Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Nuclear Waste Management”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 775 records · Page 43

Vitrification of Hanford Tank Wastes for Condensate Recycle and Feed Composition Changeover Testing (Rev. 1)

During the vitrification of Hanford Site nuclear waste at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP), which is a part of the safe and efficient retrieval, treatment, and disposal mission of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of River Protection, the offgas condensate generated from the waste-to-glass conversion is currently planned to be concentrated by evaporation in the Effluent Management Facility (EMF). This concentrated condensate can then be recycled back to the incoming waste and vitrified. To test the recycle process, an apparatus was designed and built to mimic the EMF evaporator and was then used to concentrate a volume of condensate produced during the vitrification of a sample of Hanford tank 241-AP-107 (referred to herein as AP-107) waste in a continuous laboratory-scale melter (CLSM). The concentrated condensate was added to an additional sample of AP-107 waste, to mimic one round of the recycle process, and the combined solution was vitrified, producing a second round of recycle condensate. In the current study, the EMF test apparatus was used to concentrate the second-round recycle condensate under evaporation conditions (at 45 °C and 1.4 psia) designed to emulate EMF operation. The condensate was successfully concentrated by a factor of ~10 while retaining over 95 % of the technetium-99 (99Tc), Cs, and I inventories in the concentrate. Another portion of AP-107 waste was retrieved by Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) and transferred to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), where it was pretreated and then combined with the second-round recycle AP-107 condensate concentrate and glass-forming chemicals (GFCs) to form the two-time recycle AP-107 melter feed, approximating a second round to the recycling action to be performed at the WTP. A portion of AP-105 waste was also retrieved by WRPS and provided to PNNL for pretreatment and combining with GFCs to form AP-105 melter feed. The two-time recycle AP-107 and AP-105 melter feeds were processed consecutively in the CLSM. The CLSM run proceeded for 13.63 hours, producing 9.70 kg of glass for an average glass production rate of 1464 kg m 2 d -1 during the two-time recycle AP-107 feed charging and 1568 kg m 2 d -1 during the AP-105 feed charging. The rate during AP-107 charging was essentially equivalent to the rate when processing no-recycle AP-107 feed and lower than that achieved when processing one-time recycle AP-107 feed. However, all rates were within the potential range of variability when processing melter feeds with similar composition in the CLSM. Likewise, the rate during AP-105 charging was higher than the previous rate processing AP-105, but within the potential CLSM range. The cold-cap characteristics changed from the typically thin AP-107 cold cap to a foamy-edged cold cap as previously seen with AP-105 shortly after transitioning to the AP-105 melter feed. The glass produced during the CLSM run was within 10 % of its target composition for the primary glass components. The CaO and Li 2 O targets varied by more than 1 wt% between the two-time recycle AP-107 and AP-105 glass targets and it took about 2 turnovers of the CLSM glass inventory to reach a relative chemical steady state in the glass for CaO and Li 2 O after the melter feed inputs were switched.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Analytical Sensitivity Analysis of a Spent Nuclear Fuel Cask

Here, we report nuclear science and engineering is a field increasingly dominated by computational studies resulting from increasingly powerful computational tools. As a result, analytical studies, which previously pioneered nuclear engineering, are increasingly viewed as secondary or unnecessary. However, analytical solutions to reduced-fidelity models can provide important information concerning the underlying physics of a problem and aid in guiding computational studies. Similarly, there is increased interest in sensitivity analysis studies. These studies commonly use computational tools. However, providing a complementary sensitivity study of relevant analytical models can lead to a deeper analysis of a problem. This work provides the analytical sensitivity analysis of the one-dimensional (1D) cylindrical mono-energetic neutron diffusion equation using the forward sensitivity analysis procedure (FSAP) developed by Cacuci. Further, these results are applied to a reduced-fidelity model of a spent nuclear fuel cask, demonstrating how computational analysis might be improved with a complementary analytic sensitivity analysis.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

ILAW Glass Ion-Exchange Rate Testing (Final Report FY2020)

