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At least 739 records · Page 41

TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NGSI: IAEA Verification of UF6 Cylinders

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is often ignorant of the location of declared, uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders following verification, because cylinders are not typically tracked onsite or off. This paper will assess various methods the IAEA uses to verify cylinder gross defects, and how the task could be ameliorated through the use of improved identification and monitoring. The assessment will be restricted to current verification methods together with one that has been applied on a trial basis—short-notice random inspections coupled with mailbox declarations. This paper is part of the NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and International Security’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) program to investigate the concept of a global monitoring scheme that uniquely identifies and tracks UF6 cylinders.

cylinder monitoring tracking IAEA↗

International Internships in Nuclear Safeguards and Security: Challenges and Successes

All students in the Russian safeguards and security degree programs at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI and Tomsk Polytechnic University, sponsored by the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Education Project, take part in a domestic internship at a Russian enterprise or facility. In addition, a select few students are placed in an international internship. These internships provide students with a better view of how MPC&A and nonproliferation in general are addressed outside of Russia. The possibility of an international internship is a significant incentive for students to enroll in the safeguards and security degree programs. The U.S. members of the MPC&A Education Project team interview students who have been nominated by their professors. These students must have initiative and reasonable English skills. The project team and professors then select students to be tentatively placed in various international internships during the summer or fall of their final year of study. Final arrangements are then made with the host organizations. This paper describes the benefits of the joint United States/Russia cooperation for next-generation workforce development, some of the international internships that have been carried out, the benefits of these international internships, and lessons learned in implementing them.

education↗

The Case for the Application of Worldwide Marine Radioactivity Studies In the Search for Undeclared Facilities and Activities

Undeclared nuclear facilities unequivocally remain the most difficult safeguards challenge facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Recent cases of undeclared facilities revealed in Iran and Syria, which are NPT signatory States, show both the difficulty and the seriousness of this threat to nonproliferation. In the case of undeclared nuclear facilities, the most effective deterrent against proliferation is the application of Wide-Area Environmental Sampling (WAES); however, WAES is currently cost-prohibitive. As with any threat, the most effective countering strategy is a multifaceted approach. Some of the approaches applied by the IAEA include: open source analysis, satellite imagery, on-site environmental sampling, complementary access under the Additional Protocol (where in force), traditional safeguards inspections, and information provided by member States. These approaches, naturally, are focused on specific States. Are there other opportunities not currently within the IAEA purview to assess States that may provide another opportunity to detect clandestine facilities? In this paper, the author will make the case that the IAEA Department of Safeguards should explore the area of worldwide marine radioactivity studies as one possible opportunity. One such study was released by the IAEA Marine Environment Laboratory in January 2005. This technical document focused on 90Sr, 137Cs, and 239/240Pu. It is clearly a challenging area because of the many sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the world’s oceans and seas including: nuclear weapons testing, reprocessing, accidents, waste dumping, and industrial and medical radioisotopes, whose distributions change based on oceanographic, geochemical, and biological processes, and their sources. It is additionally challenging where multiple States share oceans, seas, and rivers. But with the application of modern science, historical sampling to establish baselines, and a focus on the most relevant radionuclides, the potential is there to support this challenging IAEA safeguards mission.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Next Generation National Security Leaders

It is generally accepted that the international security community faces an impending challenge in its changing leadership demographics. The workforce that currently addresses nonproliferation, arms control, and verification is moving toward retirement and there is a perceived need for programs to train a new set of experts for both technical- and policy-related functions to replace the retiring generation. Despite the perceived need, there are also indicators that there are not sufficient jobs for individuals we are currently training. If we had “right-sized” the training programs, there would not be a shortage of jobs. The extent and scope of the human resource crisis is unclear, and information about training programs and how they meet existing needs is minimal. This paper seeks to achieve two objectives: 1) Clarify the major human resource problem and potential consequences; and 2) Propose how to characterize the requirement with sufficient granularity to enable key stakeholders to link programs aimed at developing the next generations of experts with employment needs. In order to accomplish both these goals, this paper recommends establishing a forum comprised of key stakeholders of this issue (including universities, public and private sectors), and conducting a study of the human resources and resource needs of the global security community. If there is indeed a human resource crisis in the global security field, we cannot address the problem if we are uninformed. The solution may lie in training more (or fewer) young professions to work in this community – or it may lie in more effectively using our existing resources and training programs.

