ARIES Oxide Production Program at LANL
Disassemble pits from stockpile-return units identified as excess by NA-23 and convert metal to oxide.
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Disassemble pits from stockpile-return units identified as excess by NA-23 and convert metal to oxide.
The 618-10 Burial Ground on the Hanford Reservation was an early trench waste site used for the disposal of waste from the 300 Area at Hanford. Much of this waste consisted of residues from evaluations of failed fuel as well as various process and separations studies associated with the Department of Energy (DOE) mission which were performed in the 300 Area between March 1954 and September 1963. Much of this waste contained significant concentrations of fission products as well as Transuranic (TRU) radionuclides. Waste forms consist of drums and boxes which were disposed of in the trenches. Many of the drums are shielded containers, cemented sludge, or cemented debris. There are no identifying marks on the containers to correlate them to a specific waste stream. In addition there is some waste in the trenches which came from other locations outside of the 300 area. Cleanup of the 618-10 burial ground is covered under the Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) contract. Due to the proximity of the 618-10 site to the Columbia River, waste is being removed from the 618-10 site, stabilized, and disposed of into either the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) if the containers are determined to be LLW or transferred to the Hanford Central Waste Complex (CWC) if the containers are suspected to be TRU waste. In order to determine the correct disposal path Non Destructive Assay (NDA) must be performed on all of the containers excavated from the trenches. The NDA of these containers is performed using germanium gamma spectroscopy with an In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) and with a neutron slab counter. Due to the challenges associated with these difficult waste streams, matrices, and lack of information to associate these containers with a particular process, the NDA program has had to develop a more robust process to ensure the correct disposition of the waste. (authors)
The decommissioning of nuclear facilities has become a significantly attractive and worldwide topic due to the end of lifetime of many nuclear power plants within next coming years. In Taiwan, Chinshan nuclear power plant owned by the Taiwan Power Company will be the first candidate to be decommissioned according to the Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act. The Chinshan nuclear power plant located in New Taipei City has two units of 636 MWe boiling water reactors (BWRs) for the generation of 9 billion kWh of electricity per year. The date of cessation of operation of Unit No. 1 and Unit No. 2 will be December in 2018 and July in 2019, respectively. Based on the Regulations for the Review and Approval of Applications for a Decommissioning Permit of Nuclear Reactor Facilities, Taiwan Power Company have submitted a decommissioning plan of Chinshan nuclear power plant to the authority, Atomic Energy Council (AEC). After the review process, the decommissioning plan of Chinshan nuclear power plant has been permitted by AEC in 2017. Decontamination is generally utilized during the period of decommissioning of nuclear facility in order to minimize the radiation exposure of personnel and the cost of management of radioactive wastes. The successful decontamination also probably provides the benefits of lowering the level of radioactive wastes, facilitating potential releases, permitting the reuse of metals and facilitating the radiation principle of As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) management. Decontamination aims at the removal of radioactive materials from the contaminated surfaces by several technologies such as washing, heating, chemical reaction and mechanical process. The selection of proper decontamination technologies are depended on the requirement of the target materials and the purpose of the decontamination. Chemical decontamination has been proven to be an effective in reducing the radioactivity for metallic materials by using chemical reagents in contact with the contaminated surfaces. During the operation of Chinshan nuclear power plant, chemical decontamination was performed for Unit No.1 and No.2 in 2000 to decontaminate the Reactor Recirculation System (RRS) and Reactor Water Clean-up Systems (RWCU) by using LOMI-NP-LOMI process. Based on the previous experience of chemical decontamination, the dismantled metallic piping is provided as sample by Chinshan nuclear power plant for the evaluation of the feasibility of chemical decontamination. The provided metallic sample is composed of carbon steel with dose rate around 0.2 mSv/hr. In this report, a multistep decontamination process using strongly oxidizing solution and organic acid solution is performed to remove the contaminated oxide layer from the metal surface, and the resulting contact dose rate and decontamination factor (DF) are also shown to discuss the performance in relation to the process control factors. In this paper, the recent progress in decommissioning programs and preliminary results of the decontamination experiment are described to provide usable information regarding the future decommissioning for Chinshan nuclear power plant. (authors)
