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Guest Editorial: Special Section on Sustainable Energy for Enhancing Grid Resiliency

Extreme weather threatens lives, disables communities, and devastates energy generation, transmission, and distribution systems. These extreme events are likely to become more frequent or more intense due to climate change. Energy networks have shown significant vulnerability during record hurricanes, deadly heat waves, destructive wildfires, and winter storms in the past few years. Because of the energy transition process, modern power grids will feature a high penetration level of the use of renewable resources. The adoption of renewable energy and the rise of omnidirectional power delivery mean that our energy network is more decentralized than ever. In this new environment, grid operation becomes more complex, and achieving resiliency is more difficult than in the past. Many utilities are seeking the latest technologies to improve energy security and responsiveness to severe events. On the one hand, sustainable energy resources can provide emergency power and assist grid restoration in disastrous events. On the other hand, their volatility, susceptibility, interdependency, and other unique features must be carefully considered when being used for grid resilience enhancement. This special section brings together 22 papers that range from innovative research advances tackling fundamental challenges of achieving more resilient grids to real-world demonstrations of leveraging sustainable energy resources to enhance grid resiliency. These papers can be categorized into three groups.

climate change↗

Fortifying Environmental Compliance Strategies at Hanford - 19541

At the Hanford Site, located near Richland, Washington, the Department of Energy is cleaning up legacy radioactive and mixed-waste generated from the Manhattan Project in the 1940's. A major component of cleaning up the waste is maintaining compliance with federal and state environmental regulations. Environmental compliance is also determined through permits, agreements, and consent orders issued by regulating agencies such as the Washington State Department of Health: Office of Radiation Protection, Washington State Department of Ecology Nuclear Waste Program, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Maintaining compliance at Hanford reduces environmental impacts and addresses violations, or non-compliances. The following strategies improve compliance and support the avoidance of enforcement actions. At Hanford, regulatory agency environmental enforcement actions, and their corrective actions, are tracked to completion using databases maintained by inspection subject matter experts. The databases are used to provide the Department of Energy and contractor management with up-to-date status of regulatory agency activity and the required corrective actions. Trending enforcement actions helps target compliance vulnerabilities. Findings and corrective actions that are entered into the databases are then trended by date, location, responsible contractor, agency, and type of compliance issue. The ability to review previous non-compliances in certain locations of the Site, or by general alleged violation, provides the project's environmental contacts with information on what types of issues to look for on pre-inspection walk downs. Finding non-compliances during pre-inspection walk downs allows the contractor to correct the issue and avoid potential fines from regulating agencies. The walk downs are conducted by environmental specialists and project personnel looking for issues that may be viewed as a compliance problem. Using agency checklists and previous inspection correspondence can help to provide valuable information during pre-inspection activities. Training regulatory agency inspectors on Site security requirements, cultural and ecological standards, and inspection protocols allows for increased efficiency and reduces potential miscommunication between regulatory agencies and the regulated contractors. The training also allows the contractors to give the regulating agencies the up-to-date policies and procedures that will be addressed during the inspection. Hanford has pre-identified inspection coordinators within each contractor to assist in coordinating with Department of Energy personnel, projects, and management prior to the inspections. These inspection coordinators notify affected management, accommodate and escort the regulators to locations they ask to inspect, set up requested interviews, and gather requested information that will need to be cleared for public release. These practices make for positive experiences and interactions with the regulating agency personnel and help reduce and eliminate environmental non-compliances, findings, violations, and fines. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Organizational Culture and Safety

'..only a fool perseveres in error.' Cicero. Humans will break the most advanced technological devices and override safety and security systems if they are given the latitude. Within the workplace, the operator may be just one of several factors in causing accidents or making risky decisions. Other variables considered for their involvement in the negative and often catastrophic outcomes include the organizational context and culture. Many organizations have constructed and implemented safety programs to be assimilated into their culture to assure employee commitment and understanding of the importance of everyday safety. The purpose of this paper is to examine literature on organizational safety cultures and programs that attempt to combat vulnerability, risk taking behavior and decisions and identify the role of training in attempting to mitigate unsafe acts.

