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Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation for Selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Underground Nuclear Tests - 2010

This report evaluates collapse evolution for selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) underground nuclear tests at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly called the Nevada Test Site). The work is being done at the request of Navarro-Interra LLC, and supports environmental restoration efforts by the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration for the Nevada Site Office. Safety decisions must be made before a surface crater area, or potential surface crater area, can be reentered for any work. Our statements on cavity collapse and surface crater formation are input into their safety decisions. These statements do not include the effects of erosion that may modify the surface collapse craters over time. They also do not address possible radiation dangers that may be present. Subject matter experts from the LLNL Containment Program who had been active in weapons testing activities performed these evaluations. Information used included drilling and hole construction, emplacement and stemming, timing and sequence of the selected test and nearby tests, geology, yield, depth of burial, collapse times, surface crater sizes, cavity and crater volume estimations, and ground motion. Both classified and unclassified data were reviewed. Various amounts of information are available for these tests, depending on their age and other associated activities. Lack of data can hamper evaluations and introduce uncertainty. We make no attempt to quantify this uncertainty.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Verification and Validation of Optimization of Replacement Portal Monitoring Replay Tools

The Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) are both developing optimization software to fulfill the objective of Phase III of the Replacement Portal Monitoring (RPM) Program for the Department of Homeland Security. The objective of the Phase III of the RPM Program is to conduct an evaluation of three RPM systems designed to enhance mission effectiveness, gain operational efficiencies, and to address emerging mission needs against the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD ) nuclear threat basis and special nuclear material (SNM) used in performance testing. As such this task involves the use of global optimization algorithms.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation for Selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Tests - 2011

This report evaluates collapse evolution for selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) underground nuclear tests at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly called the Nevada Test Site). The work is being done at the request of National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec) and supports the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration for the Nevada Site Office Borehole Management Program (BMP). The primary objective of this program is to close (plug) weapons program legacy boreholes that are deemed no longer useful. Safety decisions must be made before a crater area, or potential crater area, can be reentered for any work. Our statements on cavity collapse and crater formation are input into their safety decisions. The BMP is an on-going program to address hundreds of boreholes at the NTS. Each year NSTec establishes a list of holes to be addressed. They request the assistance of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory Containment Programs to provide information related to the evolution of collapse history and make statements on completeness of collapse as relates to surface crater stability. These statements do not include the effects of erosion that may modify the collapse craters over time. They also do not address possible radiation dangers that may be present. Subject matter experts from the LLNL Containment Program who had been active in weapons testing activities performed these evaluations. Information used included drilling and hole construction, emplacement and stemming, timing and sequence of the selected test and nearby tests, geology, yield, depth of burial, collapse times, surface crater sizes, cavity and crater volume estimations, ground motion, and radiological release information. Both classified and unclassified data were reviewed. Various amounts of information are available for these tests, depending on their age and other associated activities. Lack of data can hamper evaluations and introduce uncertainty. We make no attempt to quantify this uncertainty. The following unclassified summary statements describe collapse evolution and crater stability in response to a recent request to review 3 LLNL test locations in areas 2 and 12: Kennebec in U2af, Cumberland in U2e, and Yuba in U12b.10.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Radiation Hardening – Test Capabilities (LANSCE) [Slides]

The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) has exceptional facilities for research and testing of radiation effects in electronics. We have the best terrestrial neutron source for sea-level and airplane-altitude environments. We have a thermal neutron test capability at the Lujan Center and a proton beam test capability at the “Blue Room”. LANL has the programmatic mission to develop this radiation-effects program, namely space and satellite environments, high-performance computing (silent data corruption), and weapons delivery systems. We have a strong connection to industry which continues to grow.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Fallout Cloud Regimes

