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Nevada National Security Site 2010 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data were collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data are associated with radiation exposure, air, groundwater, meteorology, vadose zone, subsidence, and biota. This report summarizes the 2010 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (National Security Technologies, LLC, 2010a; 2010b; 2011). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Air monitoring data at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs indicate that tritium concentrations are slightly above background levels. All gamma spectroscopy results for air particulates collected at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS were below the minimum detectable concentrations, and concentrations of americium and plutonium are only slightly above detection limits. The measured levels of radionuclides in air particulates and moisture are below derived concentration guides for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate that the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by facility operations. The 246.9 millimeters (mm) (9.72 inches [in.]) of precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS during 2010 is 56 percent above the average of 158.7 mm (6.25 in.), and the 190.4 mm (7.50 in.) of precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS during 2010 is 50 percent above the average of 126.7 mm (4.99 in.). Soil-gas tritium monitoring at borehole GCD-05 continues to show slow subsurface migration consistent with previous results. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Data from the automated vadose zone monitoring system for the operational waste pit covers show that moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 90 centimeters (cm) (3 feet [ft]) before being removed by evaporation. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 61 cm (2 ft) in the vegetated final mono-layer cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS before being removed by evapotranspiration. During 2010, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Water drained from both the bare-soil drainage lysimeter and the invader species drainage lysimeter that received 3 times natural precipitation. All 2010 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facility PAs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NDE of PWA 1480 single crystal turbine blade material

Cantilever bending fatigue specimens were examined by fluorescent liquid penetrant and radioactive gas penetrant (Krypton) non-destructive evaluation (NDE) methods and tested. Specimens with cast, ground, or polished surface were evaluated to study the effect of surface condition on NDE and fatigue crack initiation. Fractographic and metallurgical analyses were performed to determine the nature of crack precursors. Preliminary results show that fatigue strength was lower for specimens with cast surfaces than for specimens with machined surfaces. The liquid penetrant and gas penetrant techniques both provided indications of a large population of defects on the cast surfaces. On ground or polished specimen surfaces, the gas penetrant appeared to estimate the actual number of voids more accurately than the liquid penetrant.

Klima, Stanley J.↗

Aerosol retention during SGTR meltdown sequences: Experimental insights of the effect of size and shape of the breach

This paper summarizes the major insights gained from aerosol retention capability of a tube bundle that simulates the break stage of the secondary side of a failed steam generator under dry SGTR conditions. This scenario is highly relevant in nuclear safety since it affects the potential retention of radioactive particles in case of meltdown sequences with a SGTR. An 8-test experimental campaign has been carried out, extending the current database on the decontamination capability of the steam generator. The effects of the breach features (shape and size) and the particle nature (SiO{sub 2} and TiO{sub 2}) on the collection efficiency have been explored. The results confirmed the strong effect of the physical nature even when tube breaks in a fish-mouth mode. Loose aggregates (i.e. TiO{sub 2}) would be trapped to a limited extent (less than 25%); while single- or few-aggregates (i.e. SiO{sub 2}) would undergo a quite effective removal (i.e. over 75%). For fish-mouth breaches and SiO{sub 2} particles, the breach size has been found to moderately affect retention efficiency. Furthermore, the breach shape does not seem to have any effect on the net collection efficiency within the break stage, no matter the particle type. However, individual tube measurements indicate notably different deposition patterns, although an effect of the facility geometry cannot be disregarded as a key player in this observation. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Survey and Remediation Project at the DOE Bannister Site - 16280