About 50 million gallons of high-level mixed waste is currently stored in underground tanks at The United States Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Hanford site in the State of Washington. The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will provide DOE’s Office of River Protection (ORP) with a means of treating this waste by vitrification for subsequent disposal. The tank waste will be separated into low- and high-activity waste fractions, which will then be vitrified respectively into Immobilized Low Activity Waste (ILAW) and Immobilized High-Level Waste (IHLW) products. The ILAW product will be disposed of in an engineered facility – the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) – on the Hanford site, while the IHLW product will be directed to the national deep geological disposal facility for high-level nuclear waste. The ILAW and IHLW products must meet a variety of requirements with respect to protection of the environment before they can be accepted for disposal.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Stability of SiO{sub 2} Fe{sub 3}O{sub 4} Nanoparticles for Uranium Extraction in Acidic Media - 20189

This comprehensive study has shown that the proposed strategy of SiO{sub 2} coating of Fe{sub 3}O{sub 4} nanoparticles (NPs) for the use of uranium (U) extraction in acidic media was successful. The breakdown of Fe{sub 3}O{sub 4} in acidic media has proven to be a challenge when applying to a nuclear waste removal scenario, leading to the dissolution of Fe{sub 3}O{sub 4} and preventing uptake of U ions in the waste. To overcome this a SiO{sub 2} passivating layer was grafted to the Fe{sub 3}O{sub 4} NPs, to which an acid stability test was conducted between pH 3 and pH 4. It has been shown via Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM) and zeta potential measurements that the uncoated Fe{sub 3}O{sub 4} NPs exhibit rapid coagulation when exposed to acidic conditions, moving from a stable zeta potential of -44 mV to an unstable zeta potential of +6 mV. SiO{sub 2} coated Fe{sub 3}O{sub 4} on the other hand can remain stable for several hours and continue to be stable beyond that. Throughout acid exposure the zeta potential of these NPs remained at ∼ -38 mV, showing great stability. As a functionality is needed on the surface of the NPs for separation and extraction, the phosphate complex used was also tested for its acid stability. It was determined that with a constant zeta potential of ∼ -20 mV, the phosphate functionality was able to remain stable in the acidic conditions simulating the environment of certain nuclear wastes. Overall SiO{sub 2} coated (PO)x-Fe{sub 3}O{sub 4} NPs show great promise for application in separation and removal of U in acid media. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Gallium oxide semiconductor-based large volume ultrafast radiation hard spectroscopic scintillators

We report on the development of the first-ever inorganic radiation-hard moisture-insensitive large volume spectroscopic semiconductor-based scintillator with less than 2 ns decay time and light yields as high as 8000 ph/MeV. Despite extensive research into scintillator materials, the quest for an ideal scintillator combining ultrafast decay times (akin to BaF 2 and Yb-doped scintillators such as Lu 2 O 3 :Yb), high light yields (exceeding 2000 photons per MeV), spectroscopic capabilities, and exceptional radiation hardness remain unfulfilled. In this study, we demonstrate and report for the first time the viability of large-volume (up to 20 mm thickness) gallium oxide (β-Ga 2 O 3 ) semiconductor-based scintillators for applications requiring these properties. These β-Ga 2 O 3 scintillators were grown using the fast turnaround (~2 days) crucible-free optical float zone (FZ) technique. The high light yield and ultrafast decay time of these high-purity n-type semiconductors with free carrier concentration of 6 × 10 17 cm –3 are attributed to native defects, specifically oxygen vacancies (V O ) and gallium–oxygen vacancy pairs (V Ga –V O ), generated during optimized FZ growth. The ultrafast decay, along with high light yield, enables excellent timing resolution and high count rate detection for applications like time-of-flight positron emission tomography, physics experiments, and nuclear safety. The radiation hardness of these devices has been documented in a separate publication.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) (Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER), Calendar Year 2022)

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2022. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2022 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods and Applications in the GDSA Framework (FY2022)

