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At least 757 records · Page 42
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Section 106 Recordation, Interpretation, and Documentation for the Demolition of Buildings 9201-5 and 9204-4, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

In 2019 and 2020, Cultural Resource Analysts, Inc. (CRA), began preparing recordation packages for 18 World War II and Cold War Era buildings slated for demolition at the request of Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS), on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The recordations for these 18 buildings, which are located within what is now known as the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, were prepared and submitted in two separate packages. The first report (EC-NP-004) was prepared as a mitigation measure to address adverse effects that will result from the proposed demolition of 16 support and ancillary buildings. The current report is the second of the two packages and addresses the last two of the 18 buildings slated for demolition (9201-5 and 9204-4), which are two of the large process buildings located at Y-12. All 18 of these buildings have previously been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The two buildings, Building 9201-5 and Building 9204-4, are located south of Bear Creek Road and west of the main Y-12 entrance gate. Both buildings were constructed as uranium enrichment facilities in support of the Manhattan Project, a top-secret World War II mission to develop the world’s first nuclear weapons. Building 9201-5, completed in October 1944, is the Alpha-5 process facility and Building 9204-4, completed in Fall 1945, is the Beta-4 process facility. Over the years, these facilities were repurposed for a number of different functions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

NuTools: Exploring Practical Roles for Neutrinos in Nuclear Energy and Security

For decades, physicists have used neutrinos from nuclear reactors to advance basic science. These pursuits have inspired many ideas for application of neutrino detectors in nuclear energy and security. While developments in neutrino detectors are now making some of these ideas technically feasible, their value in the context of real needs and constraints has been unclear. This report seeks to help focus the picture of where neutrino technology may find practical roles in nuclear energy and security. This report is the final product of the Nu Tools study, commissioned in 2019 by the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R\&D). The study was conducted over two years by a group of neutrino physicists and nuclear engineers. A central theme of the study and this report is that useful application of neutrinos will depend not only on advancing physics and technology but also on understanding the needs and constraints of potential end-users.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

Interactive Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Security Workshop

The goal of this workshop is to role play and walk through various UAS incursion scenarios to: 1. Recognize the complex interactions between physical protection, response, and UAS technologies in a nuclear security event; 2. Identify potential regulatory and legal complications dealing with UAS as aircraft; 3. Identify communication/coordination touch points with facility security and law enforcement; 4. Identify possible physical security and response strategies to help mitigate UAS impact.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Earth Sciences Applications for Energy and Global Security: A Few Vignettes [Slides]

Understanding the physics of flow and transport in the subsurface environment is crucial to several National Security applications. In the Energy Security realm, some examples include characterizing radioactive waste disposal, exploring natural gas extraction and sequestering CO2. An example in the Global Security arena is to be able to distinguish between anthropogenic and naturally occurring seismic disturbances, the former being of particular concern as underground nuclear testing activity has seen an increase in recent years. A common theme across these applications is the ability to accurately model fluid flow in porous and/or fractured subsurface media. For decades, researchers have grappled with how to include the effects of uncertainties in these models, including but not limited to heterogeneity, unknown initial and boundary conditions and issues with scalability. More recently advances in computing and machine learning methodologies have allowed a broader exploration of the uncertainty space as we strive for real time decision making. I will present an overview of the field and discuss a few examples of how my own research in these topics has evolved over nearly two decades.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Research Directions on AI for Science, Energy, and Security: Report on Summer 2022 Workshops

Over the past decade, fundamental changes in artificial intelligence (AI)—from foundational to applied—have delivered dramatic insights across a wide breadth of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) mission space. AI is helping to augment and improve scientific and engineering workflows (e.g., for control, design, and dramatic performance gains through surrogate models) in national security, the Office of Science, and DOE’s applied energy programs. The progress and potential for AI in DOE science was captured in the 2020 “AI for Science” report from the DOE laboratory community in collaboration with academia and industry. Specific scientific areas ready to further leverage the power of AI ranged from the scale and performance of computational models to data analysis to creating new classes of observations using computer vision. Since that report, the scale and scope of scientific AI have accelerated, revealing new, emergent properties that yield insights that go beyond enabling opportunities to being potentially transformative in the way that scientific problems are posed and solved. Thus, under the guidance of both the Office of Science (SC) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the DOE national laboratories organized a series of workshops in 2022 to gather input on new and rapidly emerging opportunities and challenges of scientific AI. This 2023 report is a synthesis of those workshops. The scientific community believes AI can have a foundational impact on a broad range of DOE missions, including science, energy, and national security. Further, DOE has unique capabilities that enable the community to drive progress in scientific use of AI, building on long-standing DOE strengths and investments in computation, data, and communications infrastructure, spanning the Energy Sciences Network (ESnet), the Exascale Computing Project (ECP), and integrative programs such as the NNSA Office of Defense Programs Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) and the SC Scientific Discovery through Advanced Computing (SciDAC) programs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Effects of the War in Ukraine on National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Missions

