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At least 811 records · Page 45

Cameco Corporation's Approach to Legacy and Ongoing Waste Management Within the Fuel Services Division - 19124

Since 2011, a Fuel Services Division (FSD) employee has been dedicated to oversee divisional waste management with the goal of accelerating the recycle/disposal of accumulated legacy radioactive wastes stored at its Ontario operations in Blind River and Port Hope. The Blind River Refinery (BRR) and Port Hope Conversion Facility (PHCF) were previously owned by the federal Crown Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear, becoming part of Cameco in 1988 and Cameco Fuel Manufacturing (CFM), previously known as Zircatec Precision Industries, becoming part of Cameco in 2006. Accumulated legacy radioactive waste is stored at each of the facilities. This radioactive waste has accumulated from operations beginning in the 1930's in Port Hope and the 1980's in Blind River. Due to minimal commercially available outlets for the disposal and/or treatment of these wastes, the waste was managed onsite by storage in underutilized space in buildings, trailers and/or in the secured yard. This relatively low-cost practice meant that over decades, the inventory increased at an unsustainable rate until available space became a limiting factor. During this time, the labelling, inventory records, characterization details and other history of many of the waste materials was not maintained adequately. Due to the volume of waste that had accumulated, campaigns to address these deficiencies in information were not considered feasible, sustaining the issue of accumulation of low-level radioactive waste. Since 2011, FSD has completed annual campaigns to address the accumulated legacy waste, which has included processing of material for decontamination to meet the unrestricted release criteria under the Canadian Nuclear Substance and Radiation Devices Regulations (NSRDR), disposal of marginally contaminated wastes (<500 ppm uranium) at a permitted landfill in the United States, processing of contaminated materials to reduce the volume of low-level radioactive waste and disposal at a designated facility in Port Hope. In addition FSD has undertaken significant changes to radioactive waste management practices at each of the facilities. Multiple characterization techniques, including visual observation, review of process and other historical records, laboratory analysis and radiation scanning have been utilized in campaign planning to identify the scope and appropriate waste management technique(s) to reduce the inventory of stored material. This divisional waste management program has resulted in a significant change to how radioactive waste is generated, inventoried, characterized and managed within FSD and has increased the visibility within the leadership team of the opportunities and challenges of waste management, such as alignment with decommissioning planning, project planning and budgeting. The heightened awareness has led to better financial and physical resource planning to execute waste projects with a current projected elimination of the legacy waste within FSD by 2025. (authors)

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Tank 30 and 37 Supernatant Sample Cross-Check and Evaporator Feed Qualification Analysis (2012)

This report summarizes the analytical data reported by the F/H and Savannah River National Laboratories for the 2012 cross-check analysis for high level waste supernatant liquid samples from SRS Tanks 30 and 37. The intent of this Tank 30 and 37 sample analyses was to perform cross-checks against routine F/H Laboratory analyses (corrosion and evaporator feed qualification programs) using samples collected at the same time from both tanks as well as split samples from the tanks.

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FY2017 ILAW Glass Corrosion Testing with the Single-Pass Flow-Through Method

The inventory of immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW) produced at the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will be disposed of at the near-surface, on-site Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF). When groundwater comes into contact with the waste form, the glass will corrode and radionuclides will be released into the near-field environment. Because the release of the radionuclides is dependent on the dissolution rate of the glass, it is important that the performance assessment (PA) model accounts for the dissolution rate of the glass as a function of various conditions. To accomplish this, an IDF PA glass dissolution model based on Transition State Theory (TST) can be employed. The model is able to account for changes in temperature, exposed surface area, and pH of the contacting solution as well as the effect of silicon solution concentrations, specifically the activity of orthosilicic acid (H4SiO4), whose concentration is directly linked to the glass dissolution rate. In addition, the IDF PA model accounts for the ion exchange process. The effect of temperature, pH, H4SiO4 activity, and the rate of ion exchange can be parameterized and implemented directly into the PA rate model. The rate model parameters are derived from laboratory tests with the single-pass flow-through (SPFT) method. The provided data can be used by glass researchers to further the understanding of ILAW glass behavior, by IDF PA modelers to use the rate model parameters in PA modeling efforts, and by Department of Energy (DOE) contractors and decision makers as they assess the IDF PA program.

