SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Cybersecurity”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 739 records · Page 41

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2019

Secure, Scalable Control and Communications for Distributed PV

An increasing number of jurisdictions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. These functions provide grid operators the nobs to support local and bulk power system operations with DER equipment, but the associated grid operator-to-DER communications networks must be deployed with appropriate cybersecurity features. In some situations, additional security features may prevent control system scalability or increase communication latencies and dropouts. These unintentional consequences of the security features would therefore hinder the ability of the grid operator to implement specific control algorithms. This project evaluated the tradeoffs between power system performance and cybersecurity metrics for several grid services.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2018

Risk Management Framework Process Map

The purpose of this document is to provide an overview of the Risk Management Framework (RMF) codified in National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-37r1 for the Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP). This document, while accurate, is not an authoritative source on the management of federal information systems. However, the concepts and process discussed herein are representative of the data points used to compare the RMF with NIST’s Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity , otherwise known as the cybersecurity framework .

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2017

EV Everywhere Sandia Appendix

Sandia National Laboratories has a large cybersecurity research program supporting the Department of Energy as well as other federal departments and agencies. Fundamental research helps us stay ahead of threats. Sandia’s research efforts in cybersecurity are focused in three broad areas: 1. Trusted hardware, software, and systems 2. Networks and systems architectures and analysis 3. Effective cyber defense systems Research is conducted in state-of-the-art facilities with extensive computing and information science capabilities, which range from architectures and algorithms to advanced modeling and simulation. Three areas of active research most applicable to connected vehicle security are: Red Team Assessments, Emulytics™, and Supply Chain Risk Management.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2019

Detailed Statistical Models of Host-Based Data for Detection of Malicious Activity

The cybersecurity research community has focused primarily on the analysis and automation of intrusion detection systems by examining network traffic behaviors. Expanding on this expertise, advanced cyber defense analysis is turning to host-based data to use in research and development to produce the next generation network defense tools. The ability to perform deep packet inspection of network traffic is increasingly harder with most boundary network traffic moving to HTTPS. Additionally, network data alone does not provide a full picture of end-to-end activity. These are some of the reasons that necessitate looking at other data sources such as host data. We outline our investigation into the processing, formatting, and storing of the data along with the preliminary results from our exploratory data analysis. In writing this report, it is our goal to aid in guiding future research by providing foundational understanding for an area of cybersecurity that is rich with a variety of complex, categorical, and sparse data, with a strong human influence component. Including suggestions for guiding potential directions for future research.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2019

Alliance Project: Secure Control Systems for the Energy Sector

The Alliance Project addresses Area of Interest 4: Secure Remote Access for the Energy Sector, by combining physical and cyber access under one cybersecurity access system. The Alliance Project built on the successful completion of the Lemnos and Padlock Project (DOE-Funded Project started in 2007 and 2010) and researched and developed a solution for an Ethernet Security Gateway with the functionality required to integrate the physical access control cyber system and interface with legacy and new proximity card readers used for physical access requests. This project focused on securing and enhancing the cyber system the physical access control system operates on. The team tested and demonstrated the system solution on the SEL campus. Currently the physical access cyber system is completely separate from the cyber access control cyber system. With a single system industry benefits include: (1) Single system to learn and teach employees; (2) Single system that collects and alerts on logs and events simplifying incident response plans and NERC CIP compliance; (3) Unifies trust management to a single system reducing the potential errors in privilege escalation or revocation; (4) Provides a stronger cybersecurity platform the physical access control system operates on. Today they are mostly plain text protocols and little cyber awareness; (5) Integration of physical access awareness allows the cyber system to react and adjust. In some cases, the cyber access can be enhanced with authorized physical access and other cases the cyber access can be more restricted with unauthorized physical access; and (6) Enables the utility to establish as large or as small a physical access control system as they require. One example would be when a utility shares a substation with a neighbor utility and can’t rely on the substation door for the physical access control. The Alliance technology enables them to lock equipment racks simply with no scalability issues because it stands on the cyber security infrastructure which is already highly scalable.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2020

