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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

Design and Construction of a Loess-Cement Cushion as an Integral Component of an SL-LILW Repository - 16077

The Bulgarian State Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (SERAW) is planning the construction of a near-surface repository for short-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste, the National Disposal Facility (NDF), adjacent to the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP). The NDF will be constructed as a reinforced concrete vault-type repository system, where prefabricated cubic waste packages (2 m on a side) will be emplaced in large reinforced concrete disposal cells. Waste emplacement operations will be conducted in three phases over a total of 60 years of operations. After the last waste packages have been disposed, an engineered multilayer cover will be installed over the site to further isolate the waste from the accessible environment. The Radiana Site where the NDF will be constructed is a sloping area located between the second and sixth loess terraces above the River Danube with elevations ranging from approximately +40 m to elevation +95 m. The unsaturated zone at the location selected for waste disposal ranges from 13 m to 16 m in thickness. After construction, the unsaturated zone will consist of a 5 m thick, engineered loess-cement cushion installed over naturally occurring Pliocene clays and sandy clayey sediments of the Brusarci Formation with a thickness above the top of groundwater ranging from 8 m to 11 m. The loess-cement cushion is a key component of the 'engineered fill' barrier as identified in the Intermediate Safety Assessment Report (ISAR) for the NDF. This barrier consists of engineered fill both below the disposal cells, i.e., the loess-cement cushion, and above the disposal cells, i.e. the final multilayer cover to be installed at closure of the facility. The loess-cement cushion component of this barrier will act to provide a geo-technically stable foundation for the disposal system. In addition, the barrier will raise the base of the disposal cells and increases the unsaturated zone thickness above the top of the groundwater table, as well as to serve as a chemical barrier that will act to sorb radionuclides thereby retarding their migration to the underlying groundwater. In addition to its assigned barrier functions the loess cement cushion also houses key embedded components required as part of the overall NDF safety concept, including systems necessary for operational and post-closure performance monitoring as well as the support foundation structures required for the mobile roofs, which are designed to handle and protect the waste during emplacement operations. The post-closure monitoring period, i.e., the period of institutional control, is given by as 300 years. While similar although less massive cushions have been previously constructed as foundations for various structures at the KNPP, the loess-cement cushion planned for construction at the NDF including the embedded structures will represent a first of its kind construction in terms of both its physical dimensioning as well as its requirements for long-term performance. This paper describes the design of the cushion, its functions and its construction as planned for the NDF as an integral component of the site safety concept. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Web-Based Learning as a Tool for Public Education and Outreach - 17503

As internet access grows worldwide, so do online learning opportunities. Academic institutions have provided Web-based courses for many years, more are joining this set each year, and online training is common in the workplace. Web-based learning represents an opportunity for sharing information with members of the public interested in learning more about nuclear energy and approaches for managing associated spent fuel and radioactive wastes. A literature review was conducted to assess current practices and opportunities for Web-based learning relevant to nuclear energy and radioactive waste management, and to identify insights toward enhancing public education and outreach. Results indicate that substantial learning is being achieved online. A review of several online training materials related to nuclear waste management found that while informative, some are text-heavy with few supporting graphics. Many educational materials designed for the workforce could also serve as a foundation for informational materials for the broader public. To address this expanded objective, basic concepts could be illustrated with graphics, the use of video clips could be expanded, a tiered approach could be applied to present increasing levels of detail, and additional practical exercises could be included to reflect field situations. Such enhancements could further strengthen the effectiveness of Web-based learning as a tool for education and outreach, both for the nuclear workforce and for citizens interested in these topics. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2018

Optimising National WM Strategies through early consideration of Nuclear Safeguards - 18607

