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At least 811 records · Page 45

CZT Virtual Frisch-grid Detector: Principles and Applications

Cadmium Zinc Telluride (CdZnTe or CZT) is a very attractive material for using as room-temperature semiconductor detectors, because it has a wide bandgap and a high atomic number. However, due to the material's poor hole mobility, several special techniques were developed to ensure its suitability for radiation detection. Among them, the virtual Frisch-grid CZT detector is an attractive option, having a simple configuration, yet delivering an outstanding spectral performance. The goal of our group in Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) is to improve the performance of Frisch-ring CZT detectors; most recently, that effort focused on the non-contacting Frisch-ring detector, allowing us to build an inexpensive, large-volume detector array with high energy-resolution and a large effective area. In this paper, the principles of virtual Frisch-grid detectors are described, especially BNL's innovative improvements. The potential applications of virtual Frisch-grid detectors are discussed, and as an example, a hand-held gamma-ray spectrometer using a CZT virtual Frischgrid detector array is introduced, which is a self-contained device with a radiation detector, readout circuit, communication circuit, and high-voltage supply. It has good energy resolution of 1.4% (FWHM of 662-keV peak) with a total detection volume of {approx}20 cm{sup 3}. Such a portable inexpensive device can be used widely in nonproliferation applications, non-destructive detection, radiation imaging, and for homeland security. Extended systems based on the same technology have potential applications in industrial- and nuclear-medical-imaging.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who either are experts in international safeguards, or understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. The 44 participants represented eight national laboratories, four universities, three government organizations, two international organizations, two professional organizations, and three small companies. The goal of the ERIS workshop was to improve efforts to engage U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. At the workshop's conclusion, participants presented their findings to the NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243). The report's major findings are summarized.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

HEAT TRANSFER ANALYSIS FOR NUCLEAR WASTE SOLIDIFICATION CONTAINER

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Design Authority is in the design stage of the Waste Solidification Building (WSB) for the treatment and solidification of the radioactive liquid waste streams generated by the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) and Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The waste streams will be mixed with a cementitious dry mix in a 55-gallon waste container. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has been performing the testing and evaluations to support technical decisions for the WSB. Engineering Modeling & Simulation Group was requested to evaluate the thermal performance of the 55-gallon drum containing hydration heat source associated with the current baseline cement waste form. A transient axi-symmetric heat transfer model for the drum partially filled with waste form cement has been developed and heat transfer calculations performed for the baseline design configurations. For this case, 65 percent of the drum volume was assumed to be filled with the waste form, which has transient hydration heat source, as one of the baseline conditions. A series of modeling calculations has been performed using a computational heat transfer approach. The baseline modeling results show that the time to reach the maximum temperature of the 65 percent filled drum is about 32 hours when a 43 C initial cement temperature is assumed to be cooled by natural convection with 27 C external air. In addition, the results computed by the present model were compared with analytical solutions. The modeling results will be benchmarked against the prototypic test results. The verified model will be used for the evaluation of the thermal performance for the WSB drum. Detailed results and the cases considered in the calculations will be discussed here.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Proliferation resistance: issues, initiatives and evaluation

The vision of a nuclear renaissance has highlighted the issue of proliferation resistance. The prospects for a dramatic growth in nuclear power may depend on the effectiveness of, and the resources devoted to, plans to develop and implement technologies and approaches that strengthen proliferation resistance. The GenIV International Forum (GIF) and others have devoted attention and resources to proliferation resistance. However, the hope of finding a way to make the peaceful uses of nuclear energy resistant to proliferation has reappeared again and again in the history of nuclear power with little practical consequence. The concept of proliferation resistance has usually focused on intrinsic (technological) as opposed to extrinsic (institutional) factors. However, if there are benefits that may yet be realized from reactors and other facilities designed to minimize proliferation risks, it is their coupling with effective safeguards and other nonproliferation measures that likely will be critical. Proliferation resistance has also traditionally been applied only to state threats. Although there are no technologies that can wholly eliminate the risk of proliferation by a determined state, technology can play a limited role in reducing state threats and perhaps in eliminating many non-state threats. These and other issues are not academic. They affect efforts to evaluate proliferation resistance, including the methodology developed by GIF's Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) Working Group as well as the proliferation resistance initiatives that are being pursued or may be developed in the future. This paper will offer a new framework for thinking about proliferation resistance issues, including the ways the output of the methodology could be developed to inform the decisions that states, the International Atomic Energy (IAEA) and others will have to make in order to fully realize the promise of a nuclear renaissance.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Measurement and Characterization of Nuclear Material at Idaho National Laboratory

