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Soils Activity Mobility Study: Methodology and Application

This report presents a three-level approach for estimation of sediment transport to provide an assessment of potential erosion risk for sites at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) that are posted for radiological purposes and where migration is suspected or known to occur due to storm runoff. Based on the assessed risk, the appropriate level of effort can be determined for analysis of radiological surveys, field experiments to quantify erosion and transport rates, and long-term monitoring. The method is demonstrated at contaminated sites, including Plutonium Valley, Shasta, Smoky, and T-1. The Pacific Southwest Interagency Committee (PSIAC) procedure is selected as the Level 1 analysis tool. The PSIAC method provides an estimation of the total annual sediment yield based on factors derived from the climatic and physical characteristics of a watershed. If the results indicate low risk, then further analysis is not warranted. If the Level 1 analysis indicates high risk or is deemed uncertain, a Level 2 analysis using the Modified Universal Soil Loss Equation (MUSLE) is proposed. In addition, if a sediment yield for a storm event rather than an annual sediment yield is needed, then the proposed Level 2 analysis should be performed. MUSLE only provides sheet and rill erosion estimates. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Hydrologic Engineering Center-Hydrologic Modeling System (HEC-HMS) provides storm peak runoff rate and storm volumes, the inputs necessary for MUSLE. Channel Sediment Transport (CHAN-SED) I and II models are proposed for estimating sediment deposition or erosion in a channel reach from a storm event. These models require storm hydrograph associated sediment concentration and bed load particle size distribution data. When the Level 2 analysis indicates high risk for sediment yield and associated contaminant migration or when there is high uncertainty in the Level 2 results, the sites can be further evaluated with a Level 3 analysis using more complex and labor- and data-intensive methods. For the watersheds analyzed in this report using the Level 1 PSIAC method, the risk of erosion is low. The field reconnaissance surveys of these watersheds confirm the conclusion that the sediment yield of undisturbed areas at the NNSS would be low. The climate, geology, soils, ground cover, land use, and runoff potential are similar among these watersheds. There are no well-defined ephemeral channels except at the Smoky and Plutonium Valley sites. Topography seems to have the strongest influence on sediment yields, as sediment yields are higher on the steeper hill slopes. Lack of measured sediment yield data at the NNSS does not allow for a direct evaluation of the yield estimates by the PSIAC method. Level 2 MUSLE estimates in all the analyzed watersheds except Shasta are a small percentage of the estimates from PSIAC because MUSLE is not inclusive of channel erosion. This indicates that channel erosion dominates the total sediment yield in these watersheds. Annual sediment yields for these watersheds are estimated using the CHAN-SEDI and CHAN-SEDII channel sediment transport models. Both transport models give similar results and exceed the estimates obtained from PSIAC and MUSLE. It is recommended that the total watershed sediment yield of watersheds at the NNSS with flow channels be obtained by adding the washload estimate (rill and inter-rill erosion) from MUSLE to that obtained from channel transport models (bed load and suspended sediment). PSIAC will give comparable results if factor scores for channel erosion are revised towards the high erosion level. Application of the Level 3 process-based models to estimate sediment yields at the NNSS cannot be recommended at this time. Increased model complexity alone will not improve the certainty of the sediment yield estimates. Models must be calibrated against measured data before model results are accepted as certain. Because no measurements of sediment yields at the NNSS are available, model validation cannot be performed. This is also true for the models used in the Level 2 analyses presented in this study. The need to calibrate MUSLE to local conditions has been discussed. Likewise, the transport equations of CHAN-SEDI and CHAN-SEDII need to be calibrated against local data to assess their applicability under semi-arid conditions and for the ephemeral channels at the NNSS. Before these validations and calibration exercises can be undertaken, a long-term measured sediment yield data set must be developed. Development of long-term measured sediment yield data cannot be overemphasized. Long-term monitoring is essential for accurate characterization of watershed processes. It is recommended that a long-term monitoring program be set up to measure watershed erosion rates and channel sediment transport rates.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed for cyber-physical energy systems in smart commercial buildings

