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DOE OSTI1993

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1993]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types, such as light- and heavy-water-moderated reactors, graphite-moderated reactors, and breeder reactors, with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and condition of SNF, a robust canister termed the DOE Standardized SNF Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard SNF Canister had four variations consisting of a 10- or 15-foot length and an 18- or 24-inch diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository these canisters were to be grouped with 24-inch diameter HLW canisters in a codisposal waste package. The 18-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The 24-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister would take the place of one the five HLW canister on the outer ring in the codisposal waste package. No DOE Standardized SNF Canisters have been loaded, and many fuel types can be loaded in multiple canisters. Depending on the selected diameter of the DOE Standardized SNF Canister for a particular fuel, the number of potential codisposal waste packages could vary. In addition, different types of DOE SNF may be able to be combined in a single canister. This could significantly change the number of DOE SNF canisters that are loaded and result in a decrease of the number of total potential codisposal waste packages. Ultimately, if too many HLW canisters need disposition, then a reduction in the number of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will change the final total of codisposal waste packages very little. Likewise, if the ratio of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters to HLW canister produced is too high, then DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will not have enough HLW canisters to surround them in the codisposal waste package. This paper examines the results of differing loading strategies for a few DOE SNFs. It also compares the ranges of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters that may be produced to the ranges of HLW canisters that may be produced in order to determine potential scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW PPT

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Final Report For Project TCF-18-15778

This report documents work performed under the Technology Commercialization Fund (TCF-18-15778, Used (spent) nuclear fuel management and analysis tool) award provided by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Technology Transitions (OTT). This report describes various Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage, Transportation & Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS) enhancements to advance the technology readiness level (TRL). The principal work performed under TCF is the integration of the initial dry storage loading optimization algorithm into UNF-ST&DARDS.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Pillars of Innovation Across Southeast Idaho & the Interstate-15 Corridor

Since 1949, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been home to developing civilian and defense nuclear reactor technologies and managing spent nuclear fuel. Today, INL is the nation’s nuclear energy research laboratory, sustaining the safe and efficient operation of existing reactors, powering science in space, and breaking ground on the future fleet of advanced nuclear reactors. INL is only one of many rising technology resources in the region, however. Along the Interstate 15 (I-15) corridor, technology and cybersecurity industries and intellectual assets are rapidly expanding. Creating an innovation hub in this region would unite capabilities to solve current and future challenges in nuclear reactor sustainment and expanded deployment, integrated fuel cycle solutions, integrated energy systems, advanced materials and manufacturing for extreme environments, and secure and resilient cyber-physical systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

DOESC Remote Canister Closure System UT Inspection Couplant Solutions

The DOE Standard Canister (DOESC) Remote Canister Closure System is a remotely operated welding and inspection mechanism designed for the packaging of DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel into canisters. The ultrasonic testing (UT) inspection, included in the system, requires the use of water tanks that are opened to act as a couplant between the canister and the sensors. With the couplant, the UT inspection can guarantee accurate results determining imperfections in the weld.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Spent nuclear fuel receipt rate analysis within an integrated waste management system (IWMS) architecture that includes consolidated storage

A key parameter in analyzing the performance of an integrated waste management system (IWMS) architecture for the disposition of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is the SNF receipt rate from reactor and other custodian sites. Receipt rate in this paper means how much SNF is accepted per year for transport in the IWMS from such sites. Introducing one or more federal consolidated interim storage facilities (CISFs) into the IWMS architecture can potentially accelerate the receipt rate profile over time relative to system architectures without a CISF. This raises the question of what an optimal SNF receipt rate profile for an IWMS architecture might be in view of practical constraints and desired system performance attributes and associated metrics. This paper describes a sensitivity study on SNF receipt rates and the associated results for a selected set of IWMS scenarios aimed at informing near-term planning for interim storage capabilities and transportation assets. Two different strategies for CISF operation while awaiting availability of a disposal system to receive SNF are compared: one that relatively quickly fills an initial CISF and then idles the transportation system; and another that aims for more continuous use of transportation assets and receipt capabilities at the CISF. This study examines cost considerations and other factors, such as the timing of clearing reactor sites of SNF, efficient use of capital assets, and some other metrics that might be important to a CISF host community. Based on the analysis, an initial approach is presented that targets a continuous receipt strategy while maintaining the flexibility to step up receipt capabilities to a reasonable degree when needed and beneficial, within overall system constraints.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

