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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effect of Boundary Conditions on Process-Induced Stresses in a Plain Weave Unit Cell

Woven polymer matrix composites (PMCs) are leveraged in aerospace applications for their desirable specific properties, yet they are vulnerable to high residual stresses during manufacturing and their complex geometry makes experimental results difficult to observe. Process modeling is needed to characterize the effects of the curing and predict end stress states. Finite element software can be used to model woven architectures, however accurate representation of processing conditions remains a challenge when it comes to selecting boundary conditions. The effect of BCs on process-induced stress within woven PMCs is studied. The commercial Finite Element Analysis (FEA) software Abaqus is coupled with user-written subroutines in a process modeling framework. A two-dimensionally (2D) woven PMC repeating unit cell (RUC) is modeled with TexGen and Abaqus. Virtual curing is imposed on the bulk matrix. The BC study is conducted with Free, Periodic, Flat, and Flat-Free configurations. Results show that the end stress state is sensitive to the boundary condition assumptions. Flat BC results show great agreement with Periodic BCs. Residual stress results from process modeling are then compared with a linear-elastic thermal cooldown analysis in Abaqus. Cooldown results indicate an overestimation in matrix stresses compared with process modeling.

micromechanics↗
NASA NTRS2010

Positive Voltage Hazard to EMU Crewman from Currents through Plasma

This paper describes the model of the EMU with a human body in the circuit that has been used by NASA to evaluate the low positive voltage hazard. The model utilizes the electron collection characterization from on orbit Langmuir probe data as representative of electron collection to a positive charged surface with a wide range of on orbit plasma temperature and density conditions. The data has been unified according to non-linear theoretical temperature and density variation of the electron saturated probe current collection theory and used as a model for the electron collection at EMU surfaces. Vulnerable paths through the EMU connecting through the crewman s body have been identified along with electrical impedance of the exposed body parts. The body impedance information is merged with the electron collection characteristics in circuit simulation software (SPICE). The assessment shows that currents can be on the order of 20 mA for a 15 V exposure and of order 4 mA at 3V. These currents formally violate NASA protocol for electric current exposures however the human factors associated with subjective consequences of noxious stimuli from low voltage exposure during the stressful conditions of EVA are an area of active inquiry.

Koontz, Steven L.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Toward Synthesis, Analysis, and Certification of Security Protocols

Implemented security protocols are basically pieces of software which are used to (a) authenticate the other communication partners, (b) establish a secure communication channel between them (using insecure communication media), and (c) transfer data between the communication partners in such a way that these data only available to the desired receiver, but not to anyone else. Such an implementation usually consists of the following components: the protocol-engine, which controls in which sequence the messages of the protocol are sent over the network, and which controls the assembly/disassembly and processing (e.g., decryption) of the data. the cryptographic routines to actually encrypt or decrypt the data (using given keys), and t,he interface to the operating system and to the application. For a correct working of such a security protocol, all of these components must work flawlessly. Many formal-methods based techniques for the analysis of a security protocols have been developed. They range from using specific logics (e.g.: BAN-logic [4], or higher order logics [12] to model checking [2] approaches. In each approach, the analysis tries to prove that no (or at least not a modeled intruder) can get access to secret data. Otherwise, a scenario illustrating the &tack may be produced. Despite the seeming simplicity of security protocols ("only" a few messages are sent between the protocol partners in order to ensure a secure communication), many flaws have been detected. Unfortunately, even a perfect protocol engine does not guarantee flawless working of a security protocol, as incidents show. Many break-ins and security vulnerabilities are caused by exploiting errors in the implementation of the protocol engine or the underlying operating system. Attacks using buffer-overflows are a very common class of such attacks. Errors in the implementation of exception or error handling can open up additional vulnerabilities. For example, on a website with a log-in screen: multiple tries with invalid passwords caused the expected error message (too many retries). but let the user nevertheless pass. Finally, security can be compromised by silly implementation bugs or design decisions. In a commercial VPN software, all calls to the encryption routines were incidentally replaced by stubs, probably during factory testing. The product worked nicely. and the error (an open VPN) would have gone undetected, if a team member had not inspected the low-level traffic out of curiosity. Also, the use secret proprietary encryption routines can backfire, because such algorithms often exhibit weaknesses which can be exploited easily (see e.g., DVD encoding). Summarizing, there is large number of possibilities to make errors which can compromise the security of a protocol. In today s world with short time-to-market and the use of security protocols in open and hostile networks for safety-critical applications (e.g., power or air-traffic control), such slips could lead to catastrophic situations. Thus, formal methods and automatic reasoning techniques should not be used just for the formal proof of absence of an attack, but they ought to be used to provide an end-to-end tool-supported framework for security software. With such an approach all required artifacts (code, documentation, test cases) , formal analyses, and reliable certification will be generated automatically, given a single, high level specification. By a combination of program synthesis, formal protocol analysis, certification; and proof-carrying code, this goal is within practical reach, since all the important technologies for such an approach actually exist and only need to be assembled in the right way.

