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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2014

Low-Cost, Class D Testing of Spacecraft Photovoltaic Systems Can Reduce Risk

The end-to-end verification of a spacecraft photovoltaic power generation system requires light! Specifically, the standard practice for doing so is the Large Area Pulsed Solar Simulation (LAPSS). A LAPSS test can characterize a photovoltaic system's efficiency via its response to rapidly applied impulses of simulated sunlight. However, a Class D program on a constrained budget and schedule may not have the resources to ship an entire satellite for a LAPSS test alone. Such was the case with the Lunar Atmospheric and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) program, which was also averse to the risk of hardware damage during shipment. When the Electrical Power System (EPS) team was denied a spacecraft-level LAPSS test, the lack of an end-to-end power generation test elevated to a project-level technical risk. The team pulled together very limited resources to not only eliminate the risk, but build a process to monitor the health of the system through mission operations. We discuss a process for performing a low-cost, end-to-end test of the LADEE photovoltaic system. The approach combines system-level functional test, panel-level performance results, and periodic inspection (and repair) up until launch. Following launch, mission operations tools are utilized to assess system performance based on a scant amount of data. The process starts in manufacturing at the subcontractor. The panel manufacturer provides functional test and LAPSS data on each individual panel. We apply an initial assumption that the per-panel performance is sufficient to meet the power generation requirements. The manufacturer's data is also carried as the performance allocation for each panel during EPS system modeling and initial mission operations. During integration and test, a high-power, professional theater lamp system provides simulated sunlight to each panel on the spacecraft, thereby permitting a true end-to-end system test. A passing test results in a step response to nearly full-rated current at the appropriate solar array switch in the power system. A metal-halide bulb, infrared imagers, and onboard spacecraft measurements are utilized to minimize risk of thermal damage during test. Data is provided to support test results for both passing and marginal panels. Prior to encapsulation in the launch vehicle, each panel is inspected for damage by the panel manufacturer. Cracked cells or other damage is amended on-site. Because the photovoltaic test system is inexpensive and portable, each repaired panel can be re-verified immediately. Post-launch, the photovoltaic system is again characterized for per-panel deviations from the manufacturer's performance test. This proved especially tricky as the LADEE spacecraft performs only one current measurement on the entire array. The algorithm for Matlab tools to assess panel performance based on spacecraft attitude is discussed. While not as precise and comprehensive as LAPSS, the LADEE approach leverages minimal resources into an ongoing assessment program that can be applied through numerous stages of the mission. The project takes a true Class D approach in assessing the technical value of a spacecraft level performance test versus the programmatic risk of shipping the spacecraft to another facility. The resources required are a fraction of that for a LAPSS test, and is easy to repeat. Further, the test equipment can be handed down to future projects without building an on-site facility.

photovoltaic↗
NASA NTRS2008

Best Practices for Researching and Documenting Lessons Learned

Identification, resolution, and avoidance of technical and programmatic issues are important for ensuring safe and successful space missions. Although the importance of applying lessons learned to reduce risk is frequently stressed, there is little material available to help technical and management personnel research and document lessons learned. Collecting, researching, identifying, and documenting lessons learned that will be useful to current and future management and engineering personnel is not always a straightforward task. This white paper presents lessons learned and best practices concerning the research and documentation of technical and organizational lessons learned. It is intended to enable organizations to initiate or improve lessons learned research and documentation efforts. The content of this white paper is based on four technical lessons learned projects conducted by the United Space Alliance (USA) Flight Design and Dynamics Department, in support of the NASA/Johnson Space Center (JSC) Flight Design and Dynamics Division. Each project published a report, titled as follows: (1) GPS Lessons Learned From the ISS, Space Shuttle and X-38; (2) Lessons Learned From Seven Space Shuttle Missions; (3) Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Experience Report; and (4) Navigation Technical History with Lessons Learned. The four projects were different in availability of subject matter experts and primary source material, subject scope, and the level of effort required to produce the final report. However, generic lessons can be drawn from all of them. The best practices will be discussed by the phases of report research and development: (1) Defining Report Requirements, Project Organization, and Schedule; (2) Collection and Analysis of Source Material; (3) Writing and Integrating the Report; and (4) Review and Revision of the Report.

