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At least 73 records · Page 4

PIMS-Universal Payload Information Management

As the overall manager and integrator of International Space Station (ISS) science payloads and experiments, the Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) at Marshall Space Flight Center had a critical need to provide an information management system for exchange and management of ISS payload files as well as to coordinate ISS payload related operational changes. The POIC's information management system has a fundamental requirement to provide secure operational access not only to users physically located at the POIC, but also to provide collaborative access to remote experimenters and International Partners. The Payload Information Management System (PIMS) is a ground based electronic document configuration management and workflow system that was built to service that need. Functionally, PIMS provides the following document management related capabilities: 1. File access control, storage and retrieval from a central repository vault. 2. Collect supplemental data about files in the vault. 3. File exchange with a PMS GUI client, or any FTP connection. 4. Files placement into an FTP accessible dropbox for pickup by interfacing facilities, included files transmitted for spacecraft uplink. 5. Transmission of email messages to users notifying them of new version availability. 6. Polling of intermediate facility dropboxes for files that will automatically be processed by PIMS. 7. Provide an API that allows other POIC applications to access PIMS information. Functionally, PIMS provides the following Change Request processing capabilities: 1. Ability to create, view, manipulate, and query information about Operations Change Requests (OCRs). 2. Provides an adaptable workflow approval of OCRs with routing through developers, facility leads, POIC leads, reviewers, and implementers. Email messages can be sent to users either involving them in the workflow process or simply notifying them of OCR approval progress. All PIMS document management and OCR workflow controls are coordinated through and routed to individual user's "to do" list tasks. A user is given a task when it is their turn to perform some action relating to the approval of the Document or OCR. The user's available actions are restricted to only functions available for the assigned task. Certain actions, such as review or action implementation by non-PIMS users, can also be coordinated through automated emails.

Elmore, Ralph↗

Evaluating the Use of Remote Sensing Data in the USAID Famine Early Warning Systems Network

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) s Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) provides monitoring and early warning support to decision makers responsible for responding to food insecurity emergencies on three continents. FEWS NET uses satellite remote sensing and ground observations of rainfall and vegetation in order to provide information on drought, floods and other extreme weather events to decision makers. Previous research has presented results from a professional review questionnaire with FEWS NET expert end-users whose focus was to elicit Earth observation requirements. The review provided FEWS NET operational requirements and assessed the usefulness of additional remote sensing data. Here we analyzed 1342 food security update reports from FEWS NET. The reports consider the biophysical, socioeconomic, and contextual influences on the food security in 17 countries in Africa from 2000-2009. The objective was to evaluate the use of remote sensing information in comparison with other important factors in the evaluation of food security crises. The results show that all 17 countries use rainfall information, agricultural production statistics, food prices and food access parameters in their analysis of food security problems. The reports display large scale patterns that are strongly related to history of the FEWS NET program in each country. We found that rainfall data was used 84% of the time, remote sensing of vegetation 28% of the time, and gridded crop models 10%, reflecting the length of use of each product in the regions. More investment is needed in training personnel on remote sensing products to improve use of data products throughout the FEWS NET system.

Brown, Molly E.↗

Evaluating the Use of Remote Sensing Data in the U.S. Agency for International Development Famine Early Warning Systems Network

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)'s Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) provides monitoring and early warning support to decision makers responsible for responding to food insecurity emergencies on three continents. FEWS NET uses satellite remote sensing and ground observations of rainfall and vegetation in order to provide information on drought, floods, and other extreme weather events to decision makers. Previous research has presented results from a professional review questionnaire with FEWS NET expert end-users whose focus was to elicit Earth observation requirements. The review provided FEWS NET operational requirements and assessed the usefulness of additional remote sensing data. We analyzed 1342 food security update reports from FEWS NET. The reports consider the biophysical, socioeconomic, and contextual influences on the food security in 17 countries in Africa from 2000 to 2009. The objective was to evaluate the use of remote sensing information in comparison with other important factors in the evaluation of food security crises. The results show that all 17 countries use rainfall information, agricultural production statistics, food prices, and food access parameters in their analysis of food security problems. The reports display large-scale patterns that are strongly related to history of the FEWS NET program in each country. We found that rainfall data were used 84% of the time, remote sensing of vegetation 28% of the time, and gridded crop models 10% of the time, reflecting the length of use of each product in the regions. More investment is needed in training personnel on remote sensing products to improve use of data products throughout the FEWS NET system.

