Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Cybersecurity”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 721 records · Page 40

Evaluating Resilience of Water Distribution Networks to Operational Failures from Cyber-Physical Attacks

Water cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have gained increasing interest to improve operational efficiency and reliability. However, due to growing exposure to cyber-physical attacks, cybersecurity and resilience against the attacks have become significant concerns. There have been efforts to improve cybersecurity in water CPSs, yet few attempts to investigate resilience against cyber-physical attacks. This study contributes to characterizing resilience of a water CPS and investigating potential resilience strategies. An advanced resilience measure integrating withstanding, absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capability of a system is proposed and applied to the C-town water distribution network (WDN) for 15 failure set scenarios with a pressure-driven hydraulic simulation. The results provide identification of failure sets and unfavorable operational conditions that make the system more vulnerable to the cyber-physical attacks and in turn produce low resilience and capabilities. It is also found that, after recovery of a disrupted component, adjustment of overall operational interactions across system components is needed for complete restoration of disrupted functionality. The findings provide insights on infrastructure investment with resilience strategies in cyber and physical water system domains.

Shin, Sangmin↗

Smart manufacturing maturity models and their applicability: a review

The purpose of this paper is to review existing smart manufacturing (SM) maturity models' dimensions and maturity levels to assess their applicability and drawbacks. There are many maturity models available but many of them have not been validated or do not provide a useful guide or tool for applications. This gap creates the need for a review of the existing maturity model's applicability. Nineteen peer-reviewed maturity models related to “Digital Transformation,” “Industry 4.0” or “Smart Manufacturing” were selected based on a systematic literature review and five consulting firm models were selected based on the author's industry knowledge. The chosen models were analyzed to determine 10 categories of dimensions. Then they are assessed on a 1–5 scale for how applicable they are in the 10 categories of dimensions. The five “consulting firm” models have a first-mover advantage, are more widely used in industry and are more applicable, but some require payment, and they lack published details and validation. The 19 “peer reviewed” models are not as widely used, lack awareness in the industry and are not as easy to apply because of no web tool for self-assessment, but they are improving. The categories defined to characterize the models and facilitate comparisons for users include “Information Technology (IT) and Cyber-Physical System (CPS) and Data,” “Strategy and Organization,” “Supply Chain and Logistics,” “Products and Services,” “Culture and Employees,” “Technology and Capabilities,” “Customer and Market,” “Cybersecurity and Risk,” “Leadership and Management” and “Governance and Compliance.” The analyzed maturity models were particularly weak in the areas of cybersecurity, leadership and governance. Researchers and practitioners can use this review with consideration of their specific needs to determine if a maturity model is applicable or if a new model needs to be developed. The review can also aid in the development of maturity models through the discussion of each of the dimension categories. Finally, compared to existing reviews of SM maturity models, this research determines comprehensive dimension categories and focuses on applicability and drawbacks.

42 ENGINEERING↗

AI-based Cyber Event OSINT via Twitter Data

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is largely regarded as a necessary component for cybersecurity intelligence gathering to secure network systems. With the advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) and increasing usage of social media, like Twitter, we have a unique opportunity to obtain and aggregate information from social media. In this study, we propose an AI-based scheme capable of automatically pulling information from Twitter, filtering out security-irrelevant tweets, performing natural language analysis to correlate the tweets about each cybersecurity event (e.g., a malware campaign), and validating the information. This scheme has many applications, such as providing a means for security operators to gain insight into ongoing events and helping them prioritize vulnerabilities to deal with. To give examples of the possible uses, we present three case studies demonstrating the event discovery and investigation processes.