Schumann, Johann↗
NASA NTRS2019

Ensuring Flexibility and Security in SDN-Based Spacecraft Communication Networks Through Risk Assessment

Software-defined networking (SDN) has enabled elastic networking and resource distribution in cloud computing. The centralization and separation of the Control Plane also offers a high degree of network configurability and management, which can be used to mitigate and manage threats to the network. Space communication networks have historically been restricted and circuit switching in these networks has been a manual process. This study evaluates the potential role of SDN in space communication networks from a networking security standpoint. The evaluation covers the networking security needs of spacecraft missions and their associated assets. The results from the evaluation lead to a risk assessment that identifies vulnerabilities in an SDN-based communications architecture. Security challenges introduced into the network from integrating SDN are also considered. A risk register summarizes the severity of the attack outcomes, as well as occurrence likelihood. The study identifies Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks as a new threat (presently unmitigated by existing security controls) that would be prevalent in an SDN-based space communication environment. A Mininet-based emulation testbed is built to demonstrate the susceptibility of spacecraft flight software to a flooding DoS attack when on an interconnected SDN-managed network. This type of attack would be highly consequential to mission assets, and therefore SDN-based space communications would need to be resilient to such attacks. Future work will need to be performed to fully characterize DoS attack methods that can apply to the space communication scenario, as well as to devise a comprehensive DoS-resilient solution.

Baker, Dylan Z.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Cyber Resiliency and the Implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System in an Urban Air Mobility Environment

With the growth in Urban Air Mobility systems and the increasing reliance on interconnected technologies, ensuring the security of these complex components has become critical. As cities evolve into smart urban centers, the vulnerability to cyber threats escalates, possibly endangering citizens safety and the efficiency of transportation networks.In response to these challenges, this paper presents a study on the need for cyber resilient techniques within future air traffic environments. It will pay specific attention to the implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) utilizing Atomic OSSEC software, tailored specifically to a NASA simulation of an UrbanAirMobility environments’ unique demands. Further, this study seeks to outline the rational for NASA’s recommendation for a HIDS in such environments. It explores the design, development, and deployment of the proposed HIDS, focusing on its adaptability to monitor the hybrid nature of the Urban Air Mobility environment. Leveraging machine learning algorithms and anomaly detection techniques, the HIDS is equipped to continuously monitor and analyze the behavior of individual host systems, vehicles, and devices, thereby providing a proactive approach to threat detection. Implementing a HIDS is a pivotal strategy for enhancing cyber resiliency, as it gives an organization granular visibility into internal system activities, enables rapid detection and response to anomalous behavior and cyber threats, and fortifies the organizations overall cybersecurity posture. Finally, this study aims to provide recommendations and include learned takeaways that the Urban Air Mobility industry should consider. In brief, this paper highlights the significance of host-based intrusion detection in UrbanAirMobility environments and underscores the necessity of tailored security solutions to safeguard against emerging cyber threats.

