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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2005

Risk Management for Human Support Technology Development

NASA requires continuous risk management for all programs and projects. The risk management process identifies risks, analyzes their impact, prioritizes them, develops and carries out plans to mitigate or accept them, tracks risks and mitigation plans, and communicates and documents risk information. Project risk management is driven by the project goal and is performed by the entire team. Risk management begins early in the formulation phase with initial risk identification and development of a risk management plan and continues throughout the project life cycle. This paper describes the risk management approach that is suggested for use in NASA's Human Support Technology Development. The first step in risk management is to identify the detailed technical and programmatic risks specific to a project. Each individual risk should be described in detail. The identified risks are summarized in a complete risk list. Risk analysis provides estimates of the likelihood and the qualitative impact of a risk. The likelihood and impact of the risk are used to define its priority location in the risk matrix. The approaches for responding to risk are either to mitigate it by eliminating or reducing the effect or likelihood of a risk, to accept it with a documented rationale and contingency plan, or to research or monitor the risk, The Human Support Technology Development program includes many projects with independently achievable goals. Each project must do independent risk management, considering all its risks together and trading them against performance, budget, and schedule. Since the program can succeed even if some projects fail, the program risk has a complex dependence on the individual project risks.

jones, Harry↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Risk Analysis Tool for Estimating the Risk of Electrical Failures Due to Human Induced Defects

Aerospace electrical systems are required to withstand and adequately operate in extremely harsh environments that include, for example, high radiation exposure, temperature extremes, intense vibrational stress and drastic temperature cycling. The nature of aerospace electronics also demands high reliability since, with very few exceptions, there is no chance for hardware servicing or repairs. Common risk mitigation techniques for this type of situation are to perform a Reliability Analysis of the system throughout the development cycle, and to use electrical components that are regarded as “high reliability” because of additional controls and requirements applied in their design, manufacturing and testing. Unfortunately, studies have shown that even though these techniques are used, many systems fail to meet mission requirements well before the predicted lifetimes. This paper presents the analysis of failures of electrical parts, experienced during various stages of system development, at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt MD, between the years 2001 and 2013. These components were subjected to qualification, screening and testing in which the goal was to ensure that the components would survive the stresses of the mission. The analysis categorizes failures by part type and failure mechanisms. One of the results of the analysis was the realization that a surprising proportion of failures experienced during system integration and testing were caused by human error (i.e. human induced defect). Further analysis included the determination of root failure mechanisms and any influencing factors contributing to these failures. The major causes of these defects were attributed to electrostatic damage (ESD), electrical overstress (EOS), mechanical overstress (MOS), and thermal overstress (TOS). Finally, the study proposes a risk analysis tool which incorporates these major causes for the failures, termed error-producing conditions (EPCs), and a proportionality factor representing the number of each type of failure that has occurred at the facility under study. These factors are quantified and used to communicate the risk of human induced defects for the assembly, integration and testing of space hardware based on the system’s electrical parts list. The new risk identification can trigger risk-mitigating actions more effectively, based on the presence of component categories or other hazardous conditions that have a history of failure due to human error.

Majewicz, Peter J.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Certification-Based Process Analysis

Space mission architects are often challenged with knowing which investment in technology infusion will have the highest return. Certification-based analysis (CBA) gives architects and technologists a means to communicate the risks and advantages of infusing technologies at various points in a process. Various alternatives can be compared, and requirements based on supporting streamlining or automation can be derived and levied on candidate technologies. CBA is a technique for analyzing a process and identifying potential areas of improvement. The process and analysis products are used to communicate between technologists and architects. Process means any of the standard representations of a production flow; in this case, any individual steps leading to products, which feed into other steps, until the final product is produced at the end. This sort of process is common for space mission operations, where a set of goals is reduced eventually to a fully vetted command sequence to be sent to the spacecraft. Fully vetting a product is synonymous with certification. For some types of products, this is referred to as verification and validation, and for others it is referred to as checking. Fundamentally, certification is the step in the process where one insures that a product works as intended, and contains no flaws.