In recent years, there has been a growing trend toward the development of smart buildings that rely on cyber-physical systems (CPS) to optimize occupant comfort, safety, and energy efficiency. To ensure the reliable and efficient operation of CPS with designed control strategies, it is important to evaluate their performance under various scenarios before deploying them in the real world. This is where a Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed designed for studying sensor and control-related studies in smart buildings can be highly valuable. With the growing threat of cyber-attacks and physical faults targeting smart buildings, it is essential to ensure the security of building operations. A HIL testbed can emulate cyber-attack and physical fault scenarios, allowing researchers to develop and test threat detection and mitigation algorithms. This enables researchers to identify potential issues and optimize the algorithms in a safe and controlled environment before they are deployed in real-world settings, reducing the risk of failures that can negatively impact occupant comfort, safety, and energy efficiency. Therefore, this paper developed a HIL testbed designed for cyber-physical energy systems (e.g. buildings automation system (BAS)) in smart commercial buildings. The HIL testbed is comprised of a real-time building and Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) emulator using Modelica-based dynamic models, a set of BAS controllers, and a BAS computer server. The data generation capability of the HIL testbed is demonstrated by tracking normal and faulty operating data in the BAS, as well as monitoring detailed network traffic in the local BAS network. Here, this study further demonstrates the HIL testbed’s capability by conducting case studies on real-time physical fault and cyber-attack experiments using a Department of Energy (DOE) prototype commercial building. It is anticipated that the fully functional HIL testbed will be utilized for a variety of sensor and control-related studies, including but not limited to testing, developing, validating of different HVAC control strategies, fault detection & diagnosis, energy monitoring and analysis, cyber security study, etc.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

CAU 573 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 05-23-02, GMX Alpha Contaminated Area • 05-45-01, Atmospheric Test Site - Hamilton These two CASs include the release at the Hamilton weapons-related tower test and a series of 29 atmospheric experiments conducted at GMX. The two CASs are located in two distinctly separate areas within Area 5. To facilitate site investigation and data quality objective (DQO) decisions, all identified releases (i.e., CAS components) were organized into study groups. The reporting of investigation results and the evaluation of DQO decisions are at the release level. The corrective action alternatives (CAAs) were evaluated at the FFACO CAS level. The purpose of this CADD/CAP is to evaluate potential CAAs, provide the rationale for the selection of recommended CAAs, and provide the plan for implementation of the recommended CAA for CAU 573. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from January 2015 through November 2015, as set forth in the CAU 573 Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP). Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against appropriate final action levels (FALs) to identify the contaminants of concern. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities conducted at CAU 573 revealed the following: • Radiological contamination within CAU 573 does not exceed the FALs (based on the Occasional Use Area exposure scenario). • Chemical contamination within CAU 573 does not exceed the FALs. • Potential source material—including lead plates, lead bricks, and lead-shielded cables—was removed during the investigation and requires no additional corrective action.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Rapid Monitoring and Defense Approach for Resilience Improvement of Grid Cyber Security

Cyber-physical systems and electric utilities significantly depend on the reliability and efficiency of information and operational technology. However, false data injection attacks based on synchrophasor measurement data pose a serious threat to the safe and reliable operation of modern power systems. Here, to mitigate this problem, a rapid monitoring and defense approach is proposed to defend against cyber attacks. Initially, the Time and Frequency based Convolutional neural Network (TFCN) is proposed to detect different types of attacks. Within the TFCN, the advances are that both time and frequency domain information can be fused without extra spectrum analysis methods, and can save detection time to speed the calculation efficiency using the developed time-frequency block. Next, a comprehensive defense strategy is developed for multiple cyber attacks to ensure the stability and resilience of the power system according to the feedback detection results. The advances of this strategy are that different control strategies can be automatically selected to recover the stability to the greatest extent according to the detected attacks. To verify the effectiveness of the proposed approach, the high-speed frequency measurements collected from the wide-area monitoring system are used. The results demonstrate that the cyber attack detection performance can reach 95.57% accuracy, outperforming both traditional and some advanced neural networks. Importantly, the defense strategy is conducted and verified in a modified IEEE 39 bus system as well, which illustrates profound performance in faster stability restoration.