Dale, Dakota↗

Impact Analysis of Data Integrity Attacks on FACTS-based Wide-Area Voltage Control System

Energy management system (EMS) consists of several wide-area control applications that serve as a backbone for security, stability, and reliability of the power system. Wide-area voltage control system (WAVCS), one of the critical wide-area applications, operates in coordination with local Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices to provide voltage security and optimal management of active and reactive power resources. Since the WAVCS relies on wide-area communication and data sharing devices, possible cybersecurity vulnerabilities have to be addressed to ensure the closed-loop operation of WAVCS. In this paper, we present a methodology for performing an impact analysis of cyber-attacks in WAVCS cybersecurity. In particular, different types of data integrity attacks, such as malicious tripping, fault replay, and signal altering attacks, are considered, and detailed impact analysis is conducted in a testbed environment using the Kundur's four machine two-area system. For performing an impact analysis, the transient voltage stability of the sensitive bus voltage is studied, followed by the quantitative assessment and severity ranking using the voltage profile index. Our experimental evaluation reveals that the data integrity attacks on control signals exhibit a higher attack severity than on the measurement signals. Further, the severity of these attacks varies with nature (static or dynamic), location, and types of attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Graph Analytics for Signature Discovery

Within large amounts of seemingly unstructured data it can be diffcult to find signatures of events. In our work we transform unstructured data into a graph representation. By doing this we expose underlying structure in the data and can take advantage of existing graph analytics capabilities, as well as develop new capabilities. Currently we focus on applications in cybersecurity and communication domains. Within cybersecurity we aim to find signatures for perpetrators using the pass-the-hash attack, and in communications we look for emails or phone calls going up or down a chain of command. In both of these areas, and in many others, the signature we look for is a path with certain temporal properties. In this paper we discuss our methodology for finding these temporal paths within large graphs.

Signature Science↗

Real-World Cyber Security Demonstration for Networked Electric Drives

In this article, we present the design and implementation of a cyber-physical security testbed for networked electric drive systems, aimed at conducting real-world security demonstrations. To our knowledge, this is one of the first security testbeds for networked electric drives, seamlessly integrating the domains of power electronics and computer science, and cybersecurity. By doing so, the testbed offers a comprehensive platform to explore and understand the intricate and often complex interactions between cyber and physical systems. The core of our testbed consists of four electric machine drives, meticulously configured to emulate small-scale but realistic information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. This setup both provides a controlled environment for simulating a wide array of cyber-attacks, and mirrors potential real-world attack scenarios with a high degree of fidelity. The testbed serves as an invaluable resource for the study of cyber-physical security, offering a practical and dynamic platform for testing and validating cybersecurity measures in the context of networked electric drive systems. As a concrete example of the testbed's capabilities, we have developed and implemented a Python-based script designed to execute step-stone attacks over a wireless local area network (WLAN). This script leverages a sequence of target IP addresses, simulating a real-world attack vector that could be exploited by adversaries. To counteract such threats, we demonstrate the efficacy of our developed cyber-attack detection algorithms, which are integral to our testbed's security framework. Furthermore, the testbed incorporates a real-time visualization system using InfluxDB and Grafana, providing a dynamic and interactive representation of networked electric drives and their associated security monitoring mechanisms. This visualization component not only enhances the testbed's usability but also offers insightful, real-time data for researchers and practitioners, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber-physical security dynamics in networked electric drive systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Coherency-Based Detection Algorithm for Synchrophasor Cyberattacks

The wide area monitoring system (WAMS) is critical for power system situational awareness, but represents a growing cybersecurity vulnerability. Malicious adversaries may seek to compromise one or more PMUs in order to effect control decisions that unnecessarily disrupt typical grid operations. One example of a particularly pernicious attack vector is the spoofing or replaying of a fault event using one or more compromised PMUs. This work documents the development and validation of a coherency-based cyberattack detection algorithm that integrates a sliding-window singular value decomposition (SVD) with physics-based partitioning analysis to achieve accurate classification of events. Special consideration is given to discerning a sophisticated fault-replay or fault spoofing attack from actual faults. A software-based cybersecurity testbed has been developed for rigorous testing of the algorithm. The algorithm is further validated using simulated synchrophasor datasets obtained from a MinniWECC 63-bus test system. Results show that the algorithm can successfully detect fault-replay attacks even when over half of the PMUs are compromised.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

SDN-Based Smart Cyber Switching (SCS) for Cyber Restoration of a Digital Substation

