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At least 793 records · Page 44

BERYLLIUM DETECTION BY FLUORESCENT SPECTROSCOPY

Facilities that machine and process materials involving beryllium oxide are hazardous to workers safety and require monitoring of contamination. A primary goal in industrial worker safety in beryllium containing facilities is avoiding inhalation, which may cause chronic beryllium disease (CBD). Decontamination is labor intensive due to the miniscule size of beryllium dust and the difficulty of detecting its presence on surfaces. Current methods of beryllium detection, while successful, involve numerous intermediate steps such as obtaining wipe samples, applying buffers, centrifuging with ammonium bifluoride, additives to reduce influence of other competing metal ions, and require potentially long wait times of around 24 hours for a single surface sample. In some cases, these samples must be sent to testing facilities across the country and results may not be available for days. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, it has been deemed important to test new fluorescent dyes that can rapidly produce a beryllium presence confirmation via application spray.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Improving the LandScan USA Non-Obligate Population Estimate (NOPE)

Where do people go when they have nowhere to be? Nonobligate activities are a significant part of our social and cultural lives, but there are no existing large scale data which characterize spatial variability in population allocation for these activities. As large scale population estimates have ever-finer resolutions, gaps in our ability to estimate this population segment have an increasingly large impact on high resolution population estimates. In this paper, we demonstrate an improved method for estimating the spatial allocation of the non-obligate population - people who are not at work, school, or in another residential institution. This method builds upon on anonymized and aggregate data on visits to public places, allocating the non-obligate population proportionally to worker population while accounting for the estimated ratio of visitors to workers in public places.

Brelsford, Christa↗

On-Line Monitoring and Real-Time Characterization of Low Level Waste and Off-Gas Condensate Samples using Raman Spectroscopy

The demand for Hanford waste property analysis is expected to significantly increase as the U.S. Department of Energy River Protection Project progresses toward transferring waste to the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. The analysis of waste includes chemical, radionuclide, and physical property characterizations, with the goal of achieving safe/informed transfer and processing. Waste sampling followed by offline laboratory analysis is the current baseline analytical approach. The addition of field-deployed/in situ instruments has the potential to provide improvements and benefits over offline analysis in the areas of 1) Worker Safety: by reducing the need for sampling and thereby reducing the need for worker interaction with waste during sample handling; 2) Operational Efficiency: by reducing analysis turnaround times and offsetting demand on analytical laboratories; and 3) Accuracy: continuous analysis of a flowing waste stream allows cumulative results to be produced for the batch, which is likely to be more representative than discrete samples of batch properties. This paper describes the development and application of an online monitor to provide chemical characterizations; specifically, Raman spectroscopy is utilized to identify and quantify tank components. Accurate quantification is achieved through the use of chemometric analysis, which can be configured to provide real-time analysis in field deployment settings.

Lines, Amanda M.↗

The Cold and Dark Process at the Savannah River Site

The deactivation and decommissioning (D and D) of a facility exposes D and D workers to numerous hazards. One of the more serious hazards is coming into contact to hazardous energy sources (e.g. electrical, pressurized steam). At the Savannah River Site (SRS) a formal process for identifying and eliminating sources of hazardous energy was developed and is called 'Cold and Dark'. Several 'near miss' events involving cutting of energized conductors during D and D work in buildings thought to be isolated identified the need to have a formal process to identify and isolate these potentially hazardous systems. This process was developed using lessons learned from D and D activities at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Rocky Flats) in Colorado. The Cold and Dark process defines an isolation boundary (usually a building perimeter) and then systematically identifies all of the penetrations through this boundary. All penetrations that involve hazardous energy sources are then physically air-gapped. The final product is a documented declaration of isolation performed by a team involving operations, engineering, and project management. Once the Cold and Dark declaration is made for a building work can proceed without the usual controls used in an operational facility (e.g. lockout/tag-out, arc flash PPE). It is important to note that the Cold and Dark process does not remove all hazards from a facility. Work planning and controls still need to address hazards that can be present from such things as chemicals, radiological contamination, residual liquids, etc., as well as standard industrial hazards. Savannah River Site experienced 6 electrical events prior to declaring a facility 'cold and dark' and has had zero electrical events after 'cold and dark' declaration (263 facilities to date). The formal Cold and Dark process developed at SRS has eliminated D and D worker exposures to hazardous energy sources. Since the implementation of the process there have been no incidents involving energized conductors or pressurized liquids/gases. During this time SRS has demolished over 200 facilities. The ability to perform intrusive D and D activities without the normal controls such as lock outs results in shorter schedule durations and lower overall costs for a facility D and D.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Decommissioning of the 247-F Fuel Manufacturing Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS)