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards stand alongside safety and security as one of the three pillars for prudent management of all nuclear material, including nuclear waste. Although safety considerations, including public and environmental radiation protection, are the traditional drivers of waste management strategies, there is a requirement for nuclear safeguards in shaping and quantifying long-term solutions for special classes of radioactive waste. This is especially important when considering the disposal of nuclear material in a repository that could be released from regulatory oversight for radiation protection after a period of institutional control, as some safeguards oversight would still be required. Failure to consider nuclear safeguards at the early stages of planning may alternatively lead to excessive volumes for disposal or the need to recondition already treated wastes. At the very least, safeguards measures should be considered before countries seek to dispose of legacy nuclear materials, decommissioning wastes and other materials containing uranium, thorium or plutonium in an operating repository. Nuclear safeguards are the set of tools and techniques used by the IAEA to verify that countries comply with their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials to nuclear explosive devices. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear safeguards apply to all uranium, thorium and plutonium held in non-weapons NPT states, with limited exceptions. In nuclear-weapon states, much of their material is likewise subject to IAEA safeguards through conditions in agreements with respective suppliers of the uranium. Under IAEA safeguards, such nuclear material must remain accounted for and accessible for periodic verification-analogous to the safety concepts of reversibility and retrievability. Nevertheless, safeguards requirements can be terminated - provided that the State and the [IAEA] agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable - through dilution or immobilisation in solid form (such as cement, glass or ceramic). This means candidate material can be disposed of as non- nuclear material, with no further safeguards requirements, provided this criterion is met. Unlike radiological wastes where repository design strongly influences pathways for radionuclide migration and overall safety performance, repository design is not a factor in considering the termination of safeguards on nuclear material. This paper looks at similarities and differences in the safety, security and safeguards regulatory requirements for the management of radioactive waste and nuclear material in Australia. In particular, it outlines recent experience gained from participation in Australia's waste acceptance criteria working group for a national low-level waste repository and intermediate-level waste store, as well as from Australia's overall waste management strategy. These items of work have coincided with the IAEA update of its internal policy on termination of safeguards on nuclear material. Australia's experience shows how inclusion of safeguards criteria in the planning process is leading to optimisations in choice of facility concepts, project sequencing and equitable distribution of economic risk. By considering the three pillars-safety, security and safeguards-early on in the planning process, Australia's waste management strategy will provide a benchmark for other states in establishing and updating their own waste acceptance criteria for the disposal of nuclear material. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

X-Ray Diffraction of Slag-Based Sodium Salt Waste Forms - 15513

Cementitious materials are used to solidify and stabilize aqueous based radioactive waste containing sodium salts. The types and proportions of cementitious ingredients used to treat aqueous radioactive waste streams containing sodium salts depend on the performance objectives for the waste forms and the compositions of the waste streams. This paper documents sample preparation and x-ray diffraction results for a series of materials made with water or highly alkaline sodium salt simulated waste water and cementitious binders. The objective of this study was to: 1) generate a base line for the evolution of the waste form as a function of time and conditions, 2) design new binders based on mineralogy of the binder, 3) understand and predict anion and cation leaching behavior of contaminants of concern, and 4) predict performance of the waste forms for which phase solubility and thermodynamic data are available. Characterization of the mineralogy is also important for understanding the buffering effects that the waste form has on infiltrating water / leachates. In summary, mixtures of Type II portland cement, Grade 100 ground granulated blast furnace slag (GGBFS) and carbon burn-out (CBO) Class F Fly ash which were hydrated with water contained hydrated phase assemblages typical of those reported in the literature. The calcium silicate hydrate phase assemblage in samples hydrated with the alkaline 4.4 M sodium salt simulated waste solution was found to be a function of the (CaO + MgO) / (SiO{sub 2} + Al{sub 2}O{sub 3}) ratio of the samples characterized. No significant differences were detected in samples cured 2 months and 14 months in sealed containers at ambient indoor temperatures. Slag and a blend of slag and cement hydrated with caustic 4.4 M Na salt solution resulted in the most crystalline matrix. In addition to poorly ordered C-S-H, these samples contained fairly well ordered C-S-H I (a precursor of 14A tobermorite) and 11 A Al-substituted tobermorite. These crystalline C-S-H phases did not form or were present in only trace amounts in slag blends containing about 45 to 62 mass percent fly ash. These slag-Class F fly ash blends had a higher silica plus alumina content relative to lime and magnesia than the blends that produced C-S-H I and Al-substituted tobermorite. The calcium silicate binder in the 10:45:45 mixture of cement: slag: fly ash was made up of poorly ordered C-S-H. The sample cured for 14 months may contain a small amount of the more crystalline calcium silicate hydrate phases. Layered double hydroxides in the hydrotalcite (magnesium-aluminum carbonate hydroxide) and hydrocalumite / AFm phases (calcium aluminum hydroxide) were present in mixtures containing slag. The specific phase(s) were not identified because these phases form solid solutions and have a considerable amount of overlap in their x-ray patterns. Sodium nitrate was the only sodium salt phase identified in x-ray diffraction patterns of the samples hydrated with salt solution. Drying during x-ray diffraction sample preparation may have resulted in precipitation of the sodium nitrate or it may have been present in the samples prior to x-ray sample preparation. Sodium sulfate, aluminate, and carbonate may have been incorporated in the structures of the layered double hydroxide (AFm) type phases. These mixed metal layered double hydroxides make up an important fraction of the matrix in the slag containing blends hydrated with caustic salt solution. They are among the few oxide-based phases that exhibit substantial, permanent anion exchange capacity [Kirkpatrick, et al. 1999, Plamer, et al., 2009, and Zhang and Reardon, 2003]. They also contribute to the structural properties of cementitious matrices [Taylor, 1997]. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2025