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), and other organizations maintain operational nuclear explosion and atmospheric dispersion models to provide critical guidance on the expected effects of an accidental or deliberate explosion of a nuclear weapon (in this paper simply referred to as “device”). To be effective, these models must represent, as accurately as possible, the complex interactions of the blast, fire, and residual radiological hazards with the environment and population. One hundred atmospheric nuclear tests that form the basis for many models were conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) (now referred to as the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, NNSS) in a dry desert environment. Other environments should be studied, but have less data available and are beyond the scope of the work presented in this paper. The debris clouds produced by the NTS tests, frequently called “mushroom clouds,” are familiar, with common structural elements such as a buoyant cap connected to a skirt of raised dust at the desert surface by a thin, dirt-filled stem. The film scanning project at LLNL has investigated historical film records of nuclear weapons tests. Here, we summarize findings showing that the mushroom cloud behavior for historic U.S. tests conducted in Nevada, has similar characteristics based on the distance of the device from the ground surface or Height of Burst (HOB), scaled by the energy release, or yield, of the device. This scaled height is referred to as the scaled-height-of-burst (SHOB). The findings discussed below show that mushroom clouds look and behave similarly when detonated at the same SHOB. The amount of residual radiation that is produced by a nuclear detonation is proportional to the yield. But, the amount of that residual radiation that actually becomes local fallout is strongly dependent on the SHOB and the type of surface over which the detonation occurs. In order to develop a more comprehensive model that predicts the fraction of the residual radiation that becomes local fallout, it is convenient to define a series of regimes based on SHOB values in which all detonations that occur within a given regime can be modeled using the same algorithms. The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for defining different regimes, and, in a qualitative way, a basic understanding of the fundamental characteristics of each of these regimes.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

Nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. We find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. The resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Polyphosphate Amendments for In-Situ Remediation of Uranium

Environmental contamination of surface and subsurface geologic media by uranium is a lasting legacy of past operations related to nuclear energy and weapons production. Operations conducted at United States Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) sites including research activities, nuclear fuel processing, weapons development and testing, construction of nuclear energy reactors, and waste management have resulted significant surface and subsurface contamination of geologic media by heavy metals and radionuclides. Despite several decades of studies, effective uranium remediation strategies remain elusive for contamination in deep subsurface settings that prevail in the western United States. Polyphosphate technology has been demonstrated to delay the precipitation of phosphate phases for controlled in situ precipitation of stabile phosphate phases to control the long-term fate of uranium. Precipitation of phosphate minerals occurs when phosphate compounds undergo hydrolysis to yield orthophosphate. Accordingly, a detailed understanding of polyphosphate degradation and reaction kinetics, in the context of site specific information, allows the technology to be tailored as a time-released source of phosphate for subsurface treatment. Results of 1) a labortory testing program, providing a detailed understanding of the fundamental underpinnings necessary to evaluate the efficacy and potential use of polyphosphate technology for implementation through a field-scale demonstration, 2) field-scale injection into the aquifer demonstrating a reduction in the concentration of aqueous uranium and presenting field-scale challenges to implementation, and 3) infiltration into the vadose zone and capillary fringe stabilizing the inventory of uranium and mitigating a portion of the persistent flux of uranium to the aquifer will be presented. The data from field-scale demonstrations provide valuable information for designing a full-scale remediation of uranium within the 300 Area of the Hanford Site. Moreover, this study presents the fundamental information necessary to evaluate the efficacy and potential utilization of polyphosphate technology at other sites with varying geochemical and hydrodynamic conditions.

