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The United Nations' activities in the area of space law and the accomplishments of the Outer Space Committee are discussed. Two draft conventions, the draft treaty on the moon and the draft treaty on the registration of space objects are considered. Other issues covered include the direct broadcast by satellite, the boundary between air space and outer space, and remote sensing from space.
The evolution of space law over the past 25 years is surveyed, with attention also given to the procedures that were followed. The treaties now in existence are given, as are issues currently before the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Projections that were made 25 years ago are discussed in the light of subsequent developments. It is noted that nearly all the technological advances in space activities forecast 25 years ago have come to pass. Various provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Principles Treaty relating to stricture against weapons and the militarization of space are discussed.
The paper outlines space law as it currently stands and sets forth the arena in which such law has been negotiated. Note is taken of the flexibility set forth in these negotiated treaties and the fact that the treaties provide the necessary framework for the development of cooperative space activities in the future.
The central problem of our time -- one that is shared by all races and nationalities -- is to discover the things, the qualities, and interest that people have in common so that durable institutions can be designed for mankind's survival. The 'common heritage of mankind' and the 'province of all mankind' are different legal concepts developed in international space law during the last quarter of a century. Since the initial appearance of these provisions, controversy has arisen regarding their intent and meaning as applied to a nation's right to explore and use a common environment such as space or the high seas and a nation's obligation to share benefits derived from those environments with the rest of the world. As can be expected, different interpretations are currently competing for acceptance. This is so, in part, because, in the case of the Outer Space Treaty, although a general principle was articulated, rules for acceptance and application of the principles were not. In the case of the Moon and Sea Treaties, although an effort has been made to clarify both meaning and application, the articulations are still too vague for legal certainty. This paper focuses on the fact that these concepts are already currently available tools for the advancement of both global and U.S. interests but, because of the labyrinthine legal arguments that have been generated and some assumptions being held, they are in danger of being lost as such tools. The tendency of many observers in the U.S. to confuse the concept of 'province of all mankind' and 'common heritage of mankind' and to assume that both are incompatible with U. S. commercial space interests is also addressed. It is suggested that reconsidering these provisions can yield positions compatible with U.S. interests and that it can and should actively seek the use of these provisions as a basis for global cooperation and commercial benefit.
The conference provided four days of displays and scientific presentations on applications, technology, a science of sub-orbital data gathering and analysis. The twelve displayed aircraft equipped with sophisticated instrumentation represented a wide range of environmental and reconnaissance missions,including marine pollution control, fire detection, Open Skies Treaty verification, thermal mapping, hydrographical measurements, military research, ecological and agricultural observations, geophysical research, atmospheric and meterological observations, and aerial photography. The U.S. Air Force and the On-Site Inspection Agency displayed the new Open Skies Treaty verification Boeing OC 135B that promotes international monitoring of military forces and activities. SRl's Jetstream uses foliage and ground penetrating SAR for forest inventories, toxic waste delineation, and concealed target and buried unexploded ordnance detection. Earth Search Sciences's Gulfstream 1 with prototype miniaturized airborne hyperspectral imaging equipment specializes in accurate mineral differentiation, low-cost hydrocarbon exploration, and nonproliferation applications. John E. Chance and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers displayed the Bell 2 helicopter with SHOALS that performs hydrographic surveying of navigation projects, coastal environment assessment, and nautical charting surveys. Bechtel Nevada and U.S. DOE displayed both the Beech King AIR B-200 platform equipped to provide first response to nuclear accidents and routine environmental surveillance, and the MBB BO-105 helicopter used in spectral analysis for environmental assessment and military appraisal. NASA Ames Research Center's high-altitude Lockheed ER-2 assists in earth resources monitoring research in atmospheric chemistry, oceanography, and electronic sensors; ozone and greenhouse studies and satellite calibration and data validation. Ames also showcased the Learjet 24 Airborne Observatory that completed missions in Venus cloud cover analysis, Quadantid meteor shower studies, extra-solar far infrared ionic structure lines measurement, Cape Kennedy launch support, and studies in air pollution, The Products and Services Exhibit showcased new sensor and image processing technologies, aircraft data collection services, unmanned vehicle technology, platform equipment, turn-key services, software a workstations, GPS services, publications, and processing and integration systems by 58 exhibitors. The participation of aircraft users and crews provided unique dialogue between those who plan data collection a operate the remote sensing technology, and those who supply the data processing and integration equipment. Research results using hyperspectral imagery, radar and optical sensors, lidar, digital aerial photography, a integrated systems were presented. Major research and development programs and campaigns we reviewed, including CNR's LARA Project and European Space Agency's 1991-1995 Airborne Campaign. The pre-conference short courses addressed airborne video, photogrammetry, hyperspectral data analysis, digital orthophotography, imagery and GIS integration, IFSAR, GPS, and spectrometer calibration.