RANGERS: Methodology for Design and Performance Assessment of Engineered Barrier Systems in a Salt Repository for HLW/SNF: Synthesis Report

Salt formations have long been recognized as a highly favorable host rock for the final disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) in deep geological repositories. Their unique properties, including exceptional impermeability, self-healing capabilities, and thermal conductivity, make them a reliable natural barrier for the deep disposal of radioactive waste. This report focuses on the development and application of a methodology for assessing the integrity and per formance of the Engineered Barrier System (EBS) within salt-based repositories, a critical component of the multi-barrier system ensuring safe radioactive waste disposal.

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DOE OSTI2015

Second phase of the OECD NEA international initiative on the preservation of records, knowledge and memory across generations - 15616

The OECD/NEA initiative on the Preservation of Records, Knowledge and Memory across Generations (RK and M) constitutes an activity within the area of transfer of information about radioactive waste disposal projects for the benefit of future generations. Launched in 2011, the initiative has now entered Phase-II, which will run through to 2017. Building on results of Phase-I, which was dedicated to exploring issues of strategic relevance for the preservation of RK and M, Phase-II of the initiative will focus on developing an understanding of the interactions between the identified issues, while continuing to examine hitherto little aspects of the same issues. This corresponds to a systemic approach to RK and M preservation consisting in employing different means and methods to preserve RK and M, which are in a complementary but also redundant relationship to each other, and in situating and analysing activities in a wider context than radioactive waste management. The strategic issues for RK and M preservation are the use of archives, cultural heritage, the so-called Key Information File, transfer of responsibilities after closure, regulations governing RK and M preservation, markers and international mechanisms that could be adapted to foster RK and M preservation. The issues were discussed extensively at 'Constructing Memory - An International Conference and Debate', which was organised by the OECD/NEA with the support of Andra (French Radioactive Waste Management Organisation) and took place in September 2014 in Verdun, France. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

First Industrial Tests of a Matrix Monitor Correction for the Differential Die-away Technique of Historical Waste Drums

