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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 721 records · Page 40
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

Use of Heritage Hardware on MPCV Exploration Flight Test One

Due to an aggressive schedule for the first orbital test flight of an unmanned Orion capsule, known as Exploration Flight Test One (EFT1), combined with severe programmatic funding constraints, an effort was made to identify heritage hardware, i.e., already existing, flight-certified components from previous manned space programs, which might be available for use on EFT1. With the end of the Space Shuttle Program, no current means exists to launch Multi Purpose Logistics Modules (MPLMs) to the International Space Station (ISS), and so the inventory of many flight-certified Shuttle and MPLM components are available for other purposes. Two of these items are the Shuttle Ground Support Equipment Heat Exchanger (GSE Hx) and the MPLM cabin Positive Pressure Relief Assembly (PPRA). In preparation for the utilization of these components by the Orion Program, analyses and testing of the hardware were performed. The PPRA had to be analyzed to determine its susceptibility to pyrotechnic shock, and vibration testing had to be performed, since those environments are predicted to be significantly more severe during an Orion mission than those the hardware was originally designed to accommodate. The GSE Hx had to be tested for performance with the Orion thermal working fluids, which are different from those used by the Space Shuttle. This paper summarizes the certification of the use of heritage hardware for EFT1.

Rains, George Edward↗
NASA NTRS2013

Human-rated Safety Certification of a High Voltage Robonaut Lithium-ion Battery

NASA's rigorous certification process is being followed for the R2 high voltage battery program for use of R2 on International Space Station (ISS). Rigorous development testing at appropriate levels to credible off-nominal conditions and review of test data led to design improvements for safety at the virtual cell, cartridge and battery levels. Tests were carried out at all levels to confirm that both hardware and software controls work. Stringent flight acceptance testing of the flight battery will be completed before launch for mission use on ISS.

Jeevarajan, Judith↗
NASA NTRS2016

Overview of Sense and Avoid/Separation Assurance Interoperability (SSI)

The UAS in the NAS project is studying the minimum operational performance standards for unmanned aerial systems (UAS's) detect-and-avoid (DAA) system in order to operate in the National Airspace System. The project is executing a series of fast-time simulation, human-in-the-loop experiments, and flight test in support of this effort. Officials of the Swiss Government (Peter Winter, Director of Aeronautical Systems, and Michel Godinat, Head of the Certification Office) are visiting NASA to become more familiar with the advances being made to integrate UAS into civilian airspace. This briefing will review the activities and results over the past 3 years within the Separation AssuranceSense-and-Avoid Interoperability team.

Santiago, Confesor↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fabrication Lessons Learned of Transportation Packaging from the Perspective of a Design Authority - 20322

This paper presents lessons learned regarding fabricating packaging systems from the perspective of a design authority (DA). Capturing and implementing lessons learned is critical for an organization to reduce systematic project risk and thereby promote the likelihood of project success. This paper defines the design authority as the organization responsible for technical design, resolving technical design issues, quality assurance program, and maintenance of the packaging system license. A package system is defined as the packaging, its contents, and auxiliary equipment. Packages are certified by the NRC under 10 CFR 71[1] for transportation by ground. The following lessons learned subjects are presented in the paper: quality assurance, interpretation of drawing dimensional requirements, execution of manufacturing processes, hardware dimensional inspection, and leakage rate testing. All discrepancies presented in this paper have been resolved as described in the appropriate final data package. All described package systems are in compliance with their Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and certificate of conformance requirements. The intent of this paper is to identify opportunities for improving the outcome of future projects and to mitigate fabrication challenges proactively. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An MBSE Framework to Identify Regulatory Gaps for Electrified Transport Aircraft

A typical aircraft certification process consists of obtaining a type, production, airworthiness, and continued airworthiness certificates. During this process, a type certification plan is created that includes the intended regulatory operating environment, the proposed certification basis, means of compliance, and a list of documentation to show compliance. Earlier work by the authors demonstrated a model-based framework for the management of these certification artifacts for normal category airplanes. Presently, it is expanded and adapted to consider certification for transport category airplanes regulated under 14 CFR Part 25, providing clear transparency and traceability between the text of the regulations and imposed requirements, contextual information, and specified test activities. In particular, a capability to identify potential gaps in the applicability of regulations for novel architectures such as electrified aircraft is proposed. This capability, based on mismatches between the functional intent and the corresponding prescribed physical implementation, is developed. A sample implementation of the proposed capability is presented for a notional electrified powertrain aircraft architecture.