System Analysis Support of Consent-Based Siting Efforts - 23400

To better enable informed decision-making regarding the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Integrated Waste Management (IWM) program within the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) has been sponsoring the development and application of system analysis tools capable of analyzing various system options for the management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste. With these tools, integrated waste management system (IWMS) architecture analyses are being conducted to support the future deployment of a comprehensive nuclear waste management system that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). System analyses and assessments typically use these modeling and simulation tools to investigate things like the implications of changes in various assumptions and parameters such as acceptance rates, receipt logic, facility capacities and capabilities, use of standardized canisters, and different assumed system operation start dates. Some example system analysis results have been published previously. With the passage of the consolidated appropriations acts for fiscal years 2021 and 2022, Congress provided funding and direction for the DOE to move forward with interim storage to support near-term action in managing the nation’s SNF as an important component of an IWMS. Consent-based siting is a phased, adaptive, and collaborative approach to siting facilities that focuses on the needs and concerns of people and communities. Communities participate in the siting process by working carefully through a series of phases and steps with the DOE (as the implementing organization). Each step and phase helps a community determine whether and how hosting a facility to manage SNF is aligned to the community’s goals. By its nature, a consent-based siting process must be transparent, flexible, adaptive, and responsive to community concerns. Thus, the phases and steps are intended to serve as a guide, not a prescriptive set of instructions. System analysis research analysts interface with DOE’s consent-based siting for a federal interim storage program and can perform preliminary system analyses as requested to support various aspects of the consent-based siting team’s work. This paper provides an overview of IWM program’s system analysis activities that support the ongoing consent-based siting process. The questions that decision-makers, planners, communities, and stakeholders might have during the consent-based siting process are similar to questions that have been explored by system analysts previously. Specifically, this paper discusses work that will inform consent-based siting efforts in the areas of community impacts, cost estimates, various SNF acceptance rates by potential facilities, potential consolidated interim storage facility (CISF) capacities and configurations, and the implications of a CISF on the overall waste management system. It is expected that system analysis will continue to be performed to support the consent-based siting process in the future.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Summary of Consolidated Interim Storage Advantages and Disadvantages from an Integrated Systems Perspective from Prior Reports and Studies

The question of whether centralized storage of civilian spent nuclear fuel (SNF) should be part of the federal waste management system as an intermediate step before permanent disposal has been debated for more than four decades. Centralized storage facilities were included as a potential component of the U.S. spent fuel management system in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), but these facilities were not identified as being essential. When the NWPA was passed, it was expected that a permanent repository would be available around the turn of the century to meet the commitments that were made to start accepting waste by that time. For a number of reasons, a permanent repository was not available at that stage. This report summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of including an ISF as part of an integrated waste management system that have been identified in numerous analyses of the impacts of a consolidated interim storage facility (ISF), previously discussed as monitored retrievable storage, the form of ISF authorized in the NWPA) by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and independent groups. Storing SNF before disposal is a functional requirement for an integrated waste management system. As described below, the studies reviewed in this report have identified a range of benefits that could be obtained by adding a consolidated ISF to the waste management system, including (1) earlier acceptance of fuel by the federal government, (2) reduction in the number of unintended long-term storage sites, (3) added system flexibility and opportunity for better integration, and (4) near-term development and demonstration of institutional and technical infrastructures for large-scale management of SNF. At the same time, these studies have identified potential drawbacks to deployment of an ISF, including (1) potential adverse impacts on development of a repository, (2) additional transportation of SNF, and (3) a large upfront economic investment to establish the consolidated storage capability. In general, the studies that have considered the positive and negative impacts of consolidated storage most comprehensively have concluded that in light of these considerations, the benefits of including an ISF as part of an integrated waste management system can outweigh any real or perceived disadvantages.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