Dragonstone Strategy Kickoff Report [Slides]

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system like any other heavy industrial process, relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. Cyber-preparedness varies across the ONG industry from organization to organization. Common challenges include remote locations, long-lived field assets, and insufficient capabilities to find and track malware. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cybersecurity within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cybersecurity of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: regulatory overlap and inefficiencies, and lack of industry awareness of potentially useful technologies for solving known issues. In the months following this report, LLNL will develop a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, coupling threat intelligence, industry knowledge base, and ongoing outreach

02 PETROLEUM↗

DOE OSTI2020

5G Enabled Energy Innovation: Advanced Wireless Networks for Science (Workshop Report)

Rapidly expanding, new telecommunications infrastructure based on 5G technologies will disrupt and transform how we design, build, operate, and optimize scientific infrastructure and the experiments and services enabled by that infrastructure, from continental-scale sensor networks to centralized scientific user facilities, from intelligent Internet of Things devices to supercomputers. Concurrently, 5G will introduce, or exacerbate, challenges related to protecting infrastructure and associated scientific data as well as to fully leveraging opportunities related to expanded infrastructure scale and complexity. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science operates scientific infrastructure, supporting some of the nation’s most advanced intellectual discoveries, spanning the country and including 30 world-class user facilities from supercomputers to accelerators. Along with field experiments and remote observatories, every aspect of DOE’s scientific enterprise will be affected by 5G, which amounts to a complete renovation of the underpinnings of the nation’s information infrastructure. In this report we explore the scientific opportunities and new research challenges associated with 5G, ranging from scalability to heterogeneity to cybersecurity. The rapid commercial deployment of 5G opens the opportunity to rethink and reinvent DOE’s scientific infrastructure and experimentation, from intelligent sensor networks at unprecedented scales to a digital continuum of cyberinfrastructure spanning low-power sensors, high-performance computing embedded within and at the edge of the network, and DOE’s large-scale user instrument and computing facilities. New programming paradigms, workflow and data frameworks, and AI-based system design, operation, and autonomous adaptation and optimization will be necessary in order to exploit these new opportunities. Field deployments and centralized scientific instruments can also be revolutionized, moving (without traditional performance penalties) from wired to wireless connectivity for data and control systems, improving flexibility, and opening new sensing modalities, including the use of the 5G electromagnetic spectrum itself as an environmental probe. For DOE science, in contrast to commercial 5G applications and settings, devices will be deployed in extreme environments such as cryogenically cooled instrument control systems and in remote settings with harsh conditions, requiring the design of new materials for RF communication and edge processing to operate in these regimes. Concurrently, 5G infrastructure comprises both hardware and sophisticated software systems - currently closed and proprietary. The cybersecurity challenges to 5G-empowered reinvention mirror the complexity and variety of new 5G features, from virtualization to private network slices to ubiquitous access. Research is also needed in order to accelerate the development of secure and open 5G software infrastructure, reducing reliance on hardware and software produced outside the United States and providing the transparency and rigorous evaluation and testing afforded through open software. Twelve broad research thrusts are laid out in four chapters, with a companion fifth chapter (and three additional research thrusts) underscoring the needs and opportunities for an aggressive testbed program co-designed by networking experts and scientists involved in the 15 research thrusts. The urgency of undertaking this research is fueled by a global, accelerating deployment of new telecommunications infrastructure that is designed for entertainment and commercial applications - barely scratching the surface of what 5G can do to extend U.S. leadership in scientific discovery.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2018

Cyberspace, Information Strategy and International Security (Workshop Summary)