Building 247-F at SRS was a roughly 110,000 ft{sup 2} two-story facility designed and constructed during the height of the cold war naval buildup to provide additional naval nuclear fuel manufacturing capacity in early 1980's. The manufacturing process employed a wide variety of acids, bases, and other hazardous materials. As the need for naval fuel declined, the facility was shut down and underwent initial deactivation, which was completed in 1990. All process systems were flushed with water and drained using the existing process drain valves. However, since these drains were not always installed at the lowest point in piping and equipment systems, a significant volume of liquid remained after initial deactivation. After initial deactivation, a non-destructive assay of the process area identified approximately 17 ({+-}100%) kg of uranium held up in equipment and piping. The facility was placed in Surveillance and Maintenance mode until 2003, when the decision was made to perform final deactivation, and then decommission the facility. The following lessons were learned as a result of the D and D of building 247-F. Successful D and D of a major radiochemical process building requires significant up-front planning by a team of knowledgeable personnel led by a strong project manager. The level of uncertainty and resultant risk to timely, cost effective project execution was found to be high. Examples of the types of problems encountered which had high potential to adversely impact cost and schedule performance are described below. Low level and sanitary waste acceptance criteria do not allow free liquids in waste containers. These liquids, which are often corrosive, must be safely removed from the equipment before it is loaded to waste containers. Drained liquids must be properly managed, often as hazardous or mixed waste. Tapping and draining of process lines is a dangerous operation, which must be performed carefully. The temptation to become complacent when breaking into lines is great. Incidents of personnel exposure to liquids during draining are likely. Records from the initial 1990 deactivation led early work planners to assume the facility was cold, dark and dry. This turned out to be a poor assumption. Work instructions had to be modified to require that engineers evaluate each of several hundred process lines to identify the low point, where a tap and drain system could be installed to allow positive verification that the line was empty before the line was cut for removal. During the period between facility shut down in 1990 and the start of final deactivation in 2003, roof leaks had developed, allowing rain water to enter building 247-F, which provided an environment for mold growth. Sampling confirmed the presence of Stachybotrys chartarum, a toxic indoor mold that grows on wet cellulosic material, such as drywall paper. D and D workers in areas where this hazard was identified were required to where proper personal protective equipment, which complicated work execution. Discovery of the potential presence of uniquely hazardous chemicals such as shock sensitive compounds and toxic uranium hexafluoride became issues which required investigation and special handling strategies. Team access to subject matter experts, who could quickly provide the required guidance for safe material handling, was critical to keeping the project on schedule. In old legacy facilities, it is possible that the D and D workers will be exposed to undocumented energy sources such as energized electrical conductors and pipes containing hazardous materials that originate outside the boundaries of the facility. Significant effort must be expended on adequate mechanical and electrical isolation. Subdividing the facility into well defined zones for which detailed zone-specific end points could be developed proved to be a highly effective project management strategy. Waste management must be carefully planned. The rate of waste generation as the facility is converted from a structure to waste can frequently exceed the D and D team's resources to characterize, package, store and transport the waste to a disposal facility in a timely manner. This can lead to schedule delays and/or increased project cost.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Fernald Closure Project: Lessons Learned

