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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Neptunium transition probabilities estimated through laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) measurements

in tis report calibration free–laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (CF-LIBS) approaches are promising for the analysis of radioactive materials; however, a lack of reported fundamental properties for these materials is an obstacle to implementation. Spectra of laser induced plasmas containing Np and Sr, along with Saha–Boltzmann methods, were used to estimate the first reported transition probabilities (TPs) of Np. These TPs enabled the first attempt at CF-LIBS analysis of radioactive samples to predict Np/Sr ratios with a mean error of 3.86%. The presented methodology of TP estimation will be applied to the study of other actinides and allow broader applications of CF-15 LIBS in the nuclear field.

74 ATOMIC AND MOLECULAR PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2019

ENHANCEMENTS IN THE TECHA RIVER DOSIMETRY SYSTEM: TRDS-2016D CODE FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF DETERMINISTIC ESTIMATES OF DOSE FROM ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURES

Waterborne releases to the Techa River from the Mayak plutonium facility in Russia during 1949–1956 resulted in significant doses to persons living downstream. The dosimetry system TRDS-2016D has been developed which provides individual doses of external and internal exposure for the members of the Techa River Cohort (TRC) and other persons, who were exposed to releases of radioactive material to the Southern Urals. The results of computation of individual doses absorbed in red bone marrow and extra-skeletal tissues for the TRC members (29,647 persons) are presented, which are based on residence histories on the contaminated Techa River and the East Urals Radioactive Trace (EURT) which was formed in 1957 as a result of the Kyshtym Accident. Available 90Sr-body-burden measurements and available information on individual household locations have been used for refinement of individual dose estimates. TRDS-2016D-based dose estimates will be used for verification of risk of low-dose-rate effects of ionizing radiation in the TRC.

dose reconstruction, environmental contamination, ↗
DOE OSTI2014

Pill to Treat Radiation Exposure

Rebecca Abergel explains how one pill could be used to treat people exposed to radioactive materials at our '8 Big Ideas' Science at the Theater event on October 8th, 2014, in Oakland, California.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fiberboard Properties and Degradation Rates for Storage of 9975 Shipping Package in KAC (2020 Status Report)

Savannah River Site (SRS) stores plutonium materials within model 9975 shipping packages in the K-Area Complex (KAC). The 9975 shipping package consists of a 35 gallon stainless steel drum, Celotex fiberboard insulation, lead shield, and primary and secondary containment vessels. The 9975 shipping package design, performance, and analysis for safe transport of radioactive material are described in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). Celotex fiberboard provides three safety functions: thermal insulation to limit internal temperature during a fire, criticality control, and resistance to package crushing. The fiberboard material must retain its dimensions and density within certain ranges to provide the required impact resistance, criticality control, and fire resistance. The SRS Surveillance Program monitors material performance to establish a basis for service life and ensures the continued integrity of 9975 packages. Fiberboard samples, taken from multiple fiberboard assemblies fabricated from cane and softwood fiberboard, have been conditioning in elevated temperature environments since 2005. The samples are periodically examined to monitor thermal, mechanical, and physical properties, and assess degradation trends. Fiberboard properties of interest that are evaluated to demonstrate acceptable long-term performance include dimensional stability, density, compressive strength, thermal conductivity, and specific heat capacity. Duplicate samples from multiple package sources have been tested to identify the range of variability in fiberboard properties and degradation rates. Baseline and long-term testing of fiberboard material properties have been reported previously; reference 6 summarized experimental results of cane and softwood fiberboard through May 2019 and presented degradation models for the measured properties. This report presents the cumulative data collected through June 2020 and the corresponding updated aging models.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Review of Nuclear Forensics: 2016-2020