In recent years, the Center for Global Security Research has hosted a number of events to inform strategic thought on key areas of concern to national security and laboratory planning. This was the first dedicated workshop that CGSR has hosted seeking to convene a community of experts around issues of cybersecurity and Internet governance as they pertain to national security. The goal of this work was to bridge policy, academic, military, technical and other expert communities that often have limited contact with each other’s concerns and specialized knowledge. This workshop brought together over 80 experts from government, military, national labs, academic institutions, think tanks, the private sector, and civil society and hailing from 10 countries. While focusing on the national security challenges and military strategy emerging in and through cyberspace, the workshop aimed to address the cross-cutting interests and concerns of different stakeholders in the development and future governance of cyberspace, including those of the private sector, and civilian publics. To this end, the first day of the workshop focused particularly on issues directly relevant to military strategy in the cyber domain, while the second day addressed questions bridging national security and military concerns and their connections to the domestic and international politics of Internet governance. Topics discussed included the evolving cyber strategies of the U.S., U.S. allies and potential adversaries, as well as the complex characteristics of the cyber domain, the potential for deterrence in or through cyberspace, the domain’s escalation risks, and the ways in which the “dual use” nature of much of the underlying technology of cyberspace connects actions in the domain with broader questions of global Internet governance. Issues of online disinformation and information warfare and the unique conceptual tensions and governance challenges posed by these forms of conflict were addressed. The workshop also examined the roles and interests of different stakeholders in addressing cybersecurity challenges, as well as the possibility of norms, international law, and other potential mechanisms of constraint.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2019

Secure Scalable Control and Communications for Distributed PV (Final Technical Report)

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2021

Review of Intrusion Detection Methods and Tools for Distributed Energy Resources

Recent trends in the growth of distributed energy resources (DER) in the electric grid and newfound malware frameworks that target internet of things (IoT) devices is driving an urgent need for more reliable and effective methods for intrusion detection and prevention. Cybersecurity intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are responsible for detecting threats by monitoring and analyzing network data, which can originate either from networking equipment or end-devices. Creating intrusion detection systems for PV/DER networks is a challenging undertaking because of the diversity of the attack types and intermittency and variability in the data. Distinguishing malicious events from other sources of anomalies or system faults is particularly difficult. New approaches are needed that not only sense anomalies in the power system but also determine causational factors for the detected events. In this report, a range of IDS approaches were summarized along with their pros and cons. Using the review of IDS approaches and subsequent gap analysis for application to DER systems, a preliminary hybrid IDS approach to protect PV/DER communications is formed in the conclusion of this report to inform ongoing and future research regarding the cybersecurity and resilience enhancement of DER systems.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2021

Development of Integrated Safety and Security Models for Comprehensive Reliability and Resiliency Evaluation

The security of the electric grid and supporting energy systems is crucial to national security. One of the complexities in analyzing the security of energy systems is the safety consequences that may result from accidents. For energy systems, the goal is to ensure that they operate as intended and that any consequences are mitigated or prevented. The integration of safety and security is paramount to protecting these systems from attacks and ensuring that large consequences are prevented. This report describes an integrated safety and security methodology to evaluate cybersecurity events that can lead to large consequences. This novel approach first describes how Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) provides a digital causal analysis for Bayesian Networks (BNs). The use of STPA causal analysis provides a systematic approach to constructing BNs that adequately model cyber scenarios that result in consequences. When combined with the technical principles described in Risk-Informed Management of Enterprise Systems (RIMES), a comprehensive risk-informed cybersecurity analysis results that allows decision-makers to prioritize systems that most impact risk.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

NNSA Minority Serving Institute Partnership Program (MSIPP)— Advanced Synergistic Program for Indigenous Research in Engineering (ASPIRE) (FY22 Q1 Progress Report)