electrified transport aircraft↗
NASA NTRS2009

Ensuring Safe Exploration: Ares Launch Vehicle Integrated Vehicle Ground Vibration Testing

Ground vibration testing has been an integral tool for developing new launch vehicles throughout the space age. Several launch vehicles have been lost due to problems that would have been detected by early vibration testing, including Ariane 5, Delta III, and Falcon 1. NASA will leverage experience and testing hardware developed during the Saturn and Shuttle programs to perform ground vibration testing (GVT) on the Ares I crew launch vehicle and Ares V cargo launch vehicle stacks. NASA performed dynamic vehicle testing (DVT) for Saturn and mated vehicle ground vibration testing (MVGVT) for Shuttle at the Dynamic Test Stand (Test Stand 4550) at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, and is now modifying that facility to support Ares I integrated vehicle ground vibration testing (IVGVT) beginning in 2012. The Ares IVGVT schedule shows most of its work being completed between 2010 and 2014. Integrated 2nd Stage Ares IVGVT will begin in 2012 and IVGVT of the entire Ares launch stack will begin in 2013. The IVGVT data is needed for the human-rated Orion launch vehicle's Design Certification Review (DCR) in early 2015. During the Apollo program, GVT detected several serious design concerns, which NASA was able to address before Saturn V flew, eliminating costly failures and potential losses of mission or crew. During the late 1970s, Test Stand 4550 was modified to support the four-body structure of the Space Shuttle. Vibration testing confirmed that the vehicle's mode shapes and frequencies were better than analytical models suggested, however, the testing also identified challenges with the rate gyro assemblies, which could have created flight instability and possibly resulted in loss of the vehicle. Today, NASA has begun modifying Test Stand 4550 to accommodate Ares I, including removing platforms needed for Shuttle testing and upgrading the dynamic test facilities to characterize the mode shapes and resonant frequencies of the vehicle. The IVGVT team expects to collect important information about the new launch vehicles, greatly increasing astronaut safety as NASA prepares to explore the Moon and beyond.

Tuma, M. L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Distributed Simulation-to-Flight Framework to Support Investigating Trust/Trustworthiness in Multi-Agent Systems

As autonomous systems continue to grow both in use and complexity, the necessity for robust and extensible simulation-to-flight frameworks is paramount for establishing an effective architecture for autonomous systems. Hardware test flights are time-consuming and cost prohibitive during early system design and development. Simulation environments can be useful tools to accelerate algorithm development and testing. However, transitions from simulation to flight (sim-to-flight) can be challenging, unless systems are designed with this transition in mind and with the necessary capabilities built into the architecture and framework. One of the objectives of Autonomy Teaming and TRAjectories for Complex Trusted Operational Reliability (ATTRACTOR) was to design and develop a distributed mixed-reality simulation environment to begin establishing a basis for certification of autonomous systems via research into trust and trustworthiness. ATTRACTOR’s objective was to construct computational concepts of trustworthiness and justifiable trust in multi-agent autonomous teams, to inform future certification of safety-critical and time-critical autonomous systems in aviation. In this paper, we present an autonomous systems architecture and development framework paired with a persistent distributed modeling and simulation (ModSim) environment for test and evaluation of autonomous systems. They were designed under ATTRACTOR in order to measure and establish trustworthiness and trust in single-and multi-agent human-machine systems whether these machines are fixed-wing general aviation, rotary-wing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), ground rovers, or even spacecraft. The Autonomous Entity Operational Network (AEON) framework enables autonomous system development with an easily extensible collection of libraries and plug-n-play nodes facilitated by the Data Distribution Service (DDS) communication protocol standard. The Baseline Environment for Autonomous Modeling (BEAM) simulation environment is a distributed mixed-reality Unity™-based environment built around the same DDS communication paradigm allowing for easy integration with AEON-based autonomous applications, enabling sim-to-flight with minimal configuration changes. Using AEON and BEAM, source code that runs in simulation ports directly to hardware and has successfully flown in the National Airspace System (NAS) at NASA LaRC many times over the lifetime of ATTRACTOR.