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2018 Annual Site Environmental Report Summary

We are committed to act as stewards of our environment to achieve our mission in accordance with all applicable environmental requirements. We set continual improvement objectives and targets, measure and document our progress, and share our results with our workforce, sponsors, and public. We reduce our environmental risk through legacy cleanup, pollution prevention, and long-term sustainability programs.

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Composite Analysis for Low Level Waste Disposal in the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site (Annual Status Report, FY 2021)

In accordance with DOE M 435.1-1 requirements and as implemented by DOE/RL-2000-29, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office has prepared this annual summary for fiscal year (FY) 2021. Originally reported in PNNL-11800 and PNNL-11800, Addendum 1 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Hanford Site Composite Analysis), the Hanford Site Composite Analysis was approved through issuance of a 2002 memorandum. As required by DOE/RL-2000-29, an annual evaluation of new information and data developed by a number of onsite programs was completed. The reporting period for this annual evaluation is FY 2021 (October 1, 2020 through September 30, 2021).

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Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site (Annual Status Report FY 2022)

In accordance with DOE M 435.1-1 requirements and as implemented by DOE/RL-2000-29, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office has prepared this annual summary for fiscal year (FY) 2022. Originally reported in PNNL-11800 and PNNL-11800, Addendum 1 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Hanford Site Composite Analysis), the Hanford Site Composite Analysis was approved through issuance of a 2002 memorandum.5 As required by DOE/RL-2000-29, an annual evaluation of new information and data developed by several onsite programs was completed. The reporting period for this annual evaluation is FY 2022 (October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022).

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WASTE PROCESSING ANNUAL NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED R AND D REPORT FOR CY2008

The Engineering and Technology Office of Waste Processing identifies and reduces engineering and technical risks associated with key waste processing project decisions. The risks, and actions taken to mitigate those risks, are determined through technology readiness assessments, program reviews, technology information exchanges, external technical reviews, technical assistance, and targeted technology development and deployment (TDD). The Office of Waste Processing TDD program prioritizes and approves research and development scopes of work that address nuclear safety related to processing of highly radioactive nuclear wastes. Thirteen of the thirty-five R&D approved work scopes in FY2009 relate directly to nuclear safety, and are presented in this report.

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Double-Shell Tank Primary Bottom Visual Inspection Results - 20025

A pressing need for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program at Hanford is of the ability to inspect the bottom of the tanks. Though the DSTs' annulus spaces (the space between the internal and external tank walls) have been inspected visually since 1992 and with Ultrasonic Testing (UT) since 1996, inspections of the tank bottoms have been able to be conducted due to limitations of available technology, omitting about 40 percent of the tank surface below the maximum fill level from routine inspection. Visual inspections of the tank annulus have been conducted up to five times in some DSTs and portions of the annulus space for all of the DSTs has been inspected twice with UT. This region includes the walls of the primary tank and secondary liner along with accessible portions of the secondary liner bottom. Due to this lack of technology, the degradation of the primary tank bottom in Tank AY-102 was undetected until the tank leaked into its annulus space, confirmed in 2012. Since that time, WRPS has been working with the nondestructive examination community and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, to evaluate potential technologies to conduct these challenging remote inspections. Recent work has included the development, testing, and deployment of several remote visual inspection technologies to observe the condition of the primary tank bottom of the DSTs by leveraging air distribution slots in the refractory pad on which it rests. Robotic solutions to conduct this inspection were developed with a detailed understanding of the physical configuration and operational logistics. Understanding and subsequent communication of these details to vendors within the robotics and nondestructive examination community was a critical component to the successful production of these new tools. Throughout the FY16-FY18 years, vendors from nondestructive examination community were solicited for ideas to meet the tank bottom inspection challenge. Two tank bottom visual inspection solutions were then pursued to meet that challenge. Both tools were successfully deployed at Tank AP-107, and provided valuable visuals, never before obtained from the under tank environment of a double-shell tank. While there are minor opportunities for improvement identified with each system, general outcomes were overwhelmingly positive. Both systems were successfully able to navigate the refractory air slot pattern from the outer edge to the tank center and record video footage. The micro-crawler provided high quality and very stable footage through the air slot pattern, but took longer to deploy into the slots and traverse through them than the alternative system. The push-pull tethered camera was able to navigate all seven of its target air slots in a matter of a few hours, which included deployment, movement between slot entrances, and complete removal of the system from the annulus environment. Through these air slots, new information was gained about the tank bottom and refractory pad condition of tank AP-107, AP-106, AP-108, and AN-102. While some debris was noted in the air slots, including sand, chipped refractory, and construction materials, the refractory was found to be structurally stable and adequately supporting the primary tank bottom through the full diameter of the tank. Primary tank bottom steel exterior was found to be in good condition, free of ongoing or aggressive corrosion conditions. Looking toward the future, robotic access to and visual inspection of refractory air slots and the primary tank bottom steel has now proven viable. Incorporating periodic air slot inspections as a regular practice within the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program is the next step, allowing trending of any changes in condition. As ultrasonic testing infrastructure was leveraged to complete the initial system deployments described in this report, it makes sense to adopt that same strategy for ongoing periodic examinations and deploy these primary tank bottom inspection tools alongside ultrasonic testing operations. Development of visual inspection tools to evaluate the primary tank bottom region of the double-shell tanks was planned as the first stage of inspection. Continued development of volumetric sensors and incorporation of these inspection tools into Hanford's ongoing Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program are the next steps, seeking to continuously expand understanding of asset integrity and remaining useful life. (authors)