The study of nuclear forensics harkens back to the Manhattan Project-era, when scientists first started to analyze the debris from the 1945 Trinity test. Political turmoil stemming from the Cold War and the rehabilitation of Germany following WWII has led to new challenges in international security involving nuclear proliferation. Nuclear materials have, on occasion, been lost, misplaced, or stolen from former Soviet countries, and illicit materials have been interdicted all over the world. The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) was established in 2006, and has been at the forefront of drive to advance nuclear forensic capabilities in the United States. The ultimate goal of nuclear forensics is to examine nuclear and other radioactive materials using analytical techniques to determine origin and history of the material, particularly in the context of law enforcement investigations. Nuclear forensics can be divided into two parts: predetonation and post-detonation. Pre-detonation forensics, as the name implies, is the investigation of a nuclear material or weapon that has not been detonated or involved in an explosion, whereas postdetonation forensics is the study of activation or fission products in debris or the environment following the use of a nuclear or radiological dispersal device (RDD). Both parts require a number of analytical chemical and radiochemical techniques to determine identification of the material. Many advancements in analytical techniques, including rapidity, sample size, and forensic signatures have been made in recent years. The analytical methods that can be used in a nuclear forensic investigation, such as mass spectrometry and gamma spectroscopy, have been described in detail in previous reviews, including Straub et.al, and will not be explained here. This review will discuss recent publications (from 2016 to present) describing advancements of techniques such as radiochronometry, morphology, development of novel reference materials, and inter-laboratory collaborations for both pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2014

3rd Quarter Transportation Report FY 2014: Radioactive Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of radioactive waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter. This report summarizes the 3rd quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) shipments. This report also includes annual summaries for FY 2014 in Tables 4 and 5. Tabular summaries are provided which include the following: Sources of and carriers for LLW and MLLW shipments to and from the NNSS; Number and external volume of LLW and MLLW shipments; Highway routes used by carriers; and Incident/accident data applicable to LLW and MLLW shipments. In this report shipments are accounted for upon arrival at the NNSS, while disposal volumes are accounted for upon waste burial. The disposal volumes presented in this report do not include minor volumes of non-radioactive materials that were approved for disposal. Volume reports showing cubic feet generated using the Low-Level Waste Information System may vary slightly due to differing rounding conventions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Laboratory Enrichment of Radioactive Assemblages and Estimation of Thorium and Uranium Radioactivity in Fractions Separated from Placer Sands in Southeast Bangladesh

The present study reports the likely first attempt of separating radioactive minerals for estimation of activity concentration in the beach placer sands of Bangladesh. Several sand samples from heavy mineral deposits located at the south-eastern coastal belt of Bangladesh were processed to physically upgrade their radioactivity concentrations using plant and laboratory equipment. Following some modified flow procedure, individual fractions were separated and investigated using gamma-ray spectrometry and powder-XRD analysis. The radioactivity measurements indicated contributions of the thorium and uranium radioactive series and of {sup 40}K. The maximum values of {sup 232}Th and {sup 238}U, estimated from the radioactivity of {sup 208}Tl and {sup 234}Th in secular equilibrium, were found to be 152,000 and 63,300 Bq/kg, respectively. The fraction of the moderately conductive part in electric separation contained thorium predominantly, while that of the non-conductive part was found to be uranium rich. The present arrangement of the pilot plant cascade and the fine tuning of setting parameters were found to be effective and economic separation process of the radioactive minerals from placer sands in Bangladesh. Probable radiological impacts and extraction potentiality of such radioactive materials are also discussed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2014

2nd Quarter Transportation Report FY 2014

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of radioactive waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter. This report summarizes the second quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2014 low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) shipments. This report also includes annual summaries for FY 2014 in Tables 4 and 5. Tabular summaries are provided which include the following: Sources of and carriers for LLW and MLLW shipments to and from the NNSS; Number and external volume of LLW and MLLW shipments; Highway routes used by carriers; and Incident/accident data applicable to LLW and MLLW shipments. In this report shipments are accounted for upon arrival at the NNSS, while disposal volumes are accounted for upon waste burial. The disposal volumes presented in this report do not include minor volumes of non-radioactive materials that were approved for disposal. Volume reports showing cubic feet (ft3) generated using the Low-Level Waste Information System may vary slightly due to differing rounding conventions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Numerical Assessment of SNF Parameter Bandwidths and Muon Tomography Assay for Large Volume Casks - 18185

