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Current Status of the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program

In 1999, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Russian Federation, agreed to start a new nuclear non-proliferation initiative to return Russian/Soviet-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) back to its country of origin. Trilateral discussions among the U.S., the Russian Federation, and the IAEA identified more than 20 research reactors in 16 countries (Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, DPRK, Germany, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Libya, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam) that had Russian/Soviet-origin HEU. In 2000, the IAEA Director General sent a letter to 16 countries asking for their willingness to return this spent HEU fuel to the Russian Federation. Fourteen countries responded positively to the Director General’s letter. The primary goal of the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) program, managed by DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Material Management and Minimization, is to advance nuclear nonproliferation objectives by encouraging eligible countries to convert their research reactors from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and to eliminate stockpiles of HEU. In May 2004, the United States and the Russian Federation signed a Government-to-Government Agreement that established the legal framework necessary for cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation for the return of research/test reactor fuel from eligible countries. To date, the RRRFR program has completed sixty-three successful operations to repatriate almost 2,300 kg of Russian-origin HEU fresh and spent fuel. All Russian-origin HEU has been completely removed from 12 countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Georgia, Latvia, Libya, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. At the present time Russian-origin HEU remains in Kazakhstan, Belarus, Germany, DPRK, and China. This paper describes the current status of the RRRFR program and preparations for upcoming HEU removal and down-blending activities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Data Driven Analysis for Modernization Program Management

NNSA is responsible for managing national nuclear security missions: ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; supplying nuclear fuel to the Navy; and supporting the nation’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, over half of NNSA’s facilities are more than 40 years old, and roughly one-third date back to the Manhattan Project. To execute its critical nuclear security missions, NNSA is making large investments to modernize its nuclear production capabilities. This ramp up represents NNSA’s largest modernization effort since the Cold War. Given the scale of these efforts, NNSA’s Office of Secondary Stage Production Modernization has implemented data driven techniques to prioritize investments and inform strategic decision making. NNSA, with support from its site managing contractors, has developed and implemented an integrated schedule and risk management system to address the issues and limitations with the traditional approach. The multi-year integrated schedules are key to identifying program linkages and managing large portfolios comprised of many different projects and efforts. In conjunction with the integrated schedule, a new program risk management system has also been developed and implemented, which manages program risks and opportunities, along with specific mitigation strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks per timelines that are tracked in the integrated schedule. This paper is supplemented with a follow-on presentation on effective management of program material and throughput modeling.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

IAEA Domestic Inspections in the US

The Voluntary Offer Agreement between the United States and the IAEA for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the United States, INFCIRC/288, entered into force in 1980. Under this Agreement, the United States provides to the IAEA an Eligible Facilities List, which lists facilities eligible for IAEA inspection and verification of compliance through either a reporting-only process or for full-scope safeguards (to include inspections). Approximately 300 facilities are currently listed on the Eligible Facilities List. Since 1981, the IAEA has conducted over 700 inspections on ~20 of these facilities. Currently, four NRC-licensed facilities have been selected under the Initial (Reporting) Protocol, and one DOE facility, KAMS at the SRS, has been selected for full-scope safeguards. These IAEA inspections are documented in the ID/288 database managed by staff at ORNL and the Y-12 National Security Complex for the NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. This database also maintains records of US designated inspectors, the status of indices checks, and inspection schedules. The database was most recently updated in FY 2014 to include information related to the IAEA visit to URENCO-USA in New Mexico and will be upgraded again via proposal in FY 2017 to include the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) inspections in the US Caribbean territories, associated with INFCIRC/366. During the FY 2017 upgrade, the system will also be overhauled to allow for quicker updates and to improve performance using a modern software package.