USAID↗

Famine Early Warning Systems and Their Use of Satellite Remote Sensing Data

Famine early warning organizations have experience that has much to contribute to efforts to incorporate climate and weather information into economic and political systems. Food security crises are now caused almost exclusively by problems of food access, not absolute food availability, but the role of monitoring agricultural production both locally and globally remains central. The price of food important to the understanding of food security in any region, but it needs to be understood in the context of local production. Thus remote sensing is still at the center of much food security analysis, along with an examination of markets, trade and economic policies during food security analyses. Technology including satellite remote sensing, earth science models, databases of food production and yield, and modem telecommunication systems contributed to improved food production information. Here we present an econometric approach focused on bringing together satellite remote sensing and market analysis into food security assessment in the context of early warning.

Brown, Molly E.↗

Overview and Commentary on Applying the Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Process to Photovoltaic System Devices

The rapid expansion of photovoltaic (PV) systems, particularly inverters, has introduced new cybersecurity challenges that threaten both local operations as well as the broader electrical grid’s stability. PV inverters, integrated into critical energy infrastructure are potential targets for cyber attacks due to vulnerabilities in firmware, remote access systems, and communication protocols. The Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) process, as defined by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), provides a framework for identifying, reporting, and addressing these vulnerabilities in a transparent and collaborative manner. This report outlines the CVD process as it applies to PV systems, detailing the roles of key stakeholders, such as manufacturers, grid operators, and security researchers. The report also highlights specific challenges in managing vulnerabilities for new and legacy PV systems, which includes those introduced by insecure communications and third-party supply chain components. By adhering to the CVD process, the PV industry can mitigate cybersecurity risks, ensure regulatory compliance, and maintain consumer trust, while safeguarding the operational resilience of the energy grid. Ultimately, the effective coordination of vulnerability management is crucial for securing the future of PV systems within the critical electric grid infrastructure landscape.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Analyzing Insider Risk Threat to the Internet of Things (IoT)

Recent technological advancement has created a growing convergence of innovation. From machine learning to ubiquitous computing to wireless networks and automation, the world is seeing new technology increasingly capable of connecting with each other. Devices and systems use open communications networks to interact, process information, and react. This is called the Internet of Things (IoT) and is comprised of physical devices that exchange data over networks, creating revolutionary possibilities. The most common way most people interact with an IoT is through ‘smart home’ products like Amazon’s Alexa, which use microphones, speakers, and phones to control a variety of devices, from lights and thermostats, to cameras, to appliances and vacuum cleaners. But the open nature of IoT networks—necessary for their ability to communicate and operate—also introduces privacy and security concerns. At a personal level, this might mean a hack into a home to steal private information, but when applied in broader industries like healthcare, transportation, manufacturing, or the military, this vulnerability can have serious consequences. As IoT usage and interconnectivity increases, so too does the susceptibility to malicious actors. And the entire system is only as secure as its least secure member. This creates particular risk and vulnerability to radiological material industries, as a competent insider adversary could utilize the IoT to potentially steal or access classified or sensitive information about employees, sites, or systems; or simply sabotage security or maintenance from a more remote—and less secure—device. The IoT relies on a secure network across the entire system, especially in transport which may lack the security of more permanent locations; if one device fails, it can create a ripple effect and an insider threat may seek to exploit that connectivity. While IoT benefits drive increased innovation and usage, there are also vulnerabilities an insider threat could exploit; this risk of an IoT to radiological material must be addressed in any mitigation effort.

Kinney, Justin↗

Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations

The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Novel Platform for Digitization of Radiation Measurements, Decommissioning and Dismantling and Nuclear Waste Management - 18229

An innovative Platform for a seamless digitization of the information produced during the characterization of radioactive waste, contaminated objects, and in general radioprotection measurements has ben developed by CAEN SyS. The Platform is based on a spectroscopic handheld instrument integrating RFID technology, barcode reader, camera, voice recorder, and geo-localization, a selection of radiation tolerant RFID tags tested above 300 Gy integrated dose, ruggedized portable RFID readers and a secure database framework capable to collect data also from external sources such as gamma scanners and imaging systems. The Platform allows for real-time measurement of dose rate, radiation spectroscopy, tagging, tracking and inventorying of items. All data produced by the Platform are securely stored into the non-volatile memory of the RFID tags and in the database for both onsite and remote access to the information by operators. This paper presents the current development of the Platform and shows the advantages of such approach to achieve an easy yet reliable waste traceability, waste bagging optimization, and a structured methodology for radiation measurements, meeting an excellent quality control as increasingly required by Safety Authorities. Applications here envisaged and explored are dismantling and decontamination operations, radioprotection measurements and patrols, nuclear material management, safeguards and verification inspections. More in general, the Platform can address the needs of all plants, research laboratories and facilities that are looking to improve their Safety Standards, decrease operational costs, have a precise knowledge of the contaminated environment and objects as well as optimization for personnel dose minimization. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016, Attachment A: Site Description