Goodman, John L.↗
NASA NTRS2016

NASA's Space Launch System Marks Critical Design Review

With completion of its Critical Design Review (CDR) in 2015, NASA is deep into the manufacturing and testing phases of its new Space Launch System (SLS) for beyond-Earth exploration. This CDR was the first in almost 40 years for a NASA human launch vehicle and marked another successful milestone on the road to the launch of a new era of deep space exploration. The review marked the 90-percent design-complete, a final look at the design and development plan of the integrated vehicle before full-scale fabrications begins and the prelude to the next milestone, design certification. Specifically, the review looked at the first of three increasingly capable configurations planned for SLS. This "Block I" design will stand 98.2 meters (m) (322 feet) tall and provide 39.1 million Newtons (8.8 million pounds) of thrust at liftoff to lift a payload of approximately 70 metric tons (154,000 pounds). This payload is more than double that of the retired space shuttle program or other current launch vehicles. It dramatically increases the mass and volume of human and robotic exploration. Additionally, it will decrease overall mission risk, increase safety, and simplify ground and mission operations - all significant considerations for crewed missions and unique, high-value national payloads. The Block 1 SLS will launch NASA's Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) on an uncrewed flight beyond the moon and back and the first crewed flight around the moon. The current design has a direct evolutionary path to a vehicle with a 130t lift capability that offers even more flexibility to reduce planetary trip times, simplify payload design cycles, and provide new capabilities such as planetary sample returns. Every major element of SLS has hardware in production or testing, including flight hardware for the Exploration 1 (EM-1) test flight. In fact, the SLS MPCV-to-Stage-Adapter (MSA) flew successfully on the Exploration Flight Test (EFT) 1 launch of a Delta IV and Orion spacecraft in December 2014. This paper will discuss these and other technical and programmatic successes and challenges over the past year and provide a preview of work ahead before the first flight of this new capability.

Singer, Chris↗
NASA NTRS2007

Comprehensive Shuttle Foam Debris Reduction Strategies

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was clear in its assessment of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 3, 2003. Foam liberated from the External Tank (ET) impacting the brittle wing leading edge (WLE) of the orbiter causing the vehicle to disintegrate upon re-entry. Naturally, the CAB pointed out numerous issues affecting this exact outcome in hopes of correcting systems of systems failures any one of which might have altered the outcome. However, Discovery s recent return to flight (RTF) illustrates the primacy of erosion of foam and the risk of future undesirable outcomes. It is obvious that the original RTF focused approach to this problem was not equal to a comprehensive foam debris reduction activity consistent with the high national value of the Space Shuttle assets. The root cause is really very simple when looking at the spray-on foam insulation for the entire ET as part of the structure (e.g., actual stresses > materials allowable) rather than as some sort of sizehime limited ablator. This step is paramount to accepting the CAB recommendation of eliminating debris or in meeting any level of requirements due to the fundamental processes ensuring structural materials maintain their integrity. Significant effort has been expended to identify root cause of the foam debris In-Flight Anomaly (FA) of STS-114. Absent verifiable location specific data pre-launch (T-0) and in-flight, only a most probable cause can be identified. Indeed, the literature researched corroborates NASNTM-2004-2 13238 disturbing description of ill defined materials characterization, variable supplier constituents and foam processing irregularities. Also, foam is sensitive to age and the exposed environment making baseline comparisons difficult without event driven data. Conventional engineering processes account for such naturally occurring variability by always maintaining positive margins. Success in a negative margin range is not consistently achieved. Looking at the ET S spray-on foam insulation as part of the structural system (e.g., glass half full mentality) will create an environment where ET debris levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) can be realized. ALARA is a NASA requirements philosophy deployed for the complex, mission altering radiation exposure requirements for life safety of astronauts. In the Shuttle s case, reasonableness is established by exhaustive engineering rigor, allowable debris size/quantity, technology maturity and programmatic constraints. A more robust urethane foam thermal protection system (TPS) will enhance the hctionality of the new Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) Upper Stage. This paper will outline the strategy for a comprehensive effort to reduce ET foam debris and outline steps leading to an improved foam TPS. The NASA must remain committed to such an approach no matter what becomes of the next flight s actual debris field lest we fall back into a false sense of security. This commitment along with full implementation of all the other CAB recommendations such as orbiter hardening will significantly improve the Shuttle system, the engineering workforce, future capabilities & alternate policy offramps, national human resource protection, high value national asset protection and increase the level of service to the overall NASA mission.

Semmes, Edmund B.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Implementation of Programmatic Quality and the Impact on Safety

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Col~imbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational and sustaining quality assurance strategy for long-term manned space flight. An analysis of the ISS waiver processes and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) process implemented as quality functions. Impact of current ISS Program procedures and practices with regards to operational safety and risk A discussion regarding a "defense-in-depth" approach to quality functions will be provided to address the issue of "integration vs independence" with respect to the roles of Programs, NASA Centers, and NASA Headquarters. Generic recommendations are offered to address the inadequacies identified in the implementation of ISS quality assurance. A reassessment by the NASA community regarding the importance of a "quality culture" as a component within a larger "safety culture" will generate a more effective and value-added functionality that will ultimately enhance safety.

Huls, Dale Thomas↗