Comprehensive defense strategy↗

Cybersecurity Assessment Methodology for International Safeguards

International nuclear safeguards are technical measures implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify the correctness and completeness of declarations made by States about their nuclear activities. The systems used to verify such activities include electronic and digital hardware and software components capable of data collection, processing, analysis, storage and transmission. Despite increasing efforts to protect digital systems against unauthorized access or attack through cybersecurity measures, these systems are not immune to cyber exploitation that could compromise their integrity or reliability. Previous versions of these systems did not include capabilities that exist today, such as BluetoothTM and GPS. The inclusion of these new capabilities, as well as new data processing and storage mechanisms, adds new attack vectors and opportunities for adversaries to exploit the devices that did not previously exist. As mentioned in the above referenced Cybersecurity for Safeguards study, cyber-domain vulnerabilities present risks to the equipment used to perform the international nuclear safeguards mission. The IAEA has produced guidance on the protection of nuclear facilities and their computer systems against cyber threats, but these documents do not specifically address the risks to safeguards or safeguards equipment. In response, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Safeguards/Safeguards Technology Development (NA-241) sponsored Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia, SNL) and the Idaho National Laboratory (Idaho, INL) to conduct a one-year study to evaluate cyber related vulnerabilities in safeguards equipment and develop recommendations for the mitigation of any identified risks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Multi-Band Uncertainty Set Based Robust SCUC With Spatial and Temporal Budget Constraints

The dramatic increase of renewable energy resources in recent years, together with the long-existing load forecast errors and increasingly involved price sensitive demands, has introduced significant uncertainties into power systems operation. In order to guarantee the operational security of power systems with such uncertainties, robust optimization has been extensively studied in security-constrained unit commitment (SCUC) problems, for immunizing the system against worst uncertainty realizations. However, traditional robust SCUC models with single-band uncertainty sets may yield over-conservative solutions in most cases. This paper proposes a multi-band robust model to accurately formulate various uncertainties with higher resolution. By properly tuning band intervals and weight coefficients of individual bands, the proposed multi-band robust model can rigorously and realistically reflect spatial/temporal relationships and asymmetric characteristics of various uncertainties, and in turn could effectively leverage the tradeoff between robustness and economics of robust SCUC solutions. The proposed multi-band robust SCUC model is solved by Benders decomposition (BD) and outer approximation (OA), while taking the advantage of integral property of the proposed multi-band uncertainty set. In addition, several accelerating techniques are developed for enhancing the computational performance and the convergence speed. Numerical studies on a 6-bus system and the modified IEEE 118-bus system verify the effectiveness of the proposed robust SCUC approach for enhancing uncertainty modeling capabilities and mitigating conservativeness of the robust SCUC solution.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Ultra-High-Performance Concrete And Advanced Manufacturing Methods For Modular Construction

