Ground Truth Measurements and Forensic Analysis After an Explosive Dispersal of Radioactive Materials
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When transporting highly radioactive material, it is vital to provide a successful delivery. Without proper containment, radioactive materials can become exposed to the surrounding environment and pose a serious threat. To ensure a safe transition of radioactive material, packaging components must be able to withstand high levels of heat during the event of a fire while maintaining the integrity of the structure to safety contain the radioactive material. Various types of polyurethane and silicone have been selected to observe at high temperatures to analyze outgassing characteristics of the materials.
Screening and inspection of cargo containers are two essential methods to nondestructively examine the contents of shipment. These methods enable the detection of illicit transportation of unauthorized materials such as nuclear and radioactive materials, explosives, drugs, and so on, typically at borders or secure facilities. Although high-energy X-ray transmission is a standard system and is widely used for cargo inspection, the inherent challenges of high false-positive rates and high attenuation factors necessitate the development of complementary techniques that can increase the detection efficiency and accuracy in large and dense materials. Gamma-rays, which possess higher penetration characteristics because of their high energy, offer an alternative nonintrusive modality for cargo scanning. They represent a promising inspection method when compared to X-rays for three reasons: (1) improved ability to detect nuclear and radioactive materials, (2) higher inspection throughput rates, and (3) lower false-positive rates. Currently, there are two main gamma-ray inspection techniques, active and passive interrogation. Active interrogation can be further grouped into (1) gamma-ray transmission imaging and (2) neutron-induced gamma-ray emission detection. Gamma-ray transmission imaging utilizes differences in material densities for mapping the shipment contents and detecting anomalies. It is analogous to the X-ray transmission method; however, the high-energy photons make it more difficult to shield against, which enables more efficient performance in large and dense material inspection. Neutron-induced gamma-ray emission inspection is designed for the detection of nuclear and radioactive material because those materials emit characteristic gamma-rays when they are activated by neutron absorption. On the other hand, passive interrogation techniques rely on high-efficiency detectors to detect radiation emitted from hidden special nuclear or other radioactive materials. Similar to passive interrogation, cosmic ray muon monitoring and imaging are relatively new techniques that do not require external radioactive sources. These techniques have received attention as a potential next-generation radiographic probe to identify illicit transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials in cargo containers. Cosmic ray muons have unique features, (1) much higher energies than X-rays or gamma-rays (on the order of 10−1—104 GeV), (2) enhanced penetration capability, and (3) natural occurrence, thereby eliminating the need for induced radiation sources. These features enable cosmic ray muons to be utilized for detection of special nuclear materials in high-background-noise environments. By analyzing incoming and outgoing muon trajectories, scattering angles, and energies, it has been shown that it would be possible to locate hidden and well-shielded materials in cargo containers via three-dimensional muon tomography images or signal analysis. Gamma-rays, cosmic ray muons, and other nonintrusive cargo inspection modalities are complementary to each other, allowing them to address various cargo inspection conditions (i.e., scanning time, cost, radiation exposure level, and types of target materials). This chapter presents a detailed review of the theoretical fundamentals and technical principles behind the current gamma-ray and cosmic ray muon modalities for cargo inspection. Additionally, critical assessments and suggestions for the future directions to advance the use of gamma and muon modalities are discussed.