This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016 (prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC [NSTec], 2017). Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site’s environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Towards Reducing the Data Exfiltration Surface for the Insider Threat

Unauthorized data exfiltrations from both insiders and outsiders are costly and damaging. Network communication resources can be used for transporting data illicitly out of the enterprise or cloud. Combined with built-in malware copying utilities, we define this as comprising the Data Exfiltration Surface (DXS). For securing valuable data, it is desirable to reduce the DXS and maintain controls on the egress points. Our approach is to host the data in a protected enclave that includes novel software Data Diode (SDD) installed on a secured, border gateway. The SDD allows copying data into the enclave systems but denies data from being copied out. Simultaneously, it permits remote access with remote desktop and console applications. Our tests demonstrate that we are able to effectively reduce the DXS and we are able to protect data from being exfiltrated through the use of the SDD.

Schlicher, Bob G↗

2020 LLNL Nuclear Science and Security Summer Internship Program

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Nuclear Science and Security Summer Internship Program (NS 3 IP) is designed to give graduate students an opportunity to come to LLNL for 8–10 weeks of hands-on research. Students conduct research under the supervision of a staff scientist, attend a weekly lecture series, interact with other students, and present their work in poster format at the end of the program. Students also have the opportunity to meet staff scientists one-on-one, participate in LLNL facility tours (e.g., the National Ignition Facility and Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry), and gain a better understanding of the various science programs at LLNL. Due to the travel and access restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 NS 3 IP was organized as an “all-virtual” internship program. With LLNL’s extensive institutional support, students accessed the laboratory’s cyberinfrastructure through a secure virtual desktop environment and all seminars, mentor interactions, summer presentations, and laboratory tours were performed remotely. While this virtual internship format did not allow for hands-on laboratory research projects, both the interns and their mentors constructed creative research projects that maximized student exposure to nuclear science research that is relevant to DTRA and LLNL interests in nuclear security.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

2021 LLNL Nuclear Science and Security Summer Internship Program

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Nuclear Science and Security Summer Internship Program (NS 3 IP) is designed to give graduate students an opportunity to come to LLNL for 8–10 weeks of hands-on research. Students conduct research under the supervision of a staff scientist, attend a weekly lecture series, interact with other students, and present their work in poster format at the end of the program. Students also have the opportunity to meet staff scientists one-on-one, participate in LLNL facility tours (e.g., the National Ignition Facility and Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry), and gain a better understanding of the various science programs at LLNL. Due to the travel and access restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2021 NS 3 IP was organized as an “all-virtual” internship program. With LLNL’s extensive institutional support, students accessed the laboratory’s cyberinfrastructure through a secure virtual desktop environment and all seminars, mentor interactions, summer presentations, and laboratory tours were performed remotely. While this virtual internship format did not allow for hands-on laboratory research projects, both the interns and their mentors constructed creative research projects that maximized student exposure to nuclear science research that is relevant to DTRA and LLNL interests in nuclear security. We anticipate a return to an in-person internship format for the summer of 2022.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Middleware and Web Services for the Collaborative Information Portal of NASA's Mars Exploration Rovers Mission

We describe the design and deployment of the middleware for the Collaborative Information Portal (CIP), a mission critical J2EE application developed for NASA's 2003 Mars Exploration Rover mission. CIP enabled mission personnel to access data and images sent back from Mars, staff and event schedules, broadcast messages and clocks displaying various Earth and Mars time zones. We developed the CIP middleware in less than two years time usins cutting-edge technologies, including EJBs, servlets, JDBC, JNDI and JMS. The middleware was designed as a collection of independent, hot-deployable web services, providing secure access to back end file systems and databases. Throughout the middleware we enabled crosscutting capabilities such as runtime service configuration, security, logging and remote monitoring. This paper presents our approach to mitigating the challenges we faced, concluding with a review of the lessons we learned from this project and noting what we'd do differently and why.