Benjamin N Kelley↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Verification of the Generalized Aerospace Simulation in Simulink

NASA uses six-degrees-of-freedom (6-DOF) simulations tools to design, test, develop Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) software, and certify vehicle performance prior to flight. Therefore, it is critical that the 6-DOF tools used for vehicle design and certification are validated. The focus of this work is the validation of the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 6-DOF “GeneraLized Aerospace Simulation in Simulink” (GLASS) framework tool. The GLASS tool framework is currently used to support NASA GN&C insight for the Human Landing System (HLS) project, simulating vehicle dynamics during lunar descent and ascent. The GLASS framework utilizes the off-the-shelf Mathworks (R) Simscape (TM) Multibody (TM) toolbox to model vehicle multi-body dynamics. NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) provides a set of 6-DOF simulation verification “check cases” that are available to any user needing to verify 6-DOF tools. The check cases contain seventeen atmospheric and twenty-six orbital test scenarios are provided to validate equations of motion, environmental models (e.g., atmosphere, gravitation, and geodesy) and tool propagators. This paper compares GLASS 6-DOF simulation results against the NESC check cases’ results via simulation-to-simulation comparisons. The comparison demonstrates that GLASS simulation results are “in family” with the outputs of the applicable NASA NESC check-cases and verify the GLASS core framework dynamics and the implementation of the check case scenario models.

6-Dof↗
NASA NTRS1988

Specification for IBM/IBM compatible 3480 tape cartridge

This document establishes the same kinds of standards and controls that are currently in use for the procurement on new analog and digital magnetic tapes. The Magnetic Tape Certification Facility (MTCF) currently maintains a Quality Products List (QPL) for all new analog and digital magnetic tapes purchased by NASA-GSFC. Extensive tests are conducted in the MTCF on an annual basis to determine the manufacturer's tape types to be added to or deleted from the current QPL. The MTCF currently maintains two specifications for magnetic tapes: NASA TM-79724 is used for the QPL and acceptance testing of new analog tapes; and NASA TM-80599 is used for the QPL and acceptance testing of new digital tapes. This specification will be used for the QPL and acceptance testing of new 3480 cartridges. The magnetic tapes used by GSFC, LaRC, ARC/Dryden, WFF, and the Network Tracking Stations are covered by the NASA-GSFC specifications. The 3480 cartridge was introduced approximately 3.5 years ago and is becoming an increasingly attractive alternative to digital magnetic tapes. Many users have already converted to the 3480 system and have more tape drives on order.

Perry, Jimmy L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Verification of the Generalized Aerospace Simulation in Simulink (R)

NASA uses six-degrees-of-freedom (6-DOF) simulations tools to design, test, develop Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) software, and certify vehicle performance prior to flight. Therefore, it is critical that the 6-DOF tools used for vehicle design and certification are validated. The focus of this work is the vali-dation of the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 6-DOF “GeneraLized Aero-space Simulation in Simulink” (GLASS) framework tool. The GLASS tool framework is currently used to support NASA GN&C insight for the Human Landing System (HLS) project, simulating vehicle dynamics during lunar descent and as-cent. The GLASS framework utilizes the off-the-shelf Mathworks ® Simscape Multibody® toolbox to model vehicle multi-body dynamics. NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) provides a set of 6-DOF simulation verification “check cases” that are available to any user needing to verify 6-DOF tools. The check cases contain seventeen atmospheric and twenty-six orbital test scenarios are provided to validate equations of motion, environmental models (e.g., atmosphere, gravitation, and geodesy) and tool propagators. This paper compares GLASS 6-DOF simulation results against the NESC check cases’ results via simulation-to-simulation comparisons. The comparisons demonstrate that GLASS simulation results are “in family” with the outputs of the applicable NASA NESC check cases and verifies the GLASS core framework dynamics and the correct implementation of the check case scenario models.

6-Dof↗
NASA NTRS1984

Large space structures ground and flight progress

Unprecedented challenges arise in connection with the design and certification of space systems which are too large to be transported into orbit fully assembled. Special situations arising in the case of such systems make it necessary to rely much more on analysis than in past programs. The present investigation is concerned with the status of some research activities oriented primarily to the improvement of analysis capabilities through coordinated ground and flight testing. Aspects of system identification are explored, taking into account an eigensystem realization algorithm, and the Hoop-Column Antenna concept. Attention is also given to a suitable method for analyzing the Hoop-Column antenna structure, a deployment analysis, certification issues for large space structures, a generic space station model, and the use of actuators.

