Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Protection & Control”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 739 records · Page 41

Review of Prior U.S. Attribute Measurement Systems

Attribute Measurement Systems have been developed and demonstrated several times in the United States over the last decade or so; under the Trilateral Initiative (1996-2002), FMTTD (Fissile Material Transparency Technology Demonstration, 2000), and NG-AMS (Next Generation Attribute Measurement System, 2005-2008). Each Attribute Measurement System has contributed to the growing body of knowledge regarding the use of such systems in warhead dismantlement and other Arms Control scenarios. The Trilateral Initiative, besides developing prototype hardware/software, introduced the topic to the international community. The 'trilateral' parties included the United States, the Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). With the participation of a Russian delegation, the FMTTD demonstrated that measurements behind an information barrier are feasible while meeting host party security requirements. The NG-AMS system explored the consequences of maximizing the use of Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) equipment, which made construction easier, but authentication harder. The 3rd Generation Attribute Measurement System (3G-AMS) will further the scope of previous systems by including additional attributes and more rigor in authentication.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Enhancing grid reliability and resilience through novel DER control, total situational awareness and integrated distribution-transmission representation

High penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) can lead to overvoltage and thermal violations, miscoordination of protection devices and potential adverse control interactions. The challenges are exacerbated by a lack of operator situational awareness of behind-the-meter DERs, and T&D interactions. Furthermore, the large attack surface of a DER environment creates significant cyber security challenges. The motivation is to address these barriers. The main goal is to enable extreme levels of DERs in distribution systems while simultaneously enhancing their reliability and resiliency. This is achieved by a data-driven approach for operation, planning and control of distribution systems with total situational awareness and real-time DER control enabled by a network of edge intelligent devices, a cloud-based analytical platform, and secure communications.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Integrated testing of the Thales LPT9510 pulse tube cooler and the iris LCCE electronics

The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) has identified the Thales LPT9510 pulse tube cryocooler as a candidate low cost cryocooler to provide active cooling on future cost-capped scientific missions. The commercially available cooler can provide refrigeration in excess of 2 W at 100K for 60W of power. JPL purchased the LPT9510 cooler for thermal and dynamic performance characterization, and has initiated the flight qualification of the existing cooler design to satisfy near-term JPL needs for this cooler. The LPT9510 has been thermally tested over the heat reject temperature range of 0C to +40C during characterization testing. The cooler was placed on a force dynamometer to measure the selfgenerated vibration of the cooler. Iris Technology has provided JPL with a brass board version of the Low Cost Cryocooler Electronics (LCCE) to drive the Thales cooler during characterization testing. The LCCE provides precision closed-loop temperature control and embodies extensive protection circuitry for handling and operational robustness; other features such as exported vibration mitigation and low frequency input current filtering are envisioned as options that future flight versions may or may not include based upon the mission requirements. JPL has also chosen to partner with Iris Technology for the development of electronics suitable for future flight applications. Iris Technology is building a set of radiation-hard, flight-design electronics to deliver to the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). Test results of the thermal, dynamic and EMC testing of the integrated Thales LPT9510 cooler and Iris LCCE electronics is presented here.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Single-Volume Neutron Scatter Camera for High-Efficiency Neutron Imaging and Source Characterization. Year 2 of 3 Summary

The neutron scatter camera (NSC), an imaging spectrometer for fission energy neutrons, is an established and proven detector for nuclear security applications such as weak source detection of special nuclear material (SNM), arms control treaty verification, and emergency response. Relative to competing technologies such as coded aperture imaging, time-encoded imaging, neutron time projection chamber, and various thermal neutron imagers, the NSC provides excellent event-by-event directional information for signal/background discrimination, reasonable imaging resolution, and good energy resolution. Its primary drawback is very low detection efficiency due to the requirement for neutron elastic scatters in two detector cells. We will develop a singlevolume double-scatter neutron imager, in which both neutron scatters can occur in the same large active volume. If successful, the efficiency will be dramatically increased over the current NSC cell-based geometry. If the detection efficiency approaches that of e.g. coded aperture imaging, the other inherent advantages of double-scatter imaging would make it the most attractive fast neutron detector for a wide range of security applications.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing transformation of safeguards by the Agency.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Scenarios for exercising technical approaches to verified nuclear reductions

Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 2009 committed to a continuing process of step-by-step nuclear arms reductions beyond the new START treaty that was signed April 8, 2010 and to the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In addition, the US Nuclear Posture review released April 6, 2010 commits the US to initiate a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures. It is impossible to predict the specific directions that US-RU nuclear arms reductions will take over the 5-10 years. Additional bilateral treaties could be reached requiring effective verification as indicated by statements made by the Obama administration. There could also be transparency agreements or other initiatives (unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) that require monitoring with a standard of verification lower than formal arms control, but still needing to establish confidence to domestic, bilateral and multilateral audiences that declared actions are implemented. The US Nuclear Posture Review and other statements give some indication of the kinds of actions and declarations that may need to be confirmed in a bilateral or multilateral setting. Several new elements of the nuclear arsenals could be directly limited. For example, it is likely that both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear warheads (deployed and in storage), warhead components, and aggregate stocks of such items could be accountable under a future treaty or transparency agreement. In addition, new initiatives or agreements may require the verified dismantlement of a certain number of nuclear warheads over a specified time period. Eventually procedures for confirming the elimination of nuclear warheads, components and fissile materials from military stocks will need to be established. This paper is intended to provide useful background information for establishing a conceptual approach to a five-year technical program plan for research and development of nuclear arms reductions verification and transparency technologies and procedures.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Sensing and Sampling of Trace Contaminations by a Dexterous Hexrotor UAV at Nuclear Facilities - 18600

Safe and efficient cleanups are a priority for decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The contaminations of byproducts and wastes in such nuclear facilities pose a serious problems while decommissioning, to both the operators and public. Sensing these contaminations and cleaning them is an essential part of the safety procedures. The contaminations might range from low-energy to high-energy byproducts. Sensing these byproducts would require contact based or non-contact based sensing, based on its energy levels. Byproducts such as americium, are low-energy which makes it difficult to sense and sample without contact. Therefore, the workers need to physically swab the surfaces to collect the samples of these contaminations. These tasks pose a great danger for the safety of the human workers which includes the risk to reach greater heights, exposure to the radiation and sampling the entire building. A robotic solution is much more desirable in these cases, where the worker can safely handle the contaminations from a safe area. Use of robotic technologies inside these hazardous environments ensures the safety and enhances the performance. The more suitable robotic solution for reaching great heights and covering large areas of nuclear facilities, are aerial vehicles. Multi-rotor unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) are chosen for their ability to hover at a position and also fly around in confined spaces. Quadrotors are a common choice of multi-rotor UAVs both research and industry because of its ease to fly and commercial availability. For the applications during the cleanups we need the UAV to not only hover and fly in confined spaces, but also interact with the physical world. Despite of quadrotor's advantages, they are not a best suit as they can't interact with the physical world. The tasks involving physical interactions would require the UAV to apply arbitrary forces and torques in all six degrees of freedom (DOF). As quadrotors are under-actuated and non-holonomic in motion, they cannot exert all the required forces. At Collaborative Robotics Lab, Purdue University, we developed a novel multi-rotor UAV solution, Dexterous Hexrotor, which can exert arbitrary forces and torques in all six DOF, independently and instantaneously. This enables the UAV platform to quickly respond to the external disturbances and precisely hold its position during the mission. The Dexterous Hexrotor serves as a robotic tool for the workers to perform sensing and sampling during the cleanups. Workers can operate Dexterous Hexrotor manually and/or semi-autonomously with human intervention. Manual control requires the worker to fly the Dexterous Hexrotor using a remote control. So the workers should possess knowledge on flying the UAV and to perform physical interaction. A semiautonomous Dexterous Hexrotor requires human input to some extent and requires very less knowledge of flying. The autonomy is designed to operate in flight mode and sampling mode. In flight mode, Dexterous Hexrotor takes off from a 'safe' area, reaches the desired altitude, and fly autonomously towards a sampling point. This sampling point is the target position specified on the 2D reference map. This mode also includes navigation towards the sampling point, avoiding the obstacles in the constrained environment. After reaching a stopping point, Dexterous Hexrotor waits for the human input for a target location to swab and collect samples. The Dexterous Hexrotor is now in sampling mode and waits for the human input. The human operator selects the swabbing location through the live streaming video from onboard camera. Through visual servoing, aided by the map, the UAV will move closer towards the target position. It then transitions to the impact control scheme to perform physical interaction with the wall and collects samples. Once the sample is collected, it autonomously returns back to the takeoff position in 'safe' area for the analysis by mass spectrometry. In this paper, we majorly focus on the physical interaction strategy and the required components which enables the autonomy. Decommissioning of nuclear facilities requires decontamination inside the entire buildings. Decontamination of nuclear facilities involves sensing and sampling the huge buildings, long shafts, etc. Sampling the entire facility is not possible due to the limitation in Dexterous Hexrotor's flight time. But this can be achieved by using a swarm of Dexterous Hexrotors to cover larger areas. The onboard robotic arm can be designed based on the applications such as cleaning, applying sealants, etc. The modularity of the design allows us to switch components as per the requirements of the task. These kind of robotic solutions functioning as tools for the workers, aims to make the work environment safer and playful. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Comments for A Conference on Verification in the 21st Century