When dismantling a nuclear power plant, structures must be cut to reduce size. The cutting of radioactive material produces radioactive aerosols, which pose a health risk including radiation risk to site workers and the general public. However, due to a lack of research on the physical and chemical characteristics of aerosols produced in these processes, the calculation of internal dose in the event of an expected or unexpected accident is inaccurate. For the measurement of aerosols generated from cutting for internal dose calculations, we measured the number concentration distribution and nuclide distribution of aerosols from plasma arc cutting in a laboratory experimental setup, considering isokinetic sampling and automatic cutting. The results may suggest internal dose assessment without characteristics of radioactive aerosol has uncertainty and the possibility of being undervalued. (authors)
Radioactive materials are widespread in our everyday activities which are used in many different types of industries: Consumer products, Medicine, Industry, Energy, and Defense. In the United States there is about 3 million shipments of radioactive materials per year. With radioactive material being very widespread the number of new applications to ship these quantities increases daily. As such, ensuring the safe and secure transport of these materials is paramount, necessitating stringent packaging, transportation, and certification requirements. Shipments of radioactive materials have been made from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for the past 65 years. Since the 1940s ORNL has been at the forefront of the early development of regulations pertaining to the transport of radioactive shipments and associated regulatory testing. The early involvement resulted in ORNL being one of the leaders in the development of regulations and testing standards pertaining to the testing and design of packages. Today all package testing activities are conducted under the Package Testing Program (PTP) at ORNL at the Package Evaluation Facility (PEF). The PTP develops and evaluates testing solutions – ensuring that they are safe, efficient, and meet regulatory requirements ORNL PTP has extensive experience in the regulatory testing of radioactive material packages, supporting certification of Type A, Type, B, Type AF, and special form packages. The PEF serves as a one-stop-shop for design, testing, and certification of a wide variety of packages needed for shipment of radioactive materials. The facility provides the space, expertise, and equipment necessary to conduct rigorous performance testing under both normal and accident conditions or transport environments including free drop, dynamic crush, puncture, penetration, compression, vibration, water spray, water immersion, and thermal test. The PTP remains a key contributor to the safety and compliance of radioactive material transportation. This presentation will provide an overview of the program’s history, capabilities, and its ongoing role in advancing regulatory standards and transportation safety.
The safe transportation of radioactive material using appropriately designed and certified transportation packages is important to protect the public and environment. In the United States of America all transportation of radioactive material is regulated by the Department of Transportation (DOT) along with input by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). All packages that contain radioactive material requires that it be transported and regulated by the requirements set by the DOT Class 7 hazardous material transportation. Federal regulations place strict administrative controls on the transport of radioactive materials. The two main goals for transporting radioactive materials are 1. Safety should be the primarily focused on the package because it is the first line of defense. 2. Package integrity should be directly related to the degree of the hazard of the radioactive material contents. The two-part goal ensures that the right package is used. Type B packages are designed to transport radioactive materials with the highest level of radioactivity. Examples of material transported in Type B packagings include spent nuclear fuel, high-level radioactive waste, and high concentrations of other radioactive materials. The purpose of this test protocol is to determine the effects of drop and thermal testing on package performance in a Type B shipping package (DPP-1). Required physical tests for the DPP-1 package include free drop, crush, puncture, penetration, compression, vibration, water spray, water immersion, and thermal. The preparation, regulatory testing, and post-test evaluation of a Type B shipping package tested to the 10 CFR 71.71 and 10 CFR 71.73 requirements will be presented. Six packages were tested and the responses when subjected to the HAC sequence of free drop, puncture, and thermal tests according to 10 CFR 71.73(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3) and (c)(4) were measured. The Free Drop, Crush and Puncture tests were performed at the NTRC in Knoxville, TN, and the Thermal tests were performed Southwest Research Institute in San Antonio, TX. The test units were subjected to a pre-operational leak testing before the NCT and HAC tests and a post-operational leak test and a helium leak test once regulatory testing was complete. Finally, all test units were scanned with a handheld blue light scanner to capture a 3D CAD geometry of the test units in the deformed shape. The handheld scanner provided the most effective and reliable way to acquire accurate 3D measurements of the test unit. The scanned geometry was sectioned in areas with deformation and the cross-section profile was measured to determine accurate and repeatable results of the deformed shape of the test units.
