Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Fire Protection”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 775 records · Page 43

Q-6 Fireset Requirements

This document provides requirements for all CDU designs to be used at the Q-6 firing sites [i.e., Technical Area 22, Building 34 (TA-22-00340; TA-40-0005; and TA-40-0015], including LANL-designed CDUs, firesets from other Department of Energy (DOE) sites, and commercial firesets. CDUs for other, non-Q-6 sites [e.g., Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility, Proton Radiography (pRad) Facility, Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), etc.] may have additional requirements that are not reflected here. While this document provides recommendations and examples for some aspects of fireset design, it is not intended to be a design guide. This document is intended for use by subject matter experts (SMEs) in fireset design. Those new to fireset design should consult SMEs before submitting a fireset for Q-6 approval.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

2007 Research and Engineering Annual Report

Selected research and technology activities at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center are summarized. These following activities exemplify the Center's varied and productive research efforts: Developing a Requirements Development Guide for an Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System; Digital Terrain Data Compression and Rendering for Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance Systems; Nonlinear Flutter/Limit Cycle Oscillations Prediction Tool; Nonlinear System Identification Using Orthonormal Bases: Application to Aeroelastic/Aeroservoelastic Systems; Critical Aerodynamic Flow Feature Indicators: Towards Application with the Aerostructures Test Wing; Multidisciplinary Design, Analysis, and Optimization Tool Development Using a Genetic Algorithm; Structural Model Tuning Capability in an Object-Oriented Multidisciplinary Design, Analysis, and Optimization Tool; Extension of Ko Straight-Beam Displacement Theory to the Deformed Shape Predictions of Curved Structures; F-15B with Phoenix Missile and Pylon Assembly--Drag Force Estimation; Mass Property Testing of Phoenix Missile Hypersonic Testbed Hardware; ARMD Hypersonics Project Materials and Structures: Testing of Scramjet Thermal Protection System Concepts; High-Temperature Modal Survey of the Ruddervator Subcomponent Test Article; ARMD Hypersonics Project Materials and Structures: C/SiC Ruddervator Subcomponent Test and Analysis Task; Ground Vibration Testing and Model Correlation of the Phoenix Missile Hypersonic Testbed; Phoenix Missile Hypersonic Testbed: Performance Design and Analysis; Crew Exploration Vehicle Launch Abort System-Pad Abort-1 (PA-1) Flight Test; Testing the Orion (Crew Exploration Vehicle) Launch Abort System-Ascent Abort-1 (AA-1) Flight Test; SOFIA Flight-Test Flutter Prediction Methodology; SOFIA Closed-Door Aerodynamic Analyses; SOFIA Handling Qualities Evaluation for Closed-Door Operations; C-17 Support of IRAC Engine Model Development; Current Capabilities and Future Upgrade Plans of the C-17 Data Rack; Intelligent Data Mining Capabilities as Applied to Integrated Vehicle Health Management; STARS Flight Demonstration No. 2 IP Data Formatter; Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety (STARS) Flight Demonstration No. 2 Range User Flight Test Results; Aerodynamic Effects of the Quiet Spike(tm) on an F-15B Aircraft; F-15 Intelligent Flight Controls-Increased Destabilization Failure; F-15 Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) Improved Adaptive Controller; Aeroelastic Analysis of the Ikhana/Fire Pod System; Ikhana: Western States Fire Missions Utilizing the Ames Research Center Fire Sensor; Ikhana: Fiber-Optic Wing Shape Sensors; Ikhana: ARTS III; SOFIA Closed-Door Flutter Envelope Flight Testing; F-15B Quiet Spike(TM) Aeroservoelastic Flight Test Data Analysis; and UAVSAR Platform Precision Autopilot Flight Results.

Stoliker, Patrick↗

Potential flue gas impurities in carbon dioxide streams separated from coal-fired power plants

This study estimated the flue gas impurities to be included in the CO{sub 2} stream separated from a CO{sub 2} control unit for a different combination of air pollution control devices and different flue gas compositions. Specifically, the levels of acid gases and mercury vapor were estimated for the monoethanolamine (MEA)-based absorption process on the basis of published performance parameters of existing systems. Among the flue gas constituents considered, sulfur dioxide (SO{sub 2}) is known to have the most adverse impact on MEA absorption. When a flue gas contains 3000 parts per million by volume (ppmv) SO{sub 2} and a wet flue gas desulfurization system achieves its 95% removal, approximately 2400 parts per million by weight (ppmw) SO{sub 2} could be included in the separated CO{sub 2} stream. In addition, the estimated concentration level was reduced to as low as 135 ppmw for the SO{sub 2} of less than 10 ppmv in the flue gas entering the MEA unit. Furthermore, heat-stable salt formation could further reduce the SO{sub 2} concentration below 40 ppmw in the separated CO{sub 2} stream. In this study, it is realized that the formation rates of heat-stable salts in MEA solution are not readily available in the literature and are critical to estimating the levels and compositions of flue gas impurities in sequestered CO{sub 2} streams. In addition to SO{sub 2}, mercury, and other impurities in separated CO{sub 2} streams could vary depending on pollutant removal at the power plants and impose potential impacts on groundwater. Such a variation and related process control in the upstream management of carbon separation have implications for groundwater protection at carbon sequestration sites and warrant necessary considerations in overall sequestration planning, engineering, and management. 63 refs., 1 fig., 3 tabs.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Carolina Coastal Plain Ecological Forecasting: Utilizing NASA Earth Observations to Map Suitable Venus Flytrap Habitat in an Effort to Inform Conservation, Seed Banking, and Reintroduction in the Carolina Coastal Plain and Sandhills Regions