The author offers 5 points for the discussion of Verification and Technology: (1) Experience with the implementation of arms limitation and arms reduction agreements confirms that technology alone has never been relied upon to provide effective verification. (2) The historical practice of verification of arms control treaties between Cold War rivals may constrain the cooperative and innovative use of technology for transparency, veification and confidence building in the future. (3) An area that has been identified by many, including the US State Department and NNSA as being rich for exploration for potential uses of technology for transparency and verification is information and communications technology (ICT). This includes social media, crowd-sourcing, the internet of things, and the concept of societal verification, but there are issues. (4) On the issue of the extent to which verification technologies are keeping pace with the demands of future protocols and agrements I think the more direct question is ''are they effective in supporting the objectives of the treaty or agreement?'' In this regard it is important to acknowledge that there is a verification grand challenge at our doorstep. That is ''how does one verify limitations on nuclear warheads in national stockpiles?'' (5) Finally, while recognizing the daunting political and security challenges of such an approach, multilateral engagement and cooperation at the conceptual and technical levels provides benefits for addressing future verification challenges.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

An Overview of High Temperature Seal Development and Testing Capabilities at the NASA Glenn Research Center

The NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC), partnering with the University of Toledo, has a long history of developing and testing seal technologies for high-temperature applications. The GRC Seals Team has conducted research and development on high-temperature seal technologies for applications including advanced propulsion systems, thermal protection systems (airframe and control surface thermal seals), high-temperature preloading technologies, and other extreme-environment seal applications. The team has supported several high-profile projects over the past 30 years and has partnered with numerous organizations, including other government entities, academic institutions, and private organizations. Some of these projects have included the National Aerospace Space Plane (NASP), Space Shuttle Space Transport System (STS), the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), and the Dream Chaser Space Transportation System, as well as several high-speed vehicle programs for other government organizations. As part of the support for these programs, NASA GRC has developed unique seal-specific test facilities that permit evaluations and screening exercises in relevant environments. The team has also embarked on developing high-temperature preloaders to help maintain seal functionality in extreme environments. This paper highlights several propulsion-related projects that the NASA GRC Seals Team has supported over the past several years and will provide an overview of existing testing capabilities

