessment to observe any shift in performance. The postflight analysis and inspections provided invaluable reliability data as it enables observation of actual flight performance, most of which would not be available if the motors were not recovered. These unique challenges, features of the reusable solid rocket motor, materials and manufacturing issues, and design improvements will be discussed in the paper.

Moore, Dennis R.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Hawai'i and Gale Crater: A Mars Analogue Study of Igneous, Sedimentary, Weathering, and Alteration Trends in Geochemistry

Sedimentary rocks in Gale Crater on Mars indicate a varied provenance with a range of alteration and weathering [1, 2]. Geochemical trends identified in basaltic and alkalic sedimentary rocks by the Alpha Particle X-ray Spectrometer (APXS) on the Mars rover Curiosity represent a complex interplay of igneous, sedimentary, weathering, and alteration processes. Assessing the relative importance of these processes is challenging with unknown compositions for parent sediment sources and with the constraints provided by Curiosity's instruments. We therefore look to Mars analogues on Earth where higher-resolution analyses and geologic context can constrain interpretations of Gale Crater geochemical observations. We selected Maunakea (AKA Mauna Kea) and Kohala volcanoes, Hawai'i, for an analogue study because they are capped by post-shield transitional basalts and alkalic lavas (hawaiites, mugearites) with compositions similar to Gale Crater [1, 3]. Our aim was to characterize Hawaiian geochemical trends associated with igneous processes, sediment transport, weathering, and alteration. Here, we present initial results and discuss implications for selected trends observed by APXS in Gale Crater.

Berger, J. A.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Global and Regional Sea Level Rise Scenarios for the United States

The Sea Level Rise and Coastal Flood Hazard Scenarios and Tools Interagency Task Force, jointly convened by the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) and the National Ocean Council (NOC), began its work in August 2015. The Task Force has focused its efforts on three primary tasks: 1) updating scenarios of global mean sea level (GMSL) rise, 2) integrating the global scenarios with regional factors contributing to sea level change for the entire U.S. coastline, and 3) incorporating these regionally appropriate scenarios within coastal risk management tools and capabilities deployed by individual agencies in support of the needs of specific stakeholder groups and user communities. This technical report focuses on the first two of these tasks and reports on the production of gridded relative sea level (RSL, which includes both ocean-level change and vertical land motion) projections for the United States associated with an updated set of GMSL scenarios. In addition to supporting the longer-term Task Force effort, this new product will be an important input into the USGCRP Sustained Assessment process and upcoming Fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA4) due in 2018. This report also serves as a key technical input into the in-progress USGCRP Climate Science Special Report (CSSR).

Sweet, William V.↗

NASA NTRS2024

NPCC4: Climate Risk and Equity—Advancing Knowledge Toward a Sustainable Future: Introduction

This Introduction to NPCC4 provides an overview of the first three NPCC Reports and contextualizes NPCC4's deliberate decision to address justice, equity, diversity, and inclusion in its collective work and in its own practices, procedures, and methods of assessment. Next, it summarizes the assessment process, including greater emphasis on sustained assessment. Finally, it introduces the NPCC4 chapters and their scope.

New York City Panel on Climate Change (NPCC)↗

NASA NTRS2011

Reusable Solid Rocket Motor - Accomplishment, Lessons, and a Culture of Success

The Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) represents the largest solid rocket motor (SRM) ever flown and the only human-rated solid motor. High reliability of the RSRM has been the result of challenges addressed and lessons learned. Advancements have resulted by applying attention to process control, testing, and postflight through timely and thorough communication in dealing with all issues. A structured and disciplined approach was taken to identify and disposition all concerns. Careful consideration and application of alternate opinions was embraced. Focus was placed on process control, ground test programs, and postflight assessment. Process control is mandatory for an SRM, because an acceptance test of the delivered product is not feasible. The RSRM maintained both full-scale and subscale test articles, which enabled continuous improvement of design and evaluation of process control and material behavior. Additionally RSRM reliability was achieved through attention to detail in post flight assessment to observe any shift in performance. The postflight analysis and inspections provided invaluable reliability data as it enables observation of actual flight performance, most of which would not be available if the motors were not recovered. RSRM reusability offered unique opportunities to learn about the hardware. NASA is moving forward with the Space Launch System that incorporates propulsion systems that takes advantage of the heritage Shuttle and Ares solid motor programs. These unique challenges, features of the RSRM, materials and manufacturing issues, and design improvements will be discussed in the paper.