For nearly 37 years, the U.S. Department of Energy site at Fernald - near Cincinnati, Ohio - produced 230,000 metric tons (250,000 short tons) of high-purity, low-enriched uranium for the U.S. Defense Program, generating more than 5.4 million metric tons (6 million short tons) of liquid and solid waste as it carried out its Cold War mission. The facility was shut down in 1989 and clean up began in 1992, when Fluor won the contract to clean up the site. Cleaning up Fernald and returning it to the people of Ohio was a $4.4 billion mega environmental-remediation project that was completed in October 2006. Project evolved through four phases: - Conducting remedial-investigation studies to determine the extent of damage to the environment and groundwater at, and adjacent to, the production facilities; - Selecting cleanup criteria - final end states that had to be met that protect human health and the environment; - Selecting and implementing the remedial actions to meet the cleanup goals; - Executing the work in a safe, compliant and cost-effective manner. In the early stages of the project, there were strained relationships - in fact total distrust - between the local community and the DOE as a result of aquifer contamination and potential health effects to the workers and local residents. To engage citizens and interested stakeholders groups in the decision-making process, the DOE and Fluor developed a public-participation strategy to open the channels of communication with the various parties: site leadership, technical staff and regulators. This approach proved invaluable to the success of the project, which has become a model for future environmental remediation projects. This paper will summarize the history and shares lessons learned: the completion of the uranium-production mission to the implementation of the Records of Decision defining the cleanup standards and the remedies achieved. Lessons learned fall into ten categories: - Regulatory approach with end-state determinations; - Interaction with stakeholders; - The balanced approach - on-site and off-site waste-disposal alternatives; - The contracting model; - Site safety performance; - Effectiveness of cleanup remedies; - Worker training and transition; - Client interface; - Cost and schedule performance; - Legacy management. Lessons learned can be applied: While each site and project has its own issues, the various lessons learned from the Fernald Closure Project, when taken from a global perspective, can be applied to similar efforts so that pitfalls are avoided and efficiencies realized.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Managing Legacy Records for Formerly Utilized Sites. Remedial Action Program Sites

The Manhattan Engineer District (MED) and U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) contracted for support work through private and academic parties through the early 1960's. The work often involved radioactive materials. Residual radioactive contamination was left at some of more than 600 potentially contaminated (candidate) sites, and worker health and safety concerns remain from the site operations and subsequent remediation activities. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a program to identify and protect records of MED/AEC activities and of remediation work conducted under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) to aid in resolving questions about site conditions, liability, and worker health and safety and to ensure ongoing protectiveness of human health and the environment. This paper discusses DOE activities undertaken to locate records collections, confirm retention schedules and access requirements, and document information about the collections for use by future stewards. In conclusion: DOE-LM recognizes that records and information management is a critical component of effective LTS and M. Records are needed to answer questions about site conditions and demonstrate to the public in the future that the sites are safe. DOE-LM is working to satisfy present needs and anticipate future uses for FUSRAP records, and compile a collection of site and program information from which future stewards can readily locate and retrieve needed information. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Disposal of Large Reactor Components - Rulemaking to Address Funding of Disposal Costs

The paper will explore the current challenges of financing the disposal costs for disposing of large reactor components such as reactor pressure vessel heads and steam generators and the resulting delays in disposal caused by the current regulatory requirements. The paper also will discuss a recent rulemaking petition submitted by EnergySolutions to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission designed to improve the regulatory process by providing a process to permit funds from decommissioning trust funds to be used to fund disposal of large reactor components. If granted, the disposal of these large components could be expedited where reactor licensees have sufficient decommissioning trust funds available. Perspectives on the rulemaking will be addressed. In conclusion: NRC should provide serious consideration to this Petition. There is support in the industry for granting this Petition. As of the date this paper was submitted, there have been no negative comments. Granting this Petition is prudent and consistent with the underlying purpose of 10 C.F.R. 50.82(a)(8) and 10 CFR 20.1406. It provides flexibility without any adverse impact on the public health and safety. It should facilitate the decommissioning process by providing a regulatory framework to allow removing MRCs from sites, resulting in (1) the source term at the site being reduced, (2) the site workers being exposed to less radiation, (3) eliminating an unnecessary regulatory burden as the costs associated with maintaining the MRCs on-site and providing protection to the workers as a result of those components can be avoided, (4) the overall cost to decommission the site being reduced, and (5) more funds being made available to decommission the reactor at the time the reactor ceases operation. Finally, the framework would provide the demonstration by a site-specific decommissioning cost estimate and the associated funding program that adequate funds are available to dispose of these components as well as complete site decommissioning for unrestricted release consistent with the NRC requirements. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Improvements in Container Management of Transuranic and Low-Level Radioactive Waste Stored at the Central Waste Complex at Hanford