The Department of Energy Kansas City office has operated the Bannister site with a variety of contractors since the late 1940's. This facility has had a number of missions, some of which included using natural and depleted uranium. In order to prepare for the demolition of the site, ANTECH was contracted to perform radiometric surveys of the areas where these uranium operations took place. In the process of performing these surveys, areas with low levels of fixed radioactive contamination were identified; ANTECH then remediated these areas using a variety of techniques. In all areas surveyed, the only radioactive contaminant of interest was uranium and members of its decay chain. In no cases were other radionuclides found. The detection equipment used for the surveys included a Ludlum model 239- 1F Floor Monitor, a Ludlum 2360 Alpha Beta Data Logger Scaler/Ratemeter, and an ORTEC IDM-200-V High Purity Germanium Detector. The Ludlum instruments were used for bulk surveys and the ORTEC instrument was used to determine an accurate radioactive background spectra and subsequent spectra for areas where radioactive contamination was identified. Contamination was located on concrete floors and columns, cinder block walls, steel beams, inside ductwork and in floor drain piping. After these areas were identified, a number of methods were used to remove the contamination for disposal including scabbling, core drilling and wholesale removal. Extensive use of Pentek scabbling equipment on the concrete sections proved to be very effective at removing the contaminated layer. Upon completion, the waste materials were consolidated and packaged in a strong tight sea land container and shipped to the Energy Solutions waste facility in Utah. The completed work at the Bannister site serves as an example and demonstration of an effective and comprehensive decommissioning project. It involved the integration of a variety of decommissioning activities all executed and managed by a single contractor. These included radiometric measurement surveying using a variety of detection technologies to identify and locate uranium contamination, decontamination and removal of low level radioactive waste including some deconstruction activities and finally the management of low level radioactive waste including packaging, consignment and shipping of waste to a remediation site. The effective and efficient identification and removal of radioactive contamination at the Bannister site has contributed to the overall goal of returning the site to unrestricted use. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Occurrence of Radiological Contamination in Urban Parks Established over Former Landfill Sites - 19433

In 2005, the National Park Service was notified that elevated radiation levels were detected at Great Kills Park during a baseline radiological mapping effort conducted by the Counter Terrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department and the United States Department of Energy. Great Kills Park is in the Staten Island Unit of Gateway National Recreation Area. A records search determined that approximately 1.1 x 10{sup 6} square meters (280 acres) of the park was established over an area in which the New York City Department of Sanitation placed approximately 1.2 x 10{sup 7} cubic meters (15.1 million cubic yards) of waste fill from 1944 to 1948. Since 2005, a series of response actions and investigations were conducted on behalf of the National Park Service to mitigate risk to human health and the environment and to determine the nature of radiological contamination at Great Kills Park. The findings support that radiological contamination is related to certain components of waste fill, including incinerator residue from both on and offsite incinerators, coal ash from the historical use of coal-fired boilers for heating, and incidental radiological artifacts in the waste fill due to their historical use and subsequent disposal. A majority of the radiological artifacts were determined to contain Ra-226 and included radioluminescent markers, radium buttons, radium paint containers, and brachytherapy devices. The National Park Service is currently performing a Remedial Investigation for the waste-filled area of Great Kills Park under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. Several other Parks in Gateway National Recreation Area were established in areas with a similar history to Great Kills Park, and overlie waste fill historically placed during landfilling operations. Recently, radiological surveys were performed over limited portions of Spring Creek Park in the Jamaica Bay Unit of Gateway National Recreation Area. These surveys identified several locations with gamma radiation levels above the ambient level, several of which were attributable to radiological artifacts similar in nature to those recovered at Great Kills Park. Ongoing investigations at Great Kills Park and the recent findings at Spring Creek Park suggest that radiological contamination may be associated with historical landfilling practices that were common prior to the regulation and control of radioactive materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site 2011 Waste Management Monitoring Report, Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data are associated with radiation exposure, air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2011 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports. Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are only slightly above detection limits and background levels. The measured levels of radionuclides in air particulates and moisture are below derived concentration guides for these radionuclides. During the last 2 weeks of March 2011, gamma spectroscopy results for air particles showed measurable activities of iodine-131 ( 131 I), cesium-134 ( 134 Cs), and cesium-137 ( 137 Cs). These results are attributed to the release of fission products from the damaged Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan. The remaining gamma spectroscopy results for air particulates collected at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS were below minimum detectable concentrations. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. The 86.3 millimeters (mm) (3.40 inches [in.]) of precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS during 2011 is 44% below the average of 154.1 mm (6.07 in.), and the 64.8 mm (2.55 in.) of precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS during 2011 is 47% below the average of 122.4 mm (4.82 in.). Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Automated vadose zone monitoring on Area 5 RWMS operational waste covers was not done during 2011 due to construction of the final evapotranspiration cover at these monitoring locations. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 122 centimeters (4 feet) in the vegetated final mono-layer cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS before being removed by evapotranspiration. During 2011, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 feet) of soil from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Ten percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter that received 3 times natural precipitation. All 2011 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facility PAs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RAPID: The Development and Application of a Hybrid High Pressure Ion Chromatography and Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry Method for the Direct Analysis of Irradiated Materials