While the challenge from a risen and revisionist China may prove greater and more enduring, Russia’s war on Ukraine profoundly changes the strategic context, importance, and requirements of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) missions. The world changed as much in February of 2022 as it did in November of 1989 or December of 1991 , when the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union fell apart. These changes will not likely be ephemeral. Russia is preparing for a long war and a prolonged period of isolation from and hostility toward the West. Although Russia has many political, economic, and military weaknesses, it retains the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. Russia is therefore central to deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security issues. Furthermore, Moscow’s permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council affords it a veto potentially affecting all these issues.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber and Physical Security Analysis of GSI and Noventum Application for IoT Communications

We present our findings of the red team exercise conducted on the device and application developed by Guardian Sensors, Inc. (GSI) and Noventum. The app is used for situational awareness and control of photovoltaics (PV) and microgrid energy systems. The assessments performed are practical case scenarios that assess the risks and vulnerabilities posed by the app through targeted activities that could be engaged by an adversary. The assessment team’s results and recommendations are provided to inform on and mitigate the identified weaknesses to improve secure user authentication, connections, and communications. The recommendations in this report are not intended to be a security panacea but will add the desired defense-in-depth layer to securing communication of such interconnected systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Fielding Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests at the National Security Research Center

For staff at the Lab’s National Security Research Center, fulfilling requests for information can sometimes be a bit otherworldly. Some of these requests are made under the Freedom of Information Act or FOIA, which are submitted to NNSA by the public and directed to LANL for records search and review. The topics of these requests range from technical reports to records on unidentified flying objects. “Fulfilling FOIA requests is an important part of what we do here,” said NSRC senior archivist Daniel Alcazar (WRS-NSRCMS). “It’s critical to our mission to ensure the public has access to information it has the right to see.” Congress passed the FOIA in 1967, giving any person the right to request access to federal agency records so they can better understand the U.S. Government’s operations and activities. Federal agencies are required to disclose information requested under the FOIA, unless it falls under one or more of nine exemptions protecting interests such as personal privacy, national security, and law enforcement. Often described as the law that keeps citizens in the know about the government, the FOIA is a vital part of U.S. democracy. The Laboratory’s FOIA program works with over a hundred requests for records each year. As the Lab’s classified research and technical library dedicated to information stewardship and education, the National Security Research Center (NSRC) regularly assists with these requests– as many as 45 per year. Public queries cover a spectrum of topics, but most common include requests for Manhattan Project era documents and memoranda, Los Alamos technical reports, Los Alamos-produced historical and scientific motion picture film and videos, as well as those seeking any documents or files pertaining to a former scientist, engineer or employee. While less common, Alcazar estimates that he receives a few FOIA requests a year related to unidentified flying objects (UFOs) and unexplained aerial phenomena (UAP).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

ORNL Peer Review Summary and Recommendations for: Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors Study

The purpose of this document is to provide a summary of the peer review conducted for the "Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors" study prepared by researchers at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) International Nuclear Security (INS) program team requested that ORNL perform a peer review of the study report prior to publication as a final peer check before distributing the report to a broader audience.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security - Advanced Delay Technologies

As a new generation of reactors is developed, reducing the cost of physical security without impacting the required system effectiveness will help to make new reactors economical. This report discusses several access delay technologies available to help improve the overall effectiveness of the physical security system. These technologies include both passive and active delay elements, as well as guidance on best practices related to security by design principles.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Assessment of Physical Security Modeling and Simulation in the Vulnerability Assessment Process

This report provides a comprehensive assessment of physical security modeling and simulation tools available for use in the vulnerability assessment (VA) process for nuclear facilities. It outlines the historical evolution of VA methodologies, emphasizing the transition from traditional layer-based approaches to a more holistic framework that integrates detection probabilities directly into combat simulations. The document details the critical components of the VA process, including the characterization of targets, threats, and protective measures, as well as the development of adversary scenarios that reflect both insider and outsider threats. It highlights the importance of performance assurance programs, emphasizing the need for continuous evaluation and testing of security systems to ensure their effectiveness against evolving threats. Additionally, the report discusses the significance of utilizing accredited modeling and simulation tools in accredited areas to accurately represent adversary actions and the corresponding responses of protective forces. By establishing a systematic approach to VA, this document aims to enhance the overall security posture of nuclear facilities, ensuring compliance with regulatory standards while effectively mitigating risks associated with potential adversarial actions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Microreactor Security-by-Design Recommendations for Domestic and International Deployments

This report outlines methods vendors can use to incorporate security-by-design (SeBD) into their microreactor facility design to support and address security for both U.S. and international deployment. The team developed a hypothetical below-grade microreactor with a physical protection system (PPS) to protect the microreactor against acts of theft and sabotage and evaluated it against two adversary attack scenarios defined by a group of adversary subject matter experts (SMEs). The hypothetical microreactor facility consists of two distinct buildings. The first is the above-grade protected area (PA) entry control point (ECP) building, which houses security personnel responsible for conducting screenings and managing access to the PA. The second building is the reactor building, which features both an above-grade floor and a below-grade floor.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Regulatory Considerations for Domestic Reprocessing Facility Physical Security