White-Horton, Jessica↗

AWC for Nuclear Material Transportation

Presentation to the Forefront22 Workshop in DC to NNSA DNN. Generalized presentation on Advanced Wireless Communications and areas where Nuclear Material Transportation may find interesting to investigate further for security and cybersecurity interests. Summary of the Forefront22 workshop Traditional wireless communication technologies, such as Wi-Fi and Cellular, have modernized industries worldwide. The Nuclear industry has also started to modernize its operations by utilizing wireless connectivity and is well poised to expand the use of wireless to an increasing number of use cases. The most recent cellular technology, called 5G for Fifth Generation, brings a transformation not only to wireless; but to industries worldwide by fueling the growth of Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial IoT (IIoT). Availability of additional spectrum e.g., use of millimeter wave (mmWave) spectrum bands, is a critical boost to wireless growth. These advanced wireless technologies bring multiplicative gains in data rates, latency reduction, capacity growth, and localization accuracy, that can be harnessed for Nuclear Nonproliferation activities along with other mission critical applications. However, using these functional advances securely is of utmost important specially for these critical applications. The functional capabilities of these advanced technologies including 5G & Wi-Fi 6, and the associated security issues and mitigations will be discussed in this session. The future technologies including 6G which will follow 5G and newer versions of Wi-Fi will be also introduced.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Multi-Sensor Data Acquisition System for Process Monitoring

Idaho National Laboratory is building a new nuclear fuel cycle test bed. This fuel cycle test bed named “Beartooth” will give researchers the opportunity to study the nuclear fuel cycle process. The process operations include the use of centrifugal contactors and process flow for the purification of special nuclear material recovery in used fuel. This new research facility has the need to use non-traditional measurement sensors to determine the state-of-health of the solvent extraction process. These non-traditional sensors can also enhance nuclear nonproliferation supervision and other activities. The non-traditional sensors include accelerometers, acoustic, current, flow, colorimetric, temperature, pH and conductivity. The challenge behind deploying all these sensors, is the need for fast and reliable data collection. The data acquisition system (DAQ) needs to be capable of recording up to 12 accelerometers and/or acoustic microphones simultaneously at rates up to 12.8 kSamples/second/channel. This requires the need for a strong architecture and data collection solution. This summary identifies the system architecture, DAQ, and sensors needed to support non-traditional measurements in a solvent extraction process.

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Use of Machine Learning for Signature Development in a Multi-Sensor Environment for Safeguard Applications of Solvent Extraction Processes

Idaho National Laboratory is constructing the Special Nuclear Material test bed (Beartooth) for research and development pertaining to nuclear fuel processing operations using centrifugal contactors. Beartooth will enable give researchers the opportunity to study the dissolution, separation, and conversion of special nuclear materials (e.g., plutonium, enriched uranium, and thorium). As a lead-in to Beartooth, this project constructed a test bed to study the process and equipment behavior with real time series data collection using a variety of non-traditional sensors, in order to identify process failures and label them as either accidental or purposeful, thus enhancing nuclear nonproliferation stewardship. The measurement sources in this test bed include vibration, acoustic, current, flow, colorimetric, and thermal data. These measurements vary in terms of magnitude, frequency, and location. This information will be combined and used within data-driven machine-learning methods to detect operation condition changes that are either intentional (i.e., changes in operating set points) or malicious (i.e., flow diversion) in nature. This presentation covers the data processing and signature development activities necessary for utilizing this heterogeneous dataset to classify process anomalies.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Empirical Bounding Analysis and User Recommendations for a Neutron Multiplicity Detector

Neutron multiplicity detectors are useful for a variety of applications including nuclear emergency response, nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and criticality safety. When measuring black-box problems (i.e., when the system being measured is completely unknown) with systems that have relatively low detection efficiency, expert analysis is frequently required to determine appropriate bounds for system parameters such as neutron multiplication and neutron leakage. This is because the detection efficiency can vary wildly, which also means that the resulting system parameters can have large variations. This work applies an empirical approach to provide bounds on system parameters (such as system multiplication, neutron leakage, and detector efficiency). The results of this bounding analysis are then used as inputs to provide recommendations to users regarding criticality safety. In addition to describing the method used, this work provides sample results from a measurement campaign performed at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

NA-213 Presentation.pdf

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is one of 17 United States Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories. SRNL, a multi-program national laboratory, is a leading research and development institution for the Offices of Environmental Management and Legacy Management at the U.S. Department of Energy and the Weapons and Nonproliferation programs for the National Nuclear Security Administration. Battelle Savannah River Alliance, LLC (BSRA), a not-for-profit limited liability company, manages and operates SRNL for the DOE. BSRA board leadership includes Battelle Memorial Institute, Clemson University, University of South Carolina, South Carolina State University, University of Georgia, and Georgia Institute of Technology. Battelle Memorial Institute and the five universities are joined in partnership with preferred subcontractors TechSource and Longenecker & Associates with the singular purpose of maintaining SRNL as a best-in-class national laboratory. Scientists and Engineers at SRNL use leading edge science and technology to advance the Department of Energy’s critical mission outcomes.