NASA planetary protection, formerly planetary quarantine, is a set of regulations for extraterrestrial space missions which addresses applicable COSPAR resolutions, and ultimately derives from a 1967 United Nations treaty (the "Moon treaty"). The purpose of the NASA regulations is set forth in a basic policy, NPD 8020.7E (Ref. 1). The purposes are: to protect extraterrestrial objects from terrestrial biological contamination that may interfere with the search for extant life or its remnants or its precursors; and to protect the Earth from the possible hazards of an extraterrestrial sample return.
NASA has developed requirements dedicated to the prevention of forward and backward contamination during space exploration. Historically, international agreements provided guidelines to prevent contamination of the Moon and other celestial bodies, as well as the Earth (e.g., sample return missions). The UN Outer Space Treaty was established in 1967 and the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) maintains a planetary protection policy complying with Article IX of this treaty. By avoiding forward contamination, the integrity of scientific exploration is preserved. Planetary Protection mission requirements are levied on missions to control contamination. These requirements are dependent on the science of the mission and on the celestial bodies encountered or targeted along the way. Consequently, categories are assigned to missions, and specific implementation plans are developed to meet the planetary protection requirements. NASA missions have evolved over time with increasingly more demanding scientific objectives and more complex flight systems to achieve those objectives and, thus, planetary protection methods and processes used for implementation have become much more intricate, complicated, and challenging. Here, we will portray the evolution of planetary protection implementation at JPL in several important areas throughout the course of NASA sponsored robotic Mars lander or rover missions, starting from Mars Pathfinder through the beginning of Mars 2020. Highlighted in the discussion will be process changes in planetary protection requirements development and flow down. Development and implementation of new and improved methods used in the reduction of spacecraft bioburden will be discussed as well as approaches and challenges that come along with setting up remote laboratories to perform bioassays. The consequences and forward planning of delays on missions will be highlighted as well as lessons learned on the impact of communication and training in achieving planetary protection requirements. The evolution of methods used for the detection of microbial bioburden on spacecraft hardware will be considered. These methods use standard microbiology as well as the adaptation of advances in biotechnology, molecular biology, and bioinformatics. Technical approaches developed for the prevention of contamination and recontamination of hardware during Assembly, Test, and Launch Operations will be discussed.
The Pacific Northwest region of the United States has been recognized as a leader in crafting water laws that work to balance human needs and ecological considerations. However, this region is experiencing changing dynamics that test the strength of existing water policies and laws. Such dynamics include increasing populations, new and exempt uses, quantification of tribal treaty rights, species protection, renegotiation of the Columbia River Treaty, and the impacts of a changing climate. Together, these dynamics are stressing the legal framework, which remains vital to ensuring sustainable water supplies now and into the future. Here, the history behind water resources management in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana provides the foundation for the laws in place today. Although all four states share regulatory features, nuances specific to each state have tremendously affected their governance structures and ability to adapt to changing dynamics. Although a challenge to meet these changing dynamics, collaborative efforts offer creative opportunities for meeting current and future needs.
We overview a discrete event simulation of an arms control enterprise developed to familiarize individuals with the challenges of verification and monitoring at the enterprise level. We will review the design of the simulation applied to a notional country’s nuclear arms enterprise. This simulation models how these nuclear weapons move over their lifetime from deployment, storage, maintenance, and dismantlement. With this output information, we then characterize the “ground truth” of the enterprise. Next, based on these data, we built a sophisticated analysis engine designed to provide treaty monitoring and verification information to support partner country inspectors and their evaluation. This tool was designed to be used as a game, enabling teams to compete on developing the best inspection plan to determine if the host country is complying with the conceptual treaty developed for this effort.