UAM↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

VISUALIZING INTERANNUAL TO DECADAL COASTAL VARIABILITY NEAR VULNERABLE NASA INFRASTRUCTURE UTILIZING VIDEOS PRODUCED FROM REMOTELY SENSED DATA AT CAPE CANAVERAL, FL AND WALLOPS ISLAND, VA

Coastlines represent an interesting convolution of intense anthropogenic development superimposed onto morphologies that are among the most dynamic on the planet. Two of NASA’s critical facilities are particularly vulnerable to coastal change, Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, FL and Wallops Flight Facility, Wallops Island, VA. With continuing global sea level rise and increasing storminess coastal vulnerabilities at these facilities will only be exacerbated. These launch centers a subject to multiple coastal hazards including, flooding, episodic coastal erosion, saltwater intrusion, and coastal morphological changes. Although rapid change is readily observed during large storms or hurricanes, long term annual to decadal coastal change is much harder to visualize and conceptualize. The authors use videos developed from remotely sensed data to enhance conceptualization of coastal processes for planning and management stakeholders at these NASA facilities. Near or better than decadal coastal imagery has been available through high altitude photogrammetry efforts since the 1930’s. A significant amount of additional imagery was acquired through other federal, state, and local government agencies such as the USGS, NOAA, State DOT, and local Assessors Offices providing annual and inter annual images at spatial resolutions of 10cm – 1m. With the advent of GIS systems these images could be rectified and then layered to better understand change through time using a multitude of visual base shoreline proxies. With the increased awareness and use of video editing software the rectified images can be used to create videos. These videos can then be used to conceptualize a multitude of coastal processes including: performance of coastal restoration efforts, rapid change in sedimentation rates due to storms or other geomorphic processes, loss of protective barrier islands as sea level rises and lower sedimentation rates occur. The videos are also useful as a tool for verification and comparison to coastal models and provide an easy to understand educational resource for stakeholder engagement at these NASA centers, and other vulnerable coastal populations.

Richard A. MacKenzie III↗
NASA NTRS2012

Using ACIS on the Chandra X-ray Observatory as a Particle Radiation Monitor II

The Advanced CCD Imaging Spectrometer is an instrument on the Chandra X-ray Observatory. CCDs are vulnerable to radiation damage, particularly by soft protons in the radiation belts and solar storms. The Chandra team has implemented procedures to protect ACIS during high-radiation events including autonomous protection triggered by an on-board radiation monitor. Elevated temperatures have reduced the effectiveness of the on-board monitor. The ACIS team has developed an algorithm which uses data from the CCDs themselves to detect periods of high radiation and a flight software patch to apply this algorithm is currently active on-board the instrument. In this paper, we explore the ACIS response to particle radiation through comparisons to a number of external measures of the radiation environment. We hope to better understand the efficiency of the algorithm as a function of the flux and spectrum of the particles and the time-profile of the radiation event.

Grant, C. E.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Man-Machine Integration Design and Analysis System (MIDAS) v5: Augmentations, Motivations, and Directions for Aeronautics Applications

As automation and advanced technologies are introduced into transport systems ranging from the Next Generation Air Transportation System termed NextGen, to the advanced surface transportation systems as exemplified by the Intelligent Transportations Systems, to future systems designed for space exploration, there is an increased need to validly predict how the future systems will be vulnerable to error given the demands imposed by the assistive technologies. One formalized approach to study the impact of assistive technologies on the human operator in a safe and non-obtrusive manner is through the use of human performance models (HPMs). HPMs play an integral role when complex human-system designs are proposed, developed, and tested. One HPM tool termed the Man-machine Integration Design and Analysis System (MIDAS) is a NASA Ames Research Center HPM software tool that has been applied to predict human-system performance in various domains since 1986. MIDAS is a dynamic, integrated HPM and simulation environment that facilitates the design, visualization, and computational evaluation of complex man-machine system concepts in simulated operational environments. The paper will discuss a range of aviation specific applications including an approach used to model human error for NASA s Aviation Safety Program, and what-if analyses to evaluate flight deck technologies for NextGen operations. This chapter will culminate by raising two challenges for the field of predictive HPMs for complex human-system designs that evaluate assistive technologies: that of (1) model transparency and (2) model validation.