National Aerospace Plane↗

Multi-target camera tracking, hand-off and display LDRD 158819 final report

Modern security control rooms gather video and sensor feeds from tens to hundreds of cameras. Advanced camera analytics can detect motion from individual video streams and convert unexpected motion into alarms, but the interpretation of these alarms depends heavily upon human operators. Unfortunately, these operators can be overwhelmed when a large number of events happen simultaneously, or lulled into complacency due to frequent false alarms. This LDRD project has focused on improving video surveillance-based security systems by changing the fundamental focus from the cameras to the targets being tracked. If properly integrated, more cameras shouldn't lead to more alarms, more monitors, more operators, and increased response latency but instead should lead to better information and more rapid response times. For the course of the LDRD we have been developing algorithms that take live video imagery from multiple video cameras, identifies individual moving targets from the background imagery, and then displays the results in a single 3D interactive video. In this document we summarize the work in developing this multi-camera, multi-target system, including lessons learned, tools developed, technologies explored, and a description of current capability.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Multi-Target Camera Tracking, Hand-off and Display LDRD 158819 Final Report

Modern security control rooms gather video and sensor feeds from tens to hundreds of cameras. Advanced camera analytics can detect motion from individual video streams and convert unexpected motion into alarms, but the interpretation of these alarms depends heavily upon human operators. Unfortunately, these operators can be overwhelmed when a large number of events happen simultaneously, or lulled into complacency due to frequent false alarms. This LDRD project has focused on improving video surveillance-based security systems by changing the fundamental focus from the cameras to the targets being tracked. If properly integrated, more cameras shouldn’t lead to more alarms, more monitors, more operators, and increased response latency but instead should lead to better information and more rapid response times. For the course of the LDRD we have been developing algorithms that take live video imagery from multiple video cameras, identify individual moving targets from the background imagery, and then display the results in a single 3D interactive video. In this document we summarize the work in developing this multi-camera, multi-target system, including lessons learned, tools developed, technologies explored, and a description of current capability.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may lead to more proliferation resistant and physically secure design features for SMRs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Monitoring and verification R&D

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report outlined the Administration's approach to promoting the agenda put forward by President Obama in Prague on April 5, 2009. The NPR calls for a national monitoring and verification R&D program to meet future challenges arising from the Administration's nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament agenda. Verification of a follow-on to New START could have to address warheads and possibly components along with delivery capabilities. Deeper cuts and disarmament would need to address all of these elements along with nuclear weapon testing, nuclear material and weapon production facilities, virtual capabilities from old weapon and existing energy programs and undeclared capabilities. We only know how to address some elements of these challenges today, and the requirements may be more rigorous in the context of deeper cuts as well as disarmament. Moreover, there is a critical need for multiple options to sensitive problems and to address other challenges. There will be other verification challenges in a world of deeper cuts and disarmament, some of which we are already facing. At some point, if the reductions process is progressing, uncertainties about past nuclear materials and weapons production will have to be addressed. IAEA safeguards will need to continue to evolve to meet current and future challenges, and to take advantage of new technologies and approaches. Transparency/verification of nuclear and dual-use exports will also have to be addressed, and there will be a need to make nonproliferation measures more watertight and transparent. In this context, and recognizing we will face all of these challenges even if disarmament is not achieved, this paper will explore possible agreements and arrangements; verification challenges; gaps in monitoring and verification technologies and approaches; and the R&D required to address these gaps and other monitoring and verification challenges.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

A Mechanically-Cooled, Highly-Portable, HPGe-Based, Coded-Aperture Gamma-Ray Imager