Small modular reactors (SMR) allow for less onsite construction, increase nuclear material security, and provide a flexible and cost-effective energy alternative. SMR can be factory-built as modular components, and shipped to desired locations for fast assembly. This project successfully developed a new class of ultra-high performance concrete (UHPC), which features a compressive strength greater than 22 ksi (150 MPa) without special treatment and self-consolidating characteristics desired for SMR modular construction. With an ultra-high strength and dense microstructure, it will facilitate rapid construction of steel plate-concrete (SC) beams and walls with thinner and lighter modules, and can withstand harsh environments and mechanical loads anticipated during the service life of nuclear power plants. In addition, the self-consolidating characteristics are crucial for the fast construction and assembly of SC modules with reduced labor costs and improved quality. Following the UHPC material development, the capacity of producing self-consolidating UHPC in mass quantities was investigated and compared to accepted self-consolidating concrete standards. With slightly adjusted mixing procedure using large-scale gravity-based mixers (compared with small-scale force-based mixer), the self-consolidating UHPC has been successfully processed at six cubic yards; the product met both minimum compressive strength requirements and self-consolidating concrete standards. Steel plate-UHPC beams (15 ft. long, 12 in. wide and 16 in. deep) and wall panels (40 in. X 40 in. X 3 in.) were then constructed using the self-consolidating UHPC without any external vibration. Quality control guidelines for producing UHPC in large scale were developed. When the concrete is replaced by UHPC in a steel plate concrete (SC) beam, it is critical to evaluate its structural behavior with both flexure and shear-governed failure modes. In recent years, SC has been widely used for buildings and nuclear containment structures to resist lateral forces induced by severe earthquakes and heavy winds. SC modules have good potential for SMR because of their cost-effectiveness and reduced construction time. However, the minimum shear reinforcement (i.e. cross tie) ratio needs to be determined for the steel plate-UHPC (S-UHPC) beams to exhibit a ductile failure mode. In this project, S-UHPC beams were designed and constructed. The beams were tested to evaluate structural capacity and identify the minimum cross ties ratios. In addition, as the bond between UHPC and steel plate is essential for ensuring structural integrity under shear and flexure, it was measured and examined in this project through digital image correlation system and smart piezoelectric aggregate sensors. Large-scale testing and finite element simulation were also performed on S-UHPC wall panels. New bond slip-based constitutive models of steel plate were developed for S-UHPC, which were used in finite element analysis program to predict S-UHPC behavior under shear. The results were well validated through experimental data. The long-term durability of UHPC were established in this project. UHPC specimens were tested under free shrinkage, restrained shrinkage, elevated temperature, water permeation, chloride diffusion, corrosion, and alkali silica reaction. UHPC has demonstrated significantly improved durability compared with control concrete specimens. This research led to a new generation of steel plate-UHPC modules for SMR that can provide large benefits to the electric power industry. Taking advantage of the high strength and durability of UHPC, their modularity and ease of assembly can address the high cost barriers of typical nuclear power plants.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Laboratory Agenda 2018: Changing the world's energy future and securing our critical infrastructure

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has a vision of changing the world’s energy future and securing our nation’s critical infrastructure. INL’s mission involves discovering, demonstrating, and securing innovative nuclear energy solutions and other clean energy sources. The Laboratory also has a mission focused on protecting the nation’s power grids and other vital systems against man-made and natural threats. Completing our mission and fulfilling our vision requires carefully charting our path and priorities, building and strengthening our core capabilities, focusing on key research and development (R&D) and mission-support initiatives, assessing our performance, and correcting our priorities when necessary. INL’s Laboratory Agenda articulates INL’s priorities, goals, and initiatives to deliver our mission and vision efficiently, effectively, and collaboratively. It describes our commitment to simultaneous excellence in science and technology, management and operations, and community service, and sets priorities for Laboratory investments.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Electrospun Separator Based on Sulfonated Polyoxadiazole with Outstanding Thermal Stability and Electrochemical Properties for Lithium-Ion Batteries

Traditional polyolefin separators used in lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) are seriously limited by the issues of inferior security and poor electrolyte wettability. Most of the very promising candidate separators based on heat-resistant polymers are, however, inherently difficult to process. Herein, a unique sulfonated aromatic heterocyclic polymer, lithiated poly(diphenyl ether oxadiazole) sulfonate (Li-SPEOD), was synthesized through a simple one-pot method and further electrospun to act as a novel separator (es-Li-SPEOD) for LIBs. In this work, the prepared Li-SPEOD possesses a high degree of sulfonation with a high molecular weight (M w = 4.31 × 10 5 ). The es-Li-SPEOD separator exhibits excellent mechanical and fire-resistance properties and is able to maintain dimensional stability at a temperature of even up to 400 °C in air. The ionic conductivity (3.57 mS cm –1 ) and lithium-ion transference number (0.37) of the es-Li-SPEOD with an electrochemical stability window of 4.5 V vs Li + /Li can be improved by 382.4 and 32.1%, respectively, compared to those of Celgard-2500 in the LiPF 6 electrolyte. The enhanced rate capability and cycle performance of the LiFePO 4 –Li half-cell are therefore obtained. Moreover, the es-Li-SPEOD displays an outstanding dendrite-suppressing effect for the lithium metal anode. This research proves that the Li-SPEOD-based separator has a broad application perspective in next-generation lithium batteries.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Reproduction of the Yucca Mountain Project TSPA-LA Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses and Preliminary Upgrade of Models