In 2016, the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) initiated the Minority Serving Institution Partnership Plan (MSIPP) targeting Tribal Colleges and Universities (TCUs) to offer programs that will prepare students for technical careers in NNSA’s laboratories and production plants. The MSIPP consortium’s approach is as follows: 1) align investments at the college and university level to develop a curriculum and workforce needed to support NNSA’s nuclear weapon enterprise mission, and 2) to enhance research and education at under-represented colleges and universities. The first TCU consortium that MSIPP launched was known as the Advanced Manufacturing Network Initiative (AMNI) whose purpose was to develop additive manufacturing (AM) learning opportunities. The AMNI consortium consisted of Bay Mills Community College, Cankdeska Cikana Community College, Navajo Tech University, Salish Kootenai Community College, Turtle Mountain Community College, and United Tribes Technical College. In 2016, the American Indian Higher Education Consortium (AIHEC), the AMNI consortium and the Southwestern Indian Polytechnic Institute (SIPI), in collaboration with Sandia National Labs, using a grant by NNSA hosted the first TCU Advanced Manufacturing Technology Summer Institute (TCU AMTSI). The AMNI consortium will officially end Sept. 2022. However, building on the successes of AMNI, in FY22 NNSA’s MSIPP launched three additional consortiums: (1) the Indigenous Mutual Partnership to Advanced Cybersecurity Technology (IMPACT), which focuses on STEM and cybersecurity, (2) the Advanced Synergistic Program for Indigenous Research in Engineering (ASPIRE), which focuses on STEM and the electrical and mechanical engineering skills set needed for renewable and distributed energy systems, and (3) the Partnership for Advanced Manufacturing Education and Research (PAMER), which focuses on developing and maintaining a sustainable pathway for a highly trained, next-generation additive manufacturing workforce and a corresponding community of subject matter experts for NNSA enterprises. The following report summarizes the status update during this quarter for the ASPIRE program.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2021

Cyber-Physical Risks for Advanced Reactors

Cybersecurity for industrial control systems is an important consideration that advance reactor designers will need to consider. How cyber risk is managed is the subject of on-going research and debate in the nuclear industry. This report seeks to identify potential cyber risks for advance reactors. Identified risks are divided into absorbed risk and licensee managed risk to clearly show how cyber risks for advance reactors can potentially be transferred. Absorbed risks are risks that originate external to the licensee but may unknowingly propagate into the plant. Insights include (1) the need for unification of safety, physical security, and cybersecurity risk assessment frameworks to ensure optimal coordination of risk, (2) a quantitative risk assessment methodology in conjunction with qualitative assessments may be useful in efficiently and sufficiently managing cyber risks, and (3) cyber risk management techniques should align with a risked informed regulatory framework for advance reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Operational Technology Behavioral Analytics (OTBA) (Final Technical Report DE-FE0031640)

This final report provides a summary of the methodology, findings, lessons learned, and insights from an investigation into the feasibility of the Operational Technology Behavioral Analytics (OTBA) cybersecurity approach. The concept was evaluated with data from the National Carbon Capture Center (NCCC) – a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) funded facility that is managed and operated by Southern Company Services, Inc. at Alabama Power Company’s E. C. Gaston generating power plant in Wilsonville, Alabama. Appropriate data sources for the post-combustion carbon capture system were identified. Infrastructure was deployed to monitor, capture and archive data for the system. Critical parameters for each subsystem were identified and analyzed. Machine-learning algorithms were used to establish and characterize normal operations and subsequently identify anomalies. This effort yielded valuable insights and formed the basis of a data-centric strategy for detecting cyber-attacks along with a coordinated response philosophy. A significant takeaway is that the OTBA cybersecurity approach is quite portable; it can be applied to other critical infrastructure beyond fossil power generation.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Ambassador Project (Final Report)