For the characterization of spent fuel and for the safe direct disposal of SNF we present: a) a method of numerical assessment of their radionuclides inventory that is derived from the initial fuel characteristics and individual burn-up / cooling time history of that particular fuel assembly, and b) how the numerical information can be experimentally assessed using muon tomography as a nondestructive assay of large and heterogeneous SNF casks. We combine both complementary methods, i.e. numerical assessment and muon tomography (MT) experimental assay, to provide a powerful tool for verifying the nuclear inventory without compromising the casks or radioactive material containers. Here, we shall present the numerical assessment technique and preliminary but very promising experimental results, and explain the scope of a versatile and mobile MT-detection system for the identification of nuclear material inside large casks containing spent fuel assemblies and/or other large volume heterogeneous material containers for which the European Commission has recently granted R and D funding within the CHANCE project to be developed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Chemo-chromic Pd-V{sub 2}O{sub 5} Sensors for Passive Hydrogen Detection in Nuclear Containments - 18268

The ability to detect and monitor hydrogen gas efficiently in process and storage facilities, handling nuclear material, is crucial to ensuring their safety. The accumulation of hydrogen gas, above the lower flammable limit (LFL), in a nuclear waste containment is a concern since it creates the potential for a hydrogen-air explosion to occur, which could lead to a loss of containment and result in the uncontrolled release of radioactive material into the surrounding environment. The events that took place at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant highlighted the vulnerability of conventional hydrogen detection to extreme events, where power may be lost. In the present work, chemo-chromic hydrogen sensors have been fabricated, using transition metal oxide thin films, to provide eye-readable detection systems that would be resilient to plant power failure. Vanadium oxide (V{sub 2}O{sub 5}) films were prepared on quartz glass substrates by sol-gel deposition and sensitized with a palladium (Pd) catalyst, deposited by electron beam evaporation. When exposed to hydrogen, the Pd catalyst dissociates H{sub 2} to H atoms, which diffuse into the V{sup (V)}{sub 2}O{sub 5} forming a hydrogen-vanadium metal bronze, H{sub 2}V{sup (III)}{sub 2}O{sub 5}, resulting in a noticeable colour change from orange to dark green. To assess their viability for nuclear safety applications, these sensors have been irradiated to total doses between 5 and 250 kGy using a Co-60 gamma isotope irradiator. The results suggest that gamma irradiation, at the levels examined, has an effect on the initial colour of the V{sub 2}O{sub 5} and Pd-V{sub 2}O{sub 5} thin films with decreased transmittance above 540 nm. The orange starting colour darkened and developed a green tone, with the degree of colour change depending on the applied total dose. Changes in surface morphology and characteristics have been examined by using Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) and Raman spectroscopy. High level (250 kGy) gamma radiation exposure begins to produce surface degradation on V{sub 2}O{sub 5} thin films; however this behaviour is not observed for films that are also coated with palladium. Chemo-chromic properties of both un-irradiated and irradiated Pd-V{sub 2}O{sub 5} thin films were determined by examining their optical transmittance, using UV-vis spectroscopy, under exposure to a 4% H{sub 2}-N{sub 2} gas mixture. Exposure to gamma radiation has been found to have negligible effect upon colour change behaviour after 30 minutes exposure to hydrogen gas. The results suggest that the thin film V{sub 2}O{sub 5} sensitised with Pd is a plausible technique for application in the monitoring of hydrogen gas in low-level gamma radiation environments. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Identification of Distorted Gamma-Ray Signature Patterns Using Digital Filtering and Auto-Associative Memory Implemented with a Hopfield Neural Network