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) continued evaluation of total system performance assessment (TSPA) computing systems for the previously considered Yucca Mountain Project (YMP). This was done to maintain the operational readiness of the computing infrastructure (computer hardware and software) and knowledge capability for total system performance assessment (TSPA) type analysis, as directed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), DOE 2010. This work is a continuation of the ongoing readiness evaluation reported in Lee and Hadgu (2014) and Hadgu et al. (2015). The TSPA computing hardware (CL2014) and storage system described in Hadgu et al. (2015) were used for the current analysis. One floating license of GoldSim with Versions 9.60.300, 10.5 and 11.1.6 was installed on the cluster head node, and its distributed processing capability was mapped on the cluster processors. Other supporting software were tested and installed to support the TSPA-type analysis on the server cluster. The current tasks included verification of the TSPA-LA uncertainty and sensitivity analyses, and preliminary upgrade of the TSPA-LA from Version 9.60.300 to the latest version 11.1. All the TSPA-LA uncertainty and sensitivity analyses modeling cases were successfully tested and verified for the model reproducibility on the upgraded 2014 server cluster (CL2014). The uncertainty and sensitivity analyses used TSPA-LA modeling cases output generated in FY15 based on GoldSim Version 9.60.300 documented in Hadgu et al. (2015). The model upgrade task successfully converted the Nominal Modeling case to GoldSim Version 11.1. Upgrade of the remaining of the modeling cases and distributed processing tasks will continue. The 2014 server cluster and supporting software systems are fully operational to support TSPA-LA type analysis.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Evaluation of Machine Learning Techniques for Isotope Identification Contextualized by Training and Testing Spectral Similarity

Precise gamma-ray spectral analysis is crucial in high-stakes applications, such as nuclear security. Research efforts toward implementing machine learning (ML) approaches for accurate analysis are limited by the resemblance of the training data to the testing scenarios. The underlying spectral shape of synthetic data may not perfectly reflect measured configurations, and measurement campaigns may be limited by resource constraints. Consequently, ML algorithms for isotope identification must maintain accurate classification performance under domain shifts between the training and testing data. To this end, four different classifiers (Ridge, Random Forest, Extreme Gradient Boosting, and Multilayer Perceptron) were trained on the same dataset and evaluated on twelve other datasets with varying standoff distances, shielding, and background configurations. A tailored statistical approach was introduced to quantify the similarity between the training and testing configurations, which was then related to the predictive performance. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests revealed that the OVR-wrapped XGB significantly outperformed the other algorithms, with confidence levels of 99.0% or above for the 133Ba, 60Co, 137Cs, and 152Eu sources. The findings from this work are significant as they outline techniques to promote the development of robust ML-based approaches for isotope identification.

domain adaptation↗

Perturbation-Based Diagnosis of False Data Injection Attack Using Distributed Energy Resources

Modern smart grid relies on various sensor measurements for its operational control. In a successful false data injection attack, the attacker manipulates the measurements from the grid sensors such that undetected errors are introduced into the estimates of the system parameters leading to catastrophic situations. This paper proposes a novel perturbation based false data injection attack detection mechanism that utilizes inverter based distributed energy resources (DERs) to create low magnitude perturbation signal in the distribution system voltage that is inconsequential to the normal grid operation. Two voltage sensitivity analysis based algorithms are designed to identify the optimal set of DERs that can create the voltage perturbation signal of desired magnitude. An analytical method of voltage sensitivity analysis is used to compute the magnitude of voltage perturbation signal at each node in a computationally efficient manner. Then, a detection mechanism is developed that checks for the presence of the perturbation sequence in each sensor measurement. A sensor measurement is deemed authentic if the voltage perturbation signal is present in the data. In case of sensor malfunction or cyber-attack, the perturbation signal will not be present in the measurement data. Performance of the proposed attack detection mechanism is validated via simulation of the IEEE 69 bus test system.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Site-Directed Research and Development Fiscal Year 2013 Annual Report