Coded-aperture gamma-ray imaging is a mature technology that is capable of providing accurate and quantitative images of nuclear materials. Although it is potentially of high value to the safeguards and arms-control communities, it has yet to be fully embraced by those communities. One reason for this is the limited choice, high-cost, and low efficiency of commercial instruments; while instruments made by research organizations are frequently large and / or unsuitable for field work. In this paper we present the results of a project that mates the coded-aperture imaging approach with the latest in commercially-available, position-sensitive, High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detec-tors. The instrument replaces a laboratory prototype that, was unsuitable for other than demonstra-tions. The original instrument, and the cart on which it is mounted to provide mobility and pointing capabilities, has a footprint of ~ 2/3 m x 2 m, weighs ~ 100 Kg, and requires cryogen refills every few days. In contrast, the new instrument is tripod mounted, weighs of order 25 Kg, operates with a laptop computer, and is mechanically cooled. The instrument is being used in a program that is ex-ploring the use of combined radiation and laser scanner imaging. The former provides information on the presence, location, and type of nuclear materials while the latter provides design verification information. To align the gamma-ray images with the laser scanner data, the Ge imager is fitted and aligned to a visible-light stereo imaging unit. This unit generates a locus of 3D points that can be matched to the precise laser scanner data. With this approach, the two instruments can be used completely independently at a facility, and yet the data can be accurately overlaid based on the very structures that are being measured.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Delayed Gamma-Ray Spectroscopy for Non-Destructive Assay of Nuclear Materials

High-­energy, beta-delayed gamma-­ray spectroscopy is a potential, non-­destructive assay techniques for the independent verification of declared quantities of special nuclear materials at key stages of the fuel cycle and for directly assaying nuclear material inventories for spent fuel handling, interim storage, reprocessing facilities, repository sites, and final disposal. Other potential applications include determination of MOX fuel composition, characterization of nuclear waste packages, and challenges in homeland security and arms control verification. Experimental measurements were performed to evaluate fission fragment yields, to test methods for determining isotopic fractions, and to benchmark the modeling code package. Experimental measurement campaigns were carried out at the IAC using a photo-­neutron source and at OSU using a thermal neutron beam from the TRIGA reactor to characterize the emission of high-­energy delayed gamma rays from 235 U, 239 Pu, and 241 Pu targets following neutron induced fission. Data were collected for pure and combined targets for several irradiation/spectroscopy cycle times ranging from 10/10 seconds to 15/30 minutes.The delayed gamma-ray signature of 241 Pu, a significant fissile constituent in spent fuel, was measured and compared to 239 Pu. The 241 Pu/ 239 Pu ratios varied between 0.5 and 1.2 for ten prominent lines in the 2700-­3600 keV energy range. Such significant differences in relative peak intensities make it possible to determine relative fractions of these isotopes in a mixed sample. A method for determining fission product yields by fitting the energy and time dependence of the delayed gamma-­ray emission was developed and demonstrated on a limited 235 U data set. De-­convolution methods for determining fissile fractions were developed and tested on the experimental data. The use of high count-­rate LaBr 3 detectors was investigated as a potential alternative to HPGe detectors. Modeling capabilities were added to an existing framework and codes were adapted as needed for analyzing experiments and assessing application-­specific assay concepts. A de-­convolution analysis of the delayed gamma-­ray response spectra modeled for spent fuel assemblies was performed using the same method that was applied to the experimental spectra.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

GLAMOR – OR HOW WE ACHIEVED A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON THE DECREASE OF GLASS DISSOLUTION KINETICS

The objective of the EC funded GLAMOR project was to achieve a common understanding of the processes that control the decrease of the dissolution rate of high-level waste glass in water when silica becomes saturated. Is the affinity controlled concept, or the protective layer concept dominating? The following steps were taken: (1) review of the literature, (2) selection of an experimental dataset, and selection of the models r(t) and GM2003, and (3) application by the GLAMOR partners of the models to the datasets. The main focus has been on dissolution tests in pure water at different values of surface to volume and pH. Some of the main conclusions were: (1) both affinity and protective layer concepts must be considered in the interpretation of the rate decreasing stage, (2) the residual dissolution rate observed beyond the silica saturation stage is far more important in view of the long-term performance of the glass, and deserves more attention in future R&D. GLAMOR also discussed in detail the modelling parameters such as the silica saturation concentration, the silica diffusion coefficient, the silica retention factor in the reaction layer, and the water diffusion coefficient.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Heavy metals in fish from the Aleutians: Interspecific and locational differences