Mahy, Heidi A.↗

Secret Objective Standoff: International Safeguards Educational Exercise

The International Safeguards Regime, being so multi-faceted, can be overwhelming to those first introduced to its many components. The organizers and lecturers of workshops and courses on nonproliferation often provide a series of independent lectures and must somehow demonstrate the cohesive and effective nature of the system. An exercise titled The Secret Objective Standoff was developed to complement lectures with hands-on learning to assist participants in bringing all the many components (IAEA agreements, export controls, treaty obligations, international diplomacy, etc.) of the International Safeguards Regime together. This exercise divides participants into teams that are assigned the role of either a country or the IAEA and asks that they fully immerse themselves in their roles. The teams are then randomly assigned three unique and secret objectives that are intended to represent realistic and current geopolitical scenarios. Through construction, trading, or hoarding of four resources (experts, technology, money, and uranium), the teams have a finite number of turns to accomplish their objectives. Each turn has three phases random dispersal of resources, a timed discussion where teams can coordinate and strategize with others, and an action phase. During the action phase, teams inform the moderator individually and secretly what they will be doing that turn. The exercise has been tested twice with Oak Ridge National Laboratory personnel, and has been conducted with outside participants twice, in each case the experience was well received by both participants and instructors. This exercise provides instructors the ability to modify the exercise before or during game play to best fit their educational goals. By offering a range of experiences, from an in-depth look at specific components to a generalized overview, this exercise is an effective tool in helping participants achieve a full understanding the International Safeguards Regime.

Okowita, Samantha L↗

Advances in the growth of alkaline-earth halide single crystals for scintillator detectors

Alkaline-earth scintillators such as strontium iodide and other alkaline-earth halides activated with divalent europium represent some of the most efficient and highest energy resolution scintillators for use as gamma-ray detectors in a wide range of applications. These applications include the areas of nuclear nonproliferation, homeland security, the detection of undeclared nuclear material, nuclear physics and materials science, medical diagnostics, space physics, high energy physics, and radiation monitoring systems for first responders, police, and fire/rescue personnel. Recent advances in the growth of large single crystals of these scintillator materials hold the promise of higher crystal yields and significantly lower detector production costs. In the present work, we describe new processing protocols that, when combined with our molten salt filtration methods, have led to advances in achieving a significant reduction of cracking effects during the growth of single crystals of SrI2:Eu2+. In particular, we have found that extended pumping on the molten crystal-growth charge under vacuum for time periods extending up to 48 hours is generally beneficial in compensating for variations in the alkaline-earth halide purity and stoichiometry of the materials as initially supplied by commercial sources. These melt-pumping and processing techniques are now being applied to the purification of CaI2:Eu2+ and some mixed-anion europium-doped alkaline-earth halides prior to single-crystal growth by means of the vertical Bridgman technique. The results of initial studies of the effects of aliovalent doping of SrI2:Eu2+ on the scintillation characteristics of this material are also described.

energy resolution↗

Laboratory and Field Testing of Commercially Available Detectors for the Identification of Chemicals of Interest in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle for the Detection of Undeclared Activities

Traditionally, IAEA inspectors have focused on the detection of nuclear indicators as part of infield inspection activities. The ability to rapidly detect and identify chemical as well as nuclear signatures can increase the ability of IAEA inspectors to detect undeclared activities at a site. Identification of chemical indicators have been limited to use in the analysis of environmental samples. Although IAEA analytical laboratories are highly effective, environmental sample processing does not allow for immediate or real-time results to an IAEA inspector at a facility. During a complementary access inspection, under the Additional Protocol, the use of fieldable technologies that can quickly provide accurate information on chemicals that may be indicative of undeclared activities can increase the ability of IAEA to effectively and efficiently complete their mission. The Complementary Access Working Group (CAWG) is a multi-laboratory team with members from Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratory. The team identified chemicals at each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle that may provide IAEA inspectors with indications that proliferation activities may be occurring. The group eliminated all indicators related to equipment, technology and training, developing a list of by-products/effluents, non-nuclear materials, nuclear materials, and other observables. These proliferation indicators were prioritized based on detectability from a conduct of operations (CONOPS) perspective of a CA inspection (for example, whether an inspector actually can access the S&O or whether it is in process with no physical access), and the IAEA’s interest in the detection technology in conjunction with radiation detectors. The list was consolidated to general categories (nuclear materials from a chemical detection technique, inorganic chemicals, organic chemicals, halogens, and miscellaneous materials). The team then identified commercial off the shelf (COTS) chemical detectors that may detect the chemicals of interest. Three chemical detectors were selected and tested both in laboratory settings and in field operations settings at Idaho National Laboratory. The instruments selected are: Thermo Scientific TruDefender FT (FTIR), Thermo Scientific FirstDefender RM (Raman), and Bruker Tracer III SD (XRF). Functional specifications, operability, and chemical detectability, selectivity, and limits of detection were determined. Results from the laboratory and field tests will be presented. This work is supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, National Nuclear Security Administration.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Elementary! A Nuclear Forensics Workshop Teaches Vital Skills to International Practitioners