Environmental Molecular Sciences Laboratory↗

A Brief Review of the Application of 14C in Terrestrial Carbon Cycle Studies

An over-arching goal of the DOE TCP program is to understand the mechanistic controls over the fate, transport, and residence time of carbon in the terrestrial biosphere. Many of the modern process and modeling studies focus on seasonal to interannual variability. However, much of the carbon on the landscape and in soils is in separate reservoirs with turnover times that are multi-decadal to millennial. It is the controls on these longer term pools or reservoirs that is a critical unknown in the face of rising GHGs and climate change and uncertainties of the terrestrial biosphere as a future global sink or source of atmospheric CO{sub 2} [eg., Friedlingstein et al., 2006; Govindasamy et al., 2005; Thompson et al., 2004]. Radiocarbon measurements, in combination with other data, can provide insight into, and constraints on, terrestrial carbon cycling. Radiocarbon (t{sub 1/2} 5730yrs) is produced naturally in the stratosphere when secondary neutrons generated by cosmic rays collide with {sup 14}N atoms [Libby 1946; Arnold and Libby, 1949]. Upon formation, {sup 14}C is rapidly oxidized to CO and then to CO{sub 2}, and is incorporated into the carbon cycle. Due to anthropogenic activities, the amount of {sup 14}C in the atmosphere doubled in the mid/late 1950s and early 1960s from its preindustrial value of {sup 14}C/{sup 12}C ratio of 1.18 x 10{sup -12} [eg., Nydal and Lovseth, 1983]. Following the atmospheric weapons test ban in 1963, the {sup 14}C/{sup 12}C ratio, has decreased due to the net isotopic exchange between the ocean and terrestrial biosphere [eg., Levin and Hessheimer, 2000] and a dilution effect due to the burning of {sup 14}C-free fossil fuel carbon, the 'Suess Effect' [Suess, 1955]. In the carbon cycle literature, radiocarbon measurements are generally reported as {Delta}{sup 14}C, which includes a correction for mass dependent fractionation [Stuiver and Polach, 1977]. In the context of carbon cycle studies radiocarbon measurements can be used to determine the 'age' and rate of change of carbon stocks or as a biogeochemical tracer to elucidate processes and pathways. It is this dual nature that can be exploited across scales in space (individual plant, plot or research site, ecosystem, regional, and global) and time (days to millennia). For example, across regional scales, {Delta}{sup 14}C measurements of atmosphere CO{sub 2} can be used to attribute carbon dioxide to sources (e.g., respiration vs. fossil fuel emissions) or sinks ( e.g,. photosynthesis), which cannot be readily inferred from concentration, net flux measurements, or {delta}{sup 13}CO{sub 2} [eg. Graven et al., 2009; Levin and Hessheimer, 2000; Turnbull et al., 2007]. At smaller scales, similar analyses can be used to elucidate the source, and 'age' of the below ground component undergoing heterotrophic respiration. Net (biome or ecosystem) uptake of carbon is the difference of two large fluxes: photosynthesis and respiration. Carbon fixation by photosynthesis is, to a large extent, a single process with theoretical underpinnings. On the other-hand, net ecosystem or biome respiration integrates microbial (heterotrophic) and plant (autotrophic) respiration. Eddy covariance methods can be used to estimate bulk CO{sub 2} fluxes but they cannot discriminate the process nor the source of the respired CO{sub 2}. It is these processes that are parameterized in predictive models and contribute to the uncertainty in the climate forcing effect of the carbon cycle in the future [Friedlingstein et al., 2006; Heimann and Reichstein, 2008].

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Long Term Assessment of Radiocesium in Deer, Fish, Soil, and Vegetation at the Savannah River Site

Throughout the Savannah River Site's (SRS) operational history, many radionuclides have been released into the environment. However, due to fallout from weapons testing, the amount released from SRS, its persistence in the environment, and the seclusion of the Site, radiocesium (Cs-137) is one of the most critical radionuclides in the SRS environment. The Effective half-life (Te) is the time it takes for a radionuclide in the environment to decrease by 50% of its initial amount. There are three means of radionuclide removal: Physical: Radioactive decay, sedimentation, and washout; Chemical: Changes in pH, oxidation state or adsorption; Biological: Changes in the food web or translocation. Effective half-life (T{sub e}) = log{sub e}2/λ{sub e} Where λ{sub e} is estimated from the slopes of loge-transformed Cs-137 activity concentrations regressed on year. The objective of this work was to calculate the effective half-life of Cs-137 in various biota at SRS and to perform an assessment of the changes in the effective half life over time. Compared to 2013 data, there is a slight increase in the effective half-lives for fish at most sampling locations. This effective half-life increase is an indication that the rate of Cs-137 loss is starting to plateau. The effective half-life of Cs-137 in SRS fish ranges from 4-11 years. The effective half-life of Cs-137 in soil at the Creek plantation is about 15 years. The effective half-life of Cs-137 in grassy vegetation at the Creek Plantation is about 14 years. The effective half-life of deer hunted on the SRS is about 15.5 years. After termination of all reactor activity by 1980, the Cs-137 activity began to drop drastically.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Dose Coefficient Calculation for Use in Dosimetry Assessment of a Fission-Based Weapon