System Analysis Modeling and Intermodal Transportation for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has long term goals to develop solutions for managing the nation’s spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste (HLW) inventory. The Integrated Waste Management (IWM) program under the DOE office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) is employing system-level engineering and analysis principles to inform potential future waste management system architectures. Managing the spent nuclear waste requires the use of system-level analysis software that takes various aspects of the fuel cycle into account like waste generation, on-site/centralized storage, transportation infrastructure, and long-term disposal. The Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM) is an agent-based model that was developed to simulate the transportation and storage of SNF and HLW. As an agent-based model, NGSAM has the capability to detail the interaction and movement of individual components and groups, such as rail cars and casks. The SNF inventory from commercial nuclear reactors is currently in temporary storage at multiple locations spread across the United States. Shipping of SNF from these locations relies on one of three transportation modes: rail, heavy-haul truck, or barge. Out of the three modes identified, rail is generally the most preferred due to the size of the canisters and casks the SNF would be shipped in. However, under some scenarios, a direct rail route might not be readily available to a reactor site or improving the rail infrastructure at shutdown sites might be too cost-prohibitive for utilities to opt for a direct rail transfer. Under such scenarios, using a barge or heavy haul truck to de-inventory the site and transfer the SNF to a nearby intermodal transfer site with adequate rail infrastructure where the payload could be transferred to a rail car might prove to be an attractive option. This work initially presents the various intermodal transportation options that could be used to transfer SNF from reactor sites to rail cars. This is followed by exploring the operational steps in each of these modes to move the SNF from a reactor site and transfer it to a rail car. This work also presents the procedure of implementing the intermodal transfer methodology in NGSAM using various Java methods. Finally, the process times for accomplishing each of the individual steps are furnished. The implementation ideology, assumptions, and future steps are presented in this work.

Gadey, Harish Reddy↗
DOE OSTI2022

Next Generation System Analysis Model: Recently Added Features and Future Plans

To better enable informed decision-making regarding the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Integrated Waste Management System (IWMS) program within the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) has been sponsoring the development and application of system analysis tools capable of analyzing various system options for the management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW).With these tools, IWMS architecture analyses are being conducted to support the future deployment of a comprehensive nuclear waste management system that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). The Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM) is an agent-based simulation software tool expressly designed to be capable of modeling features within various IWMS architectures. NGSAM imports data from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)’s unified database (e.g., historic assembly information, thermal profiles for assembly heat, and at-reactor dry storage loadings) to ensure that each simulation initializes with a realistic representation of the state of commercial SNF in the U.S. Recent major enhancements implemented into NGSAM in the period since NGSAM was last presented at the WM2019 conference include: • Tracking of railroad escort car acquisition and buffer car acquisition • The addition of heavy haul truck (HHT) and barge routes for some sites, as well as support for user-defined inter-modal routes • Updates to the logic that checks the transportation cask thermal limit maps prior to package transport • An allocation method that predicts when reactor sites would pack assemblies from their spent fuel pools for dry storage, and prioritizes shipments directly from the pools of those reactor sites in the preceding periods (before the predicted loadings to dry storage), thus reducing the number of casks loaded into dry storage at reactor sites • The addition of “reactor site family” operational limits to restrict the number of loads of SNF taken from the pool and from dry storage at a given reactor site each year • Added support for multiple canister loading map options and packages with multiple compatible transportation overpacks • Updates to the handling of non-commercial SNF, including a new database that contains data to support the updates • Updates to allow analysis of hypothetical scenarios which include repackaging at reactor sites, e.g., for possible comparative analysis with other scenarios • Implementation of additional output reports, or modification of existing ones • The ability to generate and implement user edits via the NGSAM website • The ability to model loading SNF from pool storage at an interim storage facility (ISF) into dry storage at the ISF • The ability to model consolidating SNF from different existing storage containers at a DOE site into the same DOE standard canister • The ability to model transferring SNF casks from one transportation mode to another, e.g., from HHT to rail, referred to as transloading. These new features have improved NGSAM capabilities and users’ experience with the model. Preliminary NGSAM requirements for modeling advanced reactor fuels, reprocessing, treatment, and conditioning were considered, and this paper describes them at a high level. Other nuclear fuel cycle system analysis tools developed under sponsorship of DOE-NE, like the VISION code developed at Idaho National Laboratory, might be better suited for initial high-level analysis of those technologies and advanced fuel cycles. As technologies are developed and system concepts evolve, NGSAM could provide value by providing more detailed modeling of transport, storage, and disposal of spent fuel and wastes from advanced reactors and advanced fuel cycles at the fuel element and waste container level.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Spent Nuclear Fuel Receipt Rate Analysis within an Integrated Waste Manage-ment System Architecture that Includes Consolidated Interim Storage