The mission of this research is to explore novel photonuclear-based pathways into the production of 37Ar. Above-background detection levels of 37Ar uniquely indicates the occurrence of an underground nuclear explosion, produced from fission neutrons interacting in the surrounding environment through the 40Ca(n,a)37Ar reaction. The half-life of 35 days allows on-site inspectors (OSI) adequate time following the nuclear event to detect 37Ar and verify compliance or defiance of non-proliferation treaties such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). An 37Ar standard would give OSI the ability to calibrate their detectors and measure detector efficiency allowing for the quantification of detected activity, give OSI authentic samples to test detectors in field exercises, and improve models predicting diffusion pathways of 37Ar through the underground environment.
Nuclear safeguards were first announced in 1945 by the U.S., Canadian and British governments as a means to exchange scientific information about peaceful uses of atomic energy and prevent the use of nuclear material for weapons. International nuclear safeguards, now under the provision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), serves to hold accountable the 140 member countries (States) that have entered into treaties and agreements against the spread of nuclear weapons. Most notably, the IAEA acts as a nuclear materials inspectorate under the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, brought about in 1968, that specifies commitments member States make to the world?s non-proliferation regime. The Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (OINS) is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. Within OINS, the Human Capital Development program recognizes the need to build workforce capacity and safeguards expertise. This includes supporting the education and training of younger generations working in international nuclear safeguards. One of the program?s main concerns is core competencies being lost to retirement or attrition and building knowledge retention pipelines from senior to new professionals. One identified core competency is knowledge gained by individuals who have completed IAEA assignments such as missions to member States to conduct safeguards inspections. Such individuals possess unique knowledge, and efforts are being put forth to effectively capture this knowledge within the national laboratories complex. To this end, we report findings from a one-year mentor-mentee knowledge retention program in which an international safeguards subject matter expert imparted knowledge and skills to a willing professional mentee. The knowledge and skills stem from the mentor?s multi-year assignment at the IAEA in Vienna, Austria.
The International Monitoring System arm of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization utilizes sampling of atmospheric radioxenon to scan the world for nuclear testing events. Current designs utilized in the field involve plastic scintillator cells run in coincidence with Sodium Iodide (NaI) or High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors. The use of plastic scintillators as electron detectors exhibit some issues in comparison to other materials. Silicon detectors are analyzed as an alternative to plastic scintillators for beta detection based on their higher energy resolution and lowered memory effect. A radioxenon detection setup was created with the intent of measuring radioxenon samples using coincidence counting between silicon and NaI detectors as well as silicon and HPGe. Finally, the absolute efficiency of both setups is calculated and compared.
Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored under international agreements as a signature of nuclear weapons tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect this global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe to examine the change in the number of radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131m Xe and 133m Xe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a six-fold increase in 135 Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network).
In arms control treaties, verification plays a crucial role in detecting non-compliance, deterring future violations, and building trust between state parties. Neutron interrogation that induces fission reactions in fissile isotopes and measures the resulting fission neutrons, could be employed for this purpose. This study aims to develop a system which can determine the presence of fissile material while intrinsically protecting information. In this paper, we focus on optimizing the system for discriminating between an enriched uranium block from a depleted uranium (DU) block. The system was built and we report on benchmark measurements with DU and 16% enriched uranium blocks. Furthermore, the Excalibur (Experiment for Calibration with Uranium) neutron source, a neutron spectrometer (redBubble Technology Industries (BTI) N-Probe), and superheated droplet detectors were used for these measurements. MCNP simulations provided insights into detector responses to fissile materials with varying isotopic compositions, confirming that the system functioned as designed.
Every country that has made nuclear weapons has used uranium enrichment to do so. Despite the centrality of this technology to international security, there is still no reliable physical marker of past enrichment in the open literature that can be used to perform forensic verification of historically produced weapons on gas centrifuges. We show that the extremely low radioactivity from uranium alpha emissions during enrichment leaves detectable and irreversible calorimetric signatures in the common enrichment gasket material PTFE, allowing for historical reconstruction of past enrichment activities at a sensitivity better than one weapon’s quantity of highly enriched uranium. Fast scanning calorimetry also enables the measurement of recrystallization enthalpies of sequentially microtomed slices, confirming the magnitude and the type of radiation exposure while also providing detection of tampering and a method for analyzing field samples useful for treaty verification. Furthermore, this work opens the door for common items to be turned into precise dosimeters to detect the past presence of radioactivity, nuclear materials, and related activities with high confidence.
