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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

Update on the Juncture Flow PIV Results and Future Plans

A novel, embedded, 2D Particle Image Velocimetry system has been developed and implemented to obtain off-body velocity measurements in the junction of an 8% wing-body configuration in the NASA Langley Research Center 14- by 22-Foot Subsonic Tunnel. Although the initial purpose for implementing the system during this test was to evaluate system performance and identify potential risks, a considerable amount of data were obtained in the wing-fuselage junction near the trailing edge at a Reynolds Number of 2.4 Million and angle of attack of 5 degrees. In addition to providing notable efficiencies with regard to image acquisition and test operations, the PIV system captured unique details of the flow separation to complement the extensive suite of measurement techniques applied during the test. Instantaneous PIV vector fields reveal that the flow separation is not stationary but rather highly dynamic. Mean flow statistics calculated from the PIV measurements highlight where reverse flow and Reynolds stresses are concentrated in the separated region and agree well with results from the embedded Laser Doppler Velocimeter system and Computational Fluid Dynamics. The comparisons and ional insight gained during this effort will help guide system improvements for the upcoming entry in 2020.

Jenkins, Luther N.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Material Trade for Additively Manufactured Regenerative Chambers

Nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) is a game changing technology with advantages over chemical propulsion systems for deep space missions but comes with many engineering challenges. This paper focuses on the challenge of material selection for a regeneratively-cooled chamber for use in a nuclear environment with minimal design margins. Chemical compatibility with reactants and products following energy extraction (be it through combustion or neutron bombardment) must be considered. Similarly, mechanical and thermophysical properties (e.g., density, thermal conductivity, yield strength, etc.) as functions of temperature are critical. While hydrogen embrittlement environment (HEE) is a risk and consideration for traditional chemical combustion chambers, application in a nuclear thermal engine adds additional material compatibility and resilience requirements to long-term nuclear radiation exposure. Chamber materials in this trade included, but were not limited to, A-286, Haynes 230, Haynes 282, CRES 347, GRCop-42, GRCop-84, Inconel 625, JBK-75, and NASA HR-1. The material trade focuses on modern additive manufacturing techniques and hypothetical geometric constraints.

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Material Trade for Additively Manufactured Regenerative Chambers

Nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) is a game changing technology with advantages over chemical propulsion systems for deep space missions but comes with many engineering challenges. This paper focuses on the challenge of material selection for a regeneratively-cooled chamber for use in a nuclear environment with minimal design margins. Chemical compatibility with reactants and products following energy extraction (be it through combustion or neutron bombardment) must be considered. Similarly, mechanical and thermophysical properties (e.g., density, thermal conductivity, yield strength, etc.) as functions of temperature are critical. While hydrogen embrittlement environment (HEE) is a risk and consideration for traditional chemical combustion chambers, application in a nuclear thermal engine adds additional material compatibility and resilience requirements to long-term nuclear radiation exposure. Chamber materials in this trade included, but were not limited to, A-286, Haynes 230, Haynes 282, CRES 347, GRCop-42, GRCop-84, Inconel 625, JBK-75, and NASA HR-1. The material trade focuses on modern additive manufacturing techniques and hypothetical geometric constraints.

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Green Propulsion : A NASA GSFC Assessment

In the ever-changing paradigm of efficient and capable spacecraft design, scientific missions continue pushing spacecraft subsystems to deliver effective solutions to meet challenging new mission/spacecraft applications. From an in-space storable liquid chemical propulsion perspective, monopropellant hydrazine is a dependable propellant. Bi-propellant architectures offer even superior performance, but add the complexity of a hypergolic fuel (hydrazine/ mono-methyl hydrazine) and oxidizer (Nitrogen Tetroxide/ mixed oxides of nitrogen) dual tank combination. These propulsion system designs (mono-propellant and bi-propellant) have high heritage, high propellant throughput qualified engines, widely tested material compatibility, qualified fluid delivery commercial-off-the-shelf components, known handling practices, and repeatable performance in successfully delivering on mission requirements. NASA and the broader propulsion community have historically selected hypergolic propellants for most mission applications. The space propulsion community has learned to successfully handle these highly toxic and hazardous materials, navigate the regulated use and the associated safety protocols, personnel protective equipment, and unique training standards – all requisite for loading spacecraft propulsion systems with hypergolic propellants. The question now arises as to what is next for in-space chemical propulsion? Is there an alternative, or even replacement, to the reliable hypergolic fluids, or propellant alternatives that promise increased mission benefits? With the evolution and proven advancements in innovative in-space green propellant technologies capable of delivering benefits to scientific missions, concern over the reliability and infusibility of this higher performing and safer to handle class of propellants is waning. As NASA science missions move forward with the potential flight infusion of green propulsion, NASA and the broader propulsion community are working to address remaining gaps in hardware development, reliability, performance, unique operational considerations, and risk mitigations for high value scientific assets.