Although the carnivorous plant Venus flytrap (Dionaea muscipula) is recognized globally, its native range is restricted to a small portion of the North and South Carolina Coastal Plain and Sandhills. Within this limited range, Venus flytrap populations are threatened by habitat loss, fire suppression, and poaching. NASA DEVELOP partnered with the North Carolina Botanical Garden (NCBG), the University of North Carolina Herbarium (NCU), and the North Carolina Natural Heritage Program (NCNHP) to support Venus flytrap conservation. The team developed models based on species presence data and environmental variables using the Software for Assisted Habitat Modeling (SAHM) to create a 2021 habitat suitability map for Venus flytrap. These models incorporated Earth observations collected by Landsat 8 Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS), Terra Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS), Advanced Land Observation Satellite (ALOS) Phased Array type L-band Synthetic Aperture Radar (PALSAR), and Sentinel-2 Multispectral Instrument (MSI). To predict areas at high risk of development, the team produced a 2050 land-use change map using TerrSet Land Change Modeler. The team found potential areas of conflict between predicted habitat and forecasted future development. Many areas of suitable habitat were concentrated along the coast where development was likely to occur, placing populations there at risk of extirpation. Overlaying suitable habitat with forecasted land change also identified suitable habitats with minimal risk of development, which may serve as lasting Venus flytrap habitat. These results can inform the NCBG and NCNHP’s conservation decision-making, including targeted seed banking, reintroduction, and prioritization of enduring habitats for protection and management.

Monika Rock↗

Carolina Coastal Plain​ Ecological Forecasting

Although the carnivorous plant Venus flytrap (Dionaea muscipula) is recognized globally, its native range is restricted to a small portion of the North and South Carolina Coastal Plain and Sandhills. Within this limited range, Venus flytrap populations are threatened by habitat loss, fire suppression, and poaching. NASA DEVELOP partnered with the North Carolina Botanical Garden (NCBG), the University of North Carolina Herbarium (NCU), and the North Carolina Natural Heritage Program (NCNHP) to support Venus flytrap conservation. The team developed models based on species presence data and environmental variables using the Software for Assisted Habitat Modeling (SAHM) to create a 2021 habitat suitability map for Venus flytrap. These models incorporated Earth observations collected by Landsat 8 Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS), Terra Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS), Advanced Land Observation Satellite (ALOS) Phased Array type L-band Synthetic Aperture Radar (PALSAR), and Sentinel-2 Multispectral Instrument (MSI). To predict areas at high risk of development, the team produced a 2050 land-use change map using TerrSet Land Change Modeler. The team found potential areas of conflict between predicted habitat and forecasted future development. Many areas of suitable habitat were concentrated along the coast where development was likely to occur, placing populations there at risk of extirpation. Overlaying suitable habitat with forecasted land change also identified suitable habitats with minimal risk of development, which may serve as lasting Venus flytrap habitat. These results can inform the NCBG and NCNHP’s conservation decision-making, including targeted seed banking, reintroduction, and prioritization of enduring habitats for protection and management.

Monika Rock↗

Quantitative Risk Assessment for Fuel Cell Electric Bus Hydrogen Storage and Refueling Facility

It is necessary to understand the safety implications and risk mitigation options for fuel cell electric bus fleet deployment, especially for related facilities responsible for operations such as production, storage, compression, and dispensing of hydrogen for use by the buses. In this report, we present a quantitative risk assessment for a potential fuel cell electric bus fleet that was motivated by efforts to improve resilience at the Portland International Airport but can be applicable to a range of hydrogen case studies and use cases. We estimated risk for a facility that produces, stores, compresses, and dispenses hydrogen for the fleet of buses, with a focus on individual risk to people in terms of annual frequency of fatality. We considered the frequency of hydrogen leaks that could result in harmful physical outcomes like jet fires or explosions, and the consequences of those outcomes for people. We created customized fault trees to calculate the frequencies of different sizes of leaks and event sequence diagrams to calculate ignition probabilities for the various leak sizes. We also leveraged the HyRAM+ toolkit to use these inputs to calculate overall risk for the facility, which we separated into one section responsible for producing, storing, and compressing hydrogen, and one section responsible for dispensing the hydrogen to the buses. We found that the dispensing area seemed to have a higher risk than the production/storage/compression area of the facility, largely because of the inclusion of a component with a high leak frequency (the heat exchanger used to cool the hydrogen before entering the vehicle, to prevent overheating and expansion of hydrogen in the onboard tank). For the example production and refueling facility we evaluated and the data we used for the analysis, the leak frequency had a larger impact on the risk differences between the two sections on the facility, compared to the physical outcome consequence, which was slightly different due to the varying fuel conditions, but not substantially different. Actions can be taken to prevent these hazards (e.g., lowering leak frequencies in system components) or to mitigate the consequences if they do occur (e.g., installing barriers to protect people if ignition events occur). The choice of which actions to take depends not only on safety considerations but also on space, time, staffing, feasibility, and financial constraints. Therefore, the quantitative risk assessment approach can help understand relative risk contributions from different components, leak sizes, consequences, and human actions, to prioritize risk reduction strategies and balance these parameters. The outcomes of this report may be useful for a variety of stakeholders working in the hydrogen, transportation, vehicle, and aviation sector, including those responsible for aspects like facility design, operations, and regulations. There is not a single value of risk that determines whether a hypothetical system is “safe” or not. The insights about risk mitigations may be leveraged, and the quantitative risk assessment approach can be applied to other case studies to understand risk priorities and contributions specific to different FCEB and hydrogen facility uses.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Effect of alumina incorporation on the sulfur tolerance of the dual-catalyst aftertreatment system for reduction of nitrogen oxides under lean conditions