Current methods for structuring nuclear waste management, disposal, and remediation decisions are subject to three major limitations. First, they are based on a series of extraordinarily conservative assumptions. The dominant way of thinking is that, for example, conservative models yield better, safer decisions. Second, they lack methods to meaningfully address and incorporate the 'human dimension'. The dominant way of thinking is that the current approach is sufficient to bring together the values and interests of both internal and external stakeholders in making a decision. And third, they lack a formal method through which both internal and external stakeholders are encouraged collectively to 'think through' complex problems that contain multiple competing objectives so that wise, socially acceptable, and scientifically-defensible decisions are made. To overcome these limitations, a paradigm shift is needed towards a holistic, integrated approach to structure nuclear waste management, disposal and remediation decisions. The first requirement of this paradigm shift is the realization and recognition that the problems faced are decision problems, and that there is a formal theory of decision analysis that can, and should, be used to support finding the best solutions. Decision analysis, very simply, is formalized common sense. The reason it is needed for complex problems is that there are too many moving parts (variables) for humans to manage with out the formalism. Decision analysis leads to addressing problem solving using a combination of a science-based model and a costs/values model. Expectation ('realism') and uncertainty are addressed in the science-based models, whereas stakeholder values, preferences, and desires are addressed when modeling costs and value judgments. Science-based modeling tools have been developed, improved, and used since the current regulatory setting was introduced about 30 years ago. However, modeling of costs and value judgments has not often been addressed using any formal approach, despite the openings that exist in regulations (e.g., CERCLA's modifying criteria and the concept of 'as low as reasonably achievable' referenced in DOE Orders). A discussion of the need and rationale for this paradigm shift is presented, followed by a description of the technical basics of this approach to decision modeling, and ending with an explanation of the steps that are taken in this approach to structured decision-making. A software framework program called Guided Interactive Statistical Decision Tools (GiSdT - pronounced 'gist') is introduced that supports this paradigm shift. (authors)
Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants is an increasing reality in many countries with nuclear power. Already many years before final shutdown, planning of the decommissioning work is usually started in order to understand for example the costs, waste volume capacity and licensing work needed. In many countries it is required to have a final decommissioning plan before any decommissioning work is allowed to start. Westinghouse has been involved in international decommissioning planning for more than 30 years, where the first 20 years was mostly funding and preliminary plans due to that decommissioning was many years away. However, as many more plants are now moving into decommissioning, the focus has shifted to final decommissioning plans with budgets instead of funding plans, strategic decisions instead of choices, waste volume specifications instead of estimates and a defined approach instead of what ifs. Westinghouse has developed a methodology based on the planning and execution of many decommissioning projects in Europe, America and Asia. That international experience and understanding helps the customers to adopt a systematic planning process where strategy development is done with the end state in mind, where the goals are clearly outlined and the starting point described. The process and steps to reach the desired end state need to be clearly defined and all options/alternatives evaluated from a cost/benefit point of view. This is followed by a thorough and quantitative risk analysis in order to give solid recommendations and credible conclusions. One important feedback has been that real decommissioning experience from reference projects is invaluable for an efficient and timely progress in order not to spend unnecessary time and effort on understanding the barriers and links between different activities in decommissioning. Skilled project managers or engineers can drive the project forward, but without decommissioning experience previously gained, valuable lessons learned are not used and the same mistakes can be made again. Many utilities have invested in knowledge transfer from other decommissioning projects through site visits, exchange programs and supplier meetings, which is a valuable asset and way of implementing lessons learned from performed decommissioning projects into the planning process. (authors)
The new hybrid SOURCE ConveRgence accelERator (SOURCERER) sequence in SCALE deterministically computes a fission distribution and uses it as the starting source in a Monte Carlo eigenvalue criticality calculation. In addition to taking the guesswork out of defining an appropriate, problem-dependent starting source, the more accurate starting source provided by the deterministic calculation decreases the probability of producing inaccurate tally estimates associated with undersampling problems caused by inadequate source convergence. Furthermore, SOURCERER can increase the efficiency of the overall simulation by decreasing the number of cycles that has to be skipped before the keff accumulation. SOURCERER was applied to a representative example for a used nuclear fuel cask utilized at the Maine Yankee storage site {Scaglione and Ilas}. Because of the time constraints of the Used Fuel Research, Development, and Demonstration project, it was found that using more than 30,000 neutrons per cycle will lead to inaccurate Monte Carlo calculation of keff due to the inevitable decrease in the number of skipped and active cycles used with this problem. For a fixed uncertainty objective and by using 30,000 neutron per cycle, the use of SOURCERER increased the efficiency of the keff calculation by 60%compared to a Monte Carlo calculation that used a starting source distributed uniformly in fissionable regions, even with the inclusion of the extra computational time required by the deterministic calculation. Additionally, the use of SOURCERER increased the reliability of keff calculation using any number of skipped cycles below 350.