A measurement plan and preliminary Monte Carlo simulations are presented for the investigation of well-defined mixed-oxide fuel pins. Measurement analysis including pulse-height distributions and time-dependent cross-correlation functions will be performed separately for neutrons and gamma rays. The utilization of Monte Carlo particle transport codes, specifically MCNP-PoliMi, is discussed in conjunction with the anticipated measurements. Four EJ-309 liquid scintillation detectors with an accurate pulse timing and digital, offline, optimized pulse-shape discrimination method will be used to prove the dependency of pulse-height distributions, cross-correlation functions, and material multiplicities upon fuel pin composition, fuel pin quantity, and detector geometry. The objective of the measurements and simulations is to identify novel methods for describing mixed-oxide fuel samples by relating measured quantities to fuel characteristics such as criticality, mass quantity, and material composition. This research has applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

SNM Movement Detection/Radiation Sensors and Advanced Materials Portfolio Review, CdMnTe (CMT) Gamma Ray Detectors

The project goals are: (1) Develop CMT radiation detectors - Demonstrate feasibility (Phase 1 is complete) and Improve material properties and device performance; (2) This project will lead to novel radiation detectors - high detection efficiency, high energy-resolution, ambient-temperature operation, and low production cost; and (3) Such detectors are needed in areas of nonproliferation and national security for detection of SNM. Research highlights are: (1) We achieved our Phase-I goal - Demonstration of CMT detector performance approaching that of CZT detectors; (2) Demonstrated that In-doped CMT is much closer to its anticipated performance as radiation detectors than other alternative materials, TlBr and HgI{sub 2} - Large crystal volumes, 10{sup 10}{Omega}{center_dot}cm, 3 x 10{sup -3}cm{sup 2}/V, and stable response; and (3) Conducted material and device characterization experiments - Detectors: I-V, {mu}{sub e}, ({mu}{tau}){sub e}, internal E fields, energy spectra, and high-resolution x-ray response mapping data and Materials - DLTS, TCT, PL, EPDs, XRD, PCD and IR transmission.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Technology gap analysis on sodium-cooled reactor fuel handling system supporting advanced burner reactor development.

The goals of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) are to expand the use of nuclear energy to meet increasing global energy demand in an environmentally sustainable manner, to address nuclear waste management issues without making separated plutonium, and to address nonproliferation concerns. The advanced burner reactor (ABR) is a fast reactor concept which supports the GNEP fuel cycle system. Since the integral fast reactor (IFR) and advanced liquid-metal reactor (ALMR) projects were terminated in 1994, there has been no major development on sodium-cooled fast reactors in the United States. Therefore, in support of the GNEP fast reactor program, the history of sodium-cooled reactor development was reviewed to support the initiation of this technology within the United States and to gain an understanding of the technology gaps that may still remain for sodium fast reactor technology. The fuel-handling system is a key element of any fast reactor design. The major functions of this system are to receive, test, store, and then load fresh fuel into the core; unload from the core; then clean, test, store, and ship spent fuel. Major requirements are that the system must be reliable and relatively easy to maintain. In addition, the system should be designed so that it does not adversely impact plant economics from the viewpoints of capital investment or plant operations. In this gap analysis, information on fuel-handling operating experiences in the following reactor plants was carefully reviewed: EBR-I, SRE, HNPF, Fermi, SEFOR, FFTF, CRBR, EBR-II, DFR, PFR, Rapsodie, Phenix, Superphenix, KNK, SNR-300, Joyo, and Monju. The results of this evaluation indicate that a standardized fuel-handling system for a commercial fast reactor is yet to be established. However, in the past sodium-cooled reactor plants, most major fuel-handling components-such as the rotatable plug, in-vessel fuel-handling machine, ex-vessel fuel transportation cask, ex-vessel sodium-cooled storage, and cleaning stations-have accumulated satisfactory construction and operation experiences. In addition, two special issues for future development are described in this report: large capacity interim storage and transuranic-bearing fuel handling.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Proliferation resistance for fast reactors and related fuel cycles: issues and impacts