Presence of sulfur or sulfur additives in natural gas lead to the formation of sulfur dioxide in the exhaust stream of natural gas-fired lean-burn engines. The sulfur tolerance and hydrothermal stability of the dual-catalyst aftertreatment system comprising a reduction catalyst (palladium supported on sulfated zirconia- Pd/SZ) and an oxidation catalyst (cobalt oxide supported on ceria- CoO x /CeO 2 ) for NOx reduction under lean-burn conditions has been tested under simulated engine exhaust conditions. Alumina-incorporated Pd/SZ (Pd/SZ(Alumina)) reduction catalyst as part of the dual catalyst bed demonstrated superior sulfur tolerance in the presence of 5 ppm SO 2 in the feed. The ratio of the reduction to oxidation catalyst was also seen to affect the hydrothermal stability under wet conditions with SO 2 in the reaction medium. The effect of hydrocarbon and water concentration in the reaction mixture on the sulfur tolerance of the dual-catalyst bed was studied. Increasing the reaction temperature from 450°C to 500°C demonstrated very stable NO x conversion and improved CH 4 conversions when the dual-catalyst bed was kept on-stream for 40 h -1 . X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy on samples poisoned with SO 2 ex-situ revealed the deposition of surface sulfates on the Pd/SZ catalyst samples and a combination of sulfates and sulfites on the CoO x /CeO 2 on treatment with SO 2 . The presence of alumina in the Pd/SZ sample protects the support from SO 2 poisoning as the oxidation state of the zirconia support remained largely unchanged on poisoning while in the CoO x /CeO 2 sample, sulfur poisoning likely affects the cerium redox cycle (Ce 3+ -Ce 4+ ). 27 Al magic angle spinning nuclear magnetic resonance (MAS NMR) revealed redistribution of the octahedral and tetrahedral Al-O coordination on SO 2 poisoning. Due to association with deposited sulfates on the catalyst, shielding effect on the Al nuclei resulted in an increased octahedral Al-O coordination in the poisoned sample.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

JSC Orbital Debris Website Description

Purpose: The website provides information about the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office at JSC, which is the lead NASA center for orbital debris research. It is recognized world-wide for its leadership in addressing orbital debris issues. The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office has taken the international lead in conducting measurements of the environment and in developing the technical consensus for adopting mitigation measures to protect users of the orbital environment. Work at the center continues with developing an improved understanding of the orbital debris environment and measures that can be taken to control its growth. Major Contents: Orbital Debris research is divided into the following five broad efforts. Each area of research contains specific information as follows: 1) Modeling - NASA scientists continue to develop and upgrade orbital debris models to describe and characterize the current and future debris environment. Evolutionary and engineering models are described in detail. Downloadable items include a document in PDF format and executable software. 2) Measurements - Measurements of near-Earth orbital debris are accomplished by conducting ground-based and space-based observations of the orbital debris environment. The data from these sources provide validation of the environment models and identify the presence of new sources. Radar, optical and surface examinations are described. External links to related topics are provided. 3) Protection - Orbital debris protection involves conducting hypervelocity impact measurements to assess the risk presented by orbital debris to operating spacecraft and developing new materials and new designs to provide better protection from the environment with less weight penalty. The data from this work provides the link between the environment defined by the models and the risk presented by that environment to operating spacecraft and provides recommendations on design and operations procedures to reduce the risk as required. These data also help in the analysis and interpretation of impact features on returned spacecraft surfaces. 4) Mitigation - Controlling the growth of the orbital debris population is a high priority for NASA, the United States, and the major space-faring nations of the world to preserve near-Earth space for future generations. Mitigation measures can take the form of curtailing or preventing the creation of new debris, designing satellites to withstand impacts by small debris, and implementing operational procedures ranging from utilizing orbital regimes with less debris, adopting specific spacecraft attitudes, and even maneuvering to avoid collisions with debris. Downloadable items include several documents in PDF format and executable software.and 5) Reentry - Because of the increasing number of objects in space, NASA has adopted guidelines and assessment procedures to reduce the number of non-operational spacecraft and spent rocket upper stages orbiting the Earth. One method of postmission disposal is to allow reentry of these spacecraft, either from orbital decay (uncontrolled entry) or with a controlled entry. Orbital decay may be achieved by firing engines to lower the perigee altitude so that atmospheric drag will eventually cause the spacecraft to enter. However, the surviving debris impact footprint cannot be guaranteed to avoid inhabited landmasses. Controlled entry normally occurs by using a larger amount of propellant with a larger propulsion system to drive the spacecraft to enter the atmosphere at a steeper flight path angle. It will then enter at a more precise latitude, longitude, and footprint in a nearly uninhabited impact region, generally located in the ocean.