The detection and identification of radioactive sources in search applications involve analyzing passive gamma-ray emissions from high-level radioactive materials. This process uses a mobile detector-spectrometer in a complex field test environment. Recently, the use of artificial intelligence for gamma-ray spectrum analysis has shown promising results. However, challenges persist in identifying isotopic signatures from spectral measurements that may be distorted due to source shielding, random variations in natural radioactive background, or insufficient measurement time to obtain clear spectral lines. Here, this paper presents a novel intelligent signature recognition method that combines digital filtering techniques with an artificial Hopfield Neural Network (HNN). The HNN leverages auto-associative memory to store training sample patterns and match them with incoming gamma spectra from distorted sources. It restores the testing sources’ measurements by finding the closest matching signature patterns in the spectral library. Before HNN recognition, the measured spectrum undergoes preprocessing with a digital image filter to reduce fluctuations. Performance of the proposed method is evaluated using a set of gamma-ray spectra measured with a sodium iodide detector. The data collected include measurements from six pure samples: 241 Am, 60 Co, 137 Cs, 192 Ir, 239 Pu, and 235 U, which are used for training and validation (i.e. six cases). Additionally, the data set contains 24 distorted synthesized sources with various fluctuating backgrounds. Test results demonstrate the potential of the proposed method to accurately recognize the correct isotope with high precision, achieving an accuracy rate exceeding 85%. Furthermore, the proposed method exhibits superior performance compared to the conventional multiple regression fitting and simple feedforward neural network methods.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2013

Enterprise SRS: Leveraging Ongoing Operations To Advance Nuclear Fuel Cycles Research And Development Programs

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is repurposing its vast array of assets to solve future national issues regarding environmental stewardship, national security, and clean energy. The vehicle for this transformation is Enterprise SRS which presents a new, radical view of SRS as a united endeavor for ''all things nuclear'' as opposed to a group of distinct and separate entities with individual missions and organizations. Key among the Enterprise SRS strategic initiatives is the integration of research into facilities in conjunction with on-going missions to provide researchers from other national laboratories, academic institutions, and commercial entities the opportunity to demonstrate their technologies in a relevant environment and scale prior to deployment. To manage that integration of research demonstrations into site facilities, The Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) have established a center for applied nuclear materials processing and engineering research (hereafter referred to as the Center). The key proposition of this initiative is to bridge the gap between promising transformational nuclear fuel cycle processing discoveries and large commercial-scale-technology deployment by leveraging SRS assets as facilities for those critical engineering-scale demonstrations necessary to assure the successful deployment of new technologies. The Center will coordinate the demonstration of R&D technologies and serve as the interface between the engineering-scale demonstration and the R&D programs, essentially providing cradle-to-grave support to the research team during the demonstration. While the initial focus of the Center will be on the effective use of SRS assets for these demonstrations, the Center also will work with research teams to identify opportunities to perform research demonstrations at other facilities. Unique to this approach is the fact that these SRS assets will continue to accomplish DOE's critical nuclear material missions (e.g., processing in H-Canyon and plutonium storage in K-Area). Thus, the demonstration can be accomplished by leveraging the incremental cost of performing demonstrations without needing to cover the full operational cost of the facility. Current Center activities have been focused on integrating advanced safeguards monitoring technologies demonstrations into the SRS H-Canyon and advanced location technologies demonstrations into K-Area Materials Storage. These demonstrations are providing valuable information to researchers and customers as well as providing the Center with an improved protocol for demonstration management that can be exercised across the entire SRS (as well as to offsite venues) so that future demonstrations can be done more efficiently and provide an opportunity to utilize these unique assets for multiple purposes involving national laboratories, academia, and commercial entities. Key among the envisioned future demonstrations is the use of H-Canyon to demonstrate new nuclear materials separations technologies critical for advancing the mission needs DOE-Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) to advance the research for next generation fuel cycle technologies. The concept is to install processing equipment on frames. The frames are then positioned into an H-Canyon cell and testing in a relevant radiological environment involving prototypic radioactive materials can be performed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Fukushima two year processing update