The French vitrification of High Level Liquid Waste (HLLW) developed since the beginning of the 1960's led to the successive completion of four industrial vitrification facilities: PIVER facility (1969), Marcoule vitrification facility (1978), and R7 (1989) and T7 (1992) vitrification facilities on La Hague site. R and D has involved containment glass formulation and characterization of glass properties, development of modular technologies specifically tailored to be operated in shielded cells, and development of the vitrification process on full scale prototype. Industrial support has then provided by the R and D team during all phases of commissioning and operation of these industrial facilities. The initial choices of industrial facility design, as well as technologies to enhance flexibility and modularity, allowed an evolution of the vitrification process over time. Maintaining the R and D capabilities on containment glass, process and technology development at full scale size is essential to anticipate treatment of the new effluent and propose innovative industrial technologies. Fueling R and D with industrial feedback ensured the longevity of industrial vitrification facilities and development capabilities for future projects. (authors)
Testing of nuclear explosives caused widespread contamination of surface soils on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Atmospheric tests produced the majority of this contamination. The Radionuclide Inventory and Distribution Program (RIDP) was developed to determine distribution and total inventory of radionuclides in surface soils at the NTS to evaluate areas that may present long-term health hazards. The RIDP achieved this objective with aerial radiological surveys, soil sample results, and in situ gamma spectroscopy. This white paper presents the justification to support the use of RIDP data as a guide for future evaluation and to support closure of Soils Sub-Project sites under the purview of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Use of the RIDP data as part of the Data Quality Objective process is expected to provide considerable cost savings and accelerate site closures. The following steps were completed: - Summarize the RIDP data set and evaluate the quality of the data. - Determine the current uses of the RIDP data and cautions associated with its use. - Provide recommendations for enhancing data use through field verification or other methods. The data quality is sufficient to utilize RIDP data during the planning process for site investigation and closure. Project planning activities may include estimating 25-millirem per industrial access year dose rate boundaries, optimizing characterization efforts, projecting final end states, and planning remedial actions. In addition, RIDP data may be used to identify specific radionuclide distributions, and augment other non-radionuclide dose rate data. Finally, the RIDP data can be used to estimate internal and external dose rates. The data quality is sufficient to utilize RIDP data during the planning process for site investigation and closure. Project planning activities may include estimating 25-millirem per industrial access year dose rate boundaries, optimizing characterization efforts, projecting final end states, and planning remedial actions. In addition, RIDP data may be used to identify specific radionuclide distributions, and augment other non-radionuclide dose rate data. Finally, the RIDP data can be used to estimate internal and external dose rates.
This paper analyses some challenges of environmental rehabilitation (ER) projects in developing countries that the authors have encountered over the past two decades in many parts of the world, discusses the reasons and proposes ways to mitigate them. In the life cycle of an ER project, some stages that are particularly decisive for the lasting rehabilitation success are considered here: (1) site characterisation/baseline studies, (2) justification and development of remediation objectives, site end states and a remediation strategy, and (3) the after-care phase. This paper argues that the time available in many ER projects in developing countries using international funding is very often insufficient, and discusses the reasons for some of the most important bottlenecks: (1) time realistically required to produce thorough baseline data and obtain historic site information that are indispensable to develop a robust remediation design, (2) lack of an adequate legal and regulatory framework, overlapping and/or conflicting provisions of national standards and discrepancies with international best practice, (3) unmanaged stakeholder expectations regarding the actual health and environmental risks, justification and prioritisation of remedial actions, and the achievable remediation end state. Insufficient resources for after-care, monitoring and, if required, corrective action is another major issue that, in the experience of the authors, jeopardises the sustainability of remediation success. Consequently by applying the lessons learnt from previous ER projects in developing (and developed) countries and taking them on board during the programming phase of new ER projects, international funding agencies could greatly help to avoid these obstacles. (authors)