Johnson, Nicholas L.↗

Nebraska Integrated Carbon Capture and Storage Pre-Feasibility Study

In collaboration with the Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD), the Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC) has conducted a pre-feasibility study for a commercial-scale carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) geologic storage complex in western Nebraska integrated with potential CO 2 capture at Gerald Gentleman Station (GGS). GGS is the largest coal-fired electricity-generating station in Nebraska, emitting 8.5 million metric tons (Mt) of CO 2 annually, and is located near the town of Sutherland. This pre-feasibility (Phase 1) project has been executed as part of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CarbonSAFE program, a multiphase initiative to support the deployment of large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects. Each CarbonSAFE project is required to demonstrate the potential to capture and store at least 50 million tonnes (Mt) of CO 2 over a 25-year operational period. The EERC and NPPD established a coordination team to identify challenges to a potential Nebraska CCS project, comprising local stakeholder organizations, which met twice in Lincoln and via several Webinars, providing feedback and guidance throughout the pre-feasibility study. The EERC also secured the technical support of Schlumberger Carbon Services and Computer Modelling Group Ltd. (CMG). The project comprised four technical themes, all using published information sources. Regional and stakeholder analysis, including identification of sensitive environmental areas, potential resource conflicts, and strategies for public outreach. A review of geographic and socioeconomic characteristics, in combination with geologic characterization in the subbasinal analysis described below, identified an area to the southwest and within a 75-mile radius of GGS as the most prospective for development of a storage site. This area largely avoided lands with protected status such as wetlands. A public outreach plan has also been developed for implementation in any further phases of CCS assessment in western Nebraska, for example a CarbonSAFE Phase 2 feasibility study. Scenario analysis, addressing economic and regulatory factors. GGS is the only single major source of CO 2 emissions capable of satisfying the CarbonSAFE 50-Mt scale requirement within the study region. Chemical absorption using amines was identified as the most viable technology for postcombustion CO 2 capture at GGS. The total cost of a CCS project at GGS was estimated to be between $67/tonne CO 2 for capture and auxiliary boiler to minimize parasitic load and $70/tonne CO 2 avoided cost, using the Carnegie-Mellon University Integrated Environmental Control Model (IECM). The total avoided cost included the capture facility and parasitic load, a flue gas desulfurization plant required for the use of amine solvent technology, transport via pipeline, and dedicated storage infrastructure. Nebraska has no legislation in place to address typical CCS-specific issues, for example pore space ownership for storage. Long-term liability, therefore, falls under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Underground Injection Control (UIC) Class 6 program regulations. Subbasinal analysis, addressing the potential for a dedicated subsurface “container” to store the required 50-Mt quantity of CO 2 . Modeling and simulation studies identified an area to the southwest of GGS with the potential for storage of 50 Mt CO 2 in the Cloverly Formation, comprising sandstones with interbedded and intermingled shales. The area of review (AOR) that would be required for monitoring under a Class VI operating permit was estimated to be as high as 400–700 square miles, due to uncertain pressure effects. The viability of this storage option is subject to significant uncertainty due to the relatively limited amount of existing characterization data available to the pre-feasibility study; for example, dynamic simulation indicated that the proposed storage rate might require as little as two or as many as 14 injection wells. A key uncertainty is the relative proportion and distribution of sandstone and shale within the Cloverly Formation. A preliminary, semiquantitative risk assessment also suggested uncertainty over storage capacity and injectivity constitute the most significant project risks at this pre-feasibility stage. No assessed risks were considered to rule out the possibility of a project moving to deployment. National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) validation, using software tools developed by the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) to assess risks associated with the potential 50-Mt CO 2 storage complex. NRAP tools were used to assess hypothetical leakage scenarios. Results broadly supported the conclusion of the semiquantitative risk analysis – for example, even worst-case analysis of theoretical leakage scenarios found limited migration rates and impacts. In summary, the work undertaken in this Phase 1 pre-feasibility study has shown that western Nebraska has potential to host a commercial-scale CCS project, including a dedicated storage “container” for 50 Mt of CO 2 . However, the following key challenges would need to be overcome: The business case for deploying CCS projects is uncertain; recently announced federal tax credits and sales of CO 2 for enhanced oil recovery may not cover the full costs of a CCS project at GGS, as estimated by this pre-feasibility study. The potential 50-Mt CO 2 dedicated storage container defined in this pre-feasibility study should be regarded as having a relatively low level of readiness to support a CCS project. Public outreach would be a vital element in western Nebraska, where sensitivities around such environmental issues as water resource protection and pipeline construction would need to be carefully addressed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Emergency Response Manual