Hasty, Timothy C.↗

Integrating repositories with fuel cycles: The airport authority model

The organization of the fuel cycle is a legacy of World War II and the cold war. Fuel cycle facilities were developed and deployed without consideration of the waste management implications. This led to the fuel cycle model of a geological repository site with a single owner, a single function (disposal), and no other facilities on site. Recent studies indicate large economic, safety, repository performance, nonproliferation, and institutional incentives to collocate and integrate all back-end facilities. Site functions could include geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) with the option for future retrievability, disposal of other wastes, reprocessing with fuel fabrication, radioisotope production, other facilities that generate significant radioactive wastes, SNF inspection (navy and commercial), and related services such as SNF safeguards equipment testing and training. This implies a site with multiple facilities with different owners sharing some facilities and using common facilities - the repository and SNF receiving. This requires a different repository site institutional structure. We propose development of repository site authorities modeled after airport authorities. Airport authorities manage airports with government-owned runways, collocated or shared public and private airline terminals, commercial and federal military facilities, aircraft maintenance bases, and related operations - all enabled and benefiting the high-value runway asset and access to it via taxi ways. With a repository site authority the high value asset is the repository. The SNF and HLW receiving and storage facilities (equivalent to the airport terminal) serve the repository, any future reprocessing plants, and others with needs for access to SNF and other wastes. Non-public special-built roadways and on-site rail lines (equivalent to taxi ways) connect facilities. Airport authorities are typically chartered by state governments and managed by commissions with members appointed by the state governor, county governments, and city governments. This structure (1) enables state and local governments to work together to maximize job and tax benefits to local communities and the state, (2) provides a mechanism to address local concerns such as airport noise, and (3) creates an institutional structure with large incentives to maximize the value of the common asset, the runway. A repository site authority would have a similar structure and be the local interface to any national waste management authority. (authors)

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Quantitative assessment of proposals on assurance of nuclear fuel supply

The assurance of nuclear fuel supply has the potential to contribute to balancing peaceful use of nuclear power and nuclear nonproliferation. 5 proposals which provide the backup supply of the enrichment service in case of supply disruption, are investigated in this study. We investigated the 20 NPT countries which are non-nuclear-weapon states and possess operable commercial LWRs in October 2012 as potential participants for each proposal. As a result of literature researching, we have extracted factors that can be considered as important for a country to participate or not participate in the assurance of nuclear fuel supply. Then we have computed incentive and disincentive parameters for each country. The results show that the participation expectancy decreases in the order of IAEA Fuel Bank proposal, Russian LEU Reserve proposal, AFS proposal, WNA proposal and 6-Country proposal. The 'IAEA fuel bank proposal' would be triggered in case of the supply disruption which cannot be solved by the market mechanism and bilateral agreements.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Treatment of G1 Baskets at the CEA Marcoule Site - 12027

In the dismantling program for the first-generation French reactors in accordance with the nonproliferation treaty, the CEA is in charge of cleanup and dismantling operations for the facilities at Marcoule, including the decladding units. The G1 decladding was built between 1955 and 1957 in order to de-clad spent fuel elements from the G1 plutonium-producing reactor and prepare them for dissolution. The facility was also used for interim storage of G1, G2 and G3 fuel dissolution baskets, which had been used during plant operation for transfer (from the decladding facility to the UP1 plant) and/or dissolution of spent fuel elements. One of the cleanup projects involves recovery of the baskets, which will be cut up, sorted, and conditioned in metal bins. The bins will be immobilized with cement grout, then transferred to the onsite solid waste conditioning facility (CDS) and to the repository operated by the French National Radioactive Waste Management Agency (ANDRA). The project is now in progress, after special safety permits were issued and measurement stations and dedicated tools were developed to handle all types of baskets (which differed according to their origin and use). The disposal of all the baskets is scheduled to last 2 years and will produce 55 metal waste bins. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technologies: Current Challenges and Future Plans - 12558