A hallmark of high-performance research and development is sustained achievement that endures. R&D organizations and laboratories have changed the course of technology and the world, and their innovations impact us for generations. At the center of the Nevada National Security Site’s (NNSS) science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) mission is the Site-Directed Research and Development Program (SDRD), which, through sustained achievement, has had an indelible impact on our mission and altered some of our most important work for the foreseeable future. The innovations created in the SDRD program have a remarkably high return on investment, and the SDRD program has helped raise the overall emphasis on the ST&E mission. In recent years the technology mission and its importance to the long-term vitality of the NNSS has been a prominent focus of National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). For example, NSTec created the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) position and filled it in August 2013 (see Foreword). SDRD was functionally realigned to report to the CTO concurrent with this change in leadership structure. A new corporate systems–based approach to strategic applied science and technology is starting to materialize, and expectations are that this shift of attention to technology innovation will bring about powerful outcomes for our mission and customers.

information sciences↗

Constant Rate Production: DOE Approach to Meeting NASA Needs for RPS for Nuclear-Enabled Launches.

The use of radioisotope power systems (RPS) for nuclear-enabled NASA missions is a long-standing arrangement between DOE and NASA. The requirements for the power system come from NASA, while DOE performs the procurement, fueling, testing and delivery. Recent examples include Mars Science Laboratory and New Horizons. A challenge has been interplay between the schedule for RPS availability from DOE versus the schedule NASA has for competitively selected missions. By mutual agreement, the actual operations to procure an RPS and prepare it for fueling, has always waited until the final selection of a mission. This timeline for a New Frontiers class mission leaves approximately 5-6 years from the time of final mission selection to the actual launch date. The number of RPS used for a Frontier class mission can be 1 to 3 units, i.e., the recent New Frontiers-2025 announcement of opportunity published in December 2016. If 1 or 2 units are needed for a specific mission, the timeline from the decision point to the launch date is a challenge, but doable. The activities taking place in this timeframe would include manufacturing the power system, producing the fuel, and performing the assembly/testing and delivery operations. If the mission selected requires 3 RPS the logistics of accomplishing all activities during the 5-6 years is problematic. The challenge involves appropriate resourcing for plutonium production, heat source production and assembly/testing operations. Typically, the time between RPS-enabled missions involve staffing attrition and reduction at the heat source production and the assembly/testing facilities that can be down to 60-75 percent of peak staffing levels to reduce costs. The duration for increasing staffing in these areas, which includes hiring, nuclear workforce training and obtaining the appropriate security clearance is 2 years. Taking account for this 2 years and the 6 months prior to launch arrival of the RPS at Kennedy Space Center erodes too much of the 5-6 years to comfortably support the use of 3 RPS on a mission and doesn't leave much schedule margin for a 2 RPS unit mission. To provide better support for NASA nuclear-enabled missions a different approach was devised, constant rate production. This involves a higher level of base capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to provide a stabilized work force. This will enable 10-15 heat sources to be produced annually at LANL, and subsequently shipped to the INL to be placed into a stable intermediate form that enables storage for up to several years that leads to quick production of general purpose heat source modules when a mission is selected. The up-front production of Pu-238 at ORNL is maintained so that there is material constantly in the pipeline. Production of key specialized components at ORNL is also maintained using this model. This allows for a reduction of risk to the nuclear-enabled missions, yet always having quantities of hardware available “on the shelf” to support production of RPS for NASA.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Fuel Fabrication Specification Impact Analysis for NBSR LEU Conversion