The fissile mass in radioactive waste drums filled with compacted metallic residues (spent fuel hulls and nozzles) produced at AREVA NC La Hague reprocessing plant is measured by neutron interrogation with the Differential Die-away measurement Technique (DDT). In the next years, old hulls and nozzles mixed with Ion-Exchange Resins will be measured. The ion-exchange resins increase neutron moderation in the matrix, compared to the waste measured in the current process. In this context, the Nuclear Measurement Laboratory (LMN) of CEA Cadarache has studied a matrix effect correction method, based on a drum monitor, namely a 3He proportional counter located inside the measurement cavity. After feasibility studies performed with LMN's PROMETHEE 6 laboratory measurement cell and with MCNPX simulations, this paper presents first experimental tests performed on the industrial ACC (hulls and nozzles compaction facility) measurement system. A calculation vs. experiment benchmark has been carried out by performing dedicated calibration measurements with a representative drum and {sup 235}U samples. The comparison between calculation and experiment shows a satisfactory agreement for the drum monitor. The final objective of this work is to confirm the reliability of the modeling approach and the industrial feasibility of the method, which will be implemented on the industrial station for the measurement of historical wastes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Thermo-Hydraulic-Mechanical Modelling of the Full-Scale Emplacement (FE) Experiment at the Mont Terri Rock Laboratory - 16490

The Full-Scale Emplacement Experiment at the Mont Terri underground research laboratory is a heater test carried out in a gallery constructed in Opalinus Clay. The aim of the experiment is both to develop emplacement procedures for radioactive waste canisters and their surrounding backfill as well as understanding the thermo-hydro-mechanical effects of disposing of radioactive waste on the engineering materials and the host rock. Coupled thermo-hydro-mechanical models have been used to aid planning of the locations of sensors, to inform decisions on the schedule for turning on the heaters as well as to make predictions of the temperatures and water pressures in the bentonite and the Opalinus Clay. The FE Experiment was preceded by a number of other experiments at the Mont Terri laboratory at smaller scales, but with similar materials, which provided crucial input to the models and gave confidence in the general process understanding. Blind predictions were made prior to turning on the heaters, of the temperature and relative humidity in the bentonite surrounding the heaters. The comparison between the blind predictions and early data from the experiment show that knowledge gained from smaller scale experiments on similar materials has enabled good blind predictions to be made and gives confidence that temperature in the experiment is unlikely to rise to a level that could damage the sensors. It also demonstrates that the thermal properties of the disposal system are understood well enough to produce reliable estimates of temperature in the backfill. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

A New Consolidated Storage Facility for Used Nuclear Fuel in Andrews County, Texas - 16418

On February 6, 2015, Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) announced its plan to file a license application with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to construct and operate a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (CISF). Upon issuance of the license, WCS would be authorized to receive Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF) and reactor related Greater Than Class C Low Level Radioactive Waste (referred hence forth as UNF) at the CISF in late 2020. WCS based its decision to license a CISF based on strong support from the State of Texas and the local community's willingness to host such a facility in Andrews County, Texas. WCS' decision to license a CISF in a supportive community is consistent with the consent-based licensing approach recommended by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. WCS intends to use existing technology developed by AREVA and NAC International that have already been approved by the NRC to transport UNF from existing commercial nuclear reactors across the nation for interim storage at its 14,000 acre site in Andrew County, Texas. In the pre-application licensing meetings held with the NRC, WCS underscored that UNF would be removed first from the shutdown decommissioned reactor sites and transported to the CISF. Approximately eighty percent of the UNF currently residing at the shutdown decommissioned reactor sites can be safely placed into the storage systems developed by AREVA and NAC International that are currently licensed by the NRC. WCS plans to store up to 40,000 Metric Tons of Heavy Metal (MTHM) at the CISF that would be constructed in eight phases over the next 20 years. WCS intends to submit its license application for the CISF to the NRC by April 2016. The license application will request authorization to possess up to 5,000 MTHM of UNF for Phase One which can accommodate storing the fuel located at over ten shutdown decommissioned reactor sites. As discussed with the NRC, the license application will be developed following NRC regulatory guidance to comply with the technical requirements specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste. In addition, to filing the license application, WCS is also seeking legislative changes to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 requiring the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to take title of the UNF at the commercial nuclear reactor sites. Under such legislative changes, the DOE would also be responsible for the transport of UNF to the CISF. In addition to preparing the CISF License Application, WCS and its partners AREVA and NAC International are prepared to work with DOE to facilitate the development of the UNF transportation infrastructure in the timeframe needed to support CISF operations. The WCS site and technical approach give it several advantages which uniquely position it to become the first successful commercial CISF in the U.S. These advantages include: broad consent-based support at the local, state, and Congressional level; an operating waste disposal site with an existing transportation infrastructure; and the use of already licensed systems to address 80% of the UNF currently in dry storage at shutdown sites in the U.S. WCS firmly believes this initiative will provide an economically viable option for consolidated interim storage of UNF until a permanent geologic repository becomes available. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Management of Ir-192 Disused Sealed Sources with Long-Lived Radioactive Contaminants