Gore, Brian F.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Phylogenetic Conservatism in Plant Phenology

Phenological events defined points in the life cycle of a plant or animal have been regarded as highly plastic traits, reflecting flexible responses to various environmental cues. The ability of a species to track, via shifts in phenological events, the abiotic environment through time might dictate its vulnerability to future climate change. Understanding the predictors and drivers of phenological change is therefore critical. Here, we evaluated evidence for phylogenetic conservatism the tendency for closely related species to share similar ecological and biological attributes in phenological traits across flowering plants. We aggregated published and unpublished data on timing of first flower and first leaf, encompassing 4000 species at 23 sites across the Northern Hemisphere. We reconstructed the phylogeny for the set of included species, first, using the software program Phylomatic, and second, from DNA data. We then quantified phylogenetic conservatism in plant phenology within and across sites. We show that more closely related species tend to flower and leaf at similar times. By contrasting mean flowering times within and across sites, however, we illustrate that it is not the time of year that is conserved, but rather the phenological responses to a common set of abiotic cues. Our findings suggest that species cannot be treated as statistically independent when modelling phenological responses.Closely related species tend to resemble each other in the timing of their life-history events, a likely product of evolutionarily conserved responses to environmental cues. The search for the underlying drivers of phenology must therefore account for species' shared evolutionary histories.

phylogenetic conservatism↗
NASA NTRS2014

A Multiple Parameters Biodosimetry Tool with Various Blood Cell Counts - the Hemodose Approach

There continue to be important concerns about the possibility of the occurrence of acute radiation syndromes following nuclear and radiological terrorism or accidents that may result in mass casualties in densely populated areas. To guide medical personnel in their clinical decisions for effective medical management and treatment of the exposed individuals, biological markers are usually applied to examine radiation induced biological changes to assess the severity of radiation injury to sensitive organ systems. Among these the peripheral blood cell counts are widely used to assess the extent of radiation induced bone marrow injury. This is due to the fact that the hematopoietic system is the most vulnerable part of the human body to radiation damage. Particularly, the lymphocyte, granulocyte, and platelet cells are the most radiosensitive of the blood elements, and monitoring their changes after exposure is regarded as a practical and recommended laboratory test to estimate radiation dose and injury. Based upon years of physiological and pathophysiological investigation of mammalian hematopoietic systems, and rigorous coarse-grained bio-mathematical modeling and validation on species from mouse, to dog, monkey, and human, we have developed a set of software tools Hemodose, which can use single or serial granulocyte, lymphocyte, leukocyte, or platelet counts after exposure to estimate absorbed doses of adult victims very rapidly and accurately. Some patient data from historical accidents are utilized as examples to demonstrate the capabilities of these tools as a rapid point-of-care diagnostic or centralized high-throughput assay system in a large-scale radiological disaster scenario. Most significant to the improvement of national and local preparedness of a potential nuclear/radiological disaster, this HemoDose approach establishes robust correlations between the absorbed doses and victim's various types of blood cell counts not only in the early time window (1 or 2 days), but also in the very late phase (up to 4 weeks) after exposure.