Henry W. Mulkey↗
NASA NTRS2015

Using Risk Assessment Methodologies to Meet Management Objectives

Current decision making involves numerous possible combinations of technology elements, safety and health issues, operational aspects and process considerations to satisfy program goals. Identifying potential risk considerations as part of the management decision making process provides additional tools to make more informed management decision. Adapting and using risk assessment methodologies can generate new perspectives on various risk and safety concerns that are not immediately apparent. Safety and operational risks can be identified and final decisions can balance these considerations with cost and schedule risks. Additional assessments can also show likelihood of event occurrence and event consequence to provide a more informed basis for decision making, as well as cost effective mitigation strategies. Methodologies available to perform Risk Assessments range from qualitative identification of risk potential, to detailed assessments where quantitative probabilities are calculated. Methodology used should be based on factors that include: 1) type of industry and industry standards, 2) tasks, tools, and environment 3) type and availability of data and 4) industry views and requirements regarding risk & reliability. Risk Assessments are a tool for decision makers to understand potential consequences and be in a position to reduce, mitigate or eliminate costly mistakes or catastrophic failures.

DeMott, D. L.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Space Station logistics policy - Risk management from the top down

Considerations are presented in the area of risk management specifically relating to logistics and system supportability. These considerations form a basis for confident application of concurrent engineering principles to a development program, aiming at simultaneous consideration of support and logistics requirements within the engineering process as the system concept and designs develop. It is shown that, by applying such a process, the chances of minimizing program logistics and supportability risk in the long term can be improved. The problem of analyzing and minimizing integrated logistics risk for the Space Station Freedom Program is discussed.

Paules, Granville↗
NASA NTRS2008

Propensity and Risk Assessment for Solar Particle Events: Consideration of Integral Fluence at High Proton Energies

For future space missions with longer duration, exposure to large solar particle events (SPEs) with high energy levels is the major concern during extra-vehicular activities (EVAs) on the lunar and Mars surface. The expected SPE propensity for large proton fluence was estimated from a non-homogeneous Poisson model using the historical database for measurements of protons with energy > 30 MeV, Phi(sub 30). The database includes a continuous data set for the past 5 solar cycles. The resultant SPE risk analysis for a specific mission period was made including the 95% confidence level. In addition to total particle intensity of SPE, the detailed energy spectra of protons especially at high energy levels were recognized as extremely important parameter for the risk assessment, since there remains a significant cancer risks from those energetic particles for large events. Using all the recorded proton fluence of SPEs for energies >60 and >100 MeV, Phi(sub 60) and Phi(sub 100), respectively, the expected propensities of SPEs abundant with high energy protons were estimated from the same non-homogeneous Poisson model and the representative cancer risk was analyzed. The dependencies of risk with different energy spectra, for e.g. between soft and hard SPEs, were evaluated. Finally, we describe approaches to improve radiation protection of astronauts and optimize mission planning for future space missions.

Kim, Myung-Hee↗
NASA NTRS2004

A Probability Model of Decompression Sickness at 4.3 Psia after Exercise Prebreathe

Exercise PB can reduce the risk of decompression sickness on ascent to 4.3 psia when performed at the proper intensity and duration. Data are from seven tests. PB times ranged from 90 to 150 min. High intensity, short duration dual-cycle ergometry was done during the PB. This was done alone, or combined with intermittent low intensity exercise or periods of rest for the remaining PB. Nonambulating men and women performed light exercise from a semi-recumbent position at 4.3 psia for four hrs. The Research Model with age tested the probability that DCS increases with advancing age. The NASA Model with gender hypothesized that the probability of DCS increases if gender is female. Accounting for exercise and rest during PB with a variable half-time compartment for computed tissue N2 pressure advances our probability modeling of hypobaric DCS. Both models show that a small increase in exercise intensity during PB reduces the risk of DCS, and a larger increase in exercise intensity dramatically reduces risk. These models support the hypothesis that aerobic fitness is an important consideration for the risk of hypobaric DCS when exercise is performed during the PB.

Conkin, Johnny↗
NASA NTRS2003

Reducing Design Risk Using Robust Design Methods: A Dual Response Surface Approach

Space transportation system conceptual design is a multidisciplinary process containing considerable element of risk. Risk here is defined as the variability in the estimated (output) performance characteristic of interest resulting from the uncertainties in the values of several disciplinary design and/or operational parameters. Uncertainties from one discipline (and/or subsystem) may propagate to another, through linking parameters and the final system output may have a significant accumulation of risk. This variability can result in significant deviations from the expected performance. Therefore, an estimate of variability (which is called design risk in this study) together with the expected performance characteristic value (e.g. mean empty weight) is necessary for multidisciplinary optimization for a robust design. Robust design in this study is defined as a solution that minimizes variability subject to a constraint on mean performance characteristics. Even though multidisciplinary design optimization has gained wide attention and applications, the treatment of uncertainties to quantify and analyze design risk has received little attention. This research effort explores the dual response surface approach to quantify variability (risk) in critical performance characteristics (such as weight) during conceptual design.