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Office of Fuel Cycle Technology (FCT) is conducting research and development (R&D) on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW). Two high priorities for SFWST disposal R&D are design concept development and disposal system modeling. These priorities are directly addressed in the SFWST Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) control account, which is charged with developing a geologic repository system modeling and analysis capability, and the associated software, GDSA Framework, for evaluating disposal system performance for nuclear waste in geologic media. GDSA Framework is supported by SFWST Campaign and its predecessor the Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) campaign.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2023

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2023. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2023 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

Record of Decision↗

Update on ASME AG-1 and Revision of the DOE Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook - 20536

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers AG-1 Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment is updated every two years. This paper provides an overview of issues being discussed within AG-1 committee meetings and revisions that will be included in the next version of the code. Additional information is provided on issues being discussed ranging from media velocity limits, control of airflow using actual versus and standard cubic feet per minute. Navigation and identification of applicable high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter code sections can be confusing for those unfamiliar with AG-1. A general reorganization of filtration code sections clarifies geometry, flow, and performance envelopes for nuclear grade HEPA filters. The initial step consists of establishment of Section FN covering qualification of conventional, ceramic, metal, and high strength fibrous glass media. Future filter sections are currently expected to be characterized by geometry and flow direction (axial vs. radial). The Department of Energy's (DOE) Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook (NACH) is also undergoing revision. An update on the status of that effort, along with issues and changes being considered. The original charter of the AG-1 Code was specific to commercial nuclear power plants, and to safety-related air cleaning systems. This has evolved over the years to include normal non-safety ventilation systems and process gas systems. Corollary guidance for DOE facilities has been available in several editions of the Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook, starting with ORNL-NSIC 65. The latest edition of the Handbook, 2003, is undergoing revision and modifications. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Cost of (In-) Accurate Waste Characterization in the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry - 20066

Proper disposal of waste has never been a human priority. Our history is full of examples of throwing away things with minimal effort or thought to consequence. That is until disease or toxicity become apparent and we realize we need to change. Unfortunately, we almost never have all the information we need at the time we make decisions. In addition to the technical and scientific issues, profits and politics are also factors. Newton's third law also applies to politics and so for every policy (action) put in place, there will be (opposite reaction) forces in play to push back against it. These forces are seldom balanced and so the reaction to the discovery of harm is to over-correct and destroy the benefit to be had. This of course causes those who want the benefit, or profit from it, to work to undermine or repeal those measures put in place to eliminate the harm. The issue is exacerbated when the problem to be solved is highly technical and at the edge of our science so that the harm and benefit cannot be easily or accurately quantified. At these times, reason often goes out the window and our decision makers are influenced by either greed or fear as these emotions are much easier to stoke. Those of us in the middle, with the charge to 'do the right thing for the least cost', are therefore frequently constrained and forced into actions that are neither technically the right thing to do and not cost effective. The cost of radioactive waste disposal is based on the concentrations of various radioisotopes in the waste. Some of these isotopes are relatively easy to quantify and some are not. Most laboratory methods for quantification are limited in the amount of activity that can be present during the measurement process. Current nuclear plants were not designed with the idea that taking truly representative waste samples would be important. The limits used to define waste class and therefore cost are precisely defined but the methods for determining those concentrations are far less precise. Improving the accuracy of radioactivity concentrations in waste and having consistent and reasonable oversight can reduce waste costs through active management of the process. So what can we do about it? Science may provide an answer. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NA-22 Quarterly Report: April-June, 2020

At LLNL we contribute to two projects in NNSA-IAEC Science and Technology Working Group Area V: Basic Science of Waste Management & Subsurface Science. The motivation behind Topic Area V is to evaluate the scientific and safety case for an intermediate borehole to house Israel’s nuclear waste. WM1 (SNL lead) is Thermomechanical Damage (initially called Damage Accumulation and Wellbore Stability). This work focuses on evaluating the damage to the host rock induced by excavation and heat released from a possible radioactive waste repository/borehole. WM2 (LLNL lead) is Radionuclide Facilitated Transport in Carbonate Rock (initially called Colloidal Transport of Radionuclides). This work focuses on better understanding the transport of radionuclides and colloids from a nuclear waste repository/borehole in a vadose zone environment through experimentation and modeling. In the second quarter (this report) our work has been delayed in part due to COVID-19. LLNL went into shelter in place (SIP), minimum safe operations mid-March. Operations at LLNL have been slowly ramping up with 50% of the workforce back onsite in limited capacity and telecommuting widely used. The good news is that our labs opened up the last week in June and experiments are expected to start up again for WM2 Radionuclide Facilitated Transport in July. LLNL’s contribution to WM1 Thermochemical Damage modeling efforts also started back up in late June. We expect to be able to catch up on much of our work by the end of next quarter. The three national laboratories communication on a bi-monthly basis to make sure Area V projects remain on track and we have a monthly conference call with our Israeli counterparts to make sure we are communicating priorities and coordinating project details.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