As part of a national initiative to enhance nuclear security and reduce proliferation risks, significant efforts have been undertaken by the National Nuclear Security Administration Material Management and Minimization Office of Reactor Conversion Program to convert U.S. high performance research reactors (USHPRRs) from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU), including the National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR). The current plan is to procure LEU fuel assemblies from commercial fabricators according to fuel specifications tailored for each USHPRR. The analysis conducted at Brookhaven National Laboratory was part of an effort to identify the sources of uncertainty in the fuel specifications that may impact the performance of the NBSR core after its conversion and, in particular, to assess the range of acceptable tolerance limits from the perspective of core safety and reactor performance. Using the stochastic neutronics code MCNP 6.2, the variations in important NBSR neutronics characteristics were analyzed as a function of the specification parameters independently and in combination. The important NBSR specification parameters analyzed were the fuel isotopic composition, the amount of impurity content in cladding, the fuel plate thickness, and the fuel element 235U mass loading. The range of variation of each specification parameter was based on the technical specification limit or available as-fabricated assay data and uncertainties. The NBSR neutronics characteristics selected for analysis were the reactor reactivity characteristics at equilibrium and the equilibrium fuel cycle length. Results show that with variations in the fabrication parameters of the as-fabricated U-10Mo fuel within the specification limitations, the excess reactivity of the NBSR LEU core remains well below the 15% Δk/k technical specification limit, and the shutdown margin is always significantly greater than the required 0.68% Δk/k. This ensures that the NBSR can be operated safely and reliably shut down for all analyzed cases within the specified fabrication limits after the LEU conversion. In the prototypic case, the fuel cycle length was 1.5 days longer than the targeted 38.5 days. In a credible worst-case scenario, where all low-reactivity parameters were combined, the fuel cycle length was reduced to 35.5 days, which is still considered manageable for reactor operations. Variations in cycle length are primarily driven by changes in 235U loading, with other parameters having secondary effects.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Special Analysis of the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This report describes the methods and results of a special analysis (SA) of the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The purpose of the SA is to determine if the approved performance assessment (PA) and composite analysis (CA) (Shott et al., 2001) remain valid. The Area 3 RWMS PA and CA were prepared as a single document and received conditional approval on October 6, 1999. A conditional Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) for the Area 3 RWMS was issued on October 20, 1999. Since preparation of the approved PA and CA, new information and additional environmental monitoring data have been used to update the PA and CA. At the same time, continual advancements in computer processors and software have allowed improvement to the PA and CA models. Annual reviews of the PA and CA required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order DOE O 435.1 have documented multiple changes occurring since preparation of the PA and CA. Potentially important changes include: Development of a new and improved baseline PA and CA model implemented in the probabilistic GoldSim simulation platform. A significant increase in the waste inventory disposed at the site. Revision and updating of model parameters based on additional years of site monitoring data and new research and development results. Although changes have occurred, many important PA/CA issues remain unchanged, including the site conceptual model, important features, events, and processes, and the points of compliance. The SA is performed to document the current status of the PA/CA model and to quantitatively assess the impact of cumulative changes on the PA and CA results. The results of the SA are used to assess the validity of the approved PA/CA and make a determination if revision of the PA or CA is necessary. The SA was performed using the Area 3 RWMS, version 2.102, GoldSim model, the current baseline PA/CA model. Comparison of the maximum SA results with the PA performance objectives indicates that there continues to be a reasonable expectation of compliance. The resident exposure scenario was evaluated for compliance with the air pathway and all-pathways annual total effective dose (TED) performance objectives. The maximum mean air pathway TED, 7E-6 millisievert (mSv) at 1,000 years (y) has decreased relative to the approved PA and is significantly less than the 0.1 mSv limit. The maximum mean all-pathways annual TED, 7E-5 mSv at 1,000 y has increased but remains a small fraction of the 0.25 mSv limit. The SA maximum mean radon-222 (222Rn) flux density, 0.03 becquerel per square meter per second (Bq m-2 s-1), has increased relative to the PA results but is significantly less than the 0.74 Bq m-2 s-1 limit. The SA results continue to support a conclusion that the disposed waste inventory is protective of intruders and groundwater resources. The maximum mean intruder TED, 0.01 mSv for an acute construction scenario at the U-3ah/at disposal unit, was less than the 5 mSv performance measure. Site monitoring data and research results continue to support a conclusion that a groundwater pathway will not exist within the 1,000 y compliance period. Projected releases to the environment are a small fraction of the performance objectives. Cost-effective options for reducing releases further are unlikely to exist. Therefore, releases from the Area 3 RWMS are judged to be as low as reasonably achievable. Comparison of the maximum CA result with the 0.3 mSv CA dose constraint indicates that no action is required to reduce the dose from the Area 3 RWMS and all interacting sources of residual radioactive contamination. The SA maximum mean CA annual TED, 0.02 mSv at 1,000 y, has increased from the approved CA result but remains less than 10% of the dose constraint. The CA TED continues to be due predominantly to inhalation of plutonium-239 resuspended from soils contaminated by nuclear weapons tests conducted near the Area 3 RWMS. The SA results estimated with the Area 3 RWMS version 2.102 model indicate that changes to the PA and CA do not significantly alter the PA/CA results or conclusions. Although increases occur for the all-pathways annual TED, the 222Rn flux density, and the CA annual TED, all PA and CA results are a small fraction of the performance objectives or dose constraints. The same conclusion was reached for the approved PA and CA. The SA results continue to support a conclusion that there is a reasonable expectation of meeting all performance objectives and the CA dose constraint. There is no need to revise the DAS at this time. The SA results support a conclusion that the Area 3 RWMS PA and CA remain valid, and revision is not necessary at this time.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

