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Safeguards by design - industry engagement for new uranium enrichment facilities in the United States

The United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) has initiated a Safeguards by Design (SBD) effort to encourage the incorporation of international (IAEA) safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign or retrofit the facility at a later date. The main goals of Safeguards by Design are to (1) make the implementation of international safeguards at new civil nuclear facilities more effective and efficient, (2) avoid costly and time-consuming re-design work or retrofits at such facilities and (3) design such facilities in a way that makes proliferation as technically difficult, as time-consuming, and as detectable as possible. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recently hosted efforts to facilitate the use of Safeguards by Design for new uranium enrichment facilities currently being planned for construction in the U.S. While SBD is not a NRC requirement, the NRC is aiding the implementation of SBD by coordinating discussions between DOE's NA-24 and industry's facility design teams. More specifically, during their normal course of licensing discussions the NRC has offered industry the opportunity to engage with NA-24 regarding SBD.

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Integration of Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development with UNSCR 1540 Implementation - Context and Challenges

On 28 April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 (2004), obliging States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. It imposes binding obligations on all States to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials. This mandate was extended an additional two years with the adoption of Resolution 1673 (2006) and an additional three years with the adoption of Resolution 1810 (2008). UNSCR 1540 is a key nonproliferation and counterterrorism tool that needs to be implemented well. Its obligations are a core part of nuclear infrastructure development.

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Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working Group. The working group participants were tasked with providing recommendations for facility operators and designers, while promoting the IAEA's objectives of: (1) avoiding costly and time-consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear facilities and (2) providing for more effective and efficient implementation of international safeguards.

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THE NEXT GENERATION SAFEGUARDS PROFESSIONAL NETWORK: PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS

President Obama has repeatedly stated that the United States must ensure that the international safeguards regime, as embodied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has 'the authority, information, people, and technology it needs to do its job.' The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) works to implement the President's vision through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), a program to revitalize the U.S. DOE national laboratories safeguards technology and human capital base so that the United States can more effectively support the IAEA and ensure that it meets current and emerging challenges to the international safeguards system. In 2009, in response to the human capital development goals of NGSI, young safeguards professionals within the Global Nuclear Security Technology Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory launched the Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN). The purpose of this initiative is to establish working relationships and to foster collaboration and communication among the next generation of safeguards leaders. The NGSPN is an organization for, and of, young professionals pursuing careers in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation - as well as mid-career professionals new to the field - whether working within the U.S. DOE national laboratory complex, U.S. government agencies, academia, or industry or at the IAEA. The NGSPN is actively supported by the NNSA, boasts more than 70 members, maintains a website and newsletter, and has held two national meetings as well as an NGSPN session and panel at the July 2010 Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual Meeting. This paper discusses the network; its significance, goals and objectives; developments and progress to date; and future plans.

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Mesoscale to plant-scale models of nuclear waste reprocessing.

Imported oil exacerabates our trade deficit and funds anti-American regimes. Nuclear Energy (NE) is a demonstrated technology with high efficiency. NE's two biggest political detriments are possible accidents and nuclear waste disposal. For NE policy, proliferation is the biggest obstacle. Nuclear waste can be reduced through reprocessing, where fuel rods are separated into various streams, some of which can be reused in reactors. Current process developed in the 1950s is dirty and expensive, U/Pu separation is the most critical. Fuel rods are sheared and dissolved in acid to extract fissile material in a centrifugal contactor. Plants have many contacts in series with other separations. We have taken a science and simulation-based approach to develop a modern reprocessing plant. Models of reprocessing plants are needed to support nuclear materials accountancy, nonproliferation, plant design, and plant scale-up.