NA-22 Quarterly Report: April-June, 2020

At LLNL we contribute to two projects in NNSA-IAEC Science and Technology Working Group Area V: Basic Science of Waste Management & Subsurface Science. The motivation behind Topic Area V is to evaluate the scientific and safety case for an intermediate borehole to house Israel’s nuclear waste. WM1 (SNL lead) is Thermomechanical Damage (initially called Damage Accumulation and Wellbore Stability). This work focuses on evaluating the damage to the host rock induced by excavation and heat released from a possible radioactive waste repository/borehole. WM2 (LLNL lead) is Radionuclide Facilitated Transport in Carbonate Rock (initially called Colloidal Transport of Radionuclides). This work focuses on better understanding the transport of radionuclides and colloids from a nuclear waste repository/borehole in a vadose zone environment through experimentation and modeling. In the second quarter (this report) our work has been delayed in part due to COVID-19. LLNL went into shelter in place (SIP), minimum safe operations mid-March. Operations at LLNL have been slowly ramping up with 50% of the workforce back onsite in limited capacity and telecommuting widely used. The good news is that our labs opened up the last week in June and experiments are expected to start up again for WM2 Radionuclide Facilitated Transport in July. LLNL’s contribution to WM1 Thermochemical Damage modeling efforts also started back up in late June. We expect to be able to catch up on much of our work by the end of next quarter. The three national laboratories communication on a bi-monthly basis to make sure Area V projects remain on track and we have a monthly conference call with our Israeli counterparts to make sure we are communicating priorities and coordinating project details.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Effect of zeolite type, temperature, and pH on Stage III glass alteration behavior for two nuclear waste glasses

We report long-term laboratory scale static alteration tests (up to 1500 d) were conducted on two low-activity waste glasses (LAWA44 and IDF18-A161) at S/V = 2000 m –1 . Tests were seeded with either analcime, clinoptilolite, zeolite P1, or zeolite P2 to induce Stage III glass alteration behavior. The effect of several parameters on glass Stage III behavior was studied with consideration of several variables, including temperature (22 °C – 90 °C) and pH (floating or initially set using KOH at values from 9.5 to 11.5). Temporal solution data and solids characterization at the end of the experiments are reported. Solution data demonstrated the occurrence of a sustained rate acceleration at temperatures down to 40 °C and the activation energy for these Stage III rates was determined for both glasses. Three major secondary phases were identified at the end of the experiments for both glasses: zeolite P1, zeolite P2, and/or analcime (along with minor phases: zeolites, clays, carbonates). The identification of the crystalline phases at the end of the experiment often differed from the zeolite seed phase. In addition, the use of the Avrami equation showed unimpeded zeolite growth (3-dimensional) in certain conditions, suggesting that in certain conditions the glass dissolution rate is controlled by zeolite formation kinetics whereas in other conditions the glass corrosion process impeded zeolite formation kinetics. The morphological evolution of the samples revealed the growth of the zeolites which completely fill the intergranular space in the powder bed. These results are discussed with regards to previous seeded and unseeded Stage III dissolution rate experiments performed on low- and high-activity nuclear waste glasses.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Characterization of the Sulfur-Saturated Melt Versions of the HFG1 Study Glasses