The Central Waste Complex (CWC) is the interim storage facility for Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) mixed waste, transuranic waste, transuranic mixed waste, low-level and low-level mixed radioactive waste at the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Hanford Site. The majority of the waste stored at the facility is retrieved from the low-level burial grounds in the 200 West Area at the Site, with minor quantities of newly generated waste from on-site and offsite waste generators. The CWC comprises 18 storage buildings that house 13,000 containers. Each waste container within the facility is scanned into its location by building, module, tier and position and the information is stored in a site-wide database. As waste is retrieved from the burial grounds, a preliminary non-destructive assay is performed to determine if the waste is transuranic (TRU) or low-level waste (LLW) and subsequently shipped to the CWC. In general, the TRU and LLW waste containers are stored in separate locations within the CWC, but the final disposition of each waste container is not known upon receipt. The final disposition of each waste container is determined by the appropriate program as process knowledge is applied and characterization data becomes available. Waste containers are stored within the CWC based on their physical chemical and radiological hazards. Further segregation within each building is done by container size (55-gallon, 85-gallon, Standard Waste Box) and waste stream. Due to this waste storage scheme, assembling waste containers for shipment out of the CWC has been time consuming and labor intensive. Qualitatively, the ratio of containers moved to containers in the outgoing shipment has been excessively high, which correlates to additional worker exposure, shipment delays, and operational inefficiencies. These inefficiencies impacted the LLW Program's ability to meet commitments established by the Tri-Party Agreement, an agreement between the State of Washington, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency. These commitments require waste containers to be shipped off site for disposal and/or treatment within a certain time frame. Because the program was struggling to meet production demands, the Production and Planning group was tasked with developing a method to assist the LLW Program in fulfilling its requirements. Using existing databases for container management, a single electronic spreadsheet was created to visually map every waste container within the CWC. The file displays the exact location (e.g., building, module, tier, position) of each container in a format that replicates the actual layout in the facility. In addition, each container was placed into a queue defined by the LLW and TRU waste management programs. The queues were developed based on characterization requirements, treatment type and location, and potential final disposition. This visual aid allows the user to select containers from similar queues and view their location within the facility. The user selects containers in a centralized location, rather than random locations, to expedite shipments out of the facility. This increases efficiency for generating the shipments, as well as decreasing worker exposure and container handling time when gathering containers for shipment by reducing movements of waste containers. As the containers are collected for shipment, the remaining containers are segregated by queue, which further reduces future container movements. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Assessment of Soil Moisture and Fixatives Performance in Controlling Wind Erosion of Contaminated Soil at the Hanford Site

During the remediation of burial grounds at the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) Hanford Site in Washington State, the dispersion of contaminated soil particles and dust is an issue that is faced by site workers on a daily basis. This contamination issue is even more of a concern when one takes into account the semi-arid characteristics of the region where the site is located. To mitigate this problem, workers at the site use a variety of engineered methods to minimize the dispersion of contaminated soil and dust particles. Once such methods is the use of water and/or suppression agents (fixatives) that stabilizes the soil prior to soil excavation, segregation, and removal activities. A primary contributor to the dispersion of contaminated soil and dust is wind soil erosion. The erosion process occurs when the wind speed exceeds a certain threshold value (threshold shear velocity), which depends on a number of factors including wind force loading, particle size, surface soil moisture, and the geometry of the soil. Thus under these circumstances the mobility of contaminated soil and generation and dispersion of particulate matter are significantly influenced by these parameters. Wind tunnel experiments were conducted at the Florida International University's Applied Research Center (FIU-ARC) to evaluate the effectiveness of three commercially available fixatives in controlling the mobility of soil particles on soil mounds when exposed to varying wind forces. The fixatives tested included: (1) a calcium chloride solution; (2) a petroleum hydrocarbon emulsion; and 3) a synthetic organic. As an initial step, approximately 500 lbs of uncontaminated soil was obtained from the Hanford Reservation in Washington State. Soil samples were placed in an open-loop, low speed wind tunnel and exposed to wind forces ranging from 10 to 30 miles per hour (mph). Wind erosion controlling capabilities of commercially available fixatives and soil moisture were tested at a laboratory scale. Soil samples with varying moisture (W/W %) content and soil samples treated with fixatives, selected from a wide range of commercially available products, were exposed to a wind speeds ranging from 10 - 30 miles per hour (MPH). During these experiments, amount of soil displaced due to the wind forces, the amount of airborne particulates generated, and the moisture loss were measured to better understand the performance of selected fixatives and soil moisture. Results obtained during the study showed that there is a significant reduction in wind erosion and airborne particles generation by increasing the soil moisture for the velocities tested. Similar trend was observed when the soil samples treated with fixatives were exposed to the same range of velocities (10 - 30 MPH). (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Oak Ridge D and D Plan 3515 Project - Technology Review (2007) and GammaCam Technology Demonstration for Characterizing Building 3515 at Oak Ridge (2007)