Knight, Russell L.↗
NASA NTRS2025

Innovative Drug Selection, Storage, and Shelf-Life Strategies for Exploration Spaceflight

Medications have been a part of space travel dating back to the Apollo missions. A safe and effective medication formulary is essential to maintaining crew health and performance during long-duration spaceflight outside of low Earth orbit (LEO). Distance from Earth creates four key operational changes that increase medical risks, including communication, resupply, crewmember health, and evacuation. The current spaceflight pharmaceutical formulary consists of medications indicated to treat a variety of anticipated medical events and healthcare needs during spaceflight, but depends on a robust consumables resupply chain, which may be strained for a Lunar, and possibly non-existent for a Mars mission. The specific medications selections for the formulary may change to optimally align with the mission, crew compliment, and spacecraft design. Medical support at long-duration exploration missions will differ from LEO missions due to mission duration, lack of consumables resupply, prolonged exposure to space radiation, and the absence of emergency medical return capability. Loss of medication resupply limits or removes the ability to replace medications that have been exhausted or degraded, potentially exacerbating the medical risk posture. To address these anticipated risks, long-duration missions must consider use of novel medical technologies, treatment modalities, and smart medical systems that offer greater crew autonomy, such as physiologically based pharmacokinetic modeling, drug repurposing, on demand drug synthesis, or wearable drug delivery / monitoring devices. Once an ideal formulary for exploration space is determined, it is essential to establish the chemical and physical stability of each medication compound, as well as its safety by identifying its degradation profiles and products. Although few studies have been conducted to provide evidence on the physicochemical stability of pharmaceuticals during space missions, the data suggests that the spaceflight environment may promote degradation in some pharmaceuticals. Formulary drug purity and efficacy should be verified by pharmaceutical stability assessments, and can be realized non-destructively, and accessed in remote environments. Non-destructive pharmaceutical analysis and statistical modelling techniques could optimize exploration spaceflight medical care by enabling early detection of suboptimal therapeutics. Likewise, novel packaging, storage strategies, and dosage form innovations are promising countermeasures to optimize pharmaceutical shelf life, purity, and quality of exploration spaceflight medications. As we prepare for more distant exploration missions, risk management planning for astronaut healthcare should include the assembly of a medication formulary that is comprehensive enough to prevent or treat anticipated medical events, remains safe and chemically stable, and retains sufficient potency to last for the duration of the mission. Following extensive review of the literature, we will present innovative formulary optimization strategies, pharmaceutical stability assessment techniques, and storage and packaging solutions that could enhance drug safety and efficacy for future exploration spaceflight missions.

Vernie R Daniels↗
NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management: A NASA Program Initiative

NPG 7120.5A, "NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements" enacted in April, 1998, requires that "The program or project manager shall apply risk management principles..." The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to comply with this edict. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This presentation will briefly discuss the six functions for risk management: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions.

Hammer, Theodore F.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management: An Overview

Software risk management is important because it helps avoid disasters, rework, and overkill, but more importantly because it stimulates win-win situations. The objectives of software risk management are to identify, address, and eliminate software risk items before they become threats to success or major sources of rework. In general, good project managers are also good managers of risk. It makes good business sense for all software development projects to incorporate risk management as part of project management. The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to implement risk management. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This is an introductory tutorial to continuous risk management based on this course. The rational for continuous risk management and how it is incorporated into project management are discussed. The risk management structure of six functions is discussed in sufficient depth for managers to understand what is involved in risk management and how it is implemented. These functions include: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions.

Rosenberg, Linda↗
NASA NTRS2010

Passing the Baton: An Experimental Study of Shift Handover

Shift handovers occur in many safety-critical environments, including aviation maintenance, medicine, air traffic control, and mission control for space shuttle and space station operations. Shift handovers are associated with increased risk of communication failures and human error. In dynamic industries, errors and accidents occur disproportionately after shift handover. Typical shift handovers involve transferring information from an outgoing shift to an incoming shift via written logs, or in some cases, face-to-face briefings. The current study explores the possibility of improving written communication with the support modalities of audio and video recordings, as well as face-to-face briefings. Fifty participants participated in an experimental task which mimicked some of the critical challenges involved in transferring information between shifts in industrial settings. All three support modalities, face-to-face, video, and audio recordings, reduced task errors significantly over written communication alone. The support modality most preferred by participants was face-to-face communication; the least preferred was written communication alone.