In the event of a fission-based weapon or improvised nuclear device (IND) detonation, dose coefficients can be harnessed to provide dose assessments for defense, emergency preparedness, and consequence management, as well as to prospectively inform the assessment of radiation biomarkers and development of medical prophylaxis countermeasures for defense and homeland security stakeholders and decision-makers. Although dose coefficients have previously been calculated for this group, they would apply specifically to the studied population, the 1945 Japanese cohort, after which their anthropomorphic computational phantoms were modeled. For this reason, applications to other populations may be limited, and instead, an assessment of a more standardized population is desired. We employed a series of computational human phantoms representing international reference individuals: UF/NCI voxel phantom series containing newborn, 1-, 5-, 10-, 15-, and 35-year-old males and females. Irradiation of the phantoms was simulated using the Monte Carlo N-Particle transport code to determine organ dose coefficients under four idealized irradiation geometries at three distances from the detonation hypocenter at Hiroshima and Nagasaki using DS02 free-in-air prompt neutron and photon fluence spectra. Through these simulations, age-specific dose coefficients were determined for individual organs. Various articulated PIMAL stylized phantoms were simulated as well to estimate the effect of body posture on dose coefficients and determine the effect of posture on dosimetric estimation and reconstruction. Results additionally demonstrate that 137 Cs and the Watt fission spectra are not ideal general surrogate sources for fission weapons, which may be considered for experimental testing of medical countermeasures. Supplementary data provided tabulates the compilation of organ dose-rate coefficients in this study.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Safe Guards Analysis Toolbox for Non-Proliferation Modeling

As nuclear technology becomes more widely available outside of nuclear weapon armed nations, the importance of preventing the illicit development of nuclear weapons has increased dramatically. A system of nuclear safeguards prevents proliferation; stopping the diversion of nuclear material from civilian facilities for the construction of nuclear weapons. These safeguards function through a combination of accountancy measurements that confirm the locations and amounts of nuclear material, and physical security at every nuclear facility. Safeguards Analysis (SGA) is a computational tool-kit developed using the MATLAB Simulink software suite that simulates a system of nuclear safeguards. The code allows users to examine current safeguards systems for weaknesses and to pinpoint the best locations for improvement. Developed as a modular framework, SGA does not directly model material flows, and relies on an outside code for this information. Instead, it represents a series of safeguards measurements that represent the values inspectors would see. Furthermore, SGA is designed to be modular in design, allowing the user to construct as complex or simple a model as needed: simulating an entire fuel-cycle comprising multiple facilities to a single measurement. SGA's use of outside codes for its material flow information makes it applicable to any model available to the user, as opposed to previous work that applied only to a single scenario. This paper discusses the initial development of SGA and the testing of these modules. The tests described in this paper demonstrate that the different pieces of SGA currently work as intended. Future work on the toolbox will develop and test SGA against a more realistic and complicated scenario using the various tools available in SGA. SGA currently has the pieces to perform analysis on safeguards systems, but needs to be tested on large, multi-MBA, systems to ensure the code is capable of handling such large models, to see the effect large models have on calculation speed, and if further work is needed to improve code efficiency. (authors)

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Using Project Complexity Determinations to Establish Required Levels of Project Rigor

This presentation discusses the project complexity determination process that was developed by National Security Technologies, LLC, for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office for implementation at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The complexity determination process was developed to address the diversity of NNSS project types, size, and complexity; to fill the need for one procedure but with provision for tailoring the level of rigor to the project type, size, and complexity; and to provide consistent, repeatable, effective application of project management processes across the enterprise; and to achieve higher levels of efficiency in project delivery. These needs are illustrated by the wide diversity of NNSS projects: Defense Experimentation, Global Security, weapons tests, military training areas, sensor development and testing, training in realistic environments, intelligence community support, sensor development, environmental restoration/waste management, and disposal of radioactive waste, among others.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Key Response Planning Factors for the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism

Despite hundreds of above-ground nuclear tests and data gathered from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the effects of a ground-level, low-yield nuclear detonation in a modern urban environment are still the subject of considerable scientific debate. Extensive review of nuclear weapon effects studies and discussions with nuclear weapon effects experts from various federal agencies, national laboratories, and technical organizations have identified key issues and bounded some of the unknowns required to support response planning for a low-yield, ground-level nuclear detonation in a modern U.S. city. This study, which is focused primarily upon the hazards posed by radioactive fallout, used detailed fallout predictions from the advanced suite of three-dimensional (3-D) meteorology and plume/fallout models developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), including extensive global Key Response Planning Factors for the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism geographical and real-time meteorological databases to support model calculations. This 3-D modeling system provides detailed simulations that account for complex meteorology and terrain effects. The results of initial modeling and analysis were presented to federal, state, and local working groups to obtain critical, broad-based review and feedback on strategy and messaging. This effort involved a diverse set of communities, including New York City, National Capitol Regions, Charlotte, Houston, Portland, and Los Angeles. The largest potential for reducing casualties during the post-detonation response phase comes from reducing exposure to fallout radiation. This can be accomplished through early, adequate sheltering followed by informed, delayed evacuation.B The response challenges to a nuclear detonation must be solved through multiple approaches of public education, planning, and rapid response actions. Because the successful response will require extensive coordination of a large number of organizations, supplemented by appropriate responses by local responders and the general population within the hazard zones, regional planning is essential to success. The remainder of this Executive Summary provides summary guidance for response planning in three areas: (1) Public Protection Strategy details the importance of early, adequate shelter followed by informed evacuation. (2) Responder Priorities identify how to protect response personnel, perform regional situational assessment, and support public safety. (3) Key Planning Considerations refute common myths and provide important information on planning how to respond in the aftermath of nuclear terrorism.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Performance of Cladding on MOX Fuel with Low 240Pu/239Pu Ratio

The U.S. Department of Energy has decided to dispose of a portion of its surplus plutonium by reconstituting it into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and irradiating it in commercial power reactors. As part of fuel qualification, four lead assemblies were manufactured and irradiated to a maximum fuel rod average burnup of 47.3 MWd/kg heavy metal. This was the world s first commercial irradiation of MOX fuel with a 240Pu/239Pu ratio less than 0.10. Five fuel rods with varying burnups and plutonium contents were selected from one of the assemblies and shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory for hot cell examination. This paper discusses the results of those examinations with emphasis on cladding performance. Exams relevant to the cladding included visual and eddy current exams, profilometry, microscopy, hydrogen analysis, gallium analysis, and mechanical testing. There was no discernible effect of the type of MOX fuel on the performance of the cladding.

FMDP↗

Science & Technology Review May 2019

Lawrence Livermore’s “brain-on-a-chip” is designed to predict the effects of potentially harmful chemicals, viruses, and drugs on humans without relying on animal or human test subjects. In conjunction with an artificial blood–brain barrier, the device simulates the central nervous system by recording activity from brain cells grown onto a small platform embedded with microelectrode arrays. The brain-on-a-chip holds significant promise for national security and broader applications. For example, the device could be used to determine how soldiers are affected by exposure to chemical and biological weapons and the effectiveness of potential countermeasures and prophylactic pretreatments. The technology could also help predict the effects on the brain from promising drugs designed to treat neurological disorders. The brain-on-a-chip is the latest iteration of the Laboratory’s iCHIP (in vitro chip-based human investigational platform) project—a broad initiative at Livermore to advance human health with a focus on understanding, diagnosing, and potentially treating human neural problems and diseases.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Technical Area V (TA-V) transformation project close-out report.

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Technical Area V (TA-V) has provided unique nuclear experimental environments for decades. The technologies tested in TA-V facilities have furthered the United States Nuclear Weapons program and has contributed to the national energy and homeland security mission. The importance of TA-V working efficiently to produce an attractive and effective platform for experiments should not be underestimated. Throughout its brief history, TA-V has evolved to address multiple and diverse sets of requirements. These requirements evolved over many years; however, the requirements had not been managed nor communicated comprehensively or effectively. A series of programmatic findings over several years of external audits was evidence of this downfall. Today, these same requirements flow down through a new TA-V management system that produces consistently applied and reproducible approaches to work practices. In 2008, the TA-V department managers assessed the state of TA-V services and work activities to understand how to improve customer interfaces, stakeholders perceptions, and workforce efficiencies. The TA-V management team initiated the TA-V Transformation Project after they deemed the pre-June 2008 operational model to be ineffective in managing work and in providing integrated, continuous improvement to TA-V processes. This report summarizes the TA-V Transformation Project goals, activities, and accomplishments.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