The prospects for a dramatic growth in nuclear power may depend to a significant degree on the effectiveness of, and the resources devoted to, plans to develop and implement technologies and approaches that strengthen proliferation resistance and nuclear materials accountability. The challenges for fast reactors and related fuel cycles are especially critical. They are being explored in the Generation IV Tnternational Forum (GIF) and the Tnternational Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) initiative, as well as by many states that are looking to these systems for the efficient lise of uranium resources and long-term energy security. How do any proliferation risks they may pose compare to other reactors, both existing and under development, and their fuel cycles? Can they be designed with intrinsic (technological) features to make these systems more proliferation resistant? What roles can extrinsic (institutional) features play in proliferation resistance? What are the anticipated safeguards requirements, and will new technologies and approaches need to be developed? How can safeguards be facilitated by the design process? These and other questions require a rethinking of proliferation resistance and the prospects for new technologies and other intrinsic and extrinsic features being developed that are responsive to specific issues for fast reactors and related fuel cycles and to the broader threat environment in which these systems will have to operate. There are no technologies that can wholly eliminate the risk of proliferation by a determined state, but technology and design can playa role in reducing state threats and perhaps in eliminating non-state threats. There will be a significant role for extrinsic factors, especially the various measures - from safeguards and physical protection to export controls - embodied in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. This paper will offer an assessment of the issues surrounding, and the prospects for, efforts to develop proliferation resistance for fast reactors and related fuel cycles in the context of a nuclear renaissance. The focus of the analysis is on fast reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

First Video Game

More than fifty years ago, before either arcades or home video games, visitors waited in line at Brookhaven National Laboratory to play Tennis for Two, an electronic tennis game that is unquestionably a forerunner of the modern video game. Two people played the electronic tennis game with separate controllers that connected to an analog computer and used an oscilloscope for a screen. The game's creator, William Higinbotham, was a physicist who lobbied for nuclear nonproliferation as the first chair of the Federation of American Scientists.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Secretary of Energy Steven Chu speaks to the 2009 IAEA General Conference delegation

On Sept. 14, 2009, U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu addressed the 2009 IAEA General Conference delegation. Chu is the first Cabinet official to discuss President Obama's nuclear security and nonproliferation agenda outside the United States since the President delivered his landmark speech in Prague in April 2009.

Steven Chu, NNSA, IAEA, nuclear security, nuclear ↗

Teleconference highlights-NE-NA proliferation resistance review

Herczeg gave a readout from the kickoff meeting with Paul Lisowski - namely develop a common definition of proliferation resistance (for use by S-1, other upper management, public affairs, etc.), and to evaluate possible framework where a metric could be assigned for fuel cycle comparisons (integral, easy to communicate). Sprinkle raised concern about 'trivializing' notion of proliferation resistance (PR), with idea of making sure we don't lose the concept that strong safeguards and security are required within a nonproliferation framework that support U.S. policy goals. Integrated Safeguards by Design notion was brought up in this context. Round table discussion of the term PR, its misuse (even unintentional), fact that Chu is using term and apparently in context of proliferation proof. It was noted that there has been much work already done in this area and we should not reinvent the wheel. One of the first tasks needs to be gathering up old reports (TOPS, Como, PRPP, etc) and distributing to group (action item for all). It was also noted that there are multiple definitions of PR, including the recent NPIA, supporting the need for this type of activity. Miller described the current work package under AFCI, with $50k of funding from the campaign management account. Herczeg asked about additional funds should it become clear that a larger effort is required (tension between current program and getting something out relatively soon). Goldner to look into potential additional funds. Miller notes that within current work package, easy to engage LANL participants and that Per Peterson can participate under UCB funding (a new center is being established with UC fee awards from LANL and LLNL - the Berkeley Nuclear Research Center). Consensus that Per would be a good external member of the group. Sprinkle notes that held like to coordinate the NE and NA work packages. Miller and Sprinkle to work offline. Wallace talked about the possibility of being more quantitative in an analysis based on recent conversation with Chuck Bathke, Pratap Sadasivan, and John Ireland in which some statistical and data integration concepts that have been used for homeland security applications might be of value. Wallace and Murphy talked about different threats, which influence analys is (such as is being done in the SPIKE/material attractiveness analyses). Three threats identified - nation state with advanced nuclear capabilities, nation state without advanced nuclear capabilities, and sub-national or terrorist. Sprinkle brought forward idea that a third category could be nation state that does not have nuclear proliferation aspirations.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Fresh nuclear fuel measurements at Ukrainian nuclear power plants