Iridium-192 sealed sources are the most widely used sealed source in industrial applications in Brazil. They are not recyclable and in the end of the useful life, they are discarded as radioactive waste. The recommended management strategy of this waste is decay in storage and disposal as exempt waste because the half-life is only 73.8 days. Presently, thousands of Ir- 192 sources are under storage waiting release. Surprisingly, sources that were under storage for more than ten years and for which no measurable contact dose rate was expected still present significant remaining radioactivity. The examination of the gamma spectra of these sources showed the presence of Co-60 and the gamma emission lines from the Ir-192m2 isomer, the metastable isotope with half-life of 241 years, which is also formed by the irradiation of natural iridium. The aim of the study reported in this paper is to characterize the Ir-192 disused sources under interim storage at the Radioactive Waste Management Department, considering the presence of minor contaminants in the irradiated iridium and the fraction of the total initial activity of the sources that is attributable to that metastable isotope. The radioactive inventories at the end of the irradiation and after the decay period were predicted using the Scale 6.0 code and the results were compared with activity measurements of the disused sources by gamma spectrometry. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

The Use of Positrons to Survey Alteration Layers on Synthetic Nuclear Waste Glasses

In order to safeguard society and the environment, understanding radioactive waste glass alteration mechanisms in interactions with solutions and near-field materials, such as Fe, is essential to nuclear waste repository performance assessments. Alteration products are formed at the surface of glasses after reaction with solution. In this study, glass altered in the presence of Fe0 in aqueous solution formed two alteration layers: one embedded with Fe closer to the surface and one without Fe found deeper in the sample. Both layers were found to be thinner than the alteration layer found in glass altered in aqueous solution only. For the first time, Doppler Broadening Positron Annihilation Spectroscopy (DB-PAS) is used to non-destructively characterize the pore structures of glass altered in the presence of Fe0. Advantages and disadvantages of DB-PAS compared to other techniques used to analyze pore structures for altered glass samples are discussed. Ultimately, DB-PAS has shown to be an excellent choice for pore structure characterization for glasses with multiple alteration layers. Monte Carlo modeling predicted positron trajectories through the layers, and helped explain DB-PAS data, which showed that the deeper alteration layer without Fe had a similar composition and pore structure to layers on glass altered in water only.

Doppler Broadening Positron Annihilation Spectrosc↗
DOE OSTI2024

Boron nitride: Novel ceramic reductant for low‐activity waste vitrification

Abstract During vitrification of radioactive wastes, excessive foaming reduces processing rates within melters by hindering heat transfer from the molten glass pool to the reacting melter feed. Formulations of low‐activity waste (LAW) melter feeds, for vitrification at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant at the Hanford Site, conventionally include the addition of sucrose to mitigate excessive foaming by hastening the denitration process. However, incomplete combustion of sucrose produces organics such as acetonitrile (C 2 H 3 N) that may exceed bounding limits of downstream effluent treatment facilities. Using boron nitride (BN) as an alternate reductant to sucrose, in a representative LAW melter feed reduced C 2 H 3 N production by 90% by preventing the low‐temperature sucrose–nitrate reactions. Furthermore, foaming was suppressed due to the higher decomposition temperature of BN than H 3 BO 3 meaning a delayed reaction of a large fraction of boron with the transient glass‐forming melt until above the foam onset temperature, thus reducing the quantity and viscosity of the connected melt and trapping less gas in the foam layer.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Remote Dismantling and Packaging of the RPV and Thermal Shield at the Obrigheim NPP - 16073