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Bayesian Radiation Source Localization

Locating illicit radiological sources using gamma ray or neutron detection is a key challenge for both homeland security and nuclear nonproliferation. Localization methods using an array of detectors or a sequence of observations in time and space must provide rapid results while accounting for a dynamic attenuating environment. In the presence of significant attenuation and scatter, more extensive numerical transport calculations in place of the standard analytical approximations may be required to achieve accurate results. Numerical adjoints based on deterministic transport codes provide relatively efficient detector response calculations needed to determine the most likely location of a true source. Probabilistic representations account for uncertainty in the source location resulting from uncertainties in detector responses, the approximations that are used, and the potential for nonunique solutions. A Bayesian approach improves on previous likelihood methods for source localization by allowing the incorporation of all available information to help constrain solutions.

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CHAMPION: Intelligent Hierarchical Reasoning Agents for Enhanced Decision Support

We describe the design and development of an advanced reasoning framework employing semantic technologies, organized within a hierarchy of computational reasoning agents that interpret domain specific information. Designed based on an inspirational metaphor of the pattern recognition functions performed by the human neocortex, the CHAMPION reasoning framework represents a new computational modeling approach that derives invariant knowledge representations through memory-prediction belief propagation processes that are driven by formal ontological language specification and semantic technologies. The CHAMPION framework shows promise for enhancing complex decision making in diverse problem domains including cyber security, nonproliferation and energy consumption analysis.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Safeguards design strategies: designing and constructing new uranium and plutonium processing facilities in the United States

In the United States, the Department of Energy (DOE) is transforming its outdated and oversized complex of aging nuclear material facilities into a smaller, safer, and more secure National Security Enterprise (NSE). Environmental concerns, worker health and safety risks, material security, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy while maintaining the capability for an effective nuclear deterrence by the United States, are influencing this transformation. As part of the nation's Uranium Center of Excellence (UCE), the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, will advance the U.S.'s capability to meet all concerns when processing uranium and is located adjacent to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF), designed for consolidated storage of enriched uranium. The HEUMF became operational in March 2010, and the UPF is currently entering its final design phase. The designs of both facilities are for meeting anticipated security challenges for the 21st century. For plutonium research, development, and manufacturing, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico is now under construction. The first phase of the CMRR Project is the design and construction of a Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building. The second phase consists of the design and construction of the Nuclear Facility (NF). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) selected these two sites as part of the national plan to consolidate nuclear materials, provide for nuclear deterrence, and nonproliferation mission requirements. This work examines these two projects independent approaches to design requirements, and objectives for safeguards, security, and safety (3S) systems as well as the subsequent construction of these modern processing facilities. Emphasis is on the use of Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), incorporating Systems Engineering (SE) principles for these two projects.

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DEVELOPMENT OF A TAMPER RESISTANT/INDICATING AEROSOL COLLECTION SYSTEM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING AT BULK HANDLING FACILITIES

Environmental sampling has become a key component of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards approaches since its approval for use in 1996. Environmental sampling supports the IAEA's mission of drawing conclusions concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities in a Nation State. Swipe sampling is the most commonly used method for the collection of environmental samples from bulk handling facilities. However, augmenting swipe samples with an air monitoring system, which could continuously draw samples from the environment of bulk handling facilities, could improve the possibility of the detection of undeclared activities. Continuous sampling offers the opportunity to collect airborne materials before they settle onto surfaces which can be decontaminated, taken into existing duct work, filtered by plant ventilation, or escape via alternate pathways (i.e. drains, doors). Researchers at the Savannah River National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory have been working to further develop an aerosol collection technology that could be installed at IAEA safeguarded bulk handling facilities. The addition of this technology may reduce the number of IAEA inspector visits required to effectively collect samples. The principal sample collection device is a patented Aerosol Contaminant Extractor (ACE) which utilizes electrostatic precipitation principles to deposit particulates onto selected substrates. Recent work has focused on comparing traditional swipe sampling to samples collected via an ACE system, and incorporating tamper resistant and tamper indicating (TRI) technologies into the ACE system. Development of a TRI-ACE system would allow collection of samples at uranium/plutonium bulk handling facilities in a manner that ensures sample integrity and could be an important addition to the international nuclear safeguards inspector's toolkit. This work was supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