In 2005, the Provisions on Nuclear Material Measurement System was enacted in Ukraine as an important regulatory driver to support international obligations in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. It defines key provisions and requirements for material measurement and measurement control programs to ensure the quality and reliability of measurement data within the framework of the State MC&A System. Implementing the Provisions requires establishing a number of measurement techniques for both fresh and spent nuclear fuel for various types of Ukrainian reactors. Our first efforts focused on measurements of fresh nuclear fuel from a WWR-1000 power reactor.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Potential application of LIBS to NNSA next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI)

In a climate in which states and nations have been and perhaps currently are involved in the prol iferation of nuclear materials and technologies, advanced methodologies and improvements in current measurement techniques are needed to combat new threats and increased levels of sophistication. The Department of Energy through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has undertaken a broad review of International Safeguards. The conclusion from that review was that a comprehensive initiative to revitalize international safeguards technology and the human resource base was urgently needed to keep pace with demands and increasingly sophisticated emerging safeguards challenges. To address these challenges, NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as its mission evolves for the next 25 years. NGSI is designed to revitalize and strengthen the U.S. safeguards technical base, recognizing that without a robust program the United States of America will not be in a position to exercise leadership or provide the necessary support to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). International safeguards as administrated by the IAEA are the primary vehicle for verifying compliance with the peaceful use and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy or LIBS has the potential to support the goals of NGSI as follows: by providing (1) automated analysis in complex nuclear processing or reprocessing facilities in real-time or near real-time without sample preparation or removal, (2) isotopic and important elemental ratio (Cm/Pu, Cm/U, ... etc) analysis, and (3) centralized remote control, process monitoring, and analysis of nuclear materials in nuclear facilities at multiple locations within the facility. Potential application of LIBS to international safeguards as outlined in the NGSI will be discussed.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

BN-350 unattended safeguards system current status and initial fuel movement data

The Unattended and Remote Monitoring (UNARM) system at the BN-350 fast breeder reactor facility in Aktau, Kazakhstan continues to provide safeguards monitoring data as the spent fuel disposition project transitions from wet fuel storage to dry storage casks. Qualitative data from the initial cask loading procedures has been released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is presented here for the first time. The BN-350 fast breeder reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan, operated as a plutonium-producing facility from 1973 W1til 1999. Kazakhstan signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in February 1994, and shortly afterwards the IAEA began safeguarding the reactor facility and its nuclear material. Slnce the cessation of reactor operations ten years ago, the chief proliferation concern has been the spent fuel assemblies stored in the pond on-site. By 2002, all fuel assemblies in wet storage had been repackaged into proliferation-resistant canisters. From the beginning, the IAEA's safeguards campaign at the BN-350 included a constant unattended sensor presence in the form of UNARM which monitors nuclear material activities at the facility in the absence of inspector presence. The UNARM equipment at the BN-350 was designed to be modular and extensible, allowing the system to adapt as the safeguards requirements change. This has been particularly important at the BN-350 due to the prolonged wet storage phase of the project. The primary function of the BN-350 UNARM system is to provide the IAEA with an independent, radiation-centric Containment and Surveillance (C&S) layer in addition to the standard seals and video systems. The UNARM system has provided continuous Continuity of Knowledge (COK) data for the BN-350's nuclear material storage areas in order to ensure the validity of the attended measurements during the lifetime of the project. The first of these attended measurements was characterization of the spent fuel assemblies. This characterization utilized the Spent Fuel Coincidence Counter (SFCC) instrument [ref] to measure neutron multiplicity and calculate Pu mass. These calculated masses were then compared to modeling simulation of the assemblies as well as declarations from the facility in order to baseline the amount of material under IAEA safeguards [ref]. Once the baseline was established, bundles of four or six assemblies were repackaged into proliferati n-resistant canisters. This provided an additional physical barrier to material diversion and provided further protection by choosing assemblies for each canister so that the overall dose rate met self-protection requirements. Each of the canisters were then characterized using a similar technique to the SFCC, but with the Spent Fuel Attribute Monitor (SPAM) instnunent (ref). The data from these measurements were then used to calculate an attribute proportional to the total Pu mass in each canister. This attribute was then compared to the know Pu mass of each assembly in order to verify the accuracy of SPAM. In the event that COK is lost, the SPAM detector remains positioned to reverify Pu content of individual canisters without requiring the canister to be opened.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Information-Driven Inspections