The mission of the Office of Nuclear Energy's Fuel Cycle Technologies office (FCT program) is to provide options for possible future changes in national nuclear energy programs. While the recent draft report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future stressed the need for organization changes, interim waste storage and the establishment of a permanent repository for nuclear waste management, it also recognized the potential value of alternate fuel cycles and recommended continued research and development in that area. With constrained budgets and great expectations, the current challenges are significant. The FCT program now performs R and D covering the entire fuel cycle. This broad R and D scope is a result of the assignment of new research and development (R and D) responsibilities to the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), as well as reorganization within NE. This scope includes uranium extraction from seawater and uranium enrichment R and D, used nuclear fuel recycling technology, advanced fuel development, and a fresh look at a range of disposal geologies. Additionally, the FCT program performs the necessary systems analysis and screening of fuel cycle alternatives that will identify the most promising approaches and areas of technology gaps. Finally, the FCT program is responsible for a focused effort to consider features of fuel cycle technology in a way that promotes nonproliferation and security, such as Safeguards and Security by Design, and advanced monitoring and predictive modeling capabilities. This paper and presentation will provide an overview of the FCT program R and D scope and discuss plans to analyze fuel cycle options and support identified R and D priorities into the future. The FCT program is making progress in implanting a science based, engineering driven research and development program that is evaluating options for a sustainable fuel cycle in the U.S. Responding to the BRC recommendations, any resulting legislative changes, and meeting the needs of the commercial nuclear industry (including developing and evaluating fuel concepts that may enhance accident tolerance in light water reactors while possibly improving fuel performance) are program priorities. Continuing to build partnerships and collaborations with industry, universities, international organizations, and other DOE programs are essential to addressing the challenges facing the FCT program. (authors)

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Teaching Old Packaging New Tricks - 12593

Waste disposition campaigns have been an industry and government focus area since the mid- 1970's. With increased focus on this issue, and a lot of hard work, most waste packaging and transportation issues have been addressed. The material has been successfully shipped and dis-positioned. DOE has successfully de-inventoried materials from multiple sites to meet material consolidation, footprint reduction, nonproliferation, and regulatory obligations with cost savings from reduced maintenance and regulatory compliance. There has been a wide range of certified shipping packagings for the transportation of hazardous materials to meet most of the waste needs. The remaining materials are problematic, generally low volume, and do not meet the certified content of the existing inventory of packaging. Designing, testing and certifying new packaging designs can be a long and expensive process and for small volumes of material it is cost prohibitive. One very cost effective option is to lease and use a certified packaging to overpack waste containers. There are many robust certified packagings available with the capability to envelope the waste content. The capability to use inner containers, inside the current fleet of certified casks or packaging, to address specific content problems of additional shielding (e.g., U-233) or containment (e.g., sodium bonded nuclear material) has successfully expanded the capability for timely cost effective shipment of unique contents. This option has been used successfully in the NAC-LWT, T-3 and other packagings. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Security Education Program at the Pennsylvania State University