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NGSI: FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR A CYLINDER TRACKING SYSTEM

While nuclear suppliers currently track uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) cylinders in various ways, for their own purposes, industry practices vary significantly. The NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and International Security's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has begun a 5-year program to investigate the concept of a global monitoring scheme that uniquely identifies and tracks UF{sub 6} cylinders. As part of this effort, NGSI's multi-laboratory team has documented the 'life of a UF{sub 6} cylinder' and reviewed IAEA practices related to UF{sub 6} cylinders. Based on this foundation, this paper examines the functional requirements of a system that would uniquely identify and track UF{sub 6} cylinders. There are many considerations for establishing a potential tracking system. Some of these factors include the environmental conditions a cylinder may be expected to be exposed to, where cylinders may be particularly vulnerable to diversion, how such a system may be integrated into the existing flow of commerce, how proprietary data generated in the process may be protected, what a system may require in terms of the existing standard for UF{sub 6} cylinder manufacture or modifications to it and what the limiting technology factors may be. It is desirable that a tracking system should provide benefit to industry while imposing as few additional constraints as possible and still meeting IAEA safeguards objectives. This paper includes recommendations for this system and the analysis that generated them.

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Radiological Laboratory, Utility, Office Building LEED Strategy & Achievement

Missions that the Radiological Laboratory, utility, Office Building (RLUOB) supports are: (1) Nuclear Materials Handling, Processing, and Fabrication; (2) Stockpile Management; (3) Materials and Manufacturing Technologies; (4) Nonproliferation Programs; (5) Waste Management Activities - Environmental Programs; and (6) Materials Disposition. The key capabilities are actinide analytical chemistry and material characterization.

ACTINIDES↗

Broad area search for regions and objects of interest

A quad chart provides an overview on the on-going project 'Broad Area Search for Regions and Objects of Interest' funded by the DOE Office of Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development. Specifically, the quad chart shows: (1) Project title 'Broad Area Search for Regions and Objects of Interest'; (2) PI and Co-investigators; (3) Concept Panel outlining the project's approach built upon front-end scale-space image analysis; (4) Technical Challenges posed by the project, such as robustness, non-conformities, disparate spatial configuration and weak correlation between presence of objects of interest and low-level description of the surrounding geospatial background; and (5) Planned Accomplishment.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Nuclear Forensics at Los Alamos National Laboratory

The overview of this presentation is: (1) Introduction to nonproliferation efforts; (2) Scope of activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory; (3) Facilities for radioanalytical work at LANL; (4) Radiochemical characterization capabilities; and (5) Bulk chemical and materials analysis capabilities. Some conclusions are: (1) Analytical chemistry measurements on plutonium and uranium matrices are critical to numerous defense and non-defense programs including safeguards accountancy verification measurements; (2) Los Alamos National Laboratory operates capable actinide analytical chemistry and material science laboratories suitable for nuclear material forensic characterization; (3) Actinide analytical chemistry uses numerous means to validate and independently verify that measurement data quality objectives are met; and (4) Numerous LANL nuclear facilities support the nuclear material handling, preparation, and analysis capabilities necessary to evaluate samples containing nearly any mass of an actinide (attogram to kilogram levels).

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Utilizing Regional Centers in Sustaining Upgraded Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Sites