RAPID (Rapid Analysis of Post-Irradiation Debris) is an automated online separation–direct analysis method developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to measure both radioactive and stable fission isotopes by mass. Developed to measure the concentration and isotopic composition of over 40 elements down to the femtogram level, RAPID demonstrates the sensitivity, stability, and precision required to achieve accurate, low-level analyses of elements of non-natural origin. The application of the RAPID method to silica- and soil-based matrices achieved complete matrix exclusion and direct online analysis of the elementally separated analytes, yielding precise isotopic compositions. When combined with isotope dilution, this approach yielded elemental concentrations with low uncertainties, providing a rapid analytical method that encompasses group I and II metals, transition metals, refractory metals, platinum group metals, lanthanides, and actinides. The robustness, sensitivity, reproducibility, and numerous applications to a number of fields in nuclear measurements have been confirmed.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Uptake selectivity for different types of zeolites in the presence of boric acid - 15244

The development of selective adsorbents is very important subject for the effective multi-nuclide decontamination related to the severe accident of Fukushima NPP-1. Many removal methods have been developed to separate nuclide from decontaminated solutions containing multi-nuclide so far. From the standpoint of cost efficiency, stability for usage and safety handling, the decontamination methods using inorganic adsorbents are one of the most effective methods for the selective decontamination system. Thus, many researches related to inorganic adsorbents have been carried out after the accident; actually, in Fukushima NPP-1, zeolites are used to remove radioactive nuclides from decontaminated water as a main adsorbent in the circulating injection cooling system. However, the adsorption characteristics of zeolites in the presence of boric acid have not been clarified in detail. As for the decontamination in PWR[1], the adsorption properties should be examined in the presence of highly concentrated boric acid. Based on this background, the final objective of this study is to develop the decontamination methods in PWR-NPP by using various zeolites for multi-nuclide. In this study, the adsorption properties for eight kinds of zeolites (Zeolite A, Zeolite X, Zeolite Y, Zeolite L, Chabazite, Synthetic Mordenite, Natural Mordenite and Clinoptilolite) are evaluated in the presence of boric acid and seawater. The present study deals with (1) selective adsorption properties for single nuclide ion ({sup 137}Cs{sup +}, {sup 60}Co{sup 2+}, {sup 85}Sr{sup 2+} and {sup 152}Eu{sup 3+}), (2) preparation of Ag-loaded Natural Mordenite (Ag-NM) and uptake properties of I- ions, and (3) multi-nuclide decontamination properties of 26 elements (typical elements in Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) in Fukushima NPP-1) for the above zeolites. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Direct experimental constraints on the spatial extent of a neutrino wavepacket