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Panel Session 55: US DOE Savannah River Operations Office: Liquid Waste Progress

This panel provided an overview of the SRS HLW Liquid Waste Program (history, challenges, opportunities, and future) including discussions of the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), Tank Closures, Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit, Tank Closure Cesium Removal, and the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). Panelists with presentations: SRS Liquid Waste Program (James Folk); SRS Liquid Waste Progress (Mark Schmitz); Salt Waste Processing Facility (Frank Sheppard)

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Nuclear Material Management Database Development at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nuclear Material Management & Storage (NMM&S) program at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) have the responsibility for the life-cycle management of accountable nuclear materials (NM) in accordance with Department of Energy (DOE) Order 410.2, “Management of Nuclear Materials” and for ensuring workers are protected from exposure to nuclear materials stored outside of an authorized shipping package under DOE Manual 441.1-1. To ensure these responsibilities were addressed in an effective, concise, and secure manner the development of NMM&S databases was undertaken. Using the existing database server structure and data acquired from the official Material Control & Accountability (MC&A) accounting program development of two separate applications, one for O 410.2 inventory requirements (NMIA) and one for M441, were begun in September 2015. The databases were deployed onto the production server in January 2017. The inventory database allows for entering NM characterization data, production of O 410.2 reports, and the ability to retain history files. The M441 database screens NM to determine if it is subject to the manual's requirements, ability to pull in unclassified RadCon materials, and provide reports as required by NMM&S, NM owners, and headquarters programs. These two databases provide NMM&S the ability to better ensure safe and secure packaging, storage, stabilization, consolidation, or disposition of NM and achieve life-cycle management goals.

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The Office of Groundwater & Soil Remediation Fiscal Year 2011 Research & Development Program

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Groundwater and Soil Remediation supports technology development and technical assistance for the remediation of environments contaminated by legacy nuclear waste. The core of the program is centered on delivering proactive, responsive expertise and technologies with highly-leveraged, carefully selected investments that maximum impact on life-cycle cleanup costs and risks across the DOE complex. The program currently focuses on four main priorities: improved sampling and characterization strategies, advanced predictive capabilities, enhanced remediation methods, and improved long-term performance evaluation and monitoring. In FY 2010, the program developed a detailed research and development (R and D) plan in support of a larger initiative to integrate R and D efforts across EM. This paper provides an overview of the priority action areas and the program's near-term technical direction.

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Public perception of hazardousness caused by current trends of municipal solid waste management

Highlights: • Contribution to the scientific literature by examining the relationship between concern for the environment and waste disposal in the frame of household waste treatment mechanism specifically in developing countries. • The awareness of the citizens satisfaction level and the local existing capacities in developing countries significantly contribute to decision making on MSW management sustainability in Palestine and other developing countries when applied. • Identification of the differences and similarities among DC resulting to failures or success in WM field. - Abstract: Municipal solid waste (MSW) piling up is becoming a serious problem in all developing countries (DC) as a result of inequitable waste collection and treatment. Citizens’ collaboration is partly based on understanding their views and their active involvement in MSW planning; on the other hand the assessment of the perception of hazardousness related with MSW is considered rather important as well since the identification of the weak points of the applied MWM strategy is eased and the level of required training is determined. Researchers implemented a case study in the West Bank (WB) and Gaza Strip (GS) regions of Palestine, taking into consideration previous researches in other developing countries. They reached to safe and useful conclusions regarding the parameters which mean the greatest in the waste management field as far as DC are concerned. Lack of skilled manpower, irregular collection services, inadequate equipment used for waste collection, inadequate legal provisions, and resource constraints are additional factors that are confirmed to be challenging the waste management scenarios in all DCs today. The research takes those factors under consideration but focuses on the educational gap and the results revealed interesting trends a significant relationship between respondent’s educational attainment and their awareness of hazardous waste (hazard perception); the results will indicate the measure taking required to avoid accidents occurred in those regions (burns from toxics, cuts from sharps, etc). National policy and legislation development based on the research outcomes will ensure equitable and accessible services are in place in order to move towards a healthier environment. Specialized health education and training programs on national scale are also needed to enhance awareness on hazardous waste.