Moore, D. R.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Automated Spacecraft Conjunction Assessment at Mars and the Moon

Conjunction assessment and collision avoidance are areas of current high interest in space operations. Most current conjunction assessment activity focuses on the Earth orbital environment. Several of the world's space agencies have satellites in orbit at Mars and the Moon, and avoiding collisions there is important too. Smaller number of assets than Earth, and smaller number of organizations involved, but consequences similar to Earth scenarios.This presentation will examine conjunction assessment processes implemented at JPL for spacecraft in orbit at Mars and the Moon.

assessment processes↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Deep-Space Conjunction Assessment: Recent Developments and Future Evolution

The Multi-mission Automated Deep-space Conjunction Assessment Process (MADCAP) is a NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) capability used to perform conjunction assessment in shared deep-space environments. MADCAP began performing conjunction assessment at Mars and the Moon in 2011, with the Sun/Earth libration points added to its functionality in 2020. There has been an increasing number of missions operating in these environments in recent years, leading to an elevated frequency of close conjunction events, especially in the Lunar orbital environment. MADCAP provides this service not only to NASA missions, but to any operator who is willing to share ephemerides. Since there is no space surveillance network for deep space environments, ephemeris sharing is the only way in which spacecraft operators can ensure the safety of their spacecraft from collision in these orbit regimes. NASA published a set of conjunction assessment best practices in 2020 that cover the MADCAP process. This paper details recent MADCAP operational experience in the deep space environments, including statistics and process improvements. Updates to the MADCAP software and automation framework implemented to handle the recent growth in the number of deep space missions are also discussed. Future enhancements planned in anticipation of increasingly crowded deep-space environments, such as non-standard runs based on exploratory scenarios, are also discussed.

conjunction assessment↗

NASA NTRS1995

Credible Computations: Standard and Uncertainty

The discipline of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) is at a crossroad. Most of the significant advances related to computational methods have taken place. The emphasis is now shifting from methods to results. Significant efforts are made in applying CFD to solve design problems. The value of CFD results in design depends on the credibility of computed results for the intended use. The process of establishing credibility requires a standard so that there is a consistency and uniformity in this process and in the interpretation of its outcome. The key element for establishing the credibility is the quantification of uncertainty. This paper presents salient features of a proposed standard and a procedure for determining the uncertainty. A customer of CFD products - computer codes and computed results - expects the following: A computer code in terms of its logic, numerics, and fluid dynamics and the results generated by this code are in compliance with specified requirements. This expectation is fulfilling by verification and validation of these requirements. The verification process assesses whether the problem is solved correctly and the validation process determines whether the right problem is solved. Standards for these processes are recommended. There is always some uncertainty, even if one uses validated models and verified computed results. The value of this uncertainty is important in the design process. This value is obtained by conducting a sensitivity-uncertainty analysis. Sensitivity analysis is generally defined as the procedure for determining the sensitivities of output parameters to input parameters. This analysis is a necessary step in the uncertainty analysis, and the results of this analysis highlight which computed quantities and integrated quantities in computations need to be determined accurately and which quantities do not require such attention. Uncertainty analysis is generally defined as the analysis of the effect of the uncertainties involved in all stages of a process on the final responses. There are two approaches for conducting the uncertainty analysis: experimental and computational. These analyses and approaches are briefly described.

Mehta, Unmeel B.↗

NASA NTRS1999

The Role of Independent Assessment in the International Space Station Program

This paper presents the role of Independent Assessment in the International Space Station (ISS) Program. Independent Assessment is responsible for identifying and specifying technical and programmatic risks that may impact development, launch, and on-orbit assembly and operations of the ISS. The various phases of the assessment process are identified and explained. This paper also outlines current and future participation by Independent Assessment in Human Exploration and Development of Space projects including the X-38 Space Plane, Mars mission scenarios, and applications of Nanotechnology. This paper describes how Independent Assessment helps the shuttle, ISS, and other programs to safely achieve mission goals now and into the next century.

Strachan, Russell L.↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA Langley Systems Analysis & Concepts Directorate Technology Assessment/Portfolio Analysis

Systems analysis develops and documents candidate mission and architectures, associated system concepts, enabling capabilities and investment strategies to achieve NASA s strategic objectives. The technology assessment process connects the mission and architectures to the investment strategies. In order to successfully implement a technology assessment, there is a need to collect, manipulate, analyze, document, and disseminate technology-related information. Information must be collected and organized on the wide variety of potentially applicable technologies, including: previous research results, key technical parameters and characteristics, technology readiness levels, relationships to other technologies, costs, and potential barriers and risks. This information must be manipulated to facilitate planning and documentation. An assessment is included of the programmatic and technical risks associated with each technology task as well as potential risk mitigation plans. Risks are assessed and tracked in terms of likelihood of the risk occurring and consequences of the risk if it does occur. The risk assessments take into account cost, schedule, and technical risk dimensions. Assessment data must be simplified for presentation to decision makers. The Systems Analysis and Concepts Directorate (SACD) at NASA Langley Research Center has a wealth of experience in performing Technology Assessment and Portfolio Analysis as this has been a business line since 1978.