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have increasingly been targets of cyber-attacks, causing widespread and extended blackouts. Digital substations are particularly vulnerable to such cyber incursions, jeopardizing grid stability. This paper addresses these risks by proposing a cybersecurity framework that leverages software-defined networking (SDN) to bolster the resilience of substations based on the IEC- 61850 standard. The research introduces a strategy involving smart cyber switching (SCS) for mitigation and concurrent intelligent electronic device (CIED) for restoration, ensuring ongoing operational integrity and cybersecurity within a substation. The SCS framework improves the physical network’s behavior (i.e., leveraging commercial SDN capabilities) by incorporating an adaptive port controller (APC) module for dynamic port management and an intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect and counteract malicious IEC-61850-based sampled value (SV) and generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages within the substation’s communication network. The framework’s effectiveness is validated through comprehensive simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed, demonstrating its ability to sustain substation operations during cyber-attacks and significantly improve the overall resilience of the power grid.

Liu, Chen-Ching (ORCID:0000000289417958)↗

A Testbed Environment for Buildings-to-Grid Cyber Resilience Research and Development

The Smart Grid is characterized by the proliferation of advanced digital controllers at all levels of its operational hierarchy from generation to end consumption. Such controllers within modern residential and commercial buildings enable grid operators to exercise fine-grained control over energy consumption through several emerging Buildings-to-Grid (B2G) applications. Though this capability promises significant benefits in terms of operational economics and improved reliability, cybersecurity weaknesses in the supporting infrastructure could be exploited to cause a detrimental effect and this necessitates focused research efforts on two fronts. First, the understanding of how cyber attacks in the B2G space could impact grid reliability and to what extent. Second, the development and validation of cyber-physical application-specific countermeasures that are complementary to traditional infrastructure cybersecurity mechanisms for enhanced cyber attack detection and mitigation. The PNNL B2G testbed is currently being developed to address these core research needs. Specifically, the B2G testbed combines high-fidelity buildings+grid simulators, industry-grade building automation and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems in an integrated, realistic, and reconfigurable environment capable of supporting attack-impact-detection-mitigation experimentation. In this paper, we articulate the need for research testbeds to model various B2G applications broadly by looking at the end-to-end operational hierarchy of the Smart Grid. Finally, the paper not only describes the architecture of the B2G testbed in detail, but also addresses the broad spectrum of B2G resilience research it is capable of supporting based on the smart grid operational hierarchy identified earlier.

Sridhar, Siddharth↗

Predicting and Detecting Emerging Cyberattack Patterns Using StreamWorks

The number and sophistication of cyberattacks on industries and governments have dramatically grown in recent years. To counter this movement, new advanced tools and techniques are needed to detect cyberattacks in their early stages such that defensive actions may be taken to avert or mitigate potential damage. From a cybersecurity analysis perspective, detecting cyberattacks may be cast as a problem of identifying patterns in computer network traffic. Logically and intuitively, these patterns may take on the form of a directed graph that conveys how an attack or intrusion propagates through the computers of a network. Such cyberattack graphs could provide cybersecurity analysts with powerful conceptual representations that are natural to express and analyze. We have been researching and developing graph-centric approaches and algorithms for dynamic cyberattack detection. The advanced dynamic graph algorithms we are developing will be packaged into a streaming network analysis framework known as StreamWorks. With StreamWorks, a scientist or analyst may detect and identify precursor events and patterns as they emerge in complex networks. This analysis framework is intended to be used in a dynamic environment where network data is streamed in and is appended to a large-scale dynamic graph. Specific graphical query patterns are decomposed and collected into a graph query library. The individual decomposed subpatterns in the library are continuously and efficiently matched against the dynamic graph as it evolves to identify and detect early, partial subgraph patterns. The scalable emerging subgraph pattern algorithms will match on both structural and semantic network properties.