Hu, Shaowen↗
NASA NTRS2017

Preliminary Investigation of Impact of Technological Impairment on Trajectory-Based Operations

The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) incorporates collaborative air traffic management and Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO) in order to significantly increase the capacity, efficiency, and predictability of operations in the National Airspace System (NAS), without decreasing safety. This is enabled by airspace users and service providers sharing knowledge about operations that allows prediction of the complete 4D flight trajectory with as little uncertainty as possible. Additionally, new software and hardware technology is critical to reaching NextGen goals, especially with regard to TBO. What if the technologies that are critical for TBO were to be impaired or fail completely? Should there be a malfunction of a piece of the technology, it must be ensured that the whole system does not break down completely or suffer severe impairment. Instead, operations need to be maintained proportionally to the problem and safety needs to be ensured (graceful degradation). This paper proposes a systematic framework to investigate the vulnerability of TBO to technology disruption, and determine the impact of technological impairment on TBO. Two representative technologies are chosen for detailed investigation and the impact of their impairment on the degradation of TBO is illustrated using a weather-related scenario. XXXX There are several possible directions of future work. We believe it is desirable to develop methods to quantitatively assess the impact of technological disruption on TBO and to have the simulation tools to validate the impact. The availability of prognostics and health management methods could be leveraged to predict technological failure/disruption, thus predicting how TBO will be a ected, and possibly pro-actively mitigating the impact. It is important to develop large-scale scenarios where the e ect of technological impairment is prominent, and identify methods to quantitatively assess the extent of TBO degradation. An important goal of such an investigation is the development of failure-resistant resilient trajectory-based oper- ations. Resilience14, 15 is the property of a system to \bounce back" and resume at least a signi cant portion of its functionalities after degradation due to technological impairment(s). A systems resilience includes properties such as \bu ering capacity" (quantifying disruptions the system can absorb or adapt to without a fundamental breakdown in performance or in the systems structure), \ exibility" (ability to restructure itself in response to external changes or pressures), "margin" (how closely the system is currently operating rela- tive to one or another kind of performance boundary), \tolerance" (whether the system gracefully degrades as stress/pressure increase, or collapses quickly when pressure exceeds adaptive capacity), etc. Future work needs to focus on quantifying and improving the resilience of TBO, and identifying resilient design solutions for aviation.

TBO↗
NASA NTRS2014

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control System Development

My job title is IT Security support for the Spaceport Command & Control System Development. As a cyber‐security analyst it is my job to ensure NASA's information stays safe from cyber threats, such as, viruses, malware and denial-of-service attacks by establishing and enforcing system access controls. Security is very important in the world of technology and it is used everywhere from personal computers to giant networks ran by Government agencies worldwide. Without constant monitoring analysis, businesses, public organizations and government agencies are vulnerable to potential harmful infiltration of their computer information system. It is my responsibility to ensure authorized access by examining improper access, reporting violations, revoke access, monitor information request by new programming and recommend improvements. My department oversees the Launch Control System and networks. An audit will be conducted for the LCS based on compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). I recently finished analyzing the SANS top 20 critical controls to give cost effective recommendations on various software and hardware products for compliance. Upon my completion of this internship, I will have successfully completed my duties as well as gain knowledge that will be helpful to my career in the future as a Cyber Security Analyst.

IT Security↗
NASA NTRS2019

NASA IV&V's Cyber Range for Space Systems

A cyber range is a virtual environment that is used for cyberwarfare training and cyber technology development. It provides tools that help strengthen the stability, security and performance of cyber infrastructures and IT systems. NASA IV&V has created an adaptable virtual environment that is representative of a typical NASA mission system of systems environment that serves multiple purposes: Training of network defenders. Ability to perform simulated red vs blue training events. Ability to deploy mission specific technologies in a cyber contested environment. Ability to demonstrate vulnerabilities and their impact to ground and space systemsThe overall system is comprised of more than 70 virtual machines and physical infrastructure to demonstrate real-world cyber attacks against: email users, wireless networks, and physically implanted devices with command and control call-back. The cyber range was built to emulate a NASA precipitation satellite infrastructure.This presentation will give an overview of the virtual cyber range and how it was used to conduct a simulate red vs blue exercise with the goal of compromising the simulated spacecraft that utilizes real NASA flight software.