The availability of trained and qualified nuclear and radiation security experts worldwide has decreased as those with hands-on experience have retired while the demand for these experts and skills have increased. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has responded to the continued loss of technical and policy expertise amongst personnel and students in the security field by initiating the establishment of a Nuclear Security Education Initiative, in partnership with Pennsylvania State University (PSU), Texas A and M (TAMU), and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). This collaborative, multi-year initiative forms the basis of specific education programs designed to educate the next generation of personnel who plan on careers in the nonproliferation and security fields with both domestic and international focus. The three universities worked collaboratively to develop five core courses consistent with the GTRI mission, policies, and practices. These courses are the following: Global Nuclear Security Policies, Detectors and Source Technologies, Applications of Detectors/Sensors/Sources for Radiation Detection and Measurements Nuclear Security Laboratory, Threat Analysis and Assessment, and Design and Analysis of Security Systems for Nuclear and Radiological Facilities. The Pennsylvania State University (PSU) Nuclear Engineering Program is a leader in undergraduate and graduate-level nuclear engineering education in the USA. The PSU offers undergraduate and graduate programs in nuclear engineering. The PSU undergraduate program in nuclear engineering is the largest nuclear engineering programs in the USA. The PSU Radiation Science and Engineering Center (RSEC) facilities are being used for most of the nuclear security education program activities. Laboratory space and equipment was made available for this purpose. The RSEC facilities include the Penn State Breazeale Reactor (PSBR), gamma irradiation facilities (in-pool irradiator, dry irradiator, and hot cells), neutron beam laboratory, radiochemistry laboratories, and various radiation detection and measurement laboratories. A new nuclear security education laboratory was created with DOE NNSA- GTRI funds at RSEC. The nuclear security graduate level curriculum enables the PSU to educate and train future nuclear security experts, both within the United States as well as worldwide. The nuclear security education program at Penn State will grant a Master's degree in nuclear security starting fall 2015. The PSU developed two courses: Nuclear Security- Detector And Source Technologies and Nuclear Security- Applications of Detectors/Sensors/Sources for Radiation Detection and Measurements (Laboratory). Course descriptions and course topics of these courses are described briefly: - Nuclear Security - Detector and Source Technologies; - Nuclear Security - Applications of Detectors/Sensors/Sources for Radiation Detection and Measurements Laboratory.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The Development of National Nuclear Forensics Capability in ROK - 18562

According to the IAEA, each state has to build a national nuclear forensics system to determine the origin of radioactive or nuclear materials related to nuclear terrors. Based on this, the system in ROK was proposed by the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). The strategy for it consists of 4 TIER; legal framework, field response, library, and analysis. The legal framework for anti-terror has been systemizing and planned to extend to the nuclear respond with reflection of nuclear threat. It does not include the role and responsibility for each TIER, which impedes the progression of lower TIER. The government makes it materialized shortly with a strong will. The field of sampling and library had many progress. These were not completed, since unexplored before. However, it is possible to expect the outcome in years by active cooperation of license holders. The field of analysis has no major progress. KINAC expects rapid progress after roles are confirmed by law, because there are research laboratories specialized in nuclear material analysis. Meanwhile, the interface with the traditional forensics is in a barren land. KINAC expects there would be ignition for the traditional forensic experts by raising awareness of the nuclear forensics, such as cooperation in the council. Through these efforts, KINAC hopes to build regulatory system without loophole. In this process, the NSSC and KINAC are aware that this process is not possible with a single agency's effort, and will strive to elicit cooperation. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Comparing Thick Target Neutron Yield Calculations for Alphas on F-19 using MCNP6 1.1 Beta with TENDL 2012 Libraries