The Retrieval Box Assay System (RBAS) at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant (AMWTP) is an Imaging Passive Active Neutron system supplemented with a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) gamma system for the quantification of Pu-239 Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE) and transuranic (TRU) alpha activity of waste containers of various sizes up to 249 cm x 149 cm x 198 cm (Length x Width x Height). The system was originally calibrated in 2002 (with a range of surrogate matrices and radioactive sources in a 213 cm x 122 cm x 122 cm FRP box) and has been operational for over a decade. As of August 2015, the RBAS has measured approximately 18,000 boxes (50,000 m3 of waste) which has subsequently been fed into the facility's treatment process. Its success, and the wide envelope of waste that it can characterize, has led AMWTP to extend the RBAS mission to include WIPP certification. As part of this new project, the instrument must be capable of meeting WIPP's Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) which include reporting activities and masses of the 10 WIPP-tracked radionuclides. The system will be required to assay sludge and debris waste streams, shredded waste and large metal items. The container size includes Standard Waste Box (SWBs), Fiberglass Reinforced Plywood (FRPs) and large Shredder Boxes. Sludge matrices will be loaded into 210-liter (55-gallon) drums and placed inside an SWB. After assay, boxes will be over-packed into SLB-II's for shipment to WIPP. The target waste streams will contain mixtures of Weapons Grade plutonium, Heat Source plutonium (high in Pu-238 content) and Mixed Oxide (MOX). The activity of the waste is expected to encompass a wide dynamic range of activity from low-level waste (LLW) to TRU with up to several hundred grams of plutonium. Some packages will have high gamma activity associated with fission and activation products such as Cs-137 and Co-60. The existing RBAS hardware (detectors, electronics, assay chamber etc.) was retained for this project. Two lead filters were provided and installed on the existing filter wheels to attenuate the gamma ray flux from the highest activity boxes to avoid overload of the HPGe detectors. The new software suite includes PC-FRAM (Version 5), which is used for the isotopic analysis of the gamma spectra. Integration of FRAM and neutron results is performed using a software package known as RBAS WIPP Analysis Reporting Software (RWARS). This package also performs matrix dependent background adjustments. Other upgrades provided include automated tests that identify when assay parameters fall outside a predetermined range and a new Quality Checking (QC) application. Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA) values were determined for the active and passive neutron modes as a function of measured matrix correction indices. The resulting Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC) has been demonstrated to be less than 3700 Bq/g alpha activity (100 nCi/g). Modifications were performed to update the system TMU parameters to accommodate assay of non-standard size boxes and a wider range of matrix materials. A series of calibration confirmation, measurements were performed on site in 2014 using a representative range of surrogate boxes and radioactive sources including Pu. The WIPP WAC performance criteria were successfully demonstrated up to 157 g Pu and the system passed its first Performance Demonstration Program (PDP) cycle in the Spring of 2015. (authors)
The Department of Energy (DOE) requires that Savannah River Remediation LLC (SRR), the Liquid Waste contractor, maintain a robust and timely Structural Integrity Program for waste tanks that are leak-tight and for waste tanks that have leaked or are suspect. These requirements are promulgated in DOE Manual 435.1-1, Section II.Q.(2). A key aspect of SRR's implementation of these requirements is its annual tank inspection program. In 2018, the SRR Visual and In-Service Inspection Program used two visual imagery techniques to ascertain the integrity of the Savannah River Site (SRS) waste tanks: high resolution digital photography and closed-circuit television. The primary inspection method made use of direct photograph techniques, e.g., making a series of photographs providing detailed views of the tank and wide-angle photography for obtaining overviews of large areas. Closed-circuit television was then typically used to further investigate conditions found during the initial inspection. During 2018, a total of 4,853 photographs were taken and 47 video inspections were performed as part of this inspection program. Of the 51 waste tank systems at SRS that were designed, constructed, and placed into active service storing radioactive liquid waste, 43 remain in active service. Eight tanks have been cleaned, stabilized by filling with engineered grout, and removed from service (also known as operationally closed) -Tanks 5, 6, and 12 (Type I tanks); Tank 16 (Type II tank); and Tanks 17, 18, 19, and 20 (Type IV tanks). For the 43 waste tanks, inspections were successfully conducted in 2018 through all accessible annulus risers and inspection ports for nine Type I tanks, three Type II tanks, and 27 Type III/IIIA tanks; at least one inspection was made in the interior of four Type IV tanks (i.e., the tanks without annular spaces) above the liquid level in the tank. Rainwater continues periodically to be observed migrating into the annuli of some tanks. Evidence of this infiltration was primarily noted by observation of surface stains, and occasionally by calciferous deposits, changed configuration of salt deposits in the associated annulus, and mild surface corrosion. The conditions of the 43 tanks remained essentially unchanged from the conditions reported in 2017. The one key exception was the identification of eight new cracks in the Tank 15 primary tank wall. These newly identified cracks are located at 65, 67, 70, 76, 150, 152, 176 inches and 200 inches above the tank bottom. The identified cracks in Tank 15 do not constitute an impact on the structural integrity of the tank, as evaluated and confirmed in the referenced report, SRNS-STI-2008-00028, A Structural Impact Assessment of Flaws Detected During Ultrasonic Examination of Tank 15, and calculation, T-CLC-H-00890, Calculation of Critical Crack Lengths in HLW Tank 15. The 2018 inspection program confirmed the structural integrity and waste confinement capability of all 43 waste tanks.