test and evaluation DT&E↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assessing Alaskan boreal forest landcover affected by climate-wildfire interactions from ground truth surveys and NASA airborne remote sensing

Alaska’s boreal forest is facing unprecedented challenges under rapid climate warming (increasingly severe fires, droughts, pest/disease outbreaks) that may destabilize its function as a global carbon sink. Forests near Fairbanks may be especially vulnerable, impacting air quality and ecosystem services. We combined GT (ground truthing) with Airborne Visible InfraRed Imaging Spectrometer (AVIRIS-NG) images collected by the NASA Arctic-Boreal Vulnerability Experiment (ABoVE) program (2017-2019) to assess landcover change at five recently burned sites (2001-2019) of different fire severities and moisture regimes within 30 miles of Fairbanks. GT included tree seedling counts, understory % cover and >50% leaf canopy color assessment. 36 circular plots (1/30 ha radius) including 6 moderate to severely burned plots were selected across sites. 31 additional sites including 12 burned sites were geotagged in photos. AVIRIS images were processed from 29 spectral bands selected to identify changes in chlorophyll and water content. Images were segmented into natural boundaries (polygons) using ENVI 5.5 software. A spectral library of 8 AVIRIS bands with high between-class/low within-class variation was used in two random forest models to predict vegetation classes (model 1: 12 classes, model 2: 14 classes) in each AVIRIS scene, using 20% of the data as training data. Model 2 classified 20% more polygons overall, but only 42% of GT/geotagged polygons were correctly classified by both models. More forest sites were correctly classified (63%) than open vegetation (32%) or post-fire sites (46%). 50% of aspen forest and post-fire polygons were misclassified as shrubland. GT revealed that post-fire plots supported 134,000 (± 48,000) tree seedlings and saplings ha-1 (0.2 - 4 m height, 64% deciduous) versus 2500 (± 2100) shrubs ha-1 (1-6 m height). > 50% canopy browning was observed in conifer forest (8 plots) with no signs of insect infestation. Canopy herbivory > 50% (leaf miner, leaf beetle) and moose herbivory of tree bark was seen across aspen sites. Our study suggests: 1) low canopy vegetation presents challenges for improved landcover classification, and 2) aspen forest should be differentiated in vegetation maps which would aid in tracking herbivory.

Alaska↗
NASA NTRS2013

IT Security Support for Spaceport Command and Control System

During the fall 2013 semester, I worked at the Kennedy Space Center as an IT Security Intern in support of the Spaceport Command and Control System under the guidance of the IT Security Lead Engineer. Some of my responsibilities included assisting with security plan documentation collection, system hardware and software inventory, and malicious code and malware scanning. Throughout the semester, I had the opportunity to work on a wide range of security related projects. However, there are three projects in particular that stand out. The first project I completed was updating a large interactive spreadsheet that details the SANS Institutes Top 20 Critical Security Controls. My task was to add in all of the new commercial of the shelf (COTS) software listed on the SANS website that can be used to meet their Top 20 controls. In total, there are 153 unique security tools listed by SANS that meet one or more of their 20 controls. My second project was the creation of a database that will allow my mentor to keep track of the work done by the contractors that report to him in a more efficient manner by recording events as they occur throughout the quarter. Lastly, I expanded upon a security assessment of the Linux machines being used on center that I began last semester. To do this, I used a vulnerability and configuration tool that scans hosts remotely through the network and presents the user with an abundance of information detailing each machines configuration. The experience I gained from working on each of these projects has been invaluable, and I look forward to returning in the spring semester to continue working with the IT Security team.