Pinson, L. D.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Role of NDE and In-Situ Process Monitoring in Managing Risk of AM Space Hardware

The recently published NASA-STD-6030 defines the Additive Manufacturing (AM) Requirements for Spaceflight Systems. Key aspects of the certification approach include the development of a qualified material process (QMP) and material characterization determined by part classification. Nondestructive evaluation (NDE) of the full surface and volume is required for all part classifications except those with negligible risk. NASA is exploring the use of in-process monitoring data to improve risk posture and supplement post-build inspection for complex parts. Currently, the most challenging obstacle to overcome is linking the indications in the monitoring data to the physics of the process and the final material state of the finished part. NASA is undertaking studies to understand and quantify this relationship for various monitoring methods. The desired goal is to develop a protocol to establish this correlation for any monitoring method. Once this correlation is known, the critical defect size can be linked to a representative indication in the monitoring data, and the capability of the monitoring system can be tested using the 90/95 probability of detection requirement for NDE methods. This would enable the use of in-process monitoring as a defect screening activity for AM part certification. Many high-criticality components built with AM have high complexity and therefore limited inspectability, so using in-process monitoring can help address this certification gap. The use of adaptive, closed-loop monitoring systems that alter the locked process will require a new approach to the QMP.

additive manufacturing↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Role of NDE and In-Situ Process Monitoring in Managing Risk of AM Space Hardware

The recently published NASA-STD-6030 defines the Additive Manufacturing (AM) Requirements for Spaceflight Systems. Key aspects of the certification approach include the development of a qualified material process (QMP) and material characterization determined by part classification. Nondestructive evaluation (NDE) of the full surface and volume is required for all part classifications except those with negligible risk. NASA is exploring the use of in-process monitoring data to improve risk posture and supplement post-build inspection for complex parts. Currently, the most challenging obstacle to overcome is linking the indications in the monitoring data to the physics of the process and the final material state of the finished part. NASA is undertaking studies to understand and quantify this relationship for various monitoring methods. The desired goal is to develop a protocol to establish this correlation for any monitoring method. Once this correlation is known, the critical defect size can be linked to a representative indication in the monitoring data, and the capability of the monitoring system can be tested using the 90/95 probability of detection requirement for NDE methods. This would enable the use of in-process monitoring as a defect screening activity for AM part certification. Many high-criticality components built with AM have high complexity and therefore limited inspectability, so using in-process monitoring can help address this certification gap. The use of adaptive, closed-loop monitoring systems that alter the locked process will require a new approach to the QMP.

advanced manufacturing↗
DOE OSTI2021

An infeasible-start framework for convex quadratic optimization, with application to constraint-reduced interior-point and other methods

A framework is proposed for solving general convex quadratic programs (CQPs) from an infeasible starting point by invoking an existing feasible-start algorithm tailored for inequality-constrained CQPs. The central tool is an exact penalty function scheme equipped with a penalty-parameter updating rule. The feasible-start algorithm merely has to satisfy certain general requirements, and so is the updating rule. Under mild assumptions, the framework is proved to converge on CQPs with both inequality and equality constraints and, at a negligible additional cost per iteration, produces an infeasibility certificate, together with a feasible point for an (approximately) ℓ 1 -least relaxed feasible problem, when the given problem does not have a feasible solution. The framework is applied to a feasible-start constraint-reduced interior-point algorithm previously proved to be highly performant on problems with many more inequality constraints than variables (“imbalanced”). Numerical comparison with popular codes (OSQP, qpOASES, MOSEK) is reported on both randomly generated problems and support-vector machine classifier training problems. The results show that the former typically outperforms the latter on imbalanced problems. Finally, application of the proposed infeasible-start framework to other feasible-start algorithms is briefly considered, and is tested on a simplex iteration.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2010

The NASA Langley Research Center's Unmanned Aerial System Surrogate Research Aircraft