Radioactive supernate, salt, and/or sludge wastes (i.e., high level wastes) are confined in 45 underground storage tanks at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The waste is transported between tanks within and between the F and H area tank farms and other facilities on site via underground and a limited number of aboveground transfer lines. The Department of Energy - Savannah River Operations Office (DOE-SR) performed a comprehensive assessment of the structural integrity program for the Tank Farm waste transfer system at the SRS. This document addresses the following issues raised during the DOE assessment
The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2021. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2021 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.
On April 21, 2009, the Energy Facilities Contractors Group (EFCOG) Waste Management Working Group (WMWG) provided a recommendation to the Department of Energy's Environmental Management program (DOE-EM) concerning supplemental guidance on blending methodologies to use to classify waste forms to determine if the waste form meets the definition of Transuranic (TRU) Waste or can be classified as Low-Level Waste (LLW). The guidance provides specific examples and methods to allow DOE and its Contractors to properly classify waste forms while reducing the generation of TRU wastes. TRU wastes are much more expensive to characterize at the generator's facilities, ship, and then dispose at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) than Low-Level Radioactive Waste's disposal. Also the reduction of handling and packaging of LLW is inherently less hazardous to the nuclear workforce. Therefore, it is important to perform the characterization properly, but in a manner that minimizes the generation of TRU wastes if at all possible. In fact, the generation of additional volumes of radioactive wastes under the ARRA programs, this recommendation should improve the cost effective implementation of DOE requirements while properly protecting human health and the environment. This paper will describe how the message of appropriate, less expensive, less hazardous blending of radioactive waste is the 'right' thing to do in many cases, but can be confused with inappropriate 'dilution' that is frowned upon by regulators and stakeholders in the public. A proposal will be made in this paper on how to communicate this very complex and confusing technical issue to regulatory bodies and interested stakeholders to gain understanding and approval of the concept. The results of application of the proposed communication method and attempt to change the regulatory requirements in this area will be discussed including efforts by DOE and the NRC on this very complex subject.
Here, the caustic precipitation of plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U) from Pu and U containing waste solutions has been investigated to determine whether gadolinium (Gd) could be used as a neutron poison for precipitation with greater than a fissile mass containing both Pu and enriched U. Precipitation experiments were performed using both actual samples and simulant solutions with a range of 2.6-5.16 g/L U and 0-4.3 to 1 U to Pu. Analyses were performed on solutions at intermediate pH to determine the partitioning of elements for accident scenarios. When both Pu and U were present in the solution, precipitation began at pH 4.5 and by pH 7, 99% of Pu and U had precipitated. When complete neutralization was achieved at pH greater than 14 with 1.2 M excess OH - , greater than 99% of Pu, U, and Gd had precipitated. At pH greater than 14, the particles sizes were larger and the distribution was a single mode. The ratio of hydrogen to fissile atoms in the precipitate was determined after both settling and centrifuging and indicates that sufficient water was associated with the precipitates to provide the needed neutron moderation for Gd to prevent a criticality in solutions containing up to 4.3 to 1 U to Pu and up to 5.16 g/L U.