Chin, George↗

Cytrics Repository Of Analysis Tools And Engineering Resources

Cybersecurity Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) is a DOE-funded project that works with vendors to evaluate the cybersecurity of equipment used in US critical infrastructure. In the process of testing systems, CyTRICS researchers often develop custom tools. The tools in this repository were developed during multiple CyTRICS tests to assist with the testing process. They help solve problems encountered by CyTRICS researchers and address uncommon testing subjects for which limited tooling is available. They are useful to other researchers working on similar systems and architectures.

Laird, SutterE↗

The Benefits of a Software Bill of Materials Program at Nuclear Facilities

Software supply chain attacks are becoming increasingly more prevalent in both information communications technology and operational technology environments. Often, a supplier or other entity discloses vulnerability information about software components and subcomponents used in a digital asset, but an asset owner is unable to quickly ascertain if the vulnerable component is installed in their facility. The generation and use of a software bill of materials (SBOM) for installed digital assets can enable an asset owner to quickly identify if and where a component is used, allowing them to evaluate the risk and determine necessary risk treatments. The integration of an SBOM program into a nuclear facility not only improves vulnerability management and risk management processes, it also benefits asset and configuration management, cybersecurity, and supply chain programs. This paper reviews the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Cybersecurity Crosscutting Technology Development program’s work on integrating an SBOM program into a nuclear facility. It also provides a discussion on the benefits of such a program.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cryptographic Key Management and Critical Risk Assessment

The Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) CyberSecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CSEDS) industry led program (DE-FOA-0000359) entitled "Innovation for Increasing CyberSecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (12CSEDS)," awarded a contract to Sypris Electronics LLC to develop a Cryptographic Key Management System for the smart grid (Scalable Key Management Solutions for Critical Infrastructure Protection). Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Sypris Electronics, LLC as a result of that award entered into a CRADA (NFE-11-03562) between ORNL and Sypris Electronics, LLC. ORNL provided its Cyber Security Econometrics System (CSES) as a tool to be modified and used as a metric to address risks and vulnerabilities in the management of cryptographic keys within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) domain of the electric sector. ORNL concentrated our analysis on the AMI domain of which the National Electric Sector Cyber security Organization Resource (NESCOR) Working Group 1 (WG1) has documented 29 failure scenarios. The computational infrastructure of this metric involves system stakeholders, security requirements, system components and security threats. To compute this metric, we estimated the stakes that each stakeholder associates with each security requirement, as well as stochastic matrices that represent the probability of a threat to cause a component failure and the probability of a component failure to cause a security requirement violation. We applied this model to estimate the security of the AMI, by leveraging the recently established National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7628 guidelines for smart grid security and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 63351, Part 9 to identify the life cycle for cryptographic key management, resulting in a vector that assigned to each stakeholder an estimate of their average loss in terms of dollars per day of system operation. To further address probabilities of threats, information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic Agent Based Game Theoretic (ABGT) simulations. Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. The strategy for the game was developed by analyzing five electric sector representative failure scenarios contained in the AMI functional domain from NESCOR WG1. From these five selected scenarios, we characterized them into three specific threat categories affecting confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). The analysis using our ABGT simulation demonstrated how to model the AMI functional domain using a set of rationalized game theoretic rules decomposed from the failure scenarios in terms of how those scenarios might impact the AMI network with respect to CIA.

Advanced Metering Infrastructure↗

Nested Narratives Final Report

In cybersecurity forensics and incident response, the story of what has happened is the most important artifact yet the one least supported by tools and techniques. Existing tools focus on gathering and manipulating low-level data to allow an analyst to investigate exactly what happened on a host system or a network. Higher-level analysis is usually left to whatever ad hoc tools and techniques an individual may have developed. We discuss visual representations of narrative in the context of cybersecurity incidents with an eye toward multi-scale illustration of actions and actors. We envision that this representation could smoothly encompass individual packets on a wire at the lowest level and nation-state-level actors at the highest. We present progress to date, discuss the impact of technical risk on this project and highlight opportunities for future work.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Irvine Smart Grid Demonstration, a Regional Smart Grid Demonstration Project