The Obrigheim Nuclear Power Plant (KWO) is located in the Federal State of Baden- Wuerttemberg in Germany and was operated by the EnKK-KWO. The Nuclear Power Plant - a light water pressurized water reactor with 357 MW of electrical power - was operated from 1968 to 2005. In June 2009 the Energiewerke Nord GmbH (EWN) was charged with the dismantling planning and dismantling of the reactor. According to the German nuclear and radiation protection law, several licenses will be required for the realisation of this task. This also applies to the disposal of the waste produced by dismantling, which must finally be stored in the German final repository for low and medium-radioactive waste (underground repository 'Konrad'). In spring 2010 EWN completed all application documents for the dismantling of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the RPV internals and EnKK-KWO delivered them to the responsible Environmental Ministry of Baden-Wuerttemberg. Since then it has been worked intensively on the design, construction and manufacturing of the facilities for dismantling. With a separate notification of amendment, it was applied for the license to install and commission the facilities for the dismantling of the RPV and the RPV internals at the Environmental Ministry of Baden-Wuerttemberg in October 2010. This notification of amendment was confirmed in summer 2012. In September 2011 the work process and test plan and the technical information about the campaign for the removal of the radioactive waste resulting from the RPV with internals, peripheral components and secondary waste with the aim of final disposal in the Federal Repository 'Konrad' was submitted to the Federal Office for Radiation Protection. The evaluation and assessment of the work process and test plan was concluded in August 2013, when it was audited by TUV Nord EnSys without any further measures and indications. On September 10 the work process and test plan was released by the Federal Office for radiation protection. The dismantling of the RPV internals upper core and lower core structure started in September 2013 in the wet cutting area in room 01.106/306 and were finished in October 2014. In the presentation 'Dismantling of the Obrigheim NPP Reactor and Waste Management' held on the WM Symposia in Phoenix, 2014, an overview about the remote cutting and packaging of the upper and lower core structure was given. In today's presentation the subsequent dismantling activities will be outlined and evaluated. The presentation will start with the short description of the basic frame conditions for the nuclear licensing procedure, important procedural principles, and necessary plant-specific conditions. After the remote cutting and packing of the reactor internals of the upper and lower core structure was completed, the wet cutting area 'reactor room 01.106/306' was cleaned and the reactor room rebuilt into a cutting area for peripheral components. After the peripheral components were dismantled, all preconditions were set to lift the RPV from its mounting position and to arrange it in the upper reactor room 01.306. After these activities were completed, the lifting of the RPV was prepared and the cutting area 'Dismantling of the RPV insulation in the reactor room 01.106/306' was set up. To carry out this task, a strand jack unit with connection block was installed on the bridge of the reactor building crane. The opening created by the dismantling of the pool plate was closed with a flap door. The manipulators used for the wet cutting of the RPV internals were also used for the remote dismantling of the RPV insulation and mounted in the cutting area. The remote facilities were handled from a control centre and/or control stand. The air-technical housing which has already been used for the remote dismantling of the RPV internals was designed for the dismantling of the RPV insulation and was extended for this dismantling scope with appropriate ventilation systems. A special feature is the fixation of the RPV insulation at the RPV corpus. The RPV insulation consists of insulation wool, wire mesh and metal-sheet insulation. This 'Sandwich Construction' is detached with a steel corset at the RPV corpus and partly tightened. The insulation of the RPV bottom dome is tightened at the supporting frame. Due to the activation of the material in the core area and the resulting high ambient dose rate the RPV insulation can only be dismantled remotely. Additionally, as asbestos fibers are expected to be found in the insulation the dismantling has to be performed according to the Technical Rules for hazardous substances. The demolition, restoration or maintenance works have to be performed remotely according to the Technical Rules for hazardous substances when the RPV is located in the cutting area. But in case of dismantling of a power reactor no such experience can be found. Beginning with the explanation of the technical, radiological and substantial boundary conditions this presentation will not only impart knowledge about the dismantling of the RPV insulation but also about the remote controlled packaging of the metal sheet insulation and the manual conditioning of the RPV insulation. Subsequently, reports on the remotely controlled cutting and packaging of the RDB are given. Here is particularly interesting that cutting methods have been used and how the activity determination of the segments was carried out. On the basis of the evaluation of the realisation the subsequent dismantling activities will be lined out. In parallel to the dismantling tasks, the waste package documentation for the final repository was issued, checked and confirmed for the containers loaded with parts of the RDB internals. The most important stages are exemplified in this presentation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Progress Update on the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Pulse- Jet Mixed Vessel Testing Program - 16286