Because of the heritage of MCNPX, the first production release of MCNP6{sup TM} used physics models, instead of ACE (A Compact Evaluated Nuclear Data File) formatted libraries, for simulating the transport of alpha particles at all energies, as MCNPX could not yet read ACE formatted light ion libraries. For non-Coulombic interactions, the physics models have suggested minimums of ∼ 20-200 MeV. The first production release of MCNP6, MCNP6{sup TM} 1.0, was still capable of transporting alphas to low energies; however, the physics models resulted in poor prediction of inelastic reactions at energies below the suggested minimums. This poorer prediction at low energies resulted in orders of magnitude lower neutron yields for events resulting from light ion interactions at low energies. For example, F-19(α,n)Na-22 from U-234 decay in UF{sub 6} produced poor neutron production results. Modeling these types of interactions correctly is vital for signal analysis for nonproliferation safeguards and nuclear security as well as for correctly characterizing source terms for radiation protection and shielding calculations. The TALYS computer code was developed to simulate nuclear reactions involving neutrons, photons, protons, deuterons, tritons, alphas and He-3 particles, in the 1 keV - 200 MeV energy range. TENDL is a nuclear data library, which provides the output of the TALYS nuclear model code system for direct use in applications (i.e. ACE formatted cross sections). Since 2008, TENDL had publicly provided ACE formatted libraries for alpha transport; however, not until the release of MCNP6{sup TM} 1.1 beta, had MCNP6 publicly possessed the capability to read such libraries. At the Radiation Protection and Shielding Division topical meeting in 2014, initial testing of MCNP6 1.1 beta showed that MCNP6 using TENDL 2012 resulted in poor prediction when compared to the compilation of experiment data provided in R. Heaton et al. Further comparisons for PuBe sources, using the MCNP6 1.1 beta spontaneous decay alpha feature coupled with alpha transport, were also given in the winter American Nuclear Society meeting in 2014, where the results showed large discrepancies with measured data. For F-19(α,n)Na-22 interactions, the R. Heaton et al. paper is a conglomeration of several important references; and the data provided by R. Heaton et al. used a numerical fit of the excitation function provided by Norman et al.. Norman et al. has recently published their (α,n) thick target yield data for PbF{sub 2} in tabular form, backing out the thick target yields of F-19(α,n)Na-22 and computing F{sub 2} and UF{sub 6} thick target neutron yields (as supplements to the PbF{sub 2} data). Here we compared measured thick target yields of E. B. Norman et al. to MCNP6 1.1 beta using TENDL 2012 libraries. Deterministically backing out the thick target yield from measured values involves using the stopping power. MCNP uses either the SPAR code or an interpolation of the Spar code and Bethe-Boch formula for computing stopping powers. As a result one may believe that these separate methods will arrive at separate thick target yields independent of the production cross section. In our MCNP calculations, we simulated the alpha until the alpha completely stopped in the medium. The energy loss in the condensed history algorithm is not continuous but discrete and related to the stopping powers. Because the neutron production yield is energy dependent, the energy loss dictates the emission of secondary neutrons; and therefore the difference in stopping powers used may have some slight effect on the yield difference. For this study, we chose to use the default condensed history algorithm setup, while future studies should address tightening steps in the condensed history algorithm to prove whether or not choice of stopping power actually matters. The fact that all 5 evaluated isotopic compositions resulted in different thick target yield percent differences does warrant this type of investigation. A typical user may not be only interested in integral emission, taking 10 s to 100 s of processor hours to simulate, but rather a timely generation of the spectra. Such an application would require biasing the production of secondaries from alpha sources such that millions of secondaries could be produced, emulating a converged energy dependent spectra. Neutron production biasing from alpha sources does not currently exist; however, developing a biasing algorithm for neutron production from alpha sources should be investigated in the future.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Effect of Reactor Radiation on the Thermal Conductivity of Graphite-based Dispersion Fuel

The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in 2011 stimulated materials development efforts to improve the current fuel design for Light Water Reactors (LWRs). From fuel element to fuel cladding, new concepts in advanced nuclear fuel development have been proposed, studied, and tested. The new fuel systems are expected to have better resistance to damage, melting, and chemical reaction during accident scenarios. To test the performance and accident tolerance of the advanced fuel, it is highly preferable to simulate off-normal transients in addition to standard in-core fuel performance tests (available at High Flux Isotope Reactor at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Advanced Test Reactor at Idaho National Laboratory). The Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT) is now being prepared to restart its operation, performing transient testing to assist advanced fuel development. TREAT was operated from 1959 to 1994, and was extensively used to generate thousands of reactor transients for different programs. The reactor has not operated since 1994. The original fuel used at TREAT was graphite-based dispersion fuel with highly-enriched uranium (HEU, 93.1% enriched uranium). For nonproliferation purposes, a fuel conversion program, supported by U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA), Office of Material Management and Minimization (NA-23) Reactor Conversion Program, is underway to develop a replacement core in which the UO{sub 2} contains only low-enriched uranium (LEU). The preliminary LEU core design has shown a much lower carbon/uranium atomic ratio and enrichment than in the HEU core design. To achieve performance similar to the HEU core, the prospective LEU core will contain a much higher density of UO{sub 2} particles. As a result, a higher level of radiation damage, particularly from fission fragments emerging from the UO{sub 2} particles, can be expected dependent on the UO{sub 2} particle size within the fuel. To support LEU fuel design, the present study investigates the effect of reactor radiations on the thermal conductivity of graphite-based dispersion fuel. Both neutron- and fission-radiation induced degradations of the fuel are modeled, and validated based on the available experimental data. In this study, the reactor-radiation induced thermal conductivity degradation of graphite-based dispersion fuel was analyzed. A semi-empirical method to model the relative thermal conductivity with reactor radiations was proposed and validated. The proposed method can be further applied to predict the changes in the thermal conductivity of the prospective LEU TREAT fuel during long-term operation. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