ISGD was a comprehensive demonstration that spanned the electricity delivery system and extended into customer homes. The project used phasor measurement technology to enable substation-level situational awareness, and demonstrated SCE’s next-generation substation automation system. It extended beyond the substation to evaluate the latest generation of distribution automation technologies, including looped 12-kV distribution circuit topology using URCIs. The project team used DVVC capabilities to demonstrate CVR. In customer homes, the project evaluated HAN devices such as smart appliances, programmable communicating thermostats, and home energy management components. The homes were also equipped with energy storage, solar PV systems, and a number of energy efficiency measures (EEMs). The team used one block of homes to evaluate strategies and technologies for achieving ZNE. A home achieves ZNE when it produces at least as much renewable energy as the amount of energy it consumes annually. The project also assessed the impact of device-specific demand response (DR), as well as load management capabilities involving energy storage devices and plug-in electric vehicle charging equipment. In addition, the ISGD project sought to better understand the impact of ZNE homes on the electric grid. ISGD’s SENet enabled end-to-end interoperability between multiple vendors’ systems and devices, while also providing a level of cybersecurity that is essential to smart grid development and adoption across the nation. The ISGD project includes a series of sub-projects grouped into four logical technology domains: Smart Energy Customer Solutions, Next-Generation Distribution System, Interoperability and Cybersecurity, and Workforce of the Future. Section 2.3 provides a more detailed overview of these domains.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Analysis of Alternatives for Risk Assessment Methodologies and Tools

The purpose of this document is to provide a basic overview and understanding of risk assessment methodologies and tools from the literature and to assess the suitability of these methodologies and tools for cyber risk assessment. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) performed this review in support of risk modeling activities performed for the Stakeholder Engagement and Cyber Infrastructure Resilience (SECIR) division of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C). The set of methodologies and tools covered in this document is not intended to be exhaustive; instead, it focuses on those that are commonly used in the risk assessment community. The classification of methodologies and tools was performed by a group of analysts with experience in risk analysis and cybersecurity, and the resulting analysis of alternatives has been tailored to address the needs of a cyber risk assessment.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Interaction and Impact Studies for Distributed Energy Resource, Transactive Energy, and Electric Grid, using High Performance Computing ?based Modeling and Simulation

The electric utility industry is undergoing significant transformations in its operation model, including a greater emphasis on automation, monitoring technologies, and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS). With these changes and new technologies, while driving greater efficiencies and reliability, these new models may introduce new vectors of cyber attack. The appropriate cybersecurity controls to address and mitigate these newly introduced attack vectors and potential vulnerabilities are still widely unknown and performance of the control is difficult to vet. This proposal argues that modeling and simulation (M&S) is a necessary tool to address and better understand these problems introduced by emerging technologies for the grid. M&S will provide electric utilities a platform to model its transmission and distribution systems and run various simulations against the model to better understand the operational impact and performance of cybersecurity controls.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Safe Active Scanning for Energy Delivery Systems Final Report

The Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems Program has funded Safe(r) Active Scanning for Energy Delivery Systems, led by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, to investigate and analyze the impacts of active scanning in the operational environment of energy delivery systems. In collaboration with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Idaho National Laboratory, active scans across three testbeds including 38 devices were performed. This report gives a summary of the initial literature survey performed on the SASEDS project as well as industry partner interview summaries and main findings from Phase 1 of the project. Additionally, the report goes into the details of scanning techniques, methodologies for testing, testbed descriptions, and scanning results, with appendices to elaborate on the specific scans that were performed. As a result of testing, a single device out of 38 exhibited problems when actively scanned, and a reboot was required to fix it. This single failure indicates that active scanning is not likely to have a detrimental effect on the safety and resilience of energy delivery systems. We provide a path forward for future research that could enable wide adoption of active scanning and lead utilities to incorporate active scanning as part of their default network security plans to discover and rectify rogue devices, adversaries, and services that may be on the network. This increased network visibility will allow operational technology cybersecurity practitioners to improve their situational awareness of networks and their vulnerabilities.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