A key parameter in analyzing the performance of an integrated waste management system (IWMS) architecture for the disposition of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is the SNF receipt rate from reactor and other custodian sites. The introduction of one or more federal consolidated interim storage facilities (CISFs) into the IWMS architecture can enable the receipt rate profile as a function of time to be accelerated relative to system architectures without a CISF. The question then arises as to what an optimal SNF receipt rate profile for an IWMS architecture might be in view of practical constraints and desired system performance attributes and associated metrics. This paper describes a sensitivity study on SNF receipt rates and the associated results for a selected set of IWMS scenarios aimed an in-forming near-term planning for interim storage capabilities and transportation assets. Two different strategies are compared, one that fills an initial CISF quickly and then idles the transportation system while a disposal system is prepared, and a second strategy that aims to provide a more continuous use of transportation assets and receipt capabilities at the IWMS while the disposal system is readied for SNF receipt. Cost considerations and other factors such as impact on timing of clearing reactor sites of SNF, efficient use of capital assets, and other metrics, including those which may be important to a CISF host community, are examined. Based on the analysis, an initial approach is presented targeting a continuous receipt strategy while having the flexibility to step up receipt capabilities to a reasonable degree when needed and beneficial within overall system constraints.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Criticality Analysis of FSV Spent Nuclear Fuel in the DOE Standard Canister

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). To manage this large variety of fuel types, DOE plans to employ standardized canisters for the transportation, long-term storage, and eventual disposal of SNF. Idaho National Laboratory is currently supporting DOE’s SNF Packaging Demonstration Project, in which Fort Saint Vrain (FSV) fuel assemblies will be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper presents criticality calculations demonstrating that all four or five FSV fuel assemblies loaded into the DOE Standard Canister will remain subcritical in any expected normal or credible abnormal conditions. Previous criticality analyses were performed for one FSV fuel assembly and 12 Peach Bottom Core 2 fuel elements loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper covers the criticality analysis performed for loading both four and five FSV fuel assemblies into a DOE Standard Canister. Various intact and degraded mode configurations were modeled in conducting the criticality calculations. This analysis encompassed three different configurations: (1) a single DOE Standard Canister loaded into a concrete storage overpack, (2) seven DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack, and (3) nine DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack. The overpack dimensions were varied for each of the three configurations, and transport, storage, and disposal scenarios were analyzed for each configuration. For transport scenarios, a pair of degradation cases was analyzed. In the first case, the fuel compacts became degraded and were removed from the fuel block, then deposited at the bottom of a horizontally placed canister, thereby simulating a drop event. The canister was considered to remain intact. In the second case, the spacing between horizontally placed canisters in a nine-canister overpack was reduced such that the canisters were piled on top of each other, simulating a drop event. For this case, no degradation of the canister internals or fuel was considered. For storage scenarios, the water moderator location in the system was varied to enable identification of the most reactive configurations. Dry and wet conditions were analyzed for the fuel materials, canister, and overpack. For disposal scenarios, two degradation cases were analyzed. In the first, the stainless-steel internals of the canister degraded to either hematite or goethite under both dry and wet conditions. In the second case, degraded FSV fuel formed a uranium-water slurry that filled the coolant/void holes. None of the cases presented exceeded the application specific upper subcritical limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

The iodine-129 paradox in nuclear waste management strategies

Nuclear energy has an important role in the low-carbon energy transition, but the safety of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management remains a public concern. Here, in this study, we investigate the interplay between waste management strategies and their environmental impacts with a particular focus on a highly mobile and persistent radionuclide, iodine-129 (I-129), which is the dominant risk contributor from SNF disposal and at existing groundwater contamination sites. The results show that the current recycling practice releases more than 90% of I-129 in SNF into the present-day biosphere using an isotropic dilution strategy, whereas the direct disposal of SNF in geological repositories is likely to delay and reduce the release by 8 orders of magnitude. In addition, our data synthesis of surface water concentrations near four nuclear facilities shows that the release-dilution strategy results in lower concentrations than regulatory standards, while insufficient waste isolation in the past has resulted in locally high concentrations within one site. Our analysis suggests that it is essential to consider effluents more explicitly as a part of the waste, that as society moves from dilution to isolation of waste, the potential risks of waste isolation to local regions should be carefully evaluated, and that excessive burdens of proof could hinder or discourage waste isolation. Comprehensive waste management strategies—considering not just volume but also mobility, isolation technologies and ultimate fates—are needed for persistent contaminants. This study offers valuable insights for optimizing the management of SNF and other persistent contaminants.

Wainwright, Haruko M. [Massachusetts Inst. of Tech↗
DOE OSTI2023

A Historical Review of the Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel

This report meets the requirements of M3 milestone M3SF-21OR020302066 for the Office of Integrated Waste Management (IWM) and is a revision to M3 milestone M3FT-16OR090402028 for the former Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation Planning Project (NFST), “Safety Record of SNF Shipments.” The US Department of Energy (DOE) has since established the IWM, which builds on the work begun by NFST, to develop an integrated waste management system for spent nuclear fuel (SNF), including the development of a large-scale transportation system for the safe transport of SNF to storage or disposal facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