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63 records · Page 4

Visit from JAXA to NASA MSFC: The Engines Element & Ideas for Collaboration

System Design, Development, and Fabrication: Design, develop, and fabricate or procure MB-60 component hardware compliant with the imposed technical requirements and in sufficient quantities to fulfill the overall MB-60 development effort. System Development, Assembly, and Test: Manage the scope of the development, assembly, and test-related activities for MB-60 development. This scope includes engine-level development planning, engine assembly and disassembly, test planning, engine testing, inspection, anomaly resolution, and development of necessary ground support equipment and special test equipment. System Integration: Provide coordinated integration in the realms of engineering, safety, quality, and manufacturing disciplines across the scope of the MB-60 design and associated products development Safety and Mission Assurance, structural design, fracture control, materials and processes, thermal analysis. Systems Engineering and Analysis: Manage and perform Systems Engineering and Analysis to provide rigor and structure to the overall design and development effort for the MB-60. Milestone reviews, requirements management, system analysis, program management support Program Management: Manage, plan, and coordinate the activities across all portions of the MB-60 work scope by providing direction for program administration, business management, and supplier management.

Greene, William D.↗

UTM UAS Service Supplier Specification

Within the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) system, the UAS Service Supplier (USS) is a key component. The USS serves several functions. At a high level, those include the following: Bridging communication between UAS Operators and Flight Information Management System (FIMS) Supporting planning of UAS operations Assisting strategic deconfliction of the UTM airspace Providing information support to UAS Operators during operations Helping UAS Operators meet their formal requirements This document provides the minimum set of requirements for a USS. In order to be recognized as a USS within UTM, successful demonstration of satisfying the requirements described herein will be a prerequisite. To ensure various desired qualities (security, fairness, availability, efficiency, maintainability, etc.), this specification relies on references to existing public specifications whenever possible.

UTM↗

UAS Service Supplier Specification

Within the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) system, the UAS Service Supplier (USS) is a key component. The USS serves several functions. At a high level, those include the following: Bridging communication between UAS Operators and Flight Information Management System (FIMS) Supporting planning of UAS operations Assisting strategic deconfliction of the UTM airspace Providing information support to UAS Operators during operations Helping UAS Operators meet their formal requirements This document provides the minimum set of requirements for a USS. In order to be recognized as a USS within UTM, successful demonstration of satisfying the requirements described herein will be a prerequisite. To ensure various desired qualities (security, fairness, availability, efficiency, maintainability, etc.), this specification relies on references to existing public specifications whenever possible.

Rios, Joseph L.↗

Investigation Into The Effects of Microsecond Power Line Transients On Line-Connected Capacitors

An investigation was conducted into the effect of power-line transients on capacitors used by NASA and installed on platform primary power inputs to avionics. The purpose was to investigate whether capacitor voltage rating needs to be derated for expected spike potentials. Concerns had been voiced in the past by NASA suppliers that MIL-STD-461 CS06-like requirements were overly harsh and led to physically large capacitors. The author had previously predicted that electrical-switching spike requirements representative of actual power-line transient potentials, durations and source impedance would require no derating. This investigation bore out that prediction. It was further determined that traditional low source impedance CS06-like transients also will not damage a capacitor, although the spikes themselves are not nearly as well filtered. This report should be used to allay fears that CS06-like requirements drive capacitor voltage derating. Only that derating required by the relatively long duration transients in power quality specification need concern the equipment designer.

Javor, Ken↗

Investigation into the Effects of Microsecond Power Line Transients on Line-Connected Capacitors

An investigation was conducted into the effect of power-line transients on capacitors used by NASA and installed on platform primary power inputs to avionics. The purpose was to investigate whether capacitor voltage ratings needs to be derated for expected spike potentials. Concerns had been voiced in the past by NASA suppliers that MIL-STD-461 CS06-like requirements were overly harsh and led to physically large capacitors. The author had previously predicted that electrical-switching spike requirements representative of actual power-line transient potentials, durations. and source impedance would require no derating. This investigation bore out that prediction. It was further determined that traditional low source impedance CS06-like transients also will not damage a capacitor, although the spikes themselves are not nearly as well filtered. This report should be used to allay fears that CS06-like requirements drive capacitor voltage derating. Only that derating required by the relatively long duration transients in power quality specification need concern the equipment designer.

Javor, K.↗

The Assurance Challenges of Advanced Packaging Technologies for Electronics

Advances in microelectronic parts performance are driving towards finer feature sizes, three-dimensional geometries and ever-increasing number of transistor equivalents that are resulting in increased die sizes and interconnection (I/O) counts. The resultant packaging necessary to provide assemble-ability, environmental protection, testability and interconnection to the circuit board for the active die creates major challenges, particularly for space applications, Traditionally, NASA has used hermetically packaged microcircuits whenever available but the new demands make hermetic packaging less and less practical at the same time as more and more expensive, Some part types of great interest to NASA designers are currently only available in non-hermetic packaging. It is a far more complex quality and reliability assurance challenge to gain confidence in the long-term survivability and effectiveness of nonhermetic packages than for hermetic ones. Although they may provide more rugged environmental protection than the familiar Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuits (PEMs), the non-hermetic Ceramic Column Grid Array (CCGA) packages that are the focus of this presentation present a unique combination of challenges to assessing their suitability for spaceflight use. The presentation will discuss the bases for these challenges, some examples of the techniques proposed to mitigate them and a proposed approach to a US MIL specification Class for non-hermetic microcircuits suitable for space application, Class Y, to be incorporated into M. IL-PRF-38535. It has recently emerged that some major packaging suppliers are offering hermetic area array packages that may offer alternatives to the nonhermetic CCGA styles but have also got their own inspectability and testability issues which will be briefly discussed in the presentation,