This paper presents the results from the Characterization, Decontamination and Decommissioning (CD and D) Study performed by MSE Technology Application, Inc. (MSE) to assist the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in the preparation of a Project Execution Plan and Remediation Plan for Building 3515 at ORNL. Primary objectives of this study were to identify innovative CD and D technologies and methodologies and recommend alternatives applicable to the CD and D of Building 3515. Building 3515 is a small heavily shielded concrete and cement block structure centrally located in the Bethel Valley portion of the ORNL. The building's interior is extensively contaminated with Cesium 137 (Cs-137), the primary contaminant of concern. A previous attempt to characterize the building was limited to general interior area radiation exposure level measurements and a few surface smears gathered by inserting monitoring equipment into the building on long poles. Consequently, the spatial distribution of the gamma radiation source inside the building was not determined. A subsequent plan for D and D of the building presented a high risk of worker radiation dose in excess of as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) because the source of the interior gamma radiation field is not completely understood and conventional practices required workers to be in close proximity of the building. As part of an initial literature search, MSE reviewed new generation gamma source characterization technologies and identified the GammaCam{sup TM} portable gamma ray imaging system as an innovative technology applicable to locating the dominant gamma ray sources within the building. The GammaCam{sup TM} gamma-ray imaging system is a commercially available technology marketed by the EDO Corporation. This system consists of a sensor head with a co-aligned camera and a portable computer. The system is designed to provide two-dimensional spatial mappings of gamma ray emitting nuclides in real time. The gamma radiation sensor and camera can be set up within or outside of the radiation field while the system operator and PC can be located 30 to 60 m (100 to 200 ft) from the sensor head. The system has been used successfully at numerous DOE and commercial nuclear facilities to precisely locate gamma radiation sources. However, literature attesting to the ability of this technology to detect radiation sources within heavily shielded structures was not available. Consequently, MSE was not certain if this technology would be capable of locating gamma ray sources within the heavily shielded Building 3515. To overcome this uncertainty, MSE sent two individuals to the EDO Corporation for training. At completion of the training, MSE leased the GammaCam{sup TM} portable system and brought it to ORNL to evaluate the capability of the system. An overview from this evaluation is summarized in this paper. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A prototype wearable tritium monitor

Sudden unexpected changes in tritium-in-air concentrations in workplace air can result in significant unplanned exposures. Although fixed area monitors are used to monitor areas where there is a potential for elevated tritium in air concentrations, they do not monitor personnel air space and may require some time for acute tritium releases to be detected. There is a need for a small instrument that will quickly alert staff of changing tritium hazards. A moderately sensitive tritium instrument that workers could wear would bring attention to any rise in tritium levels that were above predetermined limits and help in assessing the potential hazard therefore minimizing absorbed dose. Hand-held instruments currently available can be used but require the assistance of a fellow worker or restrict the user to using only one hand to perform some duties. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Successful Deployment of System for the Storage and Retrieval of Spent/Used Nuclear Fuel from Hanford K-West Fuel Storage Basin-13051