The article describes the Nuclear Forensics Workshop sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) and hosted by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory October 28-November 8, 2013 in Richland,Washington. Twenty-six participants from 10 countries attended the workshop. Experts from from Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Pacific Northwest national laboratories collaborated with an internationally recognized cadre of experts from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and other U.S. agencies, IAEA, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, the United Kingdom Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), and the European Union Joint Research Center Institute for Transuranium Elements, to train practitioners in basic methodologies of nuclear forensic examinations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Assessment of Nuclear Fuels using Radiographic Thickness Measurement Method

The Convert branch of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) focuses on the development of high uranium density fuels for research and test reactors for nonproliferation. This fuel is aimed to convert low density high enriched uranium (HEU) based fuel to high density low enriched uranium (LEU) based fuel for high performance research reactors (HPRR). There are five U.S. reactors that fall under the HPRR category, including: the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), the National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR), the Missouri University Research Reactor (UMRR), the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR). U-Mo alloy fuel phase in the form of either monolithic or dispersion foil type fuels, such as ATR Full-size In center flux trap Position (AFIP) and Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor (RERTR), are being designed for this purpose. The fabrication process1 of RERTR is susceptible to introducing a variety of fuel defects. A dependable quality control method is required during fabrication of RERTR miniplates to maintain the allowable design tolerances, therefore evaluating and analytically verifying the fabricated miniplates for maintaining quality standards as well as safety. The purpose of this work is to analyze the thickness of the fabricated RERTR-12 miniplates using non-destructive technique to meet the fuel plate specification for RERTR fuel to be used in the ATR.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Recent Fast Neutron Imaging Measurements with the Fieldable Nuclear Materials Identification System

This paper describes some recent fast neutron imaging measurements of the fieldable nuclear materials identification system (FNMIS) under development by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA-NA-22) for possible future use in arms control and nonproliferation applications. The general configuration of FNMIS has been previously described, and a description of the application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) electronics designed for FNMIS has been reported. This paper presents initial imaging measurements performed at ORNL with a Thermo Fisher API 120 DT generator and the fast-neutron imaging module of FNMIS.

Wellington, Tracey↗

PNNL Strategic Goods Testbed: A Data Library for Illicit Nuclear Trafficking

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has put significant effort into nonproliferation activities as an institution, both in terms of the classical nuclear material focused approach and in the examination of other strategic goods necessary to implement a nuclear program. To assist in these efforts, several projects in the Analysis in Motion (AIM) and Signature Discovery (SDI) Initiatives at PNNL are developing machine learning methodology for human-computer interaction in real time environments to assist analysts in this domain. All of these technical projects require access to data – whether it is in terms of detector data, shipping records, financial information, company relations, or other communications. The first question that mathematical and computational researchers come up with when asked to build analyst assist or automated tools is “What does the data look like? ” They become frustrated when basic questions like this can not be easily answered and this can have the effect of pushing researchers away from the nuclear trafficking domain, especially in strategic commodity and export control areas where data sets can not easily be generated through standard experimental techniques. For small projects that are building a proof of concept for their methodology, obtaining this data can be arduous and expensive. To relieve the burden of data collection from these projects and grow a lab-wide capability, the Strategic Goods Testbed Team has taken over data collection and placed subscriptions and access to flat data files in a centralized location so that all projects can benefit from these items. We have collected shipping data in the form of PIERS records, judicial information about export control cases, NAC data on the nuclear fuel industry, and financial data from Dun and Bradstreet and our data sets are continuing to expand. With a single access agreement, researchers in data-mining and other fields can utilize all of the records that have been downloaded, make requests through subscription services, and interact with other researchers through our interface. Our testbed team provides more than a simply static repository by working with researchers to refine their data needs and insure data quality as well as quantity. We are currently working with laboratory and initiative specific management to examine effective ways for continuing data growth and sustainability.