On March 11, 2011, now two years ago, the magnitude 9.0 Great East Japan earth quake, Tohoku, hit off the Fukushima coast of Japan. This was one of the most powerful earthquakes in recorded history and the most powerful one known to have hit Japan. The ensuing tsunami devastated a huge area resulting in some 25,000 persons confirmed dead or missing. The perfect storm was complete when the tsunami then found the four-reactor, Fukushima- Daiichi Nuclear Station directly in its destructive path. Some 2 million people were evacuated from a fifty mile radius of the area and evaluation and cleanup began. A tremendous effort has been made, by many nationalities, since this time to restore this damaged plant and surrounding area and to return a great deal of the residents to their homes and farm lands. While most of the outcome of this unprecedented natural and manmade disaster was negative, both in Japan and worldwide, there have been some extremely valuable lessons learned and new emergency recovery technologies and systems developed to cope with the aftermath of this disaster. This paper describes new technology developed to selectively remove radioactive materials dangerous to workers, local citizens, and the natural environment from seawater used to cool the damaged reactors at Fukushima. As always, the mother of invention is necessity. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

2015 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMs

This annual summary report presents results and conclusions of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 review to assess the adequacy of the performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs) in support of the Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The report presents results and conclusions of the FY 2015 review and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R&D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the NNSS relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R&D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Support of SRS salt-stone regulatory compliance - 15586

The SRS salt-stone Facility is designed and permitted to immobilize and dispose of low-level radioactive and hazardous liquid waste (salt solution) remaining from the processing of radioactive material at the Savannah River Site. The salt-stone Processing Facility (SPF) is permitted as a wastewater treatment facility per the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control Regulations (SCDHEC) South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-67. The salt-stone Disposal Facility is permitted as a solid waste landfill site, as defined by SCDHEC Regulations R61-107.19. The salt-stone Sampling and Analysis Plan provides the SCDHEC with the chemical and physical characterization strategy for the salt solution and salt-stone waste form. During operation, samples are collected from Tank 50H on a quarterly basis and are analyzed by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) for over chemical and radioactive components. The analytical results are compared to the salt-stone waste acceptance criteria in a technical report. SRNL also prepares salt-stone samples from the quarterly sample and premix binder materials provided by the SPF to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout to meet the requirements of the SCDHEC regulation for the 'Characteristic of Toxicity', R.61-79.261.24(b) and the 'Universal Treatment Standards', R.61-79.268.48.4. salt-stone samples are collected, size reduced, packaged, and shipped to an independent United States EPA certified laboratory, or a laboratory that holds an equivalent certification such as one from the National Environmental Laboratory Accreditation Program to perform the EPA Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) extraction of the salt-stone sample. SRNL reviews the results of the TCLP analysis and prepares a report detailing the sample preparation and analysis that is used by the salt-stone Facility to demonstrate the nonhazardous nature of the salt-stone waste form. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2014

Joint US/Russian Studies of Population Exposures Resulting from Nuclear Production Activities in the Southern Urals