In 2012, a system was deployed to remove, transport, and interim store chemically reactive and highly radioactive sludge material from the Hanford Site's 105-K West Fuel Storage Basin that will be managed as spent/used nuclear fuel. The Knockout Pot (KOP) sludge in the 105-K West Basin was a legacy issue resulting from the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) washing process applied to 2200 metric tons of highly degraded fuel elements following long-term underwater storage. The washing process removed uranium metal and other non-uranium constituents that could pass through a screen with 0.25-inch openings; larger pieces are, by definition, SNF or fuel scrap. When originally retrieved, KOP sludge contained pieces of degraded uranium fuel ranging from 600 microns (μm) to 6350 μm mixed with inert material such as aluminum hydroxide, aluminum wire, and graphite in the same size range. In 2011, a system was developed, tested, successfully deployed and operated to pre-treat KOP sludge as part of 105-K West Basin cleanup. The pretreatment process successfully removed the vast majority of inert material from the KOP sludge stream and reduced the remaining volume of material by approximately 65 percent, down to approximately 50 liters of material requiring management as used fuel. The removal of inert material resulted in significant waste minimization and project cost savings because of the reduced number of transportation/storage containers and improvement in worker safety. The improvement in worker safety is a result of shorter operating times and reduced number of remote handled shipments to the site fuel storage facility. Additionally in 2011, technology development, final design, and cold testing was completed on the system to be used in processing and packaging the remaining KOP material for removal from the basin in much the same manner spent fuel was removed. This system was deployed and successfully operated from June through September 2012, to remove and package the last of the SNF fragments from the 105-K West Basin, ending the long and complex history of the KOP sludge materials. The planning and execution of this project demonstrated how the graded application of DOE O 413.3B, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets[1], DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process[2], and DOE G 413.3-4, U.S. Department of Energy Technology Readiness Assessment Guide[3], can positively affect the outcome of project implementation in the DOE Complex. Provided herein are relevant information, ideas, and tools for use by other projects facing similar issues in managing high risk waste streams in a complex regulatory environment. Positive aspects are also provided of appropriate time spent in detailed planning, design, and testing in non-hazardous environments to reduce project risks in both cost and safety performance, as well as improving confidence in meeting project goals through predictable and reliable performance. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fall Protection Procedures for Sealing Bulk Waste Shipments by Rail Cars at Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Sites - 13509

Rail-cars loaded with radioactive materials must be closed and fastened to comply with United States Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements before they shipped. Securing waste shipments in a manner that meets these regulations typically results in the use of a sealable rail-car liner. Workers accessing the tops of the 2.74 m high rail-cars to seal and inspect liners for compliance prior to shipment may be exposed to a fall hazard. Relatively recent revisions to the Fall Protection requirements in the Safety and Health Requirements Manual (EM385-1-1, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) have necessitated modifications to the fall protection systems previously employed for rail-car loading at Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) sites. In response these projects have developed site-specific procedures to protect workers and maintain compliance with the improved fall protection regulations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Isotope Specific Remediation Media and Systems - 13614