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The Study of TRR Radial Thermal Shielding Dismantling Process - 20063

The decommissioning of nuclear facilities has become an important worldwide topic because many nuclear power facilities will permanently cease operation in the foreseeable future. Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR) has stepped into the decommissioning phase in 2004, and the dismantling processes will start in 2022. TRR is a heavy water reactor designed by Canatom Company with output thermal power 40 MW. On January 3, 1973, it reaches criticality. TRR had been operated for 15 years and was permanently shut down in early 1988. The decommissioning plan of TRR was approved in 2004. According to the Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act in Taiwan, a nuclear facility must be dismantled in 25 years after stepping into the decommissioning phase. Therefore, TRR decommissioning must be completed before 2029. One of the most important tasks of TRR decommissioning is to dismantle reactor body. In the task of TRR decommissioning, mechanical cutting with remote handling is used to dismantle radial thermal shielding, which are the internal components of the TRR. This study outlines the internal components of the TRR and explains the difficulties encountered during the dismantling processes. Considering the structure and radiation dose rate of TRR and its internal components, the dismantling method and packaging method are properly arranged to complete the TRR dismantling task. This study describes the process of dismantling the radial thermal shielding during the dismantling processes and considers the impact of the radiation dose on the staff during the operation. The calculation of the radiation dose rate for the personnel during the segmentation process is based on the evaluation result by using VRdose. If the calculation of personnel working dose rate is too high, we will increase the shielding or use remote handling to reduce the operator's exposure dose in the dismantling processes to comply with the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) principle. In this study, the latest developments in the TRR decommissioning program are described. It also provides usable experience and information regarding the future decommissioning of other nuclear facilities or nuclear power plants in Taiwan. (authors)

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Nuclear Global Talent Development Program (Final Report)

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) have developed sorption database named as L-SCIE (LLNL Surface Complexation/Ion Exchange). This framework (L-SCIE) includes not only a community database of sorption data but also a fitting workflow to produce optimized surface complexation reaction constants. Through this fellowship program we have updated the L-SCIE database for selenium (Se) sorption and potentiometric titration data of iron oxides. In addition, the relevant surface complexation models (SCMs) have been updated and details in model construction are given in the following section.

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Research Needs for Fusion-Fission Hybrid Systems. Report of the Research Needs Workshop (ReNeW) Gaithersburg, Maryland, September 30 - October 2, 2009

Largely in anticipation of a possible nuclear renaissance, there has been an enthusiastic renewal of interest in the fusion-fission hybrid concept, driven primarily by some members of the fusion community. A fusion-fission hybrid consists of a neutron-producing fusion core surrounded by a fission blanket. Hybrids are of interest because of their potential to address the main long-term sustainability issues related to nuclear power: fuel supply, energy production, and waste management. As a result of this renewed interest, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), with the participation of the Office of Fusion Energy Sciences (OFES), Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), organized a three-day workshop in Gaithersburg, Maryland, from September 30 through October 2, 2009. Participants identified several goals. At the highest level, it was recognized that DOE does not currently support any R&D in the area of fusion-fission hybrids. The question to be addressed was whether or not hybrids offer sufficient promise to motivate DOE to initiate an R&D program in this area. At the next level, the workshop participants were asked to define the research needs and resources required to move the fusion-fission concept forward. The answer to the high-level question was given in two ways. On the one hand, when viewed as a standalone concept, the fusion-fission hybrid does indeed offer the promise of being able to address the sustainability issues associated with conventional nuclear power. On the other hand, when participants were asked whether these hybrid solutions are potentially more attractive than contemplated pure fission solutions (that is, fast burners and fast breeders), there was general consensus that this question could not be quantitatively answered based on the known technical information. Pure fission solutions are based largely on existing both fusion and nuclear technology, thereby prohibiting a fair side-by-side comparison. Another important issue addressed at the conference was the time scale on which long-term sustainability issues must be solved. There was a wide diversity of opinion and no consensus was possible. One group, primarily composed of members of the fission community, argued that the present strategies with respect to waste management (on-site storage) and fuel supply (from natural uranium) would suffice for at least 50 years, with the main short-term problem being the economics of light water reactors (LWRs). Many from the fusion community believed that the problems, particularly waste management, were of a more urgent nature and that we needed to address them sooner rather than later. There was rigorous debate on all the issues before, during, and after the workshop. Based on this debate, the workshop participants developed a set of high-level Findings and Research Needs and a companion set of Technical Findings and Research Needs. In the context of the Executive Summary it is sufficient to focus on the high-level findings which are summarized.