New uranium enrichment capacity is being built worldwide in response to perceived shortfalls in future supply. To meet increasing safeguards responsibilities with limited resources, the nonproliferation community is exploring next-generation concepts to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards, such as advanced technologies to enable unattended monitoring of nuclear material. These include attribute measurement technologies, data authentication tools, and transmission and security methods. However, there are several conceptual issues with how such data would be used to improve the ability of a safeguards inspectorate such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to reach better safeguards conclusions regarding the activities of a State. The IAEA is pursuing the implementation of information-driven safeguards, whereby all available sources of information are used to make the application of safeguards more effective and efficient. Data from continuous, unattended monitoring systems can be used to optimize on-site inspection scheduling and activities at declared facilities, resulting in fewer, better inspections. Such information-driven inspections are the logical evolution of inspection planning - making use of all available information to enhance scheduled and randomized inspections. Data collection and analysis approaches for unattended monitoring systems can be designed to protect sensitive information while enabling information-driven inspections. A number of such inspections within a predetermined range could reduce inspection frequency while providing an equal or greater level of deterrence against illicit activity, all while meeting operator and technology holder requirements and reducing inspector and operator burden. Three options for using unattended monitoring data to determine an information-driven inspection schedule are to (1) send all unattended monitoring data off-site, which will require advances in data analysis techniques to determine optimal thresholds; (2) have all separate unattended systems send individual go/no-go signals, allowing the inspectorate to know exactly which systems are exceeding their thresholds; and (3) develop a data aggregation system with attribute monitoring algorithms that would send a single go/no-go or other status signal off-site. Since the data in all of these options are used to inform on-site inspections (which will revert to randomized inspections if no thresholds are reached), the thresholds for the unattended systems can be set much closer to declared operating parameters than in current unattended monitoring systems.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

U.S.-CHINA RADIOLOGICAL SOURCE SECURITY PROJECT: CONTINUING AND EXPANDING BILATERAL COOPERATION

The successful radiological security cooperation between the U.S. and China to secure at-risk sites near venues of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics has led to an expanded bilateral nonproliferation cooperation scope. The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, the Chinese Atomic Energy Authority and the China Ministry of Environmental Protection are continuing joint efforts to secure radiological sources throughout China under the U.S.-China Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology (PUNT) Agreement. Joint cooperation activities include physical security upgrades of sites with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Category 1 radiological sources, packaging, recovery, and storage of high activity transuranic and beta gamma sources, and secure transportation practices for the movement of recovered sources. Expansion of cooperation into numerous provinces within China includes the use of integrated training workshops that will demonstrate methodologies and best practices between U.S. and Chinese radiological source security and recovery experts. The fiscal year 2009 expanded scope of cooperation will be conducted similar to the 2008 Olympic cooperation with the Global Threat Reduction Initiative taking the lead for the U.S., PUNT being the umbrella agreement, and Los Alamos, Sandia, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories operating as technical working groups. This paper outlines the accomplishments of the joint implementation and training efforts to date and discusses the possible impact on future U.S./China cooperation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Neutronics Design of a Thorium-Fueled Fission Blanket for LIFE (Laser Inertial Fusion-based Energy)

The Laser Inertial Fusion-based Energy (LIFE) project at LLNL includes development of hybrid fusion-fission systems for energy generation. These hybrid LIFE engines use high-energy neutrons from laser-based inertial confinement fusion to drive a subcritical blanket of fission fuel that surrounds the fusion chamber. The fission blanket contains TRISO fuel particles packed into pebbles in a flowing bed geometry cooled by a molten salt (flibe). LIFE engines using a thorium fuel cycle provide potential improvements in overall fuel cycle performance and resource utilization compared to using depleted uranium (DU) and may minimize waste repository and proliferation concerns. A preliminary engine design with an initial loading of 40 metric tons of thorium can maintain a power level of 2000 MW{sub th} for about 55 years, at which point the fuel reaches an average burnup level of about 75% FIMA. Acceptable performance was achieved without using any zero-flux environment 'cooling periods' to allow {sup 233}Pa to decay to {sup 233}U; thorium undergoes constant irradiation in this LIFE engine design to minimize proliferation risks and fuel inventory. Vast reductions in end-of-life (EOL) transuranic (TRU) inventories compared to those produced by a similar uranium system suggest reduced proliferation risks. Decay heat generation in discharge fuel appears lower for a thorium LIFE engine than a DU engine but differences in radioactive ingestion hazard are less conclusive. Future efforts on development of thorium-fueled LIFE fission blankets engine development will include design optimization, fuel performance analysis work, and further waste disposal and nonproliferation analyses.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