The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) is designed to use cylindrical-shaped pulse-jet mixers in the black cell vessels to mix the radioactive waste during process operations. Pulse-jet mixers operate like large turkey basters, using air pressure to suck radioactive waste up into the mixer and eject it back into the vessel at high velocity. Using pulse-jet mixers for keeping waste in process vessels adequately mixed is one of the design features that ensures that there are no mechanical parts inside the black cells that would require maintenance. The WTP Project is conducting a testing program to ensure the pulse-jet mixed vessels can address three design and nuclear safety concerns: 1) pulse jet mixer controls, 2) hydrogen gas generation, and 3) the potential for inadvertent criticality in the vessels. The currently planned pulse-jet mixed vessel testing program is divided into three major test campaigns. The first campaign consists of testing to demonstrate pulse-jet mixed vessel control system design and operating concepts. The second test campaign consisted of informational testing of select prototypic PJM vessel features in a reduced scale facility. This testing informed decision making on selection of different mixing system configurations. This test campaign was completed in March 2015. The third test campaign is planned to test the complete functionality of a pulse-jet mixed vessel at full-scale using a prototype standardized high-solids vessel design. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Global Survey of Selected Deep Underground Facilities; Examples of Geotechnical and Engineering Capabilities, Achievements, Challenges(Mines, Shafts, Tunnels, Boreholes, Sites and Underground Facilities for Nuclear Waste and Physics R&D):A Guide

This report presents tables, references, notes, and a synthesis of some notable geotechnical and engineering information that were applied in the creation of five interactive layer maps [http://gis.inl.gov/globalsites/ will redirect to 2018 update, http://gis.inl.gov/GlobalSurvey/] for selected: 1) deep mines and shafts; 2) existing, considered or planned radioactive waste management deep underground studies or disposal facilities 3) deep large diameter boreholes, 4) physics underground laboratories and facilities, and 5) deep open pit mines from around the world. These data are intended to facilitate user access to basic information and references regarding “deep underground” facilities, history, activities, and plans. In general, the interactive maps and database provide each facility’s approximate site location, geology, and engineered features (e.g.: access, geometry, depth, diameter, year of operations, groundwater, lithology, host unit name and age, basin; operator, management organization, geographic data, nearby cultural features, other). Although the survey is not all encompassing, it is a comprehensive review of many of the significant existing and historical underground facilities discussed in the literature addressing radioactive waste management and deep mined geologic disposal safety systems. The interactive map suite allows for a better appreciation of site area geographic and cultural settings. The global survey is intended to be used as a communication tool to support and inform: 1) interested parties and decision makers; 2) radioactive waste disposal and siting option evaluations, and 3) safety case development applicable to any mined geologic disposal facility as a demonstration (examples) of historical and current engineering and geotechnical capabilities available for use in deep underground facility siting, planning, construction, operations and monitoring.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

From Dealing with Legacy Waste to Avoiding It - 17432

When dealing with radioactive waste management and its regulation, there are various national approaches. At the same time there is a growing tendency towards consideration of fundamental principles and standards thus forming the underlying basics in detailing the customized regulatory framework for specific applications. Dealing with legacy waste poses some particular problems as at the time of its production current safety principles were sometimes not well established. Considering today's standards this frequently requires remedial actions. Usually, this involves considerable effort and cost as well as radiation exposure for the involved personnel. Resolving legacy waste related problems not only benefits from an established regulatory framework but allows conclusions on how deal with legacy waste problems in general. The most important lessons learned from such operations might be how to prevent the production of legacy waste in the first place, thus avoiding further problems. By reflecting on practical applications from a number of countries the presentation is set to carve out the crucial recommendations from internationally recognized standards that give a substantial dividend in terms of not only time and budget but most of all safety and radiation exposure when properly implemented. The scope of the examples given ranges from dealing with legacy waste to avoiding it and includes recommendations towards essential features of best practice as seen from the perspective of an independent expert organization. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Double-Shell tank Integrity program - 15533