OSI Passive Seismic Experiment at the Former Nevada Test Site

On-site inspection (OSI) is one of the four verification provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Under the provisions of the CTBT, once the Treaty has entered into force, any signatory party can request an on-site inspection, which can then be carried out after approval (by majority voting) of the Executive Council. Once an OSI is approved, a team of 40 inspectors will be assembled to carry out an inspection to ''clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I''. One challenging aspect of carrying out an on-site inspection (OSI) in the case of a purported underground nuclear explosion is to detect and locate the underground effects of an explosion, which may include an explosion cavity, a zone of damaged rock, and/or a rubble zone associated with an underground collapsed cavity. The CTBT (Protocol, Section II part D, paragraph 69) prescribes several types of geophysical investigations that can be carried out for this purpose. One of the methods allowed by the CTBT for geophysical investigation is referred to in the Treaty Protocol as ''resonance seismometry''. This method, which was proposed and strongly promoted by Russia during the Treaty negotiations, is not described in the Treaty. Some clarification about the nature of the resonance method can be gained from OSI workshop presentations by Russian experts in the late 1990s. Our understanding is that resonance seismometry is a passive method that relies on seismic reverberations set up in an underground cavity by the passage of waves from regional and teleseismic sources. Only a few examples of the use of this method for detection of underground cavities have been presented, and those were done in cases where the existence and precise location of an underground cavity was known. As is the case with many of the geophysical methods allowed during an OSI under the Treaty, how resonance seismology really works and its effectiveness for OSI purposes has yet to be determined. For this experiment, we took a broad approach to the definition of ''resonance seismometry''; stretching it to include any means that employs passive seismic methods to infer the character of underground materials. In recent years there have been a number of advances in the use of correlation and noise analysis methods in seismology to obtain information about the subsurface. Our objective in this experiment was to use noise analysis and correlation analysis to evaluate these techniques for detecting and characterizing the underground damage zone from a nuclear explosion. The site that was chosen for the experiment was the Mackerel test in Area 4 of the former Nevada Test Site (now named the Nevada National Security Site, or NNSS). Mackerel was an underground nuclear test of less than 20 kT conducted in February of 1964 (DOENV-209-REV 15). The reason we chose this site is because there was a known apical cavity occurring at about 50 m depth above a rubble zone, and that the site had been investigated by the US Geological Survey with active seismic methods in 1965 (Watkins et al., 1967). Note that the time delay between detonation of the explosion (1964) and the time of the present survey (2010) is nearly 46 years - this would not be typical of an expected OSI under the CTBT.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

NIF Operations Management Plan, August 2011

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL) National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a key component of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program, whose purpose is to maintain the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of our nation’s nuclear stockpile without underground nuclear testing. The NIF is crucial to the Stockpile Stewardship Program because it is the only facility that can create the conditions of extreme temperature and pressure—conditions that exist only in stars or in exploding nuclear weapons—that are relevant to understanding how our modern nuclear weapons operate. As such, the NIF’s primary mission is to attain fusion ignition in the laboratory. Fusion ignition not only supports Stockpile Stewardship needs, but also provides the basis for future decisions about fusion’s potential as a long-term energy source. Additionally, NIF provides scientists with access to high-energy-density regimes that can yield new insight and understanding in the areas of astrophysics, hydrodynamics, material properties, plasma physics, and radiative properties. The use of the NIF to support the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the advancement of basic high-energy-density science understanding is planned and managed through program-level execution plans and NIF directorate-level management teams. An example of a plan is the National Ignition Campaign Execution Plan. The NIF Operations Management Plan provides an overview of the NIF Operations organization and describes how the NIF is supported by the LLNL infrastructure and how it is safely and responsibly managed and operated. Detailed information on NIF management of the organization is found in a series of supporting plans, policies, and procedures. A list of related acronyms can be found in Appendix A of this document. The purpose of this document is to provide a roadmap of how the NIF Operations organization functions. It provides a guide to understanding the requirements, document flow down, organizational vision and mission, performance metrics, and interrelationship of the NIF Operations organization with other directorate and laboratory organizations. This document also provides a listing of roles and responsibilities, core processes, procedures, authority matrices, change control boards, and other information necessary for successfully functioning in the NIF Operations organization. This document, the NIF Shot Operations Plan, and the NIF Maintenance Plan together represent the primary documents satisfying our Conduct of Operations compliance requirement.

42 ENGINEERING↗