Glycolic acid (GA) is being studied as an alternate reductant in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) feed preparation process. It will either be a total or partial replacement for the formic acid that is currently used. A literature review has been conducted on the impact of glycolate on two post-DWPF downstream systems - the 2H Evaporator system and the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF). The DWPF recycle stream serves as a portion of the feed to the 2H Evaporator. Glycolate enters the evaporator system from the glycolate in the recycle stream. The overhead (i.e., condensed phase) from the 2H Evaporator serves as a portion of the feed to the ETF. The literature search revealed that virtually no impact is anticipated for the 2H Evaporator. Glycolate may help reduce scale formation in the evaporator due to its high complexing ability. The drawback of the solubilizing ability is the potential impact on the criticality analysis of the 2H Evaporator system. It is recommended that at least a theoretical evaluation to confirm the finding that no self-propagating violent reactions with nitrate/nitrites will occur should be performed. Similarly, identification of sources of ignition relevant to glycolate and/or update of the composite flammability analysis to reflect the effects from the glycolate additions for the 2H Evaporator system are in order. An evaluation of the 2H Evaporator criticality analysis is also needed. A determination of the amount or fraction of the glycolate in the evaporator overhead is critical to more accurately assess its impact on the ETF. Hence, use of predictive models like OLI Environmental Simulation Package Software (OLI/ESP) and/or testing are recommended for the determination of the glycolate concentration in the overhead. The impact on the ETF depends on the concentration of glycolate in the ETF feed. The impact is classified as minor for feed glycolate concentrations {le} 33 mg/L or 0.44 mM. The ETF unit operations that will have minor/major impacts are chlorination, pH adjustment, 1st mercury removal, organics removal, 2nd mercury removal, and ion exchange. For minor impacts, the general approach is to use historical process operations data/modeling software like OLI/ESP and/or monitoring/compiled process operations data to resolve any uncertainties with testing as a last resort. For major impacts (i.e., glycolate concentrations > 33 mg/L or 0.44 mM), testing is recommended. No impact is envisaged for the following ETF unit operations regardless of the glycolate concentration - filtration, reverse osmosis, ion exchange resin regeneration, and evaporation.
This Compliance Monitoring Implementation Plan outlines monitoring activities conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to demonstrate compliance with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disposal regulations at Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, "Environmental Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes," Subparts B and C; and the EPA criteria for certifying compliance at 40 CFR Part 194, "Criteria for the Certification and Recertification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the Disposal Regulations," Certification Decision, Final Rule. This plan does not address | monitoring activities intended to demonstrate compliance with 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart A. WIPP is a mined repository designed for the permanent disposal of defense-related transuranic (TRU)waste located in the Chihuahuan Desert, 26 miles east of Carlsbad, New Mexico. The suitability of the WIPP site for TRU waste disposal is supported by more than three decades of environmental studies. Monitoring the WIPP facility is one of the DOE's top priorities. Monitoring activities are implemented in compliance with various federal and state of New Mexico regulatory and operational safety requirements. These activities are conducted to ensure environmental protection, public and worker health and safety, and proper characterization of the disposal system. Monitoring activities will continue at WIPP through the operational period and until well after closure of the facility.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office is responsible for environmental restoration (ER) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This includes remediation at Industrial Sites where past nuclear testing activities and activities that supported nuclear testing may have or are known to have resulted in the release of contaminants into the environment. Industrial Sites at the NNSS have included nuclear facilities that supported the nuclear rocket/missile development programs, gas stations, landfills, spill sites, ordnance sites, and numerous other waste disposal and release sites. The NNSS Industrial Sites activities neared completion at the end of fiscal year 2011 while other activities required under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) and part of the same NNSS ER Project are forecasted to extend to 2027 or beyond. With the majority of Industrial Sites corrective action units (CAUs) completed (more than 250 CAUs and over 1,800 corrective action sites), it was determined that an activity closeout process should be implemented to ensure that the work completed over the past 15 years is well documented in a comprehensive and concise summary. While the process used to close each individual CAU is described in approved documents, no single document describes in summary fashion the work completed to close the many individual Industrial Sites. The activity closeout process will be used to develop an Industrial Sites closeout document that describes these years of work. This document will summarize the number of Industrial Sites closed under the FFACO and provide general descriptions of projects, contaminants removed, and sites closed in place with corresponding Use Restrictions. Other pertinent information related to Industrial Sites work such as the project history, closure decisions, historical declarations, remediation strategies, and final CAU status will be included in the closeout document, along with a table listing each CAU and corresponding corrective action sites within each CAU. Using this process of conducting the activity closeout and developing a closeout document may prove useful for other ER projects within the DOE complex in describing how a long period of ER can be summarized in a single document. The NNSS Industrial Sites activities were completed over the span of 15 years and involved the investigation, cleanup or Use Restriction, and closure of more than 260 CAUs and over 1,800 sites. These activities will conclude in FY 2012 (with the exception of one CAU). In order to capture the work completed over this length of time and document decisions made during the activities, a closeout effort was initiated. The closeout will review the work conducted during the Industrial Sites activities and produce a single document that summarizes Industrial Sites activities. This closeout is being conducted at an interim stage in the overall NNSA/NSO ER Project since the Soils and UGTA activities will continue for a number of years, but the completion of the Industrial Sites project warrants conducting a closeout now while personnel are available and information is still current. The process followed by NNSA/NSO in conducing project closeout for the Industrial Sites portion of the ER program may prove useful within the DOE complex in demonstrating how a large ER project can be summarized. (authors)