Safety and security is very important at NASA. The Security Management and Safeguards Office goal is ensure safety and security for all NASA Lewis and Plum Brook Station visitors and workers. The office protects against theft, sabotage, malicious damage, espionage, and other threats or acts of violence. There are three types of security at NASA: physical, IT, and personnel. IT is concerned with sensitive and classified information and computers. Physical security includes the officers who check visitors and workers in and patrol the facility. Personnel security is concerned with background checks during hiring. During my internship, I met people from and gained knowledge about all three types of security. I primarily worked with Dr. Richard Soppet in physical security. During my experience with physical security, I observed and worked with many aspects of it. I attended various security meetings at both NASA Lewis and Plum Brook. The meetings were about homeland security and other improvements that will be made to both facilities. I also spent time with a locksmith. The locksmith makes copies of keys and unlocks doors for people who need them. I rode around in a security vehicle with an officer as he patrolled. I also observed the officer make a search of a visitor s vehicle. All visitors vehicles are searched upon entering NASA. I spent time and observed in the dispatch office. The officer answers calls and sends out officers when needed. The officer also monitors the security cameras. My primary task was completing an emergency response manual. This manual would assist local law enforcement and fire agencies in case of an emergency. The manual has pictures and descriptions of the buildings. It also contains the information about hazards inside of the buildings. This information will be very helpul to law enforcement so that when called upon during an emergency, they will not create an even bigger problem with collateral damage.

Barnett, Traci M.↗

Depowering of Batteries to Reduce Cost of Ownership

(1) Executive Summary: End of life batteries (EOLBs) present a cost and safety liability for their owners and stakeholders. This is due flammability, energy, and power with EOLBs. Current approaches include cumbersome, expensive packaging, specialized shipping, regulated storage, and they are responsible for over half of the cost of recycling. They all expensively and inadequately address symptoms. OnTo has developed and proven a simple way to resolve the problem systemically, through depowering of lithium-ion batteries (and most any battery other than lead). The low-cost process removes flammability, power, and energy in EOLBs through non-toxic chemical processing. The opportunity for commerce of inert scrap is at least $5 billion greater than the commerce in hazardous scrap, all made possible through OnTo’s technology for efficiency and safety. (2) Depowering Improves Safety and Decreases Cost of Battery Ownership: OnTo’s depowering technology will remove half of the cost of EOLB management and recycling. Without this technology, EOLB recycling will always be a liability. EOLB is hazardous due to inherent flammability of electrolyte and lithium. The shipping and commerce of EOLBs is costly and dangerous all along the chain of custody from owner, dealership/shop, shipper, second-life sorter, (shipper again), and finally to the destination facility recycler. OnTo’s depowering service renders inert most any EOLB packs, modules, and cells. The technology uses a brief, non-toxic treatment applicable to most any chemistry. The industry needs a safe, simple, modular, and inexpensive method to render EOLBs as inert scrap. OnTo’s deactivation system is scalable to the needs of any customer along the EOLB chain of custody. (3) Evidence of Successful Depowering: Untreated batteries will catch fire and explode under abuse conditions such as heat or crush. Slide 2 below shows that untreated batteries will blow-up and expel their internal components with heating, after OnTo’s depowering treatment, the same battery is inert with the same heat treatment (Fig. 7 in the slide). Depowering also removes electrolyte reactivity, eliminating the production of HF and other toxins (Fig 6. in the slide) The depowering process is applicable to large, 26 Ah cells. Fig. 5 in the slide shows the removal of all the electrolyte from whole cells. Removal of flammable material from an EOLB contributes to the inert behavior. OnTo developed this technology through a project supported by the US Department of Energy EERE program, with partners including Seattle King County Metro Transit. While OnTo has generated evidence of successful depowering of batteries, in 2020, a follow-on voucher opportunity for third party analysis of depowered cells and materials was approved through CalTestBed. The expertise of the battery and materials research groups at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory will characterize these depowered cells to provide better understanding of the materials level changes in depowering. (4) Pilot Plant for Depowering EOLBs: Making the spoke work in hub-and-spoke While other companies are marketing the hub-and-spoke approach for recycling EOLBs, they rely on dangerous, expensive shredding methods with flimsy IP protection. OnTo offers the only patented, proven ability to depower EOLBs from most any chemistry – at half of the capital cost required for shredding, while eliminating the liability, danger, and waste streams inherent with shredding. The proposed commercial pilot facility is (5) OnTo Technology LLC Company: OnTo develops advanced battery recycling innovations that produce manufacturing quality electrode materials from recycled batteries. Their patented Cathode-healing™ and Deactivation/Depowering processes improve safety and reduce the cost of recycling. OnTo’s breakthrough technologies produce advanced materials for manufacturing batteries useful in applications from portable power to electric vehicles. Contact: Steve Sloop OnTo Technology LLC, 63221 Service Road, STE F, Bend, OR 97703, ssloop@onto-technology.com , 541-389-7897