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for building the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at the Hanford Site in Washington to remediate 55 million gallons of radioactive waste that is temporarily stored in 177 underground tanks. The Office of River Protection (ORP) has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) contribute to current glass studies to support successful startup of the WTP, due to SRNL’s recognized capabilities and expertise for glass waste form development. As part of this effort, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing, batching, and fabricating simulated high-level waste (HLW) glasses to generate the associated property data needed to validate or identify areas of potential characterization improvements in the current glass property/ composition models. Currently, the models cover only a small fraction of the waste compositions projected in the Hanford tank farm; therefore, the models must be expanded to include high fluoride compositions to successfully complete the WTP mission. SRNL support of this work is defined in the Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan (TTQAP). This report provides results from the chemical analyses of a series of sulfur-saturated melt (SSM) versions of simulated nuclear waste glasses fabricated at PNNL. The glasses were selected as part of a broader study of the influence of glass composition on chemical durability, sulfur retention, and other properties. The glasses were designated the High Fluoride Glasses-1 (HLG1).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Regulatory Spike Testing of RPP-WTP LAW and HLW Glasses for Compliance with Land Disposal Restrictions, VSL-03R3760-1, Rev. 1

The United States Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Hanford site is the current location of storage of about 50 million gallons of mixed waste. This waste is stored in underground tanks at the Hanford site and is both a listed and characteristic waste, as defined in 40 CFR Part 261, and a dangerous waste according to Chapter 173-303 of the Washington Administrative Code (WAC). The waste is also subject to the Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) (40 CFR Part 268 and WAC 173-303-140). The River Protection Project - Waste Treatment Plant (RPP-WTP) will provide DOE with a means for treating this waste by vitrification (for subsequent disposal). The tank waste will be partitioned into low and high activity fractions, which will then be vitrified respectively into Immobilized Low Activity Waste (ILAW) and Immobilized High Level Waste (IHLW) products. The ILAW product will be disposed of in an engineered facility on the Hanford site while the IHLW product will be directed to the national deep geological disposal facility for high level nuclear waste. The ILAW and IHLW products must meet a variety of requirements with respect to protection of the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Flammable Gas Generation and Control at the Idaho Completion Project Legacy Combustible Gas Generation - 20191

On April 11, 2018, four drums containing transuranic waste at the Idaho National Laboratory underwent over-pressurization, ejecting their lids and spreading radiological waste within a facility. An investigation has found that waste in the drums generated methane gas, which contributed to the event. Subsequent to the investigation, the potential for drums to have methane and other flammable analytes whose concentrations could approach or exceed the lower flammability limit (LFL) and the adequacy of the controls to prevent or mitigate a possible deflagration was evaluated. An extensive review of the historical records was performed to determine how many drums exceed the LFL. The historical record identified a small quantity of drums that exceeded the LFL for xylene, hydrogen, and methane. The primary codified applicable code or standard for handling drums is 29 CFR 1910.120 (j) 'Handling Drums and Containers.' It is used throughout the commercial and government sector. This code is integrated throughout the Fluor Idaho safety management programs and procedures to control the Standard Industrial Hazards (SIHs) associated with drum and container handling. Example requirements include: - Drums and containers are inspected, and their integrity assured prior to being moved. - Site operations are organized to minimize the amount of drum or container movement. - When there is a reasonable possibility of flammable atmospheres being present, material handling equipment and hand tools are of the type to prevent sources of ignition. Drums and containers under pressure, as evidenced by bulging or swelling, are not moved until the cause for excess pressure is determined and appropriate containment procedures have been implemented to protect employees from explosive relief of the drum. Drums which exceed the WIPP FGA limit have NCRs associated with them. Once a drum fails flammable gas sampling, an NCR is initiated. The NCR drives placement into NCR dense pack rows. A standing order drives placement of the FGA failures to a single planer segregation location. These drums are not allowed for further processing or shipment until the NCR has been cleared. Once in the single planer rows, follow-up FGA testing is performed by CCP. The NCR is dispositioned by follow-up sampling occurring after adequate time has been provided for the gas to diffuse through the filter assembly, or, in some cases, the drums are repackaged into additional drums to reduce the source term. To date, the ICP project has performed approximately 1.5 million drums moves without a deflagration event due to combustible gas generation. Flammable gas generation in a transuranic waste drum is not unique to the ICP but is common across the DOE complex. Based on the experience at Idaho, application of industry standards is sufficient to control the risk of drum deflagration due to drum movements. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Iodine Co-Precipitation with Calcium Carbonate in the Presence of Silica Ions - 20360