Parke, Bonny↗
NASA NTRS2016

Characterizing Epistemic Uncertainty for Launch Vehicle Designs

NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has the task of estimating the aleatory (randomness) and epistemic (lack of knowledge) uncertainty of launch vehicle loss of mission and crew risk, and communicating the results. Launch vehicles are complex engineered systems designed with sophisticated subsystems that are built to work together to accomplish mission success. Some of these systems or subsystems are in the form of heritage equipment, while some have never been previously launched. For these cases, characterizing the epistemic uncertainty is of foremost importance, and it is anticipated that the epistemic uncertainty of a modified launch vehicle design versus a design of well understood heritage equipment would be greater. For reasons that will be discussed, standard uncertainty propagation methods using Monte Carlo simulation produce counter intuitive results, and significantly underestimate epistemic uncertainty for launch vehicle models. Furthermore, standard PRA methods, such as Uncertainty-Importance analyses used to identify components that are significant contributors to uncertainty, are rendered obsolete, since sensitivity to uncertainty changes are not reflected in propagation of uncertainty using Monte Carlo methods. This paper provides a basis of the uncertainty underestimation for complex systems and especially, due to nuances of launch vehicle logic, for launch vehicles. It then suggests several alternative methods for estimating uncertainty and provides examples of estimation results. Lastly, the paper describes how to implement an Uncertainty-Importance analysis using one alternative approach, describes the results, and suggests ways to reduce epistemic uncertainty by focusing on additional data or testing of selected components.

Novack, Steven D.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Characterizing Epistemic Uncertainty for Launch Vehicle Designs

NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has the task of estimating the aleatory (randomness) and epistemic (lack of knowledge) uncertainty of launch vehicle loss of mission and crew risk and communicating the results. Launch vehicles are complex engineered systems designed with sophisticated subsystems that are built to work together to accomplish mission success. Some of these systems or subsystems are in the form of heritage equipment, while some have never been previously launched. For these cases, characterizing the epistemic uncertainty is of foremost importance, and it is anticipated that the epistemic uncertainty of a modified launch vehicle design versus a design of well understood heritage equipment would be greater. For reasons that will be discussed, standard uncertainty propagation methods using Monte Carlo simulation produce counter intuitive results and significantly underestimate epistemic uncertainty for launch vehicle models. Furthermore, standard PRA methods such as Uncertainty-Importance analyses used to identify components that are significant contributors to uncertainty are rendered obsolete since sensitivity to uncertainty changes are not reflected in propagation of uncertainty using Monte Carlo methods.This paper provides a basis of the uncertainty underestimation for complex systems and especially, due to nuances of launch vehicle logic, for launch vehicles. It then suggests several alternative methods for estimating uncertainty and provides examples of estimation results. Lastly, the paper shows how to implement an Uncertainty-Importance analysis using one alternative approach, describes the results, and suggests ways to reduce epistemic uncertainty by focusing on additional data or testing of selected components.

Novack, Steven D.↗
NASA NTRS2022

Assessment of Aggregate Risk for JWST

This presentation communicates the aggregate assessment of risk performed for the James Webb Space Telescope prior to shipping the observatory to the launch site.

JWST↗
NASA NTRS2001

Analytical Method to Evaluate Failure Potential During High-Risk Component Development

Communicating failure mode information during design and manufacturing is a crucial task for failure prevention. Most processes use Failure Modes and Effects types of analyses, as well as prior knowledge and experience, to determine the potential modes of failures a product might encounter during its lifetime. When new products are being considered and designed, this knowledge and information is expanded upon to help designers extrapolate based on their similarity with existing products and the potential design tradeoffs. This paper makes use of similarities and tradeoffs that exist between different failure modes based on the functionality of each component/product. In this light, a function-failure method is developed to help the design of new products with solutions for functions that eliminate or reduce the potential of a failure mode. The method is applied to a simplified rotating machinery example in this paper, and is proposed as a means to account for helicopter failure modes during design and production, addressing stringent safety and performance requirements for NASA applications.

Tumer, Irem Y.↗
NASA NTRS2011

L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System Engineering - Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.