deactivation↗

Wastewater Recycling Using a Hygroscopic Cooling System

This project by the Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC), Baltimore Aircoil Company (BAC), and Great River Energy (GRE) evaluated the concept of recycling wastewater at a coal-fired power plant using a hygroscopic cooling system, which is an evaporative cooling technology analogous to conventional cooling towers, except that sparingly soluble dissolved solids are precipitated and removed as waste solids instead of purging them with a liquid blowdown stream. This technology can maximize the use of plant makeup water by obtaining useful evaporative cooling from wastewater while minimizing the volume of wastes needing disposal. Experimental activities were conducted in two phases, a laboratory-based evaluation of the properties of wastewater from the host site, GRE’s Coal Creek Station near Underwood, North Dakota, and a field test of a small pilot hygroscopic cooling system at the host site power plant. Findings from the laboratory study informed the design of the pilot system and the system’s field test performance served as the basis for a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of the hygroscopic recycling concept. At the preferred operating conditions identified during the TEA, the wet-bulb approach temperature of the tower was 7.3°C (13°F) and the volume of blowdown produced by the plant was reduced to 5.4% of its incoming volume. Waste solids produced during field testing were classified as nonhazardous waste based on the measured hazardous element content and evaluation of their leaching potential. However, to qualify as a solid for landfill disposal i.e., as determined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s paint filter test, it appears that a dewatering step beyond hydrocyclone separation is needed. The baseline levelized cost of wastewater disposal (LCWD) for hygroscopic wastewater recycling was estimated to be $\$ $3.69–$\$ $3.72 per m3 of plant blowdown. Capital cost was estimated to contribute over 54% to the LCWD, and parameters that impact capital cost such as the heat exchange coil material of construction and the tower’s wet-bulb approach temperature were identified as having the greatest impact on overall LCWD. A LCWD estimate prepared for the same application but using thermomechanical brine evaporation was almost 40% higher than that calculated for hygroscopic cooling, despite recovering distilled-quality water for reuse, while the LCWD for disposal-only, deep well injection was estimated to be 30% lower compared to hygroscopic wastewater recycling.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

2012 Update to the Site Discharge Pollution Prevention Plan (Rev. 1): Los Alamos/Pueblo Watershed (Vol. 1)

One historical industrial activity area is associated with R001, R-SMA-0.5: Site C-00-020. Area of Concern (AOC) C-00-020 is a suspected mortar impact area located along the north valley wall of Rendija Canyon on General Services Administration (GSA) and U.S. Forest Service (USFS) land. The 30-acre site also includes a tributary of Rendija Canyon. Most of the site lies within the Santa Fe National Forest, except for a small area on the southeastern edge that is private property. AOC C-00-020 was suspected to be a former mortar-impact area because of a “U.S. Property—No Trespassing” sign and a nearly illegible bilingual sign posted in the area. The signs no longer remain. Extensive archival searches have revealed no documentation regarding the use of this site as a munitions impact area. In addition, no field evidence of operations (e.g., munitions debris [MD], munitions and explosives of concern [MEC], unexploded ordnance [UXO], or impact scars) has ever been found at AOC C-00-020. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) facility investigation (RFI) activities conducted in 1993 included conducting an ordnance sweep followed by a geophysical sweep. No ordnance, MD, MEC, or UXO was located. In addition, no ordnance was found during the 2007 investigation or during the 2009 ordnance survey. The site is located within an area burned by the 2000 Cerro Grande fire. The stream channel that runs through the center of the site has been widened by flooding. Currently, there are burned and live trees on the steep slopes next to the stream. Ordnance surveys at the site resulted in no findings except for scrap metal such as bailing wire. The complete absence of ordnance and explosives waste (OEW) confirmed that the site was never used as an ordnance-impact area. In accordance with the approved investigation work plan, no further investigation was conducted at AOC C-00-020. The New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) concurred with the conclusion that no additional ordnance surveys need to be conducted at this site and issued a corrective action complete without controls for AOC C-00-020 on May 16, 2012. No industrial materials were historically managed at this Site; therefore, no potential contaminants are associated with the Site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

WE-EF-207-04: An Inter-Projection Sensor Fusion (IPSF) Approach to Estimate Missing Projection Signal in Synchronized Moving Grid (SMOG) System