computer security↗
NASA NTRS2021

Power Operations of the Mars Exploration Rovers

The rovers of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Mars Exploration Rovers (MER) project, Spirit (MER-A) and Opportunity (MER-B), safely landed on the surface of Mars three weeks apart during January 2004. Spirit and Opportunity were built and operated by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), which is managed by the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) for NASA. Spirit landed at Gusev Crater, 14.8 degrees south of the equator, and operated continuously on the surface of Mars from January 4, 2004 until last contact from Spirit on March 22, 2010. Opportunity landed at Meridiani Planum, a location 2.5 degrees south of the Martian equator. Opportunity operated continuously on the Martian surface from January 25, 2004 until the last received transmission from Opportunity on June 10, 2018. The goal of the MER project was to determine if Mars ever had a habitable environment, in particular, if it ever had water. During their missions, both Spirit and Opportunity found evidence that liquid water once flowed on the surface of Mars. Both Spirit and Opportunity used a 1.33 m2 triple-junction solar array as their power sources. Based on observations of the original Mars rover, the Sojourner rover of the Mars Pathfinder mission that landed on Mars on July 4, 1997, the expectation was that the Martian dust would rapidly accumulate on the solar arrays of Spirit and Opportunity, and that the rovers would not have enough energy to continue operations after 90 Martian days (sols). Instead, due in part to lower dust accumulation rates than expected and numerous dust cleaning events, the Spirit and Opportunity rovers continued to operate on the Martian surface for over 2000 sols (MER-A) and 5000 sols (MER-B), respectively. During this time, the rovers experienced multiple Martian winters and several dust storms. Because the sources of solar array energy loss were known, the solar array energy output offered a method to scientifically estimate the loading and aeolian removal of dust from the solar arrays each sol. The MER Power operations team called this value that they calculated the solar array Dust Factor (DF). Dust Factor was defined as the fraction of sunlight that penetrates the accumulated dust on the surface of the solar array. A Dust Factor of 1.0 would indicate that the solar array was perfectly clean. A Dust Factor of 0.6 would indicate that only 60% of the available sunlight was able to penetrate the accumulated dust on the solar arrays. The MER Power subsystem operations team used the Multi-Mission Power Analysis Tool (MMPAT) to perform these Dust Factor calculations. The MMPAT software tool modeled the behavior of the solar arrays and the batteries as they interacted with the spacecraft power loads over the mission timeline. MMPAT also had knowledge (through telemetry and user inputs) of telemetered Power subsystem voltages and currents, atmospheric opacity (Tau), rover surface location, rover attitude, the planetary tilt and distance of Mars from the sun based on day of year, the instantaneous elevation of the sun based on time of day, temperatures (internal and external), terrain masking, and shadowing (due to the camera mast and antennas). Once all of the known sources of array energy loss are accounted, the remaining difference between the expected array energy and the actual array energy determines the solar array Dust Factor. The assumptions made while determining the Dust Factor are 1) that the single measured atmospheric opacity value (Tau) is constant over the course of the entire sol, 2) there is no measurable solar cell degradation, 3) there are no shorted strings and therefore, 4) all unexpected solar array energy losses are due to accumulated dust on the solar array. Although it cannot provide an absolute measure of dust loading, the determination of solar array Dust Factor provides a useful way of tracking dust accumulation and aeolian dust removal trends on Martian spacecraft. Any spacecraft on the Martian surface is vulnerable to dust, especially solar-powered spacecraft. The Spirit and Opportunity rovers were operational on the Martian surface for much longer than expected due in part to aeolian removal of dust from their solar arrays. The first few dust removal events were a pleasant surprise to the MER operations teams; however, over time a pattern began to arise. In over three Mars Years on the surface, the Power operations team tracked the solar array Dust Factor at Gusev Crater (location of MER-A) and observed that there were several significant dust removal and deposition events in Mars Year (MY) 27, even in the absence of a large dust storm. In MY 28 at Gusev Crater, the large atmospheric opacity (Tau) increase lagged significant dust removal events. Overall at Gusev Crater, there was a pattern of steady dust accumulation on the solar arrays, with a small number of significant dust cleaning events. At Meridiani Planum, where Opportunity rover operated for over seven Mars Years (late MY 26 to mid MY 34), a clear and consistent pattern of dust movement emerged. Meridiani Planum had a predictable, seasonally dependent pattern of gradual and continuous dust accumulation and removal. In summary, this paper explains the reasons for the development of the solar array Dust Factor and how it was used in mission operations. In particular, this paper describes the MMPAT software package, how it models array energy, including the important assumptions, model inputs and sources of error. And finally, this paper will show how the calculated solar array Dust Factor was used at Gusev Crater and Meridiani Planum to predict dust accumulation rates and weather patterns, and the importance of this generated data set for current and future solar- powered missions to Mars, such as the InSight lander and the planned Mars Sample Return rover.