ByzSec — A Multi-layered Byzantine Resilient Architecture for Bulk Power System Protective Relays

Reliability, selectivity, and sensitivity are the fundamental attributes of any protection system, acting as the main drivers in the selection of schemes, and equipment. In high-voltage systems, microprocessor-based relays represent the industry’s preferred solution, providing engineers with a vast array of benefits. However, they remain vulnerable to cybersecurity events that may compromise their functionality. To help mitigate against potential cybersecurity risks, this paper presents a fault-tolerant, Byzantine Resilient (BR) architecture that significantly increases the cybersecurity attributes of a protection system while minimizing the amount of performance impacts and integration overheads introduced. The solution relies on an array of independent relays that utilize robust consensus methods (based on Spire [1], [2]) to ensure correct system behavior is achieved even when a relay has been compromised. Furthermore, the solution has been complemented with a custom-built Situational Awareness engine that can be used to detect and identify potential threats. The implemented solution has been developed in consultation with three hardware vendors and has been tested to comply with the performance requirements of a 345kV differential protection scheme (87T). The results indicate that the proposed architecture is a comprehensive solution that: supports the strict correctness and performance requirements of the bulk power grid while providing a cost-effective alternative that offers a seamless, long-term solution.

byzantine security, Fault Tolerant Application Sof↗

Role of reinforcement learning for risk-based robust control of cyber-physical energy systems

Critical infrastructures such as cyber-physical energy systems (CPS-E) integrate information flow and physical operations that are vulnerable to natural and targeted failures. Safe, secure, and reliable operation and control of CPS-E is critical to ensure societal well-being and economic prosperity. Automated control is key for real-time operations and may be mathematically cast as a sequential decision-making problem under uncertainty. Emergence of data-driven techniques for decision making under uncertainty, such as reinforcement learning (RL), have led to promising advances for addressing sequential decision-making problems for risk-based robust CPS-E control. However, existing research challenges include understanding the applicability of RL methods across diverse CPS-E applications, addressing the effect of risk preferences across multiple RL methods, and development of open-source domain-aware simulation environments for RL experimentation within a CPS-E context. This article systematically analyzes the applicability of four types of RL methods (model-free, model-based, hybrid model-free and model-based, and hierarchical) for risk-based robust CPS-E control. Problem features and solution stability for the RL methods are also discussed. We demonstrate and compare the performance of multiple RL methods under different risk specifications (risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-seeking) through the development and application of an open-source simulation environment. Motivating numerical simulation examples include representative single-zone and multizone building control use cases. Finally, six key insights for future research and broader adoption of RL methods are identified, with specific emphasis on problem features, algorithmic explainability, and solution stability.

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