Zelkin, Natalie↗
NASA NTRS2009

Microbial Risk Assessment

Historically, microbiological spaceflight requirements have been established in a subjective manner based upon expert opinion of both environmental and clinical monitoring results and the incidence of disease. The limited amount of data, especially from long-duration missions, has created very conservative requirements based primarily on the concentration of microorganisms. Periodic reevaluations of new data from later missions have allowed some relaxation of these stringent requirements. However, the requirements remain very conservative and subjective in nature, and the risk of crew illness due to infectious microorganisms is not well defined. The use of modeling techniques for microbial risk has been applied in the food and potable water industries and has exceptional potential for spaceflight applications. From a productivity standpoint, this type of modeling can (1) decrease unnecessary costs and resource usage and (2) prevent inadequate or inappropriate data for health assessment. In addition, a quantitative model has several advantages for risk management and communication. By identifying the variable components of the model and the knowledge associated with each component, this type of modeling can: (1) Systematically identify and close knowledge gaps, (2) Systematically identify acceptable and unacceptable risks, (3) Improve communication with stakeholders as to the reasons for resource use, and (4) Facilitate external scientific approval of the NASA requirements. The modeling of microbial risk involves the evaluation of several key factors including hazard identification, crew exposure assessment, dose-response assessment, and risk characterization. Many of these factors are similar to conditions found on Earth; however, the spaceflight environment is very specialized as the inhabitants live in a small, semi-closed environment that is often dependent on regenerative life support systems. To further complicate modeling efforts, microbial dose-response characteristics may be affected by a potentially dysfunctional crew immune system during a mission. In addition, microbial virulence has been shown to change under certain conditions during spaceflight, further complicating dose-response characterization. An initial study of the applicability of microbial risk assessment techniques was performed using Crew Health Care System (CHeCS) operational data from the International Space Station potable water systems. The risk of infection from potable water was selected as the flight systems and microbial ecology are well defined. This initial study confirmed the feasibility of using microbial risk assessment modeling for spaceflight systems. While no immediate threat was detected, the study identified several medically significant microorganisms that could pose a health risk if uncontrolled. The study also identified several specific knowledge gaps in making a risk assessment and noted that filling these knowledge gaps is essential as the risk estimates may change by orders of magnitude depending on the answers. The current phase of the microbial risk assessment studies focuses on the dose-response relationship of specific infectious agents, focusing on Salmonella enterica Typhimurium, Pseudomonas spp., and Escherichia coli, as their evaluation will provide a better baseline for determining the overall hazard characterization. The organisms were chosen as they either have been isolated on spacecraft or have an identified route of infection during a mission. The characterization will utilize dose-response models selected either from the peer-reviewed literature and/or by using statistical approaches. Development of these modeling and risk assessment techniques will help to optimize flight requirements and to protect the safety, health, and performance of the crew.

Ott, C. M.↗
NASA NTRS2023

Risk Trade-Space Analysis for Safe Human Expeditions to Mars

We assessed the integrated safety, health, and performance risk to crews on long-duration missions, specifically to Mars. Using a systems approach rather than one focused on individual countermeasures, we examined the trade space around several such risks to identify high-potential risk mitigation strategies and characterize aspects of Mars mission architectures that could lower aggregated risk. Current Mars Design Reference missions would require durations well over two years and would increase crew exposure to radiation and microgravity well beyond ISS levels, likely resulting in significantly reduced performance beyond our current capability to mitigate that could jeopardize mission success. A “fast Mars transit” round-trip mission concept was studied using an innovative flight dynamics approach to quantify the minimum total mission energy required for a Mars transit with total mission duration less than 400 days. This approach holds promise for sending humans to Mars and returning them safely with acceptable, potentially mitigatable, exposure to microgravity and radiation using current or near-term technologies. The fast transit concept would also result in fewer time-driven vehicle failures and enable sustainable deployment of humans and infrastructure to Mars on a regular cadence, allowing steady exploration and colonization of Mars. Finally, we conclude that reliance on the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) mission operations paradigm – i.e., one of near-complete real-time dependence on experts at Mission Control to manage the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew – is high risk given the communication delays and limited resupply of any Mars mission, and this risk is not eliminated by the shorter missions durations of fast transit scenarios. Based on historical trends, it is highly likely that the crew will face a high-consequence problem of uncertain origin during Mars transit when ground support will be greatly reduced. While it may be possible to reduce anomaly rates through improved reliability analysis and testing, and to reduce anomaly impacts through added robustness, such mitigations address only known failure modes and known uncertainties. Therefore, a radical shift in the Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA) that defines the operational paradigm, systems design, and human-systems interactions is required to improve the risk posture to an acceptable level regardless of mission duration.