Beginning in 1948, the Soviet Union initiated a program for production of nuclear materials for a weapons program. The first facility for production of plutonium was constructed in the central portion of the country east of the southern Ural Mountains, about halfway between the major industrial cities of Ekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk. The facility now known as the Mayak Production Association and its associated town, now known as Ozersk, were built to irradiate uranium in reactors, separate the resulting plutonium in reprocessing plants, and prepare plutonium metal. The rush to production, coupled with inexperience in handling radioactive materials, lead to large radiation exposures, not only to the workers in the facilities, but also to the surrounding public. Fuel processing started with no controls on releases, and fuel dissolution and accidents in reactors resulted in release of about 37 PBq (1015 Bq) of 131I between 1948 and 1967. Designed disposals of low- and intermediate-level liquid radioactive wastes, and accidental releases via cooling water from tank farms of high-level liquid radioactive wastes, into the small Techa River caused significant contamination and exposures to residents of numerous small riverside villages downstream of the site. Discovery of the magnitude of the aquatic contamination in late 1951 caused revisions to the waste handling regimes, but not before over 200 PBq of radionuclides (with large contributions of 90Sr and 137Cs) were released. Liquid wastes were diverted to tiny Lake Karachay (which today holds over 4 EBq); cooling water was stopped in the tank farms. In 1957, one of the tanks in the tank farm overheated and exploded; over 70 PBq, disproportionately 90Sr, was blown over a large area to the northeast of the site; a large area was contaminated and many villages evacuated. This area today is known as the East Urals Radioactive Trace (EURT). Each of these releases was significant; together they have created a group of cohorts unrivaled in the world for their chronic, low-dose-rate radiation exposure. The 26,000 workers at Mayak were highly exposed to external gamma and inhaled plutonium. A cohort of individuals raised as children in Ozersk is under evaluation for their exposures to radioiodine. The Techa River Cohort consists of over 30,000 people who were born before the start of exposure in 1949 and lived along the Techa River. The Techa River Offspring Cohort consists of about 21,000 persons born to one or more exposed parents of this group - many of whom also lived along the contaminated river. The EURT Cohort consists of about 18,000 people who were evacuated from the EURT soon after the 1957 explosion and another 8000 who remained. These groups together are the focus of dose reconstruction and epidemiological studies funded by the US, Russia, and the European Union to address the question “Are doses delivered at low dose rates as effective in producing health effects as the same doses delivered at high dose rates?”

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗
DOE OSTI2013

FABRICATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE 9979 TYPE AF RADIOACTIVE WASTE PACKAGING FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

This paper summarizes the development, testing, and certification of the 9979 Type A Fissile Packaging that replaces the UN1A2 Specification Shipping Package eliminated from Department of Transportation (DOT) 49 CFR 173. The DOT Specification Package was used for many decades by the U.S. nuclear industry as a fissile waste container until its removal as an authorized container by DOT. This paper will discuss stream lining procurement of high volume radioactive material packaging manufacturing, such as the 9979, to minimize packaging production costs without sacrificing Quality Assurance. The authorized content envelope (combustible and non-combustible) as well as planned content envelope expansion will be discussed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Cold Trap Dismantling and Sodium Removal at a Fast Breeder Reactor - 12327

The first German prototype Fast Breeder Nuclear Reactor (KNK) is currently being dismantled after being the only operating Fast Breeder-type reactor in Germany. As this reactor type used sodium as a coolant in its primary and secondary circuit, seven cold traps containing various amounts of partially activated sodium needed to be disposed of as part of the dismantling. The resulting combined difficulties of radioactive contamination and high chemical reactivity were handled by treating the cold traps differently depending on their size and the amount of sodium contained inside. Six small cold traps were processed onsite by cutting them up into small parts using a band saw under a protective atmosphere. The sodium was then converted to sodium hydroxide by using water. The remaining large cold trap could not be handled in the same way due to its dimensions (2.9 m x 1.1 m) and the declared amount of sodium inside (1,700 kg). It was therefore manually dismantled inside a large box filled with a protective atmosphere, while the resulting pieces were packaged for later burning in a special facility. The experiences gained by KNK during this process may be advantageous for future dismantling projects in similar sodium-cooled reactors worldwide. The dismantling of a prototype fast breeder reactor provides the challenge not only to dismantle radioactive materials but also to handle sodium-contaminated or sodium-containing components. The treatment of sodium requires additional equipment and installations to ensure a safe handling. Since it is not permitted to bring sodium into a repository, all sodium has to be neutralized either through a controlled reaction with water or by incinerating. The resulting components can be disposed of as normal radioactive waste with no further conditions. The handling of sodium needs skilled and experienced workers to minimize the inherent risks. And the example of the disposal of the large KNK cold trap shows the interaction with others and also foreign decommissioning projects can provide solutions with were unknown before. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