data capability↗

SRNL Development of Recovery Processes for Mark-18A Heavy Actinide Targets

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) are developing plans for the recovery of rare and unique isotopes contained within heavy-actinide target assemblies, specifically the Mark-18A. Mark-18A assemblies were irradiated in Savannah River Site (SRS) reactors in the 1970s under extremely high neutron-flux conditions and produced, virtually, the world's supply of plutonium-244, an isotope of key importance to high-precision actinide measurement and other scientific and nonproliferation uses; and curium highly enriched in heavy isotopes (e.g., curium-246 and curium-248). In 2015 and 2016, SRNL is pursuing tasks that would reduce program risk and budget requirements, including further characterization of unprocessed targets; engineering studies for the use of the SRNL Shielded Cells Facility (SCF) for recovery; and development of onsite and offsite shipping methods including a replacement for the heavy (70 ton) cask previously used for onsite transfer of irradiated items at SRS. A status update is provided for the characterization, including modeling using the Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP); direct non-destructive assay measurements; and cask design.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Progress Addressing Safeguards Capability Development Needs through Educational Outreach and Knowledge Management

This paper describes the NGSI Human Capital Development Program's domestic and international activities, and offers specific case studies to exemplify the outcomes and progress achieved in this area over the past several years. The paper highlights the importance of a sustained effort to address the human dimension of safeguards and nonproliferation and to address critical work force issues in the U.S. and abroad.

international safeguards, human capital developmen↗

Global Survey of the Concepts and Understanding of the Interfaces Between Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards

There is increasing global discourse on how the elements of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards can be most effectively implemented in nuclear power programs. While each element is separate and unique, they must nevertheless all be addressed in a country’s laws and implemented via regulations and in facility operations. This topic is of particular interest to countries that are currently developing the infrastructure to support nuclear power programs. These countries want to better understand what is required by these elements and how they can manage the interfaces between them and take advantages of any synergies that may exist. They need practical examples and guidance in this area in order to develop better organizational strategies and technical capacities. This could simplify their legal, regulatory, and management structures and avoid inefficient approaches and costly mistakes that may not be apparent to them at this early stage of development. From the perspective of IAEA International Safeguards, supporting Member States in exploring such interfaces and synergies provides a benefit to them because it acknowledges that domestic safeguards in a country do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it relies on a strong State System of Accounting and Control that is in turn dependent on a capable and independent regulatory body as well as a competent operator and technical staff. These organizations must account for and control nuclear material, communicate effectively, and manage and transmit complete and correct information to the IAEA in a timely manner. This, while in most cases also being responsible for the safety and security of their facilities. Seeking efficiencies in this process benefits international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will present the results of a global survey of current and anticipated approaches and practices by countries and organizations with current or future nuclear power programs on how they are implementing, or planning to implement, safety, security, and safeguards in their programs. The idea is to capture current knowledge and thinking on this topic and to identify common themes in organizations and management. It will also document the most commonly held ideas and perception (and misperceptions) of what it means to manage interfaces and take advantage of synergies for operating nuclear facilities and those that are building their infrastructures. It is desired that the results of this paper will inform the current discourse on this topic with some quantitative data and identify any general trends in understanding.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Improved CZT for Gamma Detection

The goal of the project is to advance the state of the art for spectroscopic and imaging detectors for nonproliferation uses by developing a fundamental understanding of defects limiting the performance of large-volume CZT detectors and fixing them, and increasing the detector size and electron mobility-lifetime product while reducing the cost of detector-grade crystals. Interaction points can be precisely determined in 3D for CZT detectors.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

NNSA Program Develops the Next Generation of Nuclear Security Experts

NNSA is fostering the next generation of nuclear security experts is through its successful NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP). NGFP offers its Fellows an exceptional career development opportunity through hands-on experience supporting NNSA mission areas across policy and technology disciplines. The one-year assignments give tomorrow’s leaders in global nuclear security and nonproliferation unparalleled exposure through assignments to Program Offices across NNSA.

human capital development↗

Spectral Analysis of Rare Earth Elements using Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy

There is growing interest in rapid analysis of rare earth elements (REEs) both due to the need to find new natural sources to satisfy increased demand in their use in various electronic devices, as well as the fact that they are used to estimate actinide masses for nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) appears to be a particularly well-suited spectroscopy-based technology to rapidly and accurately analyze the REEs in various matrices at low concentration levels (parts-per-million). Although LIBS spectra of REEs have been reported for a number of years, further work is still necessary in order to be able to quantify the concentrations of various REEs in real-world complex samples. LIBS offers advantages over conventional solution-based radiochemistry in terms of cost, analytical turnaround, waste generation, personnel dose, and contamination risk. Rare earth elements of commercial interest are found in the following three matrix groups: 1) raw ores and unrefined materials, 2) as components in refined products such as magnets, lighting phosphors, consumer electronics (which are mostly magnets and phosphors), catalysts, batteries, etc., and 3) waste/recyclable materials (aka e-waste). LIBS spectra for REEs such as Gd, Nd, and Sm found in rare earth magnets are presented.

Laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy↗