Waste at Hanford is stored in 149 single-shell tanks and 28 double-shell tanks (DSTs). Concerns related to aging radioactive waste storage facilities throughout the US DOE complex led to Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) developing guidelines for structural integrity programs for tank systems (BNL-52527, Guidelines for Development of Structural Integrity Programs for DOE High-Level Waste Storage Tanks). The committee of experts who developed these guidelines is commonly known as the Tank Structural Integrity Panel (TSIP). The US DOE has subsequently adopted these guidelines, and requires site operators to have a program consistent with them (DOE M 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual). The Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) manages the tanks for the US DOE Office of River Protection (ORP) under the Tank Operations Contract (TOC). The US DOE-ORP contractual agreement with the TOC (11-NSD-010) includes a requirement to 'maintain the tank structural integrity program as described in RPP-7574, Double-Shell tank Integrity Project Plan'. The DST integrity is maintained with a variety of activities such as ultrasonic and visual inspections, chemistry controls, corrosion monitoring and structural analyses methods. The recent loss of tank 241-AY-102 has led to the formation of the High-Level Waste Integrity Assessment Panel to evaluate the DST integrity project (DSTIP) and to recommend improvements to the DSTIP. This panel continues the DOE practice of seeking expert advice to guide the formulation and continuous assessment of tank integrity activities. The panel has concluded its work and WRPS has developed a series of tasks to implement their recommendations. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2018

Regulating Operational Safety at a Future Geological Disposal Facility in the UK - 18038

The United Kingdom (UK) has generated commercial nuclear energy for over 60 years; generating a significant and varied inventory of higher activity radioactive waste (HAW). In accordance with international practice, UK Government policy for long-term management of HAW is disposal in a geological disposal facility (GDF). The nuclear materials comprising HAW include high level waste, intermediate level waste and some low level waste, not suitable for disposal to the Low Level Waste Repository. In addition, other nuclear materials may be reclassified as waste in the future and will require to be managed as HAW for disposal to a GDF; these include spent fuel, uranium and plutonium. The operator of a GDF will be required to obtain a nuclear site licence from the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), as the nuclear safety and security regulator, in order to construct and operate the facility. In the period prior to submission of a licence application, ONR is working to develop its regulatory expectations and provide advice on its regulatory role with regards to a future GDF. ONR has developed regulatory guidance on operational safety, benchmarked against the relevant IAEA Safety Standards and the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) Safety Reference Levels for Disposal. This guidance draws upon ONR's current expectations for nuclear sites; including operational reactors, fuel manufacture and reprocessing facilities, and reactors undergoing decommissioning; and incorporates relevant good practice drawn from international programmes for geological disposal and related industries (eg mining). In addition to the technical assessment guidance, ONR has developed guidance on the licensing process specific to a GDF; providing clarity for example on when a licence will be required. A review of the standard licence conditions applied to all nuclear sites concluded no significant amendment would be required for application to a GDF. Through its voluntary agreement with Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM), the developer and future operator of a GDF in the UK, ONR exerts regulatory influence on the design and organisational development of the future licensee. As part of this scrutiny, ONR has assessed RWM's generic Disposal System Safety Case. Subjecting the generic design and safety case to regulatory review provides opportunity for early engagement to ensure the appropriate standards will be achieved. ONR will only grant the necessary regulatory permissions if RWM adequately demonstrates the GDF will be constructed, operated and closed safely. Future challenges faced by ONR with respect to a GDF include building and maintaining regulatory competence and confidence, and engaging effectively with the public as the UK begins its search for a suitable site to provide appropriate assurance that a GDF will be operated safely and securely. (authors)

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