Research is needed to determine what procedures, aircraft sensors and other systems will be required to allow Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to safely operate with manned aircraft in the National Airspace System (NAS). The NASA Langley Research Center has transformed a Cirrus Design SR22 general aviation (GA) aircraft into a UAS Surrogate research aircraft to serve as a platform for UAS systems research, development, flight testing and evaluation. The aircraft is manned with a Safety Pilot and systems operator that allows for flight operations almost anywhere in the NAS without the need for a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Certificate of Authorization (COA). The UAS Surrogate can be controlled from a modular, transportable ground station like a true UAS. The UAS Surrogate is able to file and fly in the NAS with normal traffic and is a better platform for real world UAS research and development than existing vehicles flying in restricted ranges or other sterilized airspace. The Cirrus Design SR22 aircraft is a small, singleengine, four-place, composite-construction aircraft that NASA Langley acquired to support NASA flight-research programs like the Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) Project. Systems were installed to support flight test research and data gathering. These systems include: separate research power; multi-function flat-panel displays; research computers; research air data and inertial state sensors; video recording; data acquisition; data-link; S-band video and data telemetry; Common Airborne Instrumentation System (CAIS); Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B); instrumented surfaces and controls; and a systems operator work station. The transformation of the SR22 to a UAS Surrogate was accomplished in phases. The first phase was to modify the existing autopilot to accept external commands from a research computer that was connected by redundant data-link radios to a ground control station. An electro-mechanical auto-throttle was added in the next phase to provide ground station control of airspeed. Additional phases are in progress to add waypoint navigation and long range satellite voice and data communications. Potential areas for UAS Surrogate research include the development, flight test and evaluation of sensors to aid in the process of air traffic detect-sense-and-avoid. These sensors could be evaluated in real-time and compared with onboard human evaluation pilots. This paper describes the systems and design considerations that were incorporated in the development of the UAS Surrogate along with details of development problems encountered and the corresponding solutions.

Howell, Charles T., III↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Proposed Use of Unmanned Aerial System Surrogate Research Aircraft for National Airspace System Integration Research

Research is needed to determine what procedures, aircraft sensors and other systems will be required to allow Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to safely operate with manned aircraft in the National Airspace System (NAS). This paper explores the use of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Surrogate research aircraft to serve as platforms for UAS systems research, development, and flight testing. These aircraft would be manned with safety pilots and researchers that would allow for flight operations almost anywhere in the NAS without the need for a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Certificate of Authorization (COA). With pilot override capability, these UAS Surrogate aircraft would be controlled from ground stations like true UAS s. It would be possible to file and fly these UAS Surrogate aircraft in the NAS with normal traffic and they would be better platforms for real world UAS research and development over existing vehicles flying in restricted ranges or other sterilized airspace. These UAS surrogate aircraft could be outfitted with research systems as required such as computers, state sensors, video recording, data acquisition, data link, telemetry, instrumentation, and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). These surrogate aircraft could also be linked to onboard or ground based simulation facilities to further extend UAS research capabilities. Potential areas for UAS Surrogate research include the development, flight test and evaluation of sensors to aide in the process of air traffic "see-and-avoid". These and other sensors could be evaluated in real-time and compared with onboard human evaluation pilots. This paper examines the feasibility of using UAS Surrogate research aircraft as test platforms for a variety of UAS related research.

Howell, Charles T., III↗
DOE OSTI2021

Sequim Bay Underwater UXO Prototype Demonstration Site: Field Operations Summary, 2020

This report provides a summary of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL’s) activities to initiate Phase II development of the Sequim Bay Underwater UXO Prototype demonstration site (MR-2735) in 2020. Testbed development and field operations were conducted by PNNL’s Coastal and Marine Research Laboratory (MCRL) in support of the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) underwater Munitions Response (MR) program. A series of standardized underwater unexploded ordnance (UXO) demonstration sites (“testbeds”) are being developed by SERDP/ESTCP to test, evaluate, and demonstrate technologies that can detect, geolocate, and classify proud and buried munitions in 0–35 m water depths. As a prototype demonstration site, Sequim Bay is a semi-enclosed marine waterbody containing sand and mud sediments with minimal clutter in 5–30 m water depths. MCRL is located at the entrance to Sequim Bay, where it provides operational, logistical, and facilities support for testbed activities.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