Sampson, Michael J.↗

CSP Manufacturing Challenges and Assembly Reliability

Although the expression of CSP is widely used by industry from suppliers to users, its implied definition had evolved as the technology has matured. There are "expert definition"- package that is up to 1.5 time die- or "interim definition". CSPs are miniature new packages that industry is starting to implement and there are many unresolved technical issues associated with their implementation. For example, in early 1997, packages with 1 mm pitch and lower were the dominant CSPs, whereas in early 1998 packages with 0.8 mm and lower became the norm for CSPs. Other changes included the use of flip chip die rather than wire bond in CSP. Nonetheless the emerging CSPs are competing with bare die assemblies and are becoming the package of choice for size reduction applications. These packages provide the benefits of small size and performance of the bare die or flip chip, with the advantage of standard die packages. The JPL-led MicrotypeBGA Consortium of enterprises representing government agencies and private companies have jointed together to pool in-kind resources for developing the quality and reliability of chip scale packages (CSPs) for a variety of projects. This talk will cover specifically the experience of our consortium on technology implementation challenges, including design and build of both standard and microvia boards, assembly of two types of test vehicles, and the most current environmental thermal cycling test results.

Ghaffarian, Reza↗

TCL4 UTM (UAS Traffic Management) Nevada 2019 Flight Tests, Airspace Operations Laboratory (AOL) Report

The Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) research project has been developing and testing concept ideas for enabling small UAS (sUAS) operations in low altitude airspace (ground to 400 feet). To do this, NASA has organized a series of flight test demonstrations. Technology Capability Level-4 (TCL4) flight tests were conducted at a Nevada, USA test site, during June 2019. The testing resulted in over 300 data collection flights using eight live rotorcraft, 15 simulated vehicles, involving six flight crews and five Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Service Suppliers (USS). The TCL4 approach was designed to demonstrate five scenarios that set up five diverse sets of UAS events and activities. The Nevada test site focused on three of these scenarios: an incoming weather front, a concert event with an incident requiring an emergency response, and a scenario where multiple vehicles experienced Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) issues. The test site created their scenarios to each have three phases and were required to complete three executions of each scenario, for a total of nine missions per Nevada vehicle per scenario. This document presents data collected from participants during the TCL4-Nevada flight test that provides information about how much and how well operators were able to make use of UTM functions and information, with the goal of exploring what the minimum information requirements and/or best practices might be in TCL4 operations. The driving enquiry was: how do UTM tools and features support (human) operators leading to safe and effective conduct of large-scale beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) sUAS operations in “urban canyon” environments? As with the data collected during previous similar tests (e.g., TCL3, Martin et al., 2019), the quality of the UTM information exchanged, and the meaningfulness and therefore usefulness of this information, were all focal points of the questions asked and the data collected. Data aligned with five human-system attributes to indicate that UTM provided information that contributed to users’ ability to operate safely and effectively within UTM, but that information was not always complete and was sometimes unclear.

UTM↗

Issues and Methods for Assessing COTS Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability

Many vendors produce products that are not domain specific (e.g., network server) and have limited functionality (e.g., mobile phone). In contrast, many customers of COTS develop systems that am domain specific (e.g., target tracking system) and have great variability in functionality (e.g., corporate information system). This discussion takes the viewpoint of how the customer can ensure the quality of COTS components. In evaluating the benefits and costs of using COTS, we must consider the environment in which COTS will operate. Thus we must distinguish between using a non-mission critical application like a spreadsheet program to produce a budget and a mission critical application like military strategic and tactical operations. Whereas customers will tolerate an occasional bug in the former, zero tolerance is the rule in the latter. We emphasize the latter because this is the arena where there are major unresolved problems in the application of COTS. Furthermore, COTS components may be embedded in the larger customer system. We refer to these as embedded systems. These components must be reliable, maintainable, and available, and must be with the larger system in order for the customer to benefit from the advertised advantages of lower development and maintenance costs. Interestingly, when the claims of COTS advantages are closely examined, one finds that to a great extent these COTS components consist of hardware and office products, not mission critical software [1]. Obviously, COTS components are different from custom components with respect to one or more of the following attributes: source, development paradigm, safety, reliability, maintainability, availability, security, and other attributes. However, the important question is whether they should be treated differently when deciding to deploy them for operational use; we suggest the answer is no. We use reliability as an example to justify our answer. In order to demonstrate its reliability, a COTS component must pass the same reliability evaluations as the custom components, otherwise the COTS components will be the weakest link in the chain of components and will be the determinant of software system reliability. The challenge is that there will be less information available for evaluating COTS components than for custom components but this does not mean we should despair and do nothing. Actually, there is a lot we can do even in the absence of documentation on COTS components because the customer will have information about how COTS components are to be used in the larger system. To illustrate our approach, we will consider the reliability, maintainability, and availability (RMA) of COTS components as used in larger systems. Finally, COTS suppliers might consider increasing visibility into their products to assist customers in determining the components' fitness for use in a particular application. We offer ideas of information that would be useful to customers, and what vendors might do to provide it.

Schneidewind, Norman F.↗