DOE OSTI2012
Since undeclared elements of Iran’s nuclear program were revealed in 2002, Tehran has engaged in a decade of efforts to justify and advance its nuclear program. Unlike North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has maximized advantage and minimized backlash by maneuvering near the borders of the NPT system. Iran has embraced a three-pronged approach to bargain with the international community: (1) divide international opposition, (2) delay international monitoring, negotiations, and sanctions, (3) and defy international monitoring, commitments, and pressure. Iran’s nuclear bargaining can be divided into several time periods, and Iran used divide, delay, and defy tactics in each period. During the first phase from 2003 to 2005, Iranian reformist leader Mohammad Khatami was more willing to negotiate with the international community, but his ability to negotiate was constrained domestically and particularly during his last year of leadership. Tehran mainly negotiated with the France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – the European 3 (EU-3) – to drive a wedge between European and U.S. pressures on Iran and to delay outside monitoring and prevent international sanctions. It is in this early period that Iran developed its range of divide, delay, and defy tactics. For divide, Iran negotiated with the EU-3 because Europe had a close and influential relationship with the United States, whereas other international actors such as Russia and China were powerful but could not form an united bloc against the U.S. Iran began to delay international monitoring of its nuclear program by creating hurdles for international inspectors, stalling requests for information, and not volunteering information but providing updates only when Iranian nuclear developments were exposed by other parties. Iranian diplomats also delayed negotiations and sanctions by framing talks, negotiating and responding slowly to offers, providing false hopes and the appearance of concessions before key international events and resolutions, and adopting temporary and shifting negotiating positions. To defy, Iran modified and razed nuclear sites to prevent detection, used legalistic and minimal interpretations to subvert commitments, argued for an international right to enrich uranium, and proclaimed a fatwa against nuclear weapons. After President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, Iran took a tougher stance internationally. Ahmadinejad and his cabinet did not provide major concessions to facilitate international negotiations, were less willing to seriously consider proposals to curb Iran’s nuclear program, and linked Iran’s nuclear program to sovereignty and national pride. Realizing that Europe was less optimistic about negotiations, Ahmadinejad leveraged Russia and China to Iran’s advantage. Both countries helped delay and dilute United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran. Ahmadinejad employed more tactics to defy international monitoring and pressure. These tactics involved demonstrating Iran’s nuclear progress even as Tehran engaged in negotiations over its program. Iran also increased the cost of failed negotiations by sustaining and escalating regional and global tensions to coincide with international events and resolutions that criticized or condemned Iran’s nuclear program. The third and present phase of Iranian nuclear bargaining began during Ahmadinejad’s second term as president (2009-2012). During this period, Ahmadinejad’s power significant weakened and domestic turf wars made Iranian nuclear negotiations unpredictable and at times contradictory. Due to the domestic situation and the exhausting of successful divide and delay tactics, Iran began using more defy tactics. Iran, for example, considered enriching uranium to a higher percentage for naval reactors, warned of closing the Straits of Hormuz, and engaged in terrorist acts against the West and its allies. Currently, Iran’s range of bargaining options has narrowed, with many divide and delay tactics less useful since the international community has become more aware of Iranian efforts to stall and buy time. While Iran leaders have employed more acts of defiance, Iran’s ability to sustain its defy tactics are waning and it is still possible to prevent greater confrontation between Iran and the West.
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