Despite their high relative abundance in our Universe, neutrinos are the least understood fundamental particles of nature. In fact, the quantum properties of neutrinos emitted in experimentally relevant sources are theoretically contested and the spatial extent of the neutrino wavepacket is only loosely constrained by reactor neutrino oscillation data with a spread of 13 orders of magnitude. Here we present a method to directly access this quantity by precisely measuring the energy width of the recoil daughter nucleus emitted in the radioactive decay of beryllium-7. The final state in the decay process contains a recoiling lithium-7 nucleus, which is entangled with an electron neutrino at creation. The lithium-7 energy spectrum is measured to high precision by directly embedding beryllium-7 radioisotopes into a high-resolution superconducting tunnel junction that is operated as a cryogenic sensor. Under this approach, we set a lower limit on the Heisenberg spatial uncertainty of the recoil daughter of 6.2 pm, which implies that the final-state system is localized at a scale more than a thousand times larger than the nucleus itself. From this measurement, the first, to our knowledge, direct lower limit on the spatial extent of a neutrino wavepacket is extracted. These results may have implications in several areas including the theoretical understanding of neutrino properties, the nature of localization in weak nuclear decays and the interpretation of neutrino physics data.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Proceedings of the 10th US/German Workshop on Salt Repository Research Design and Operation. Rev. 1

The 10th US/German Workshop on Salt Repository Research, Design, and Operation was hosted by RESPEC and South Dakota School of Mines & Technology, both located in the Black Hills of South Dakota. Over 60 registered participants representing Germany, United States, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom availed themselves to excellent facilities on the School of Mines campus. As the 10th annual workshop, this occasion is a milestone of the modern era of collaboration between the US and Germany, which has extended to other countries with potential for radioactive waste disposal in salt. Thrust areas covered in the annual workshops are selected by participants and typically include elements of continuity from year to year. This year's themes included siting, modeling challenges, seal systems and materials, operational safety, and special topics. Two major breakout sessions addressed test sample conditioning and natural closure of salt openings. When the new-generation US/German workshops were conceived, one goal was to identify challenging issues related to salt repository sciences and then conduct open discussions in special breakout sessions. These timely sessions achieve the workshop paradigm and provide in-depth dialogue on important salt repository considerations. In many respects, general themes of these salt repository workshops reflect advances in the scientific basis for nuclear-waste disposal in salt formations and develop naturally as a consequence of unremitting attention largely as a result of the workshop commitment. Technical capabilities in the laboratory and field continue to improve in concert with accumulating experience. Because we are working together, mechanical deformation at the micro-scale can be interpreted at a large scale, which is fundamental to predictive modeling of salt repository evolution. This document records the Proceedings of the 2019 gathering of salt repository nations and has been compiled by RESPEC, demonstrating an adopted protocol in which the host organization creates that year's Proceedings. To assist with organization and compilation, individual chapters are summarized by volunteer subject-matter experts from the participatory audience; these contributors are recognized in the Acknowledgements. All formal presentations are included in this document, thus providing a resource for referencing and many excellent photographic images. Appendices include the agenda, list of participants, abstracts, and presentations. A primary purpose for recording workshop activities is to create and sustain an accessible record of salt repository research. These archives also illustrate transparent development of research areas each year.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

2016 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data include direct radiation exposure, as well as radiation from the air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2016 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports, developed by National Security Technologies, LLC Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection system at the mixed low-level waste cell were below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2016, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 8% below average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 8% above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Vadose zone monitoring on Area 5 and Area 3 RWMS cell covers shows no evidence of precipitation percolating through the covers to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 150 centimeters (cm) (5 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS. During 2016, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Forty-four percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter, which received 3 times the natural precipitation. All 2016 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