Discrimination of underground explosions from naturally occurring earthquakes and other anthropogenic sources is one of the fundamental challenges of nuclear explosion monitoring. In an operational setting, the number of events that can be thoroughly investigated by analysts is limited by available resources. The capability to rapidly screen out events that can be robustly identified as not being explosions is, therefore, of great potential benefit. Nevertheless, possible mis-classification of explosions as earthquakes currently limits the use of screening methods for verification of test-ban treaties. Moment tensors provide a physics-based classification tool for the characterization of different seismic sources and have enabled the advent of new techniques for discriminating between earthquakes and explosions. Following normalization and projection of their six-degree vectors onto the hypersphere, existing screening approaches use spherically symmetric metrics to determine whether any new moment tensor may have been an explosion. Here, we show that populations of moment tensors for both earthquakes and explosions are anisotropically distributed on the hypersphere. Distributions possessing elliptical symmetry, such as the scaled von Mises–Fisher distribution, therefore provide a better description of these populations than the existing spherically symmetric models. We describe a method that uses these elliptical distributions in combination with a Bayesian classifier to achieve successful classification rates of 99 per cent for explosions and 98 per cent for earthquakes using existing catalogues of events from the western United States. The 1983 May 5 Crowdie underground nuclear test and 2018 July 20 DAG-1 deep-borehole chemical explosion are the only two explosions out of 140 that are incorrectly classified. Application of the method to the 2006–2017 nuclear tests in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea yields 100 per cent identification rates and we provide a simple routine MTid for general usage. The approach provides a means to rapidly assess the likelihood of an event being an explosion and can be built into monitoring workflows that rely on simultaneously assessing multiple different discrimination metrics.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it will demonstrate how technical cooperation on verification contributed to the softening of tensions and the improvement of trust between the United States and the Soviet Union. Because the scope of this endeavor is too broad to be adequately considered in the length of this work, the primary focus will be on the private and public partnerships on seismic and hydroacoustic test ban treaty verification that were forged between Soviet and American scientists from 1986-1988. In order to orient the analysis within the political-scientific landscape of the time, the discussion begins with a brief description of the arms control landscape in the early 1980s, including both the stances of the Reagan and Gorbachev administrations vis a vis nuclear test ban verification. The section concludes with an analysis of the two primary US-USSR collaborative projects in this key sphere – the test ban verification project conducted by the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Soviet Academy of Sciences (SAS) and the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) between the US and Soviet National Laboratories.
Abstract Like most rivers worldwide, the transboundary North American Kootenay/i River has experienced multiple impacts including watershed developments, river channelization, and floodplain clearing, draining, and diking. Construction of Libby Dam was authorized by the 1964 Columbia River Treaty (CRT) between the United States and Canada, and in 1975 began regulating downstream flows for flood risk management and hydropower generation. Following cumulative impacts, the endemic Kootenai River White Sturgeon population collapsed and was designated as endangered in 1994 (U.S. Endangered Species Act). Subsequent Biological Opinions from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service prescribed Libby Dam operations to provide springtime flow pulses for sturgeon spawning. These provided the unanticipated benefit of substantial seedling recruitment of native and introduced riparian cottonwoods and willows. The regulated flow regime was further adaptively managed to provide a more normative (natural) regime, to balance ecological functions with flood risk management and hydropower generation. The broadened ecological considerations would be consistent with the proposed priorities for the modernization of the international CRT. The observed responses revealed that (1) diverse aquatic and riparian organisms are dependent on common river flow characteristics; (2) a normalized flow regime provided substantial ecological benefits; and (3) due to multiple influences, hybrid ecosystems develop along regulated rivers, with a blending of natural and altered processes and communities. For other regulated rivers, we recommend that (1) high springtime flows be allowed, as feasible; (2) followed by the gradual post‐peak recession; and (3) the maintenance of sufficient flows through the warm and dry interval of mid to late summer.