The objectives of this study were to examine levels of arsenic, cadmium, lead, mercury and selenium in edible tissue of seven species of marine fish collected from several Aleutian islands (in 2004) to determine: (1) interspecific differences, (2) locational differences (among Aleutian Islands), (3) size-related differences in any metal levels within a species, and (4) potential risk to the fish or to predators on the fish, including humans. We also compared metals levels to those of three other fish species previously examined in detail, as well as examining metals in the edible tissue of octopus (Octopus dofleini). Octopus did not have the highest levels of any metal. There were significant interspecific differences in all metal levels among the fish species, although the differences were less than an order of magnitude, except for arsenic (mean of 19,500 ppb in Flathead sole, Hippoglossoides elassodon). Significant intraisland variation occurred among the four sites on Amchitka, but there was not a consistent pattern. There were significant interisland differences for some metals and species. Mercury levels increased significantly with size for several species; lead increased significantly for only one fish species; and cadmium and selenium decreased significantly with size for halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis). The Alaskan Department of Health and Social Services supports unrestricted consumption of most Alaskan fish species for all people, including pregnant women. Most mean metal concentrations were well below the levels known to adversely affect the fish themselves, or predators that consume them (including humans), except for mercury in three fish species (mean levels just below 0.3 ppm), and arsenic in two fish species. However, even at low mercury levels, people who consume fish almost daily will exceed guideline values from the Centers for Disease Control and the Environmental Protection Agency. - Highlights: • Cadmium, lead, mercury and selenium levels differed among 10 fish species from the Aleutians. • Mean Arsenic was as high as 19,500 ppb (flathead sole, Hippoglossoides elassodon). • Mercury levels increased significantly with fish size for several species. • Metal levels were generally below adverse effects levels for fish and their predators. • Mercury and arsenic might pose a risk to human consumers, and require further examination.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Quality Control Quantification (QCQ): A Tool to Measure the Value of Quality Control Checks in Radiation Oncology

Purpose: To quantify the error-detection effectiveness of commonly used quality control (QC) measures. Methods: We analyzed incidents from 2007-2010 logged into a voluntary in-house, electronic incident learning systems at 2 academic radiation oncology clinics. None of the incidents resulted in patient harm. Each incident was graded for potential severity using the French Nuclear Safety Authority scoring scale; high potential severity incidents (score >3) were considered, along with a subset of 30 randomly chosen low severity incidents. Each report was evaluated to identify which of 15 common QC checks could have detected it. The effectiveness was calculated, defined as the percentage of incidents that each QC measure could detect, both for individual QC checks and for combinations of checks. Results: In total, 4407 incidents were reported, 292 of which had high-potential severity. High- and low-severity incidents were detectable by 4.0 {+-} 2.3 (mean {+-} SD) and 2.6 {+-} 1.4 QC checks, respectively (P<.001). All individual checks were less than 50% sensitive with the exception of pretreatment plan review by a physicist (63%). An effectiveness of 97% was achieved with 7 checks used in combination and was not further improved with more checks. The combination of checks with the highest effectiveness includes physics plan review, physician plan review, Electronic Portal Imaging Device-based in vivo portal dosimetry, radiation therapist timeout, weekly physics chart check, the use of checklists, port films, and source-to-skin distance checks. Some commonly used QC checks such as pretreatment intensity modulated radiation therapy QA do not substantially add to the ability to detect errors in these data. Conclusions: The effectiveness of QC measures in radiation oncology depends sensitively on which checks are used and in which combinations. A small percentage of errors cannot be detected by any of the standard formal QC checks currently in broad use, suggesting that further improvements are needed. These data require confirmation with a broader incident-reporting database.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