Unal, Resit↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer's Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer’s Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRS1993

Relating space radiation environments to risk estimates

A number of considerations must go into the process of determining the risk of deleterious effects of space radiation to travelers. Among them are (1) determination of the components of the radiation environment (particle species, fluxes and energy spectra) which will encounter, (2) determination of the effects of shielding provided by the spacecraft and the bodies of the travelers which modify the incident particle spectra and mix of particles, and (3) determination of relevant biological effects of the radiation in the organs of interest. The latter can then lead to an estimation of risk from a given space scenario. Clearly, the process spans many scientific disciplines from solar and cosmic ray physics to radiation transport theeory to the multistage problem of the induction by radiation of initial lesions in living material and their evolution via physical, chemical, and biological processes at the molecular, cellular, and tissue levels to produce the end point of importance.

Curtis, Stanley B.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Decision Making During Spacecraft Operations

Decisions made during the operational phase of a space mission often have significant and immediate consequences. Without the explicit consideration of the risks involved and their representation in a solid model, it is very likely that these risks are not considered systematically in trade studies. Wrong decisions during the operational phase of a space mission can lead to immediate system failure whereas correct decisions can help recover the system even from faulty conditions. A problem of special interest is the determination of the system fault protection strategies upon the occurrence of faults within the system. Decisions regarding the fault protection strategy also heavily rely on a correct understanding of the state of the system and an integrated risk model that represents the various possible scenarios and their respective likelihoods. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) modeling is applicable to the full lifecycle of a space mission project, from concept development to preliminary design, detailed design, development and operations. The benefits and utilities of the model, however, depend on the phase of the mission for which it is used. This is because of the difference in the key strategic decisions that support each mission phase. The focus of this paper is on describing the particular methods used for PRA modeling during the operational phase of a spacecraft by gleaning insight from recently conducted case studies on two operational Mars orbiters. During operations, the key decisions relate to the commands sent to the spacecraft for any kind of diagnostics, anomaly resolution, trajectory changes, or planning. Often, faults and failures occur in the parts of the spacecraft but are contained or mitigated before they can cause serious damage. The failure behavior of the system during operations provides valuable data for updating and adjusting the related PRA models that are built primarily based on historical failure data. The PRA models, in turn, provide insight into the effect of various faults or failures on the risk and failure drivers of the system and the likelihood of possible end case scenarios, thereby facilitating the decision making process during operations. This paper describes the process of adjusting PRA models based on observed spacecraft data, on one hand, and utilizing the models for insight into the future system behavior on the other hand. While PRA models are typically used as a decision aid during the design phase of a space mission, we advocate adjusting them based on the observed behavior of the spacecraft and utilizing them for decision support during the operations phase.

dynamic fault trees↗
NASA NTRS2005

Bridging the Divide between Safety and Risk Management for your Project or Program

This presentation will bridge the divide between these separate but overlapping disciplines and help explain how to use Risk Management as an effective management decision support tool that includes safety. Risk Management is an over arching communication tool used by management to prioritize and effectively mitigate potential problems before they concur. Risk Management encompasses every kind of potential problem that can occur on a program or project. Some of these are safety issues such as hazards that have a specific likelihood and consequence that need to be controlled and included to show an integrated picture of accepted) mitigated, and residual risk. Integrating safety and other assurance disciplines is paramount to accurately representing a program s or projects risk posture. Risk is made up of several components such as technical) cost, schedule, or supportability. Safety should also be a consideration for every risk. The safety component can also have an impact on the technical, cost, and schedule aspect of a given risk. The current formats used for communication of safety and risk issues are not consistent or integrated. The presentation will explore the history of these disciplines, current work to integrate them, and suggestions for integration for the future.

Lutomski, Mike↗
NASA NTRS2013

Laser Subdivision of the Genesis Concentrator Target Sample 60000

The Genesis Allocation Committee received a request for ~ 1 square centimeter of the diamond-like-carbon (DLC) concentrator target for the analysis of solar wind nitrogen isotopes. The target consists of a single crystal float zone (FZ) silicon substrate having a thickness on the order of 550 micrometers with a 1.5-3.0 micrometer-thick coating of DLC on the exposed surface. The solar wind is implanted shallowly in the front side DLC. The original target was a circular quadrant with a radius of 3.1 cm; however, the piece did not survive intact when the spacecraft suffered an anomalous landing upon returning to Earth on September 8, 2004. An estimated 75% of the DLC target was recovered in at least 18 fragments. The largest fragment, Genesis sample 60000, has been designated for this allocation and is the first sample to be subdivided using our laser scribing system Laser subdivision has associated risks including thermal diffusion of the implant if heating occurs and unintended breakage during cleavage. A careful detailed study and considerable subdividing practice using non-flight FZ diamond on silicon, DOS, wafers has considerably reduced the risk of unplanned breakage during the cleaving process. In addition, backside scribing reduces the risk of possible thermal excursions affecting the implanted solar wind, implanted shallowly in the front side DLC.

Lauer, Howard V., Jr.↗