In 2006, the United States Congress mandated for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to screen all cargo containers to protect against terrorist acts and ensure the safety and security of the nation. Containers are screened by gamma and neutron detectors to ensure threat material is not smuggled into the country. However, because commerce is radioactive, detecting the presence of radioactive materials is not sufficient in ensuring the safety and security of the nation. Radioactive materials must also be identified in real time, thus distinguishing threat sources (Uranium-235 and Plutonium-230) from non-threat sources (kitty litter, pot ash, medical isotopes). Screening cargo containers can be considered a two-step process (1) alerting to the presence of radioactive material when gamma counts exceed a threshold setting, and (2) once alerted, identifying the type of radioactive material, which is done by collecting a gamma spectra and analyzing it with an analysis tool/algorithm. For this reason, it is important to evaluate not only emerging technology in neutron and gamma detection, but also investigate new advances in algorithm development for radioisotope identification (RIID). New candidates in detection and on-board algorithm analysis might offer opportunities to make the scanning, detection, and identification process more efficient while still ensuring the health and safety of the public. This research will investigate emerging technology in radiation detection focused on gamma spectroscopy capabilities and RIID algorithms for DHS applications.
In this presentation I lump together the "classified RDD" - a dispersion of aerosolized radioactive material - with the nefarious use of radioactive materials. This can include other means of dispersal as well as an RED - a Radiological Exposure Device. This combination is because the threat is the nefarious use of radioactive material, and most of our concerns are in regards to the loss of control of the material, potential(s) for misuse, and detection.
Trace analysis of nuclear materials in solid particles collected in the environment or particles in liquid slurry generated in nuclear material manufacturing processes can pinpoint elemental, organic, and isotopic signatures of nuclear fuel cycle activities and processes. Such information can support nuclear safeguards programs by increasing our ability to detect undeclared nuclear materials, routine activities for safeguarding at declared facilities, and illicit activities. However, trace radioactive material analysis in liquids and slurries is challenging using bulk approaches. For example, one drawback of sensitive analysis such as inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) is that sample is consumed or destroyed as a result of the technical approach. We developed a vacuum compatible microfluidic interface to enable surface analysis of liquids and liquid-solid interactions using time-of-flight secondary ion mass spectrometry (ToF-SIMS). In this work, we illustrate initial results of liquid standards containing uranium using in situ liquid SIMS. Specifically a series of diluted uranium standards used for ICPMS analysis were studied and the limit of detection was estimated. Since the liquid SIMS analysis is almost nondestructive, the same sample can be analyzed by other more destructive approaches afterwards or saved for future references. Consequently, multimodal analysis is possible. Our results demonstrate that in situ liquid SIMS can be used as a new approach to analyze radioactive materials in liquid and slurry forms of relevance to the IAEA safeguards missions.
We have developed a specialized microfluidic electrochemical cell that enables in situ investigation of the electrochemical corrosion of microgram quantities of redox active solids. The advantage of downscaling is the reduction of hazards, waste, expense, and greatly expanding data collection for hazardous materials, including radioactive samples. Cyclic voltammetry was used to monitor the oxidation–reduction cycle of minute quantities of micron-size uraninite (UO 2 ) particles, from the formation of hexavalent uranium (U(VI)), U 3 O 7 and reduction to UO 2+x . Reaction progress was also studied in situ with scanning electron microscopy. The electrochemical measurements matched those obtained at the bulk-scale and were consistent with ex situ characterization of the run products by X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy, scanning transmission electron microscopy, and atomic force microscopy; thus, demonstrating the utility of the microfluidic approach for studying radioactive materials.
This procedure applies to the loading of materials into quartz ampoules and flame sealing these ampoules. Flame sealed quartz ampoules are commonly used as a sealed containment for neutron irradiation. Due to the importance of maintaining containment for this application, this procedure involves a double encapsulation design wherein a sealed inner ampoule is sealed is in turn sealed within a larger diameter outer ampoule. General guidance for inspection of ampoules by destructive, non-destructive, qualitative (e.g., visual) and other methods are given. Materials to be placed inside the ampoules may consist of stable element materials or radioactive materials in either solid or liquid form. Liquids shall be dried prior to sealing the ampoule.