Cavanaugh, Stephen↗

NASA NTRS2019

Satellite Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis for "Dilution Region" Events: Issues and Operational Approaches

An important activity within Space Traffic Management is the detection and prevention of possible on-orbit collisions between space objects. The principal parameter for assessing collision likelihood is the probability of collision, which is widely accepted among conjunction assessment practitioners; but it possesses a known deficiency in that it can produce a false sense of safety when the orbital position uncertainties for the conjuncting objects are high. The probability of collision is said to be “diluted” in such a situation and to understate the possible risk; certain approaches have been recommended by researchers to provide (largely conservative) risk estimates and remediation methodologies in these cases. The present analysis explores two of the main proposals for quantifying and remediating possible risk in the dilution region and quantifies their operational implications. These implications with regard to imputed additional workload are considerable, especially in anticipating the conjunction event levels expected with the deployment of the USAF Space Fence radar. This effort has been undertaken as part of a larger enterprise that seeks to clarify the philosophical and statistical underpinnings of the conjunction risk assessment process. The analysis presented herein argues that a form of hypothesis testing is implicitly used in conjunction assessment risk analysis, and that there are a number of conceptual and practical reasons for constructing the associated null hypothesis to counsel against a satellite conjunction remediation action. In short, it is concluded that, for the purposes of determining whether a conjunction remediation action should be pursued, dilution-region probabilities of collision should be treated no differently from those produced under other circumstances.

Probability of collision↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Historical Overview of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to help build and maintain the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew members wear extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. NASA includes detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper3 MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew-member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and duration. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuits and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the inner “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling an EVA to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to support the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew wore extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to help mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and durations. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuit and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the pressure-maintaining “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling EVAs to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Dana M. Lear↗

NASA NTRS2016

Enabling Research Tools for Sustained Climate Assessment

The U.S. Global Change Research Program Sustained Assessment process benefits from long-term investments in Earth science research that enable the scientific community to conduct assessment-relevant science. To this end, NASA initiated several research programs over the past five years to support the Earth observation community in developing indicators, datasets, research products, and tools to support ongoing and future National Climate Assessments. These activities complement NASA's ongoing Earth science research programs. One aspect of the assessment portfolio funds four "enabling tools" projects at NASA research centers. Each tool leverages existing capacity within the center, but has developed tailored applications and products for National Climate Assessments. The four projects build on the capabilities of a global atmospheric reanalysis (MERRA-2), a continental U.S. land surface reanalysis (NCA-LDAS), the NASA Earth Exchange (NEX), and a Regional Climate Model Evaluation System (RCMES). Here, we provide a brief overview of each enabling tool, highlighting the ways in which it has advanced assessment science to date. We also discuss how the assessment community can access and utilize these tools for National Climate Assessments and other sustained assessment activities.

Research↗

NASA NTRS2022

Quantifying Cybersecurity Risk for NASA Missions

An end-to-end cyber risk assessment process is presented that is based on the combination of guidelines from the National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST), the standard 5x5 risk matrix, and quantitative methods for generating loss exceedance curves. The NIST guidelines provide a framework for cyber risk assessment, and the standard 5x5 matrix is widely used across the industry for the representation of risk across multiple disciplines. Loss exceedance curves are a means of quantitatively assessing the loss that occurs due to a given risk profile. Combining these different techniques enables us to follow the guidelines, adhere to standard 5x5 risk management practices and develop quantitative metrics simultaneously. Our quantification process is based on the consideration of the NASA and JPL Cost Risk assessment modeling techniques as we define the cost associated with the cybersecurity risk profile of a mission as a function of the mission cost.

Miller, Robert L.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Best Practices from NASA's Open Science Response to the Satellite Needs Working Group (SNWG) Process

The Satellite Needs Working Group (SNWG) in the U.S. Group on Earth Observations (USGEO) provides dedicated analysis and advice to the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and is charged with identifying satellite data needs across the U.S. Government agencies to which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) responds with solutions aligning with its missions and goals. The SNWG puts out a biennial survey to the U.S. Government agencies asking a variety of questions aimed at gleaning their current needs for satellite data. NASA’s response to the SNWG since 2016 has been to serve the community at large with open science and open data products derived through the SNWG process. With the next SNWG cycle set to kick off in 2022, the NASA SNWG team has been actively working to incorporate lessons learned from the past three cycles into the NASA-side process and tools. We will discuss the best practices and tools NASA has developed in response to the SNWG survey assessment process. These assist NASA’s decisions on how best to utilize existing, and proposing new, products and services to address the needs of other U.S. agencies.

Cerese Albers↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis featured a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compared the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues were discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. Unresolved issues were elevated to the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office manager, Configuration Control Board (CCB), or Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) for further resolution. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode. The worst case effect could cause loss of crew/vehicle when the microwave landing system is not active. It is concluded that NASA and Prime Contractor Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed by IOA is believed to be technically accurate and complete. All CIL issues were resolved. No FMEA issues remain that have safety implications. Consideration should be given, however, to upgrading NSTS 22206 with definitive ground rules which more clearly spell out the limits of redundancy.

Hinsdale, L. W.↗