Sinderson, Elias↗

Aerospace Communications Security Technologies Demonstrated

In light of the events of September 11, 2001, NASA senior management requested an investigation of technologies and concepts to enhance aviation security. The investigation was to focus on near-term technologies that could be demonstrated within 90 days and implemented in less than 2 years. In response to this request, an internal NASA Glenn Research Center Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance Aviation Security Tiger Team was assembled. The 2-year plan developed by the team included an investigation of multiple aviation security concepts, multiple aircraft platforms, and extensively leveraged datalink communications technologies. It incorporated industry partners from NASA's Graphical Weather-in-the-Cockpit research, which is within NASA's Aviation Safety Program. Two concepts from the plan were selected for demonstration: remote "black box," and cockpit/cabin surveillance. The remote "black box" concept involves real-time downlinking of aircraft parameters for remote monitoring and archiving of aircraft data, which would assure access to the data following the loss or inaccessibility of an aircraft. The cockpit/cabin surveillance concept involves remote audio and/or visual surveillance of cockpit and cabin activity, which would allow immediate response to any security breach and would serve as a possible deterrent to such breaches. The datalink selected for the demonstrations was VDL Mode 2 (VHF digital link), the first digital datalink for air-ground communications designed for aircraft use. VDL Mode 2 is beginning to be implemented through the deployment of ground stations and aircraft avionics installations, with the goal of being operational in 2 years. The first demonstration was performed December 3, 2001, onboard the LearJet 25 at Glenn. NASA worked with Honeywell, Inc., for the broadcast VDL Mode 2 datalink capability and with actual Boeing 757 aircraft data. This demonstration used a cockpitmounted camera for video surveillance and a coupling to the intercom system for audio surveillance. Audio, video, and "black box" data were simultaneously streamed to the ground, where they were displayed to a Glenn audience of senior management and aviation security team members.

Griner, James H.↗

Operation Request Gatekeeper: A software system for remote access control of diagnostic instruments in fusion experiments

Tokamak diagnostic settings are repeatedly modified to meet the changing needs of each experiment. Enabling the remote diagnostic control has significant challenges due to security and efficiency requirements. The Operation Request Gatekeeper (ORG) is a software system that addresses the challenges of remotely but securely submitting modification requests. The ORG provides a framework for screening all the requests before they enter the secure machine zone and are executed by performing user authentication and authorization, grammar validation, and validity checks. A prototype ORG was developed for the ITER CODAC that satisfies their initial requirements for remote request submission and has been tested with remote control of the KSTAR Plasma Control System. This paper describes the software design principles and implementation of ORG as well as worldwide test results.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

ACCESS (Assembly Concept for Construction of Erectable Space Structure) - A Shuttle flight experiment

ACCESS is a planned Shuttle flight experiment to assess the potential of an on-orbit construction concept designed for efficient manual assembly of a space truss. The experiment, which is scheduled for launch November 27, 1985, on the Space Transportation System (STS) flight 61-B, uses two astronauts secured in fixed foot restraints located in the Shuttle cargo bay to assemble a 45-foot long aluminum truss beam from 93 tubular struts and 33 nodal joints. Neutral buoyancy simulations of the flight experiment indicate the truss can be assembled in less than thirty minutes. Structural assembly, structural repair, flexible cable attachment and manual manipulation of the truss is also planned for the experiment using an astronaut secured in the Manipulator Foot Restraint attached to the Remote Manipulator System arm. Flight assembly data will be generated for correlation of the neutral buoyancy ground test data. This paper describes the ACCESS flight experiment and presents results of the neutral buoyancy development and training tests.

Heard, W. L., Jr.↗

Airport Remote Tower Sensor Systems

Networks of video cameras, meteorological sensors, and ancillary electronic equipment are under development in collaboration among NASA Ames Research Center, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). These networks are to be established at and near airports to provide real-time information on local weather conditions that affect aircraft approaches and landings. The prototype network is an airport-approach-zone camera system (AAZCS), which has been deployed at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) and San Carlos Airport (SQL). The AAZCS includes remotely controlled color video cameras located on top of SFO and SQL air-traffic control towers. The cameras are controlled by the NOAA Center Weather Service Unit located at the Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center and are accessible via a secure Web site. The AAZCS cameras can be zoomed and can be panned and tilted to cover a field of view 220 wide. The NOAA observer can see the sky condition as it is changing, thereby making possible a real-time evaluation of the conditions along the approach zones of SFO and SQL. The next-generation network, denoted a remote tower sensor system (RTSS), will soon be deployed at the Half Moon Bay Airport and a version of it will eventually be deployed at Los Angeles International Airport. In addition to remote control of video cameras via secure Web links, the RTSS offers realtime weather observations, remote sensing, portability, and a capability for deployment at remote and uninhabited sites. The RTSS can be used at airports that lack control towers, as well as at major airport hubs, to provide synthetic augmentation of vision for both local and remote operations under what would otherwise be conditions of low or even zero visibility.

Maluf, David A.↗