April 2020 marks the 34. anniversary of the high-profile radiological release from the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP). The release of radioactive material from reactor number four began on the 26 April 1986 and continued over a period of about 10 days, releasing approximately 1700 PBq of radioactive material (including 85 PBq of 137-Cs) into the environment. To this day, the accident remains the most significant release of radioactive material since civil nuclear power generation began. In the years since the accident, automated and remote radiation monitoring technologies have advanced significantly in their capabilities. One such example of this is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in radiation mapping investigations. In April 2019, a team of scientists from the University of Bristol showcased a novel radiation mapping system within the CEZ, specifically aiming to map radiation over a large portion of the area immediately surrounding the ChNPP. Over six days of data collection, the system flew a total distance of 583.8 km, covering an area of 14.6 sq.km with an exceptional spatial resolution (sub 20 m/pixel). The work presented herein outlines and explains the data processing procedure to convert the raw data into 137-Cs activity (kBq/sq.m) and cesium-equivalent dose-rate (CED) at 1 m above ground level (μSv/hr). A demonstration of the validity of the method is demonstrated through the successful reduction of the raw data into a single linear relationship between the measured {sup 137}Cs net peak intensity and the {sup 137}Cs activity. (authors)
This report fulfills the M4 milestone M4MR-20PN0303023, “Complete Documentation of Applicable Regulations and Regulatory Authority for Transportation. Microreactors are very small nuclear reactors with a power output of 20MWe or less and are designed to be factory-built, modular in nature, and highly portable. The objective of this report is to identify and document applicable regulations, the appropriate regulatory authority, and the associated framework for microreactor transport. Sections 2 and 3 of this report summarize U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and NRC regulations related to the transportation of Class 7 (radioactive) materials. These sections concentrate on the transport of fissile material packages and Type B packages, which would be most applicable to the transport of a microreactor before and after irradiation. Section 4 summarizes DOE hazardous and radioactive material transportation regulations. Section 5 summarizes U.S. Coast Guard regulations related to the transport of radioactive material. Section 6 discusses state requirements for the permitting of oversize and/or overweight truck shipments. Section 7 presents detailed schedules of requirements for transporting fissile material packages and Type B packages based on NRC and DOT regulations. The schedules are presented in a two-column format, the right column is the regulatory requirement and the left column is the citation of the regulation in which the requirement is found.
Inhaled radioactive materials can pose a long-term health concern, as the material can be incorporated into the body’s metabolic pathways and remain in organs and tissues for extended durations. During the retention period, the radioactive material may localize in a source organ and irradiate adjacent target organs and tissues. Distribution of these materials changes over time, requiring biokinetic modeling to evaluate their movement through various tissues and organs. The evolving distribution depends on multiple inputs characterizing the inhaled material, such as particle size and size distribution, particle density, aspect ratio, specific radionuclide, the chemical form, and solubility. In addition, biological parameters such as breathing rate, breathing type (nasal or nasal/oral), respiratory system morphometry, tidal volume, functional residual capacity, and anatomical dead space all influence material transport. These aerosol properties and physiological characteristics of the respiratory tract jointly define a range of initial conditions that influence the time-dependent distribution of radioactive material. To evaluate both uncertainty in the initial conditions of inhalation exposure and the final output (committed effective dose) from biokinetic models, a Python-based software tool, Radiological Exposure Dose Calculator (REDCAL), was developed to propagate uncertainty within the human respiratory tract model. Focusing on deposition fraction uncertainty, the primary objective was to characterize the initial activity distribution across respiratory regions as a function of anticipated particle sizes and distributions. The impact of the deposition fraction uncertainty was propagated to committed effective dose coefficients for selected radionuclides in a companion publication. For each particle size, a lognormal distribution, characterized by its geometric mean as defined within ICRP Publication 66, serves as the basis for introducing uncertainty into the physical processes governing deposition in various lung regions. Finally, this study addresses the deposition process and examines how uncertainty in deposition mechanisms affects activity distribution in the airways, ultimately presenting the expected range and standard deviation of deposited activity as a function of particle size.