Purpose: A synchronized moving grid (SMOG) has been proposed to reduce scatter and lag artifacts in cone beam computed tomography (CBCT). However, information is missing in each projection because certain areas are blocked by the grid. A previous solution to this issue is acquiring 2 complimentary projections at each position, which increases scanning time. This study reports our first Result using an inter-projection sensor fusion (IPSF) method to estimate missing projection in our prototype SMOG-based CBCT system. Methods: An in-house SMOG assembling with a 1:1 grid of 3 mm gap has been installed in a CBCT benchtop. The grid moves back and forth in a 3-mm amplitude and up-to 20-Hz frequency. A control program in LabView synchronizes the grid motion with the platform rotation and x-ray firing so that the grid patterns for any two neighboring projections are complimentary. A Catphan was scanned with 360 projections. After scatter correction, the IPSF algorithm was applied to estimate missing signal for each projection using the information from the 2 neighboring projections. Feldkamp-Davis-Kress (FDK) algorithm was applied to reconstruct CBCT images. The CBCTs were compared to those reconstructed using normal projections without applying the SMOG system. Results: The SMOG-IPSF method may reduce image dose by half due to the blocked radiation by the grid. The method almost completely removed scatter related artifacts, such as the cupping artifacts. The evaluation of line pair patterns in the CatPhan suggested that the spatial resolution degradation was minimal. Conclusion: The SMOG-IPSF is promising in reducing scatter artifacts and improving image quality while reducing radiation dose.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

NSRD-12, Novel Mini-Tubular HEPA Media for Nuclear Facility Ventilation Systems

The overall goal is to improve safety of DOE nuclear facilities during fire scenarios by developing improved filtration technology, increasing performance while reducing pressure drop. Ceramic filtration technology can provide robust, passive mitigation against radiological releases.The primary objective of this report is to demonstrate that mini-tubular ceramic (MTC) media can reduce pressure drop across a filter compared to flow through a membrane. A secondary objective is to obtain a baseline filtration efficiency measurement. Reducing pressure drop across a filter through MTC design can be combined with nanofiber technology to improve filter performance. Developing MTC media can also solve processing challenges associated with manufacturing ceramic nanofiber membranes and coatings by electrospinning. This work will support developing specifications for industry codes and standards such as ASME AG-1, Subsection FO, Ceramic Filters.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Contaminant Stabilization Technology Gap Report

After an intentional radiological release or nuclear power plant (NPP) accidental release, there may be a large area that is contaminated. Re-suspension and tracking of contamination may create issues with containing the contaminated area and create additional exposure to responders. There is a need for technologies/methodologies to reduce resuspension and tracking. Current radiological particle containment relies on securing the area, setting up a single egress and ingress route, and minimizing the amount of contaminated equipment and vehicles leaving the contaminated zone. The re-suspension and tracking of contamination greatly hampers the ability to conduct first response activities in that zone therefore technologies that can reduce these spreading mechanisms are needed. In the NPP decommissioning industry, coatings are employed to reduce the spread of contamination. These coatings may not be readily available in the quantities needed for early response. Responders need containment methodologies that can be employed with existing equipment and materials on site using techniques such as fire hosing, street sweepers, and painting. A review by Parra et al. (2009) provided a good overview of fixative/stabilization materials, which formed the basis (in addition to a literature search) for a list of potential technologies presented to stakeholders in the initial stages of this work. Advantages and disadvantages were identified for each of the technologies, which were grouped into tiers based on the time-frame they would be available following a radiological release. Stakeholders then ranked containment technologies in terms of their preference and interest in use and availability. The final part of this task is to gather more information on the stakeholder-selected technologies and identify technical gaps that need to be filled with experimental research before technical procedures can be developed for containment technology use in the field.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Ecological Monitoring and Compliance Program 2014 Report