Chin, Keith B.↗
NASA NTRS2018

GPM Mission's Best Practices: PERP

Similar to other missions, the Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Core Observatory's Command and Data Handling (C&DH) subsystem is critical for operations of the spacecraft. The onboard C&DH system comprises of two fully redundant boxes - a primary and a cold backup. Within each box, amongst other components, is a Single Board Computer (SBC) that hosts the flight software (FSW) system. In the event of an SBC reset, the Flight Operations Team (FOT) is poised with a lengthy task of restoring the SBC to nominal configuration. Due to the complexity of the C&DH system, this may take many days at a time to complete. The spacecraft's FSW applications are located in Electronically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) and are copied into Random Access Memory (RAM) upon SBC initialization/reset. Each SBC has two banks of EEPROM, with each bank containing a copy of the FSW. Since launch, there have been many configuration changes to tables and applications that have been loaded into just RAM. Unfortunately, these changes are vulnerable to being wiped during a SBC initialization/reset, when the RAM is overwritten by the EEPROM. Although the EEPROM loads the default FSW configurations, the process to command non-default individual table and application changes is very cumbersome and time consuming. This consequentially increases the time until the spacecraft is back into nominal Mission Science Mode (MSM) drastically. The GPM Power-On Reset (POR) Expedited Recovery Process (PERP) Design introduces a method of consolidating commands into a single file load which the SBC can process independently of the ground - decreasing recovery time, the level of TDRS support reliance, and human error. This tested design can be implemented across many other missions that utilize a similar core Flight Executive (cFE) platform; hence providing an easy-to-follow, safe, and efficient process that can be applied across the board.

recovery↗
NASA NTRS2022

Mars 2020 Entry, Descent, and Landing System Software Implementation

On February 18th, 2021, the Mars 2020 project's Perseverance Rover successfully touched down on the Martian surface after nearly eight years of development. The Mars 2020 Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) System largely leveraged heritage from the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) EDL System while employing targeted technological advancements. The landing process is autonomously directed by a software behavior implemented in the rover's primary flight computer called the EDL Timeline that assumes control of the vehicle six days before atmospheric entry. This paper first walks through the basics of the EDL Timeline mechanics and how the behavior is designed to account for internal system variations and environmental unknowns. It then summarizes the interactions between the EDL timeline and other high-level system behaviors like spacecraft mode transitions and system fault protection, focusing on the complications that arise when passing spacecraft control between executive functions. Although the MSL-inherited EDL System is reliable and capable, targeted updates and a thorough verification and validation program were required for Mars 2020. This paper discusses changes made to close vulnerabilities discovered during both MSL and Mars 2020 development cycles, landing system capability enhancements that were enabling for Mars 2020's mission, and how these updates were integrated with the heritage system. It then describes how both analysis and testing campaigns were utilized to verify and validate all aspects of EDL and system behaviors that run during the six days before landing, as well as the operational workarounds that were needed to address problems found during the development and commissioning process. Finally, this paper imparts lessons learned from Mars 2020 EDL development, implementation, and operations, emphasizing how systems designed to conduct time-critical mission events with low margin of error can be improved in the future.

Stehura, Aaron↗