On March 11, 2011, now two years ago, the magnitude 9.0 Great East Japan earthquake, Tohoku, hit off the Fukushima coast of Japan. While, of course, most of the outcome of this unprecedented natural and manmade disaster was a negative, both in Japan and worldwide, there have been some extremely invaluable lessons learned and new emergency recovery technologies and systems developed. As always, the mother of invention is necessity. Among these developments has been the development and full-scale implementation of proven isotope specific media (ISMs) with the intent of surgically removing specific hazardous isotopes for the purpose of minimizing dose to workers and the environment. The first such ISMs to be deployed at the Fukushima site were those removing cesium (Cs-137) and iodine (I-129). Since deployment on June 17, 2011, along with treated cooling water recycle, some 70% of the curies in the building liquid wastes have been removed by the Kurion system alone. The current levels of cesium are now only 2% of the original levels. Such an unprecedented, 'external cooling system' not only allowed the eventual cold shut down of the reactors in mid-December, 2011, but has allowed workers to concentrate on the cleanup of other areas of the site. Water treatment will continue for quite some time due to continued leakage into the buildings and the eventual goal of cleaning up the reactors and fuel pools themselves. With the cesium removal now in routine operation, other isotopes of concern are likely to become priorities. One such isotope is that of strontium, and yttrium (Sr-90 and Y-90), which is still at original levels causing further dose issues as well as impediments to discharge of the treated waste waters. For over a year now, a new synthetic strontium specific media has been under development and testing both in our licensed facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, but also in confirmatory tests by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) in Japan for Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). The tests have proven quite successful, even in high salt conditions, and, with loading and dose calculations being completed, will be proposed to add to the existing cesium system. There is no doubt, as high gamma isotopes are removed, other recalcitrant isotopes such as this will require innovative removal media, systems and techniques. Also coming out of this international effort are other ISM media and systems that can be applied more broadly to both Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) as well as in Department of Energy (DOE) applications. This cesium and strontium specific media has further been successfully tested in 2012 at a Magnox station in the UK. The resulting proposed mitigation systems for pond and vault cleanup look quite promising. An extremely unusual ISM for carbon 14 (C-14), nickel (Ni-63) and cesium (Cs-137) has been developed for Diablo Canyon NPP for dose reduction testing in their fuel pool. These media will be deployed in Submersible Media Filter (SMF) and Submersible Columns (SC) systems adapted to standard Tri-Nuclear{sup R} housings common in the U.S. and UK. External Vessel Systems (mini-Fukushima) have also been developed as a second mitigation system for D and D and outages. Finally, technetium (Tc- 99) specific media developed for the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) recycle or condensate (secondary) waste streams (WM 2011) are being further perfected and tested for At-Tank Tc-99 removal, as well as At Tank Cs media. In addition to the on-going media development, systems for deploying such media have developed over the last year and are in laboratory- and full-scale testing. These systems include the fore mentioned Submersible Media Filters (SMF), Submersible Columns (SC) and external pilot- and full-scale, lead-lag, canister systems. This paper will include the media development and testing, as well as that of the deployment systems themselves. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

K-25 D and D Challenges - 12170

Decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) of the K-25 former gaseous diffusion plant provides lessons learned applicable to other D and D projects in the DOE Complex. The 175,000- square-meter, 1.6-kilometer-long building is contaminated with highly enriched uranium (HEU), Tc-99, trace quantities of other fission products, asbestos, PCBs, and other hazardous wastes. Safety challenges include deteriorated electrical systems, significant structural degradation, and criticality and exposure risks. The project completely revised the D and D approach after a worker fell through an operating floor and was seriously injured. For protection from deteriorated building conditions, the project reduced the number of workers in the facility, limited their hours in the building, and installed nets and barriers to protect them from falls through weakened floors and from falling material. The new plan involved removing high-risk components, removing motors and compressors, and demolishing the building from the outside with heavy equipment with most of the piping and components inside the building during demolition. The team provided temporary electrical power; reconfigured the criticality alarm system; upgraded security; performed sampling and analysis to locate and characterize HEU deposits and Tc-99; and, to establish 'criticality incredible' conditions, conducted a nondestructive assay program and injected foam into equipment and piping as a contamination fixative. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Final Demolition and Disposition of 209-E Critical Mass Laboratory - 12267