SEL, in collaboration with its partners, performed research, development and demonstration of a trust, data, and resource management software layer enabling multiple software applications from different suppliers to operate in a Software Defined Infrastructure. The Energy sector has successfully deployed Software Defined Networking (SDN) technology and is rapidly scaling deployments. One major benefit of SDN is the abstracted centralized nature of the orchestration and management of the network. This architecture enables end users to deploy new technology and capabilities as quickly as they perform firmware upgrades to field devices. When an end user needs to roll trucks to install new equipment, they simply deploy new software to run on top of this SD-Infrastructure. This has attracted many software companies to develop value added features and introduce new capabilities, which is all good for the industry but has also introduced new challenges, including how to manage trust between these software applications, how to manage the data integrity and access, and how to manage access to the network resources each of these software applications are demanding. Completion of this project developed and demonstrated a safe and reliable resource scheduler and cybersecurity trust management communication platform allowing multiple software applications to operate in a SD-Infrastructure resulting in the commercialization of a software eco-system and architecture that maintains interoperability, cybersecurity, and reliability where the end user can safely scale out their software to leverage the powerful benefits of SDN.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2022

WPTO Navigator

Protecting hydroelectric plants from incidents that adversely impact their cyber-physical systems presents unique challenges due to the plants’ widely dispersed geographic locations and varied configurations as well as the relative nascent nature of the cyberattacks targeting these facilities. To help hydroelectric plants better respond to and mitigate cybersecurity incidents, this Department of Energy Water Power Technologies Office Navigator aligns the processes within the National Institute of Standards 800-61r2 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide with the emergency actions within the FEMA 64 Emergency Action Plan Framework. This work is to be used at a hydroelectric plant to quickly understand how the plant responds to a cyber incident in relationship to the actions involved in an emergency action plan involving a hydroelectric plant. In addition to this product, there are three other products meant to be distributed to a hydroelectric plant to assist in their cyber incident response and recovery. The first, a report on the processes of building a R&R flip book based on a large set of existing guidance. The second, a handy flip book meant to be distributed to hydroelectric plants to assist them during a cybersecurity incident occurring on a hydroelectic plant. And the third is a comprehensive set of resources to assist an operator in locating appropriate guidance during the recovery process.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2022

WPTO Comprehensive References [Poster]

Protecting hydroelectric plants from incidents that adversely impact their cyber-physical systems presents unique challenges due to the plants’ widely dispersed geographic locations and varied configurations as well as the relative nascent nature of the cyberattacks targeting these facilities. To help hydroelectric plants better respond to and mitigate cybersecurity incidents, this Department of Energy Water Power Technologies Office Cyber Comprehensive Reference list is to be used at a hydroelectric plant to quickly go to appropriate sources during the response and recovery of a cyber incident. In addition to this product, there are three other products meant to be distributed to a hydroelectric plant to assist in their cyber incident response and recovery. The first, a report on the processes of building a R&R flip book based on a large set of existing guidance. The second, a handy flip book meant to be distributed to hydroelectric plants to assist them during a cybersecurity incident occurring on a hydroelectic plant. And the third is a correlated alignment of the steps an hydroelectric plant operator would take for both a cyber incident as well as an emergency response process if the event rises to a cyber incident affecting the safe and reliable operations of a hydroelectric plant.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Hydropower Cyber-Physical Configurations

The U.S. Department of Energy’s Water Power Technologies Office funded Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory to develop a typology to characterize the variety and pervasiveness of cyber-physical configurations across the nation’s hydropower fleet. Outreach to owners and operators returned configurations for 275 hydropower plants or approximately 12% of the fleet. Components (OT and IT), systems, and connections among systems differed among plants according to function, age, position in the river cascade, and many other factors. Seven cyber-physical configuration types labeled A through I, included from 2 to dozens of plants. They were differentiated by how pervasive data and control connections were among cyber-physical components and how frequently control signals paired with data signals in a feedback loop. The flow of data and control within each type implies what cybersecurity vulnerabilities may exist, and what mitigation actions may be most effective. A self-assessment approach allows plant operators to identify the configuration type similar to their plant and link to the lessons learned and best practices information. The cyber-physical typology reinforces the idea that hydropower facilities vary widely, but it also identifies groups that highlight similarities in how their cyber-physical components interact. This helps address fleetwide cybersecurity needs by identifying a reasonable number of configuration types that share risks, vulnerabilities, and potential mitigations.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