EDF's used fuel management french policy - 15199

Regarding back-end fuel cycle, EDF's strategy, implemented from the very beginning of French nuclear production, consists in reprocessing of used fuel; decision to recycle plutonium in French PWR was taken from 1984. This reprocessing and recycling strategy, relying on existing industrial facilities (AREVA La Hague and Melox plants), has proven to be reliable and efficient. Treatment leads to a stabilization of used fuel total inventory in interim storage. Vitrification process ensures a safe packaging for high level and long-lived waste under a reduced volume. Recycling of fissile materials saves natural uranium requirements. Concentration of Pu in MOX used fuel leaves open the option to reuse it for starting next Generation IV systems beyond 2040. In 2008, EDF and AREVA, supported by French Government, agreed on commercial terms covering long term fuel reprocessing and recycling (up to 2040). Currently, EDF fuel management strategy relies on flow equilibrium in order to respect fuel cycle consistency and sustainability. The underlying principle is to strictly adjust separated plutonium production to recycling possibilities (i.e. licensed reactors and MOX fuel fabrication facilities). Given that fuel cycle policy, any trend in NPP core management that may impact the fuel cycle should be anticipated within times in order to avoid technical or administrative incompatibilities, and guarantee a high level of safety and robustness. In collaboration with industrial operators, EDF have to perform periodic 'Cycle Impact' analyses and report to the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN); next exercise is scheduled by the end of 2016. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Natural and Engineered Features Supporting Environmental Performance of Idaho National Laboratory’s Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

The Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility has been designed and constructed to receive waste generated at the INL site in support of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and Naval Reactors (NR) missions. The facility has been designed to receive legacy RH LLW currently in storage at INL facilities and new waste generated by nuclear research programs. RH LLW to be received at the facility is solid waste consisting of surface contaminated debris; ion exchange resins used to purify cooling and canal water; activated metals generated during reactor core change outs and Naval spent fuel management; and nuclear Research & Development. Disposal of INL's RH LLW poses unique disposal challenges due to high radiation levels (contact rates up to 600 Sv/hr [60,000 Rem/hr]) that require remote handling and adequate shielding for transportation and disposal. The facility has been designed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1 [1], including the all-pathways dose, air pathway dose, inadvertent intruder doses, and radon emissions limits. This paper presents an overview of natural and engineered design features that support the safety case and enhance the environmental performance of the facility. These include location selection, use of reinforced pre-cast concrete vaults; a robust hydraulic drainage system; use of steel waste canisters for waste disposal; the facility monitoring system; facility layout; and crediting waste forms. The facility performance assessment (PA) [2] developed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1 “Radioactive Waste Management” credits each of these protective features. Releases from waste forms disposed of at this facility are limited by corrosion of the steel waste canisters which will ultimately allow contact with infiltrating water followed by transport of radionuclides from the vault system. The steel waste canisters were credited for their ability to limit water contact with the waste based on the demonstrated ability of the reinforced pre-caste concrete vaults to provide long-term structural protection of the steel waste canisters. Verification of hydraulic and concrete performance was conducted through laboratory data, field infiltration tests supported by a robust monitoring system, and numerical modeling. Releases into the vault system from activated metals are based on site-specific corrosion data. Radionuclide transport from the vault system from all waste forms is based on site-specific climatological, hydrologic, and stratigraphic data. At INL, the groundwater pathway historically and appropriately has received the most attention. By crediting aspects of the natural system, the engineered vault system, and the waste, estimated radiologic doses via the groundwater pathway are minimal. Air pathway doses were reduced by differentially crediting corrosion of aluminum and stainless steel activated metals resulting in the pathway being screened out of the PA. Groundwater and inadvertent intruder doses were reduced through selective facility layout. This paper provides an overview of the system-wide protective features incorporated into the facility design along with an extensive reference list to supporting technical papers and analyses that provide data and interpretation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Scenario development for safety assessment in deep geologic disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel: A review

Radiation and radioactive substances result in the production of radioactive wastes which require safe management and disposal to avoid risks to human health and the environment. To ensure permanent safe disposal, the performance of a deep geological repository for radioactive waste is assessed against internationally agreed risk-based standards. Assessing postclosure safety of the future system's evolution includes screening of features, events, and processes (FEPs) relevant to the situation, their subsequent development into scenarios, and finally the development and execution of safety assessment (SA) models. Global FEP catalogs describe important natural and man-made repository system features and identify events and processes that may affect these features into the future. By combining FEPs, many of which are uncertain, different possible future system evolution scenarios are derived. Repository licensing should consider both the reference or “base” evolution as well as alternative futures that may lead to radiation release, pollution, or exposures. Scenarios are used to derive and consider both base and alternative evolutions, often through production of scenario-specific SA models and the recombination of their results into an assessment of the risk of harm. Furthermore, while the FEP-based scenario development process outlined here has evolved somewhat since its development in the 1980s, the fundamental ideas remain unchanged. A spectrum of common approaches is given here (e.g., bottom–up vs. top–down scenario development, probabilistic vs. bounding handling of uncertainty), related to how individual numerical models for possible futures are converted into a determination as to whether the system is safe (i.e., how aleatoric uncertainty and scenarios are integrated through bounding or Monte Carlo approaches).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Conceptual Model and Risk Assessment of Waste Package Evolution - 15643