Historical releases of I-129 to the subsurface at the U.S. Department of Energy Hanford Site have resulted in large dilute plumes that cover an area of over 50 km{sup 2}. The most concentrated I-129 plume is associated with the 200 West Area in the 200-UP-1 operable unit of the Hanford Central Plateau, where peak concentrations have been measured up to 30 times the drinking water standard of 1 pCi/L. The mobility of iodine depends on many factors, including chemical speciation, pH, redox conditions, as well as the presence of organic matter, calcium carbonate minerals and microbial activities. Speciation measurements estimate that the majority of the iodine (∼76%) in Hanford groundwater exists as iodate. Information on processes that affect iodate mobility in the Hanford subsurface support evaluation of environmental management options for the I-129 plumes. Iodate can be incorporated into calcium carbonate, which is a potential mechanism of naturally attenuating radioiodine in groundwater. However, the silica content in porewater may impact the contaminant-calcium carbonate incorporation process. Silica is one of the most abundant elements in nature and can have an impact on chemical weathering of alkaline-earth carbonates in the environment. Hence, this research aims to advances knowledge of the iodine co-precipitation process with calcium carbonate in the presence of silica. This information supports the technical basis evaluation of natural attenuation for I-129. Samples for these studies were prepared using calcium carbonate-forming solutions that included certified grade sodium meta-silicate nonahydrate (Na{sub 2}SiO{sub 3}), calcium chloride dehydrate (CaCl{sub 2}.2H{sub 2}O), sodium carbonate (NaCO{sub 2}), and sodium hydroxide (NaOH) solutions for pH adjustments. Triplicate samples were prepared with silica concentrations in the solution of 0 mM, 0.5 mM and 20 mM, mixed with an iodate standard (1000 ppm of IO{sub 3}{sup -} in H{sub 2}O) and sampled over a one-week period. Preliminary data analyses suggest that less iodine remains in solution in the presence of silica (average remaining aqueous fraction 0.23±0.03 at 20 mM of Si) relative to samples without silica (0.52±0.06); an indication that more iodine has been sorbed or incorporated into precipitates. However, the mechanisms for this behavior are still under investigation and need to be interpreted relative to pore water compositions that are representative of Hanford site-specific conditions. Scanning electron microscope equipped with energy dispersive spectroscopy (SEM-EDS) analyses were performed to observe the solid phase morphology in these experiments and showed rhombohedral calcite crystals covered with amorphous Si floccules. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A novel protocol to recycle zirconium from zirconium alloy cladding from used nuclear fuel rods

A potential new zirconium recycling protocol has been demonstrated using unirradiated Zircaloy-based claddings and depleted uranium oxide for the chemical removal of zirconium alloy cladding in used nuclear fuel (UNF) rods from light water reactors. This protocol is based on the application of three new scientific findings. First, a new lower temperature chlorination reaction of zirconium with sulfur monochloride is described. Second, the high solubility of zirconium chloride in thionyl chloride is used to separate it from uranium oxide fuel and fission and activation contaminants. Finally, in the third step, the zirconium chloride is purified by simple recrystallization from thionyl chloride. Utilizing sulfur chloride solvents for a lower temperature liquid-based chemical digestion and purification of zirconium alloy claddings reduces technical complications experienced by current high temperature gas phase chlorination strategies, such as contamination of product streams. This novel protocol has been demonstrated on a 3–50 g scale of unirradiated zirconium alloy, with no significant change in the time required for complete chlorination (3–4 h). This zirconium chlorination protocol has also been performed in the presence of depleted uranium oxide pellets. The depleted fuel pellets do not affect zirconium chlorination, and the chlorination protocol does not chemically or physically alter the fuel pellets. Finally, a preliminary description of an industrial protocol to recycle nuclear grade zirconium from UNF rods is presented.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