Adams, Catherine A.↗

Quantitative Risk Analysis

The US energy sector is vulnerable to multiple hazards including both natural disasters and malicious attacks from an intelligent adversary. The question that utility owners, operators and regulators face is how to prioritize their investments to mitigate the risks from a hazard that can have the most impact on the asset of interest. In order to be able to understand their risk landscape and develop a prioritized mitigation strategy, they must quantify risk in a consistent way across all hazards their asset is facing. Without being able to quantitatively measure risk, it is not possible to defensibly prioritize security investments or evaluate trade-offs between security and functionality. Development of a methodology that will consistently measure and quantify risk across different hazards is needed.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE Fffice of Nuclear Energy cybersecurity research, development and demonstration program plan

This document describes the Cybersecurity Research Development and Demonstration (RD&D) Program, established by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) to provide sciencebased methods and technologies necessary for cost-effective, cyber-secure digital instrumentation, control and communication in collaboration with nuclear energy stakeholders. It provides an overview of program goals, objectives, linkages to organizational strategies, management structure, and stakeholder and cross-program interfaces.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Adapting Secure MultiParty Computation to Support Machine Learning in Radio Frequency Sensor Networks

In this project we developed and validated algorithms for privacy-preserving linear regression using a new variant of Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) we call "Hybrid MPC" (hMPC). Our variant is intended to support low-power, unreliable networks of sensors with low-communication, fault-tolerant algorithms. In hMPC we do not share training data, even via secret sharing. Thus, agents are responsible for protecting their own local data. Only the machine learning (ML) model is protected with information-theoretic security guarantees against honest-but-curious agents. There are three primary advantages to this approach: (1) after setup, hMPC supports a communication-efficient matrix multiplication primitive, (2) organizations prevented by policy or technology from sharing any of their data can participate as agents in hMPC, and (3) large numbers of low-power agents can participate in hMPC. We have also created an open-source software library named "Cicada" to support hMPC applications with fault-tolerance. The fault-tolerance is important in our applications because the agents are vulnerable to failure or capture. We have demonstrated this capability at Sandia's Autonomy New Mexico laboratory through a simple machine-learning exercise with Raspberry Pi devices capturing and classifying images while flying on four drones.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A Privacy-Preserving Strategy for the Trust Layer of the Energy Grid of Things Distributed Energy Resource Management System

Emergent from the shadows of the traditional grid flaws, the Smart Grid (SG) idea was born and led by government mandates toward cleaner energy production. The SG represents the next generation of electricity distribution systems that subsume recent technological innovations. It uses digital communication between its components and entities to attain more automation, self-sufficiency, and reliability. Unfortunately, this relatively new concept is not flawless; the intrinsic reliance on increased digital communication spreads open attack paths for adversaries. Therefore, finding solutions that address information exchange vulnerabilities has become imperative. The Energy Grid of Things (EGoT) is Portland State University’s (PSU’s) implementation of a Distributed Energy Resource Management System (DERMS). The EGoT DERMS requires access to customers’ information to achieve operational objectives. The system’s access to customers’ information needs to be restricted such that it does not violate customers’ privacy. Applying privacy protection models such as K-anonymity to EGoT DERMS sub-components safeguards that privacy. This thesis work proposes a strategy to ensure communication in the EGoT DERMS is privacy-preserving and secure. Specifically, it provides an approach to applying the Mondrian Algorithm to ensure data within the system excludes Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and provides means for securing the communication according to industry standards (IEEE 2030.5). Results suggest that the generalization hierarchy derived for the EGoT DERMS exhibits an Identical Generalization Hierarchy structure. Guarantees of sameness manifested in the test feeder topology would not hold in real-world scenarios. This thesis work proposes a strategy to ensure communication in the EGoT DERMS is privacy-preserving and secure. Specifically, it provides an approach to applying the Mondrian Algorithm to ensure data within the system excludes Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and provides means for securing the communication according to industry standards (IEEE 2030.5). Results suggest that the generalization hierarchy derived for the EGoT DERMS exhibits an Identical Generalization Hierarchy structure. Guarantees of sameness manifested in the test feeder topology would not hold in real-world scenarios.

Alsiad, Mohammed↗

Building Stronger State Partnerships With the US Dept. Of Energy (Energy Assurance)