A generic disposal facility model was created to mirror disposal of low-level radioactive waste in a humid environment. The standard waste package used is a painted and primed carbon steel box stacked four high and placed next to one another within the disposal facility, preventing outward deformations of individual boxes. Waste is placed in the facility in sections, and as each section is filled it is covered with a layer of natural soil. It was assumed that boxes are exposed to natural precipitation rates for approximately 12 months, reduced to natural background infiltration to simulate the soil cover, and dropping to 1% of background infiltration when the facility is filled and a water-shedding interim cover is installed. It was also assumed that each box retains its structural integrity at the time of disposal, with the exception of the top box, which has its lid collapse inward from the overlying soil cover. Waste packages experience different rates of corrosion, differential amounts of infiltration, and fill with liquid at different rates based on when and where they are placed in the facility. Using historical literature and DOE site reports, calculations were made to estimate a range of waste package failure outcomes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A summary of the results from the DOE advanced gas reactor (AGR) fuel development and qualification program

Modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) designs were developed to provide natural safety, which prevents core damage under all licensing basis events. The principle that guides their design concepts is to passively maintain core temperatures below fission product release thresholds under all accident scenarios. The required level of fuel performance and fission product retention reduces the radioactive source term by many orders of magnitude relative to source terms for other reactor types and allows a graded approach to emergency planning and the potential elimination of the need for evacuation and sheltering beyond a small exclusion area. Achieving this level, however, is predicated on exceptionally high coated-particle fuel fabrication quality and excellent performance under normal operation and accident conditions. The design goal of modular HTGRs is to meet the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for offsite dose at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB). To achieve this, the reactor design concepts require a level of fuel integrity that is far better than that achieved for all prior U.S.-manufactured tristructural isotropic (TRISO) coated particle fuel.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

The Origin and Evolution of the Normal Type Ia SN 2018aoz with Infant-phase Reddening and Excess Emission

SN 2018aoz is a Type Ia SN with a B-band plateau and excess emission in infant-phase light curves ≲1 day after the first light, evidencing an over-density of surface iron-peak elements as shown in our previous study. Here, we advance the constraints on the nature and origin of SN 2018aoz based on its evolution until the nebular phase. Near-peak spectroscopic features show that the SN is intermediate between two subtypes of normal Type Ia: core normal and broad line. The excess emission may be attributable to the radioactive decay of surface iron-peak elements as well as the interaction of ejecta with either the binary companion or a small torus of circumstellar material. Nebular-phase limits on Hα and He ι favor a white dwarf companion, consistent with the small companion size constrained by the low early SN luminosity, while the absence of [O ι] and He ι disfavors a violent merger of the progenitor. Of the two main explosion mechanisms proposed to explain the distribution of surface iron-peak elements in SN 2018aoz, the asymmetric Chandrasekhar-mass explosion is less consistent with the progenitor constraints and the observed blueshifts of nebular-phase [Fe ιι] and [Ni ιι]. The helium-shell double-detonation explosion is compatible with the observed lack of C spectral features, but current 1D models are incompatible with the infant-phase excess emission, $B_{max}$--$V_{max}$ color, and weak strength of nebular-phase [Ca ιι]. Although the explosion processes of SN 2018aoz still need to be more precisely understood, the same processes could produce a significant fraction of Type Ia SNe that appear to be normal after ~1 day.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