Since the mid-1990s the governments of the United States (U.S.) and the Russian Federation (RF) have been collaborating on nonproliferation projects, particularly in the protection of nuclear material through the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). To date, this collaboration has resulted in upgrades to more than 72 RF Ministry of Defense (MOD) sensitive sites and facilities. These upgrades include physical protection systems (PPS), facilities to ensure material remains secure in various configurations, and infrastructure to support, maintain, and sustain upgraded sites. Significant effort on the part of both governments has also been expended to ensure that personnel obtain the necessary skills and training to both operate and maintain the security systems, thereby ensuring long term sustainability. To accomplish this, initial vendor training on physical protection systems was provided to key personnel, and an approved training curriculum was developed to teach the skills of operating, managing, administering, and maintaining the installed physical protection systems. This approach also included documentation of the processes and procedures to support infrastructure, requisite levels of maintenance and testing of systems and equipment, lifecycle management support, inventory systems and spare parts caches. One of the core components in the U.S. exit strategy and full transition to the RF MOD is the development and utilization of regional centers to facilitate centralized training and technical support to upgraded MOD sites in five regions of the RF. To date, two regional centers and one regional classroom facility are functional, and two additional regional centers are currently under construction. This paper will address the process and logistics of regional center establishment and the future vision for integrated regional center support by the RF MOD.

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DISSOLUTION AND ANALYSIS OF YELLOWCAKE COMPONENTS FOR FINGERPRINTING UOC SOURCES

There are a number of chemical and physical parameters that might be used to help elucidate the ore body from which uranium ore concentrate (UOC) was derived. It is the variation in the concentration and isotopic composition of these components that can provide information as to the identity of the ore body from which the UOC was mined and the type of subsequent processing that has been undertaken. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in collaboration with Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories is surveying ore characteristics of yellowcake samples from known geologic origin. The data sets are being incorporated into a national database to help in sourcing interdicted material, as well as aid in safeguards and nonproliferation activities. Geologic age and attributes from chemical processing are site-specific. Isotopic abundances of lead, neodymium, and strontium provide insight into the provenance of geologic location of ore material. Variations in lead isotopes are due to the radioactive decay of uranium in the ore. Likewise, neodymium isotopic abundances are skewed due to the radiogenic decay of samarium. Rubidium decay similarly alters the isotopic signature of strontium isotopic composition in ores. This paper will discuss the chemical processing of yellowcake performed at ORNL. Variations in lead, neodymium, and strontium isotopic abundances are being analyzed in UOC from two geologic sources. Chemical separation and instrumental protocols will be summarized. The data will be correlated with chemical signatures (such as elemental composition, uranium, carbon, and nitrogen isotopic content) to demonstrate the utility of principal component and cluster analyses to aid in the determination of UOC provenance.

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NEN Division Funding Gap Analysis

The work in NEN Division revolves around proliferation detection. The sponsor funding model seems to have shifted over the last decades. For the past three lustra, sponsors are mainly interested in funding ideas and detection systems that are already at a technical readiness level 6 (TRL 6 -- one step below an industrial prototype) or higher. Once this level is reached, the sponsoring agency is willing to fund the commercialization, implementation, and training for the systems (TRL 8, 9). These sponsors are looking for a fast turnaround (1-2 years) technology development efforts to implement technology. To support the critical national and international needs for nonprolifertion solutions, we have to maintain a fluent stream of subject matter expertise from the fundamental principals of radiation detection through prototype development all the way to the implementation and training of others. NEN Division has large funding gaps in the Valley of Death region. In the current competitive climate for nuclear nonproliferation projects, it is imminent to increase our lead in this field.

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Next Generations Safeguards Initiative: The Life of a Cylinder

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has begun a program based on a five-year plan to investigate the concept of a global monitoring scheme that uniquely identifies uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders and their locations throughout the life cycle. A key initial activity in the NGSI program is to understand and document the 'life of a UF6 cylinder' from cradle to grave. This document describes the life of a UF6 cylinder and includes cylinder manufacture and procurement processes as well as cylinder-handling and operational practices at conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and depleted UF6 conversion facilities. The NGSI multiple-laboratory team is using this document as a building block for subsequent tasks in the five-year plan, including development of the functional requirements for cylinder-tagging and tracking devices.

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Current Trends in Gamma Ray Detection for Radiological Emergency Response

Passive and active detection of gamma rays from shielded radioactive materials, including special nuclear materials, is an important task for any radiological emergency response organization. This article reports on the current trends and status of gamma radiation detection objectives and measurement techniques as applied to nonproliferation and radiological emergencies.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