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Technology gap analysis on sodium-cooled reactor fuel handling system supporting advanced burner reactor development.

The goals of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) are to expand the use of nuclear energy to meet increasing global energy demand in an environmentally sustainable manner, to address nuclear waste management issues without making separated plutonium, and to address nonproliferation concerns. The advanced burner reactor (ABR) is a fast reactor concept which supports the GNEP fuel cycle system. Since the integral fast reactor (IFR) and advanced liquid-metal reactor (ALMR) projects were terminated in 1994, there has been no major development on sodium-cooled fast reactors in the United States. Therefore, in support of the GNEP fast reactor program, the history of sodium-cooled reactor development was reviewed to support the initiation of this technology within the United States and to gain an understanding of the technology gaps that may still remain for sodium fast reactor technology. The fuel-handling system is a key element of any fast reactor design. The major functions of this system are to receive, test, store, and then load fresh fuel into the core; unload from the core; then clean, test, store, and ship spent fuel. Major requirements are that the system must be reliable and relatively easy to maintain. In addition, the system should be designed so that it does not adversely impact plant economics from the viewpoints of capital investment or plant operations. In this gap analysis, information on fuel-handling operating experiences in the following reactor plants was carefully reviewed: EBR-I, SRE, HNPF, Fermi, SEFOR, FFTF, CRBR, EBR-II, DFR, PFR, Rapsodie, Phenix, Superphenix, KNK, SNR-300, Joyo, and Monju. The results of this evaluation indicate that a standardized fuel-handling system for a commercial fast reactor is yet to be established. However, in the past sodium-cooled reactor plants, most major fuel-handling components-such as the rotatable plug, in-vessel fuel-handling machine, ex-vessel fuel transportation cask, ex-vessel sodium-cooled storage, and cleaning stations-have accumulated satisfactory construction and operation experiences. In addition, two special issues for future development are described in this report: large capacity interim storage and transuranic-bearing fuel handling.

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The Enhanced Sealing Project, Monitoring a Full-Scale Shaft Seal at Canada's Underground Research Laboratory (2009-2015) - 16070

A full-scale shaft seal was designed and installed in the 5-m-diameter main shaft at Canada's Underground Research Laboratory (URL) in 2009. Located where the main shaft intersects a water-bearing fracture zone at a depth of approximately 273 m, a 6-m-thick clay component was sandwiched between two 3-m-thick concrete components. The clay component was 40:60 mixture of bentonite and quartz/feldspar sand and spans approximately 1 m beyond the maximum identified vertical extent of the fracture zone. Its purpose is to limit the mixing of saline groundwater from the deeper region with the fresher, near-surface groundwater. Its construction was part of Canada's Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program (NLLP). The 1. phase of the Enhanced Sealing Project (ESP), a jointly-funded Research, Development and Demonstration (RD and D) project was started in 2009 to monitor the saturation of the shaft seal until the end of 2013. The 2. phase, extended monitoring of the ESP is supported by Posiva (Finland), Andra (France) and CNL (Canada) and this will run until the end of 2016. The slow evolution of the seal and its surroundings and complete removal of the surface facilities at the URL site in 2014, has meant that the ESP monitoring has evolved to a stand-alone, lower frequency data collection program. Information gained from the ESP monitoring is applicable to support the development of sealing technology to safely close a deep geological repository for the permanent disposal of radioactive wastes. (authors)

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West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2020

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2020. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2020. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2020 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act↗