The Ecological Monitoring and Compliance Program (EMAC), funded through the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO, formerly Nevada Site Office), monitors the ecosystem of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and ensures compliance with laws and regulations pertaining to NNSS biota. This report summarizes the program’s activities conducted by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), during calendar year 2014. Program activities included (a) biological surveys at proposed activity sites, (b) desert tortoise compliance, (c) ecosystem monitoring, (d) sensitive plant species monitoring, (e) sensitive and protected/regulated animal monitoring, and (f) habitat restoration monitoring. During 2014, all applicable laws, regulations, and permit requirements were met, enabling EMAC to achieve its intended goals and objectives. Sensitive and protected/regulated species of the NNSS include 42 plants, 1 mollusk, 2 reptiles, 236 birds, and 27 mammals. These species are protected, regulated, or considered sensitive according to state or federal regulations and natural resource agencies and organizations. The desert tortoise (Gopherus agassizii) and the western yellow-billed cuckoo (Coccyzus americanus) are the only species on the NNSS protected under the Endangered Species Act, both listed as threatened. However, only one record of the cuckoo has ever been documented on the NNSS, and there is no good habitat for this species on the NNSS. It is considered a rare migrant. Biological surveys for the presence of sensitive and protected/regulated species and important biological resources on which they depend were conducted for 18 projects. A total of 199.18 hectares (ha) was surveyed for these projects. Sensitive and protected/regulated species and important biological resources found during these surveys included a predator burrow, one sidewinder rattlesnake (Crotalus cerastes), two mating speckled rattlesnakes (Crotalus mitchellii), and several species of cacti. NSTec provided to project managers a written summary report of all survey findings and mitigation recommendations, where applicable. Of the 18 projects on the NNSS, 15 occurred within the range of the threatened desert tortoise. Approximately 2.19 ha of desert tortoise habitat were disturbed. No desert tortoises were accidentally injured or killed by project activities, and no tortoises were killed by vehicles. On 13 occasions, tortoises were moved off the road and out of harm’s way. Six tortoises were found and transmitters attached as part of an approved study to assess impacts of vehicles on tortoises on the NNSS. NSTec biologists continued to monitor 37 juvenile desert tortoises as part of a collaborative effort to study survival and temperament of translocated animals. From 1978 until 2013, there has been an average of 11.2 wildland fires per year on the NNSS with an average of about 83.7 ha burned per fire. There were no wildland fires documented on the NNSS during 2014. Results from the wildland fuel surveys showed a very low risk of wildland fire due to reduced fuel loads caused by limited natural precipitation. Limited reptile trapping and reptile roadkill surveys were conducted to better define species distribution on the NNSS. Sixteen reptiles were trapped representing five species. Combined with data from 2013, 183 road kills were detected, representing 11 snake and 8 lizard species. Selected natural water sources were monitored to assess trends in physical and biological parameters, and one new water source was found. Wildlife use at five water troughs and four radiologically contaminated sumps was documented using motion-activated cameras. As part of the statewide effort to disseminate information throughout the botanical community, NSTec prepared a shape file with site-specific data for all 17 sensitive plants on the NNSS and provided it to the Nevada Natural Heritage Program for inclusion in their statewide database. No field surveys were conducted this year for sensitive plants on the NNSS due to poor growing conditions. Surveys of sensitive and protected/regulated animals during 2014 focused on winter raptors, bats, wild horses (Equus caballus), mule deer (Odocoileus hemionus), desert bighorn sheep (Ovis Canadensis nelsoni), and mountain lions (Puma concolor). Two permanent, long-term winter raptor survey routes were established and sampled in January and February. A total of 27 raptors representing 4 species were observed. The wild horse population increased from 30 to 41, with several yearlings recruiting into the population, possibly due to the death of a mountain lion known to prey on horse foals. Mule deer abundance and density measured with standardized deer surveys was similar to 2013 and appears to be stable. Desert bighorn sheep, including rams, ewes, and lambs, were detected using motion-activated cameras at four water sources. There are plans to conduct helicopter surveys to census the population during September 2015 and then capture and radio-collar up to 20 sheep during November 2015. Over 150 sheep scat samples have been collected for genetic analysis to try to determine how sheep on the NNSS are related to surrounding sheep populations. Information is presented about bird mortalities, Migratory Bird Treaty Act compliance, and a summary of nuisance animals and their control on the NNSS. A total of 93 mountain lion images (i.e., photographs or video clips) were taken during 220,379 camera hours at 16 of 32 sites sampled and another 11,946 images of at least 29 species other than mountain lions were taken as well. A mountain lion telemetry study continued in 2014. NNSS7 was tracked from January 1 to November 15 using a global positioning system satellite transmitter. He consumed 21 mule deer, 17 desert bighorn sheep, 1 juvenile bobcat, and 3 coyotes. Mule deer were primarily taken in the summer and fall. No new mountain lions were captured. A minimum of four adult lions (two males, two females), a subadult male, and three kittens were known to inhabit the NNSS during 2014. Two previously revegetated sites on the NNSS and one on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) were monitored in 2014. The cover cap on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit, revegetated in 2000, and the 92-Acre Site at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex, revegetated in 2011, were the restoration sites monitored on the NNSS. The Corrective Action Unit 407 Rollercoaster RADSAFE site, revegetated in 2000, was the restoration site monitored on the TTR. Plant cover and density were recorded at all sites except U-3ax/bl (qualitative monitoring), and reclamation success standards were evaluated, where applicable.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Predicted cumulative dose to firefighters and the offsite public from natural and anthropogenic radionuclides in smoke from wildland fires at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina USA

The contaminated ground surface at Savannah River Site (SRS) is a result of the decades of work that has been performed maintaining the country's nuclear stockpile and performing research and development on nuclear materials. The volatilization of radionuclides during wildfire results in airborne particles that are dispersed within the smoke plume and may result in doses to downwind firefighters and the public. To better understand the risk that these smoke plumes present, we have characterized four regions at SRS in terms of their fuel characteristics and radiological contamination on the ground. Combined with general meteorological conditions describing typical and extreme burn conditions, we have simulated potential fires in these regions and predicted the potential radiological dose that could be received by firefighting personnel and the public surrounding the SRS. In all cases, the predicted cumulative dose was a small percent of the US Department of Energy regulatory limit (0.25 mSv). These predictions were conservative and assumed that firefighters would be exposed for the duration of their shift and the public would be exposed for the entire day over the duration of the burn. Realistically, firefighters routinely rotate off the firefront during their shift and the public would likely remain indoors much of the day. However, we show that even under worst-case conditions the regulatory limits are not exceeded. In conclusion, we can infer that the risks associated with wildfires would not be expected to cause cumulative doses above the level of concern to either responding personnel or the offsite public.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