U.S. advanced non-light-water reactor vendors may pursue collocated on-site reprocessing activities. Therefore, these facilities are likely to possess formula quantities, or Category I quantities, of special nuclear material (SNM) during normal operations. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) has yet to formally establish a regulatory framework for commercial reprocessing. While Category I requirements would explicitly not apply in this circumstance under current regulatory requirements, regulatory certainty does not exist. A novel framework should be developed to ensure public health and safety while also risk-informing the physical security requirements. This report reviews the relevant background of related rulemaking activities and proposes risk-informed physical protection requirements to satisfy these objectives. Insights from NRC security-related rulemaking activities provide a substantial technical basis to approach potential establishment of physical security requirements for reprocessing facilities. If a licensee can provide justification that the material satisfies a sufficient self-protecting radiation dose threshold, the material may not be subject to theft or diversion requirements and only potential sabotage requirements would apply. Furthermore, if the material can be justified to be moderately dilute, a set of risk-informed requirements could provide adequate protection of public health and safety. A revised performance objective for prevention of theft of moderately dilute Category I SNM may be detection to allow prompt recovery by a local law enforcement agency. However, a significant caveat to the proposed categorization scheme is the unknown integration of radiological sabotage with requirements for the protection against theft. Future licensees should consult with the NRC regarding treatment of this regulatory topic. Additionally, the self-protecting radiation dose threshold (either the existing or a proposed future threshold) would need to be considered. An integrated approach may apply graded potential requirements for protection against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage currently applicable to commercial nuclear power plants and Category I SNM facilities defined within 10 CFR 73.1(a).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

A Framework for Building Security into the Design Process

This report presents guidance to support the implementation of security objectives during the design process for nuclear facilities using an organization’s quality management system. The guidance in this document is intended for design vendors and operators of nuclear power facilities. Additionally, this guidance document can be beneficial to regulatory bodies, industry partners, customers, and other stakeholders within the nuclear power market. This report aims to ensure security consequences are identified before designs are completed, which may lead to reduced costs and higher security effectiveness and efficiency.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop Report

The Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop - held on June 17-18, 2025, National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) in Golden, Colorado - brought together approximately 40 external stakeholders from the energy sector, including VPP owner/operators, aggregators, OEMs, utilities, testing & certification labs, trade associations, and cybersecurity vendors. Led by key facilitators, the workshop focused on addressing cybersecurity challenges and enhancing grid resilience for aggregated Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and Virtual Power Plants (VPPs). The workshop was catalyzed by recognition that traditional, rearward-looking regulatory frameworks are insufficient to keep pace with technological change. There is a "missing understanding" of risk, an "absent security basis" for managing it, and an "untenable responsibility" due to unclear ownership and requirements. The workshop aimed to shift the mindset from reacting to past crises to proactively preparing for emerging threats, fostering forward resilience through risk simulation and collaborative action. This report summarizes the outcomes of the workshop, marking it a significant step toward a secure, reliable and affordable energy future.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Mitigation for the demolition of the foundation of building 25-3113/3113a, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish the foundation of Building 25-3113/3113A and the adjoining test pad at Test Cell A in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). The foundation of Building 25-3113/3113A (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B2443) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B2443↗
DOE OSTI2026

Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Safeguards; Evaluating Safeguards and Security Risks and Benefits for Advanced and Small Modular Reactor Deployments

Rapidly growing interest in advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) technologies presents challenges as well as opportunities for implementing international safeguards and security. A/SMR deployments are expected to be more numerous, more geographically dispersed, and more varied in their designs, placing new demands on the data systems and analytical tools used to support oversight (Alberti et al., 2023; Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission et al., 2024). Because of this variability, the importance and reliance on data systems for A/SMR deployments is expected to be higher than for previous reactor generations. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) offer potential capabilities to address the high variability inherent in A/SMR technology. The beneficiaries of AI-assisted tools include facility operators, government regulators, IAEA inspectors, and A/SMR vendors. This report analyzes how AI/ML-assisted technologies can strengthen the implementation of IAEA safeguards and security measures. It also identifies AI-assisted tools to strengthen operator, facility, and regulator knowledge management practices and examines the potential risks AI/ML-based tools may introduce to IAEA safeguards and security efforts. It concludes with a set of hypothetical, standards-style requirements for AI/ML systems used in safeguards contexts, grounded in an inspector-centric view of system verification. Despite the potential benefits of AI/ML systems, understanding potential intentional and unintentional failure modes is critical for ensuring adequate protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Unique features of A/SMRs including sealed cores, remote and novel paradigms of operation, off-site reactor fabrication, novel fuel forms, and varied refueling requirements, introduce challenges for traditional safeguards technological approaches (Pensado et al., 2024; Federation of American Scientists, 2025). AI/ML systems deployed to address these challenges may introduce new risks requiring systematic evaluation rooted in both AI-specific risk frameworks, such as the NIST AI Risk Management Framework (NIST AI RMF), and established cyber risk management standards such as NIST SP 800-30 (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2023; NIST, 2012).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Mitigation for the demolition of building 25-3124,equipment testing laboratory, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish Building 25-3124 in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). Building 25-3124 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B19009) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B19009↗