From 2007 until 2011, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) engaged in a partnership with the National Energy Technology Lab (NETL) to improve State-Federal coordination on electricity policy and energy assurance issues. This project allowed State Public Utility Commissioners and their staffs to engage on the most cutting-edge level in the arenas of energy assurance and electricity policy. Four tasks were outlined in the Statement of Performance Objectives: Task 1 - Training for Commissions on Critical Infrastructure Topics; Task 2 - Analyze and Implement Recommendations on Energy Assurance Issues; Task 3 - Ongoing liaison activities & outreach to build stronger networks between federal agencies and state regulators; and Task 4 - Additional Activities. Although four tasks were prescribed, in practice these tasks were carried out under two major activity areas: the critical infrastructure and energy assurance partnership with the US Department of Energy's Infrastructure Security and Emergency Response office, and the National Council on Electricity Policy, a collaborative which since 1994 has brought together State and Federal policymakers to address the most pressing issues facing the grid from restructuring to smart grid implementation. On Critical Infrastructure protection, this cooperative agreement helped State officials yield several important advances. The lead role on NARUC's side was played by our Committee on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Key lessons learned in this arena include the following: (1) Tabletops and exercises work - They improve the capacity of policymakers and their industry counterparts to face the most challenging energy emergencies, and thereby equip these actors with the capacity to face everything up to that point as well. (2) Information sharing is critical - Connecting people who need information with people who have information is a key success factor. However, exposure of critical infrastructure information to bad actors also creates new vulnerabilities. (3) Tensions exist between the transparency-driven basis of regulatory activity and the information-protection requirements of asset protection. (4) Coordination between states is a key success factor - Because comparatively little federal authority exists over electricity and other energy infrastructure, the interstate nature of these energy grids defy centralized command and control governance. Patchwork responses are a risk when addressed at a state-by-state level. Coordination is the key to ensuring consistent response to shared threats. In Electricity Policy, the National Council on Electricity Policy continued to make important strides forward. Coordinated electricity policy among States remains the best surrogate for an absent national electricity policy. In every area from energy efficiency to clean coal, State policies are driving the country's electricity policy, and regional responses to climate change, infrastructure planning, market operation, and new technology deployment depend on a forum for bringing the States together.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Secure Design and Development Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (SD2-C2M2): Next-Generation Cyber Resilience by Design

The Secure Design and Development Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (SD2-C2M2) provides a browser-based tool that allows hardware and software developers to assess the maturity level of their design and development processes, allows management to determine desired maturity levels in seven domains, and allows developers to monitor process maturity improvements against management goals. The tool can be used by commercial developers as well as internal development organizations. This paper provides an overview of the tool and domains and presents a hypothetical case study of the tool to reduce software buffer overflow attack vulnerabilities by improving the software development process.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Prioritizing ICS Beachhead Systems for Cyber Vulnerability Testing

Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems™ (CyTRICS™) is the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) program for cybersecurity vulnerability testing, digital subcomponent enumeration, and forensic assessment. CyTRICS leverages best-in-class test facilities and analytic capabilities at six DOE National Laboratories and strategic partnerships with key stakeholders including technology developers, manufacturers, asset owners and operators, and interagency partners. During the program’s development, CyTRICS established a unique methodology for prioritizing digital components within operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) in the Energy Sector Industrial Base (ESIB) for cyber vulnerability testing. The CyTRICS Prioritization Process leverages multiple characteristics of systems, components, and their contextual deployment to calculate a quantification of individual digital components for CyTRICS testing. The initial version of the CyTRICS Prioritization Process was premised largely upon the impact which could result to an industrial control system if the digital component under testing was compromised, either through malicious means, faulty engineering, or other modes. The worldwide compromise of the SolarWinds Orion platform, first reported in December 2020, through malicious interference with the digital patching cycle was a watershed event in cyber supply chain security. The SolarWinds compromised demonstrated the strategic importance of certain types of ubiquitous software, and the ability to generate widespread cybersecurity effects. To address this challenge and as a part of the Department of Energy’s response to the SolarWinds compromise, DOE’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) directed the National Laboratories to evolve the CyTRICS Prioritization Process methodology to encompass additional factors related to the strategic importance of digital components. CESER directed CyTRICS researchers to identify, characterize, and append strategic factors to the CyTRICS Prioritization Process to provide additional weight to these characteristics. National Laboratory expert researchers identified functionality, distribution, and platform characteristics for digital components in ICS and OT that they assessed would be likely targeted in strategic initial-access cyber attack. CyTRICS has termed these factors “ICS Beachhead Systems,” leveraging a definition first advanced by Schneider Electric, which is intended as a blanket term to encompass digital components, products, and systems in OT. This paper describes the ICS Beachhead Systems identified and the rationale for inclusion. As a next step in the research and refinement process, the National Laboratories will validate this initial set of characteristics against digital components evaluated by the CyTRICS program and current implementation of the CyTRICS Prioritization Process. After validation, CyTRICS researchers will then develop a scoring methodology to generate a quantitative score to assess the degree to which a digital component is characterized as an ICS Beachhead System. Finally, the National Laboratories will append this scoring to the existing CyTRICS Prioritization Process algorithm.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Quantifying Carbon Cycle Extremes and Attributing Their Causes Under Climate and Land Use and Land Cover Change From 1850 to 2300

The increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) mole fraction affects global climate through radiative (trapping longwave radiation) and physiological effects (reduction of plant transpiration). We use the simulations of the Community Earth System Model (CESM1-BGC) forced with Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5 to investigate climate-vegetation feedbacks from 1850 to the year 2300. Human-induced land use and land cover change (LULCC), through biogeochemical and biogeophysical processes, alter the climate and modify photosynthetic activity. The changing characteristics of extreme anomalies in photosynthesis, referred to as carbon cycle extremes, increase the uncertainty of terrestrial ecosystems to act as a net carbon sink. However, the role of LULCC in altering carbon cycle extremes under business-as-usual (continuously rising) CO 2 emissions is unknown. Here we show that LULCC magnifies the intensity, frequency, and extent of carbon cycle extremes, resulting in a net reduction in expected photosynthetic activity in the future. We found that large temporally contiguous negative carbon cycle extremes are due to a persistent decrease in soil moisture, which is triggered by declines in precipitation. With LULCC and global warming, vegetation exhibits increased vulnerability to hot and dry environmental conditions, increasing the frequency of fire events and resulting in considerable losses in photosynthetic activity. While most regions show strengthening of negative carbon cycle extremes, a few locations show a weakening effect driven by declining vegetation cover or benign climate conditions for photosynthesis. Increasing hot, dry, and fire-driven carbon cycle extremes are essential for improving carbon cycle modeling and estimation of ecosystem responses to LULCC and rising CO 2 mole fractions. Moreover, large aberrations in vegetation productivity represent potential and growing threats to human lives, wildlife, and food security.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction, A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Space Station pressure wall repair techniques

Space Station components are susceptible to hypervelocity impact damage from orbital debris and meteoroids. An especially vulnerable and critical space station component is the module pressure wall. Even with shielding, sufficiently large impacting particles can create penetrations ranging from pinholes to large jagged holes. This paper describes pressure wall damage repair patches along with procedures and tools for performing the repair. One patch incorporates an aluminum foil protected from the jagged hole edge with a Kevlar or foam pad. An adhesive holds the patch in place. Another patch uses a stiff plate held away from the damaged area by a low durrometer rubber ring which also seals the plate edge. An adhesive will also secure this patch in place. Procedures were developed to prepare the punctured wall surface and apply the patch under weightless and unpressurized conditions. The procedures were tested in a laboratory and in the MSFC Neutral Buoyancy Simulator with models of the patches and tools.

Gibbins, Martin N.↗

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Project Plan 7930 Cell G PaR Remote Handling System Replacement

For over 40 years the US Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessors have made Californium-252 ({sup 252}Cf) available for a wide range of industries including medical, nuclear fuels, mining, military and national security. The Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC) located within the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) processes irradiated production targets from the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR). Operations in Building 7930, Cell G provide over 70% of the world's demand for {sup 252}Cf. Building 7930 was constructed and equipped in the mid-1960s. Current operations for {sup 252}Cf processing in Building 7930, Cell G require use of through-the-wall manipulators and the PaR Remote Handling System. Maintenance and repairs for the manipulators is readily accomplished by removal of the manipulator and relocation to a repair shop where hands-on work can be performed in glove boxes. Contamination inside cell G does not currently allow manned entry and no provisions were created for a maintenance area inside the cell. There has been no maintenance of the PaR system or upgrades, leaving operations vulnerable should the system have a catastrophic failure. The Cell G PaR system is currently being operated in a run to failure mode. As the manipulator is now 40+ years old there is significant risk in this method of operation. In 2006 an assessment was completed that resulted in recommendations for replacing the manipulator operator control and power centers which are used to control and power the PaR manipulator in Cell G. In mid-2008 the chain for the bridge drive failed and subsequent examinations indicated several damaged links (see Figure 1). To continue operations the PaR manipulator arm is being used to push and pull the bridge as a workaround. A retrieval tool was fabricated, tested and staged inside Cell G that will allow positioning of the bridge and manipulator arm for removal from the cell should the PaR system completely fail. A fully functioning and reliable Par manipulator arm is necessary for uninterrupted {sup 252}Cf operations; a fully-functioning bridge is needed for the system to function as intended.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Strategies, Protections and Mitigations for Electric Grid from Electromagnetic Pulse Effects

The mission of DOE’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) is to lead national efforts to modernize the electricity delivery system, enhance the security and reliability of America’s energy infrastructure and facilitate recovery from disruptions to the energy supply. One of the threats OE is concerned about is a high-altitude electro-magnetic pulse (HEMP) from a nuclear explosion and eletro-magnetic pulse (EMP) or E1 pulse can be generated by EMP weapons. DOE-OE provides federal leadership and technical guidance in addressing electric grid issues. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was chosen to conduct the EMP study for DOE-OE due to its capabilities and experience in setting up EMP experiments on the electric grid and conducting vulnerability assessments and developing innovative technology to increase infrastructure resiliency. This report identifies known impacts to EMP threats, known mitigations and effectiveness of mitigations, potential cost of mitigation, areas for government and private partnerships in protecting the electric grid to EMP, and identifying gaps in our knowledge and protection strategies.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