The 209-E Critical Mass Laboratory was constructed in 1960 to provide a heavy shielded reactor room where quantities of plutonium or uranium in solution could be brought to near-critical configurations under carefully controlled and monitored conditions. In the late 1980's, the responsible contractor, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), was directed by the Department of Energy (DOE) to prepare the facility for unoccupied status. The facility was demolished under a Removal Action Work Plan pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). The funding for this project was provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The primary rooms of concern with regards to contamination in 209-E facility, which is over 9,000 square feet, are the criticality assembly room (CAR), the mix room, and the change room. The CAR contained two reactor hoods (HO-140 and HO-170), which each had a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter system. The CAR contained 13 tanks ranging from 38 L (10 gal) to 401 L (106 gal). Tanks TK-109 and TK-110 are below grade, and were removed as part of this demolition and disposition remedy. Nonradiological and radiological hazardous substances were removed, decontaminated, or fixed in place, prior to demolition. Except for the removal of below grade tanks TK-109 and TK-110, the facility was demolished to slab-on-grade. PNNL performed stabilization and deactivation activities that included removal of bulk fissile material and chemicals, flushing tanks, stabilizing contamination within gloveboxes and hoods, and packaging and removing waste. The removal of the contaminated plutonium equipment and materials from the 209E facility presented a number of challenges similar in nature to those associated with the inventory reduction and cleanup activities at the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Although there were no bulk fissile materials or chemicals within the facility, there were residual radiological materials (isotopes of plutonium and americium) in the tanks and hoods. The complexity of the remedy was present because of the various configurations of the tanks and hoods, combined with the residual contaminants. Because of the weight and dimensional configuration, size reduction of the slab tanks, as well as removal and disposal of the different material used for moderation and absorption, were two examples of challenges that were resolved to complete the remedy. One of the key methods developed and implemented at the facility was the design and construction of a shroud to allow the cutting of the Pu contaminated tanks. The shroud design, development and implementation at the 209E Project was an example of enhanced work planning and task hazards analysis with worker involvement. This paper will present the lessons learned from the 209E facility inventory reduction activities including the shroud and other methodologies used. The initial Lessons Learned discussion for this project was scheduled for late January 2012. This facility is the first open-air demolition of a highly contaminated plutonium-contaminated facility accomplished by CH2M Hill under the Plateau Remediation Contract. The demolition was completed without spread of contamination to the workers and the surrounding area. As with any project of this complexity, there are significant accomplishments, as well as experience that can be applied to future demolition of plutonium-contaminated facilities on the Hanford Site. These experiences will be documented at a later date. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of Preliminary Remediation Goals for Indoor Dust at the Colonie FUSRAP Site - 12273

The Colonie FUSRAP Site is located in the Town of Colonie, Albany County, New York. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is currently addressing environmental contamination associated with the Site under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) process as part of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). Soil remediation activities have been substantially completed at the Colonie FUSRAP Site and its vicinity properties under the FUSRAP. A study unrelated to FUSRAP was recently performed by an independent party to establish the distribution of DU contamination in various media in the environs of the Site. As part of this study, dust samples were collected in residencies and businesses in the immediate vicinity of the Site. These samples were collected in non-living areas such as basement window sills and garages. Many of these samples tested positive for DU. An assessment was performed to establish preliminary remediation goals (PRGs) for indoor dust in non-living areas of residential homes and businesses in the vicinity of the Site. The results of this assessment provide estimates of dose-based, carcinogenic risk-based, and noncarcinogenic-based PRGs derived from a hypothetical exposure scenario with reasonable levels of conservatism. Ultimately, the PRGs will be compared to results of dust sampling and analyses in residences and businesses in proximity of the Site to determine whether a response action is appropriate. This assessment estimates PRGs for DU contaminated dust in non-living areas of residences in the vicinity of the Colonie FUSRAP site based on a reasonably conservative exposure scenario. Estimated PRGs based on residential receptors are considered to be conservatively representative of workers in nearby businesses based on the considerably longer exposure duration of residents relative to workers. This assessment provides reasonably conservative estimates of PRGs for DU contaminated dust in non-living areas within residences in the vicinity of the Site. It should be noted that the PRGs include hypothetical exposures resulting from activities in both the living areas and non-living areas of a residence. The PRGs are derived and presented in terms of DU dust concentration in non-living areas to facilitate comparison to results of a planned Site Investigation that will characterize concentrations of DU in dust in non-living areas. It is important to recognize that the exposure assumptions used to derive these PRGs are based on average dust DU concentrations in non-living areas. It is inappropriate to compare these PRGs to the dust DU concentration in an isolated small area. The ongoing Site Investigation addresses this consideration and is designed to provide reasonable estimates of average dust DU concentrations in non-living areas of vicinity properties. In order to accomplish this, sampling is conducted in accordance with EPA Guidance for the Sampling and Analysis of Lead in Indoor Residential Dust for Use in the Integrated Exposure Uptake Biokinetic (IEUBK) Model, (EPA 2008), which specifically addresses estimating average contaminant concentrations in dust. Four (4) large-area samples are collected from each VP in accordance with this guidance. It is anticipated that the results of the Site Investigation will be used in conjunction with the results of this assessment, and/or subsequent assessments, to establish whether or not a response action is appropriate. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