Mars↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

How to Educate Decision Makers on the Value and Necessity of Modal Testing and Model Correlation: Tips for Young Engineers

Engineers need to effectively communicate the justification and value of their modal testing and model correlation in terminology familiar to decision makers as it relates to the program’s risk tolerance. This communication must relate to the program’s risk tolerance and the metrics used to judge the performance of both the program and individual decision makers. The challenge is the terminologies familiar to engineers and decision makers are quite different and seemingly unrelated. The engineering profession has developed a specific terminology to solve highly technical issues, which are many times themselves unique to very specific engineering problems. It is all too easy for engineers to believe that everyone in their organization, including the decision makers, has an intrinsic understanding of what they do and the value it brings to the program’s success. This is especially true for young engineers who have recently spent the last four plus years in an academic engineering learning environment, which has a highly technical research oriented atmosphere. Effective communication with decision makers is increasingly important as the technical breadth and practical program and project experience level for up and coming decision makers diminishes. It is not unusual for the decision makers to have technical knowledge in a domain different from structural dynamics (e.g., electronics or systems). Competition among satellite manufactures has increased the focus on programmatic cost and ability to deliver on schedule. NASA programs are also seeing more restrictive programmatic cost and schedule constraints, which impact both analysis and testing. It should also be noted that a comprehensive suite of tests are required to verify a satellite’s design capability with some margin. These tests include static strength verification tests, shock, acoustic, and vibration tests (sine and random) of systems, subsystems, and components. Each of these verification tests provide opportunities for model correlation and risk reduction. It is important to recognize dynamic loads/modal test models may not include all of the flight hardware (i.e., harness, coax, waveguides, connectors, etc.) and the previously mentioned tests are still required for qualification/verification of the design. This paper provides tips to young engineers on how to bridge this communications gap, have a better understanding of the environment in which decision makers operate, and assist them to better support successful missions. While this paper primarily focuses on modal testing and model correlation as related to spacecraft missions, the concepts and recommendations presented here are equally applicable to other fields such as aeronautics, automotive, power generation, etc.

Decision Maker↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

How to Educate Decision Makers on the Value and Necessity of Modal Testing and Model Correlation: Tips for Young Engineers

Engineers need to effectively communicate the justification and value of their modal testing and model correlation in terminology familiar to decision makers as it relates to the program’s risk tolerance. This communication must relate to the program’s risk tolerance and the metrics used to judge the performance of both the program and individual decision makers. The challenge is the terminologies familiar to engineers and decision makers are quite different and seemingly unrelated. The engineering profession has developed a specific terminology to solve highly technical issues, which are many times themselves unique to very specific engineering problems. It is all too easy for engineers to believe that everyone in their organization, including the decision makers, has an intrinsic understanding of what they do and the value it brings to the program’s success. This is especially true for young engineers who have recently spent the last four plus years in an academic engineering learning environment, which has a highly technical research oriented atmosphere. Effective communication with decision makers is increasingly important as the technical breadth and practical program and project experience level for up and coming decision makers diminishes. It is not unusual for the decision makers to have technical knowledge in a domain different from structural dynamics (e.g., electronics or systems). Competition among satellite manufactures has increased the focus on programmatic cost and ability to deliver on schedule. NASA programs are also seeing more restrictive programmatic cost and schedule constraints, which impact both analysis and testing. It should also be noted that a comprehensive suite of tests are required to verify a satellite’s design capability with some margin. These tests include static strength verification tests, shock, acoustic, and vibration tests (sine and random) of systems, subsystems, and components. Each of these verification tests provide opportunities for model correlation and risk reduction. It is important to recognize dynamic loads/modal test models may not include all of the flight hardware (i.e., harness, coax, waveguides, connectors, etc.) and the previously mentioned tests are still required for qualification/verification of the design. This paper provides tips to young engineers on how to bridge this communications gap, have a better understanding of the environment in which decision makers operate, and assist them to better support successful missions. While this paper primarily focuses on modal testing and model correlation as related to spacecraft missions, the concepts and recommendations presented here are equally applicable to other fields such as aeronautics, automotive, power generation, etc.

Decision Maker↗