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Multi-Pack Disposal Concepts for Spent Fuel (Revision 1)

At the initiation of the Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) R&D campaign, international geologic disposal programs and past work in the U.S. were surveyed to identify viable disposal concepts for crystalline, clay/shale, and salt host media. Concepts for disposal of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste (HLW) from reprocessing are relatively advanced in countries such as Finland, France, and Sweden. The UFD work quickly showed that these international concepts are all “enclosed,” whereby waste packages are emplaced in direct or close contact with natural or engineered materials . Alternative “open” modes (emplacement tunnels are kept open after emplacement for extended ventilation) have been limited to the Yucca Mountain License Application Design. Thermal analysis showed that if “enclosed” concepts are constrained by peak package/buffer temperature, that waste package capacity is limited to 4 PWR assemblies (or 9 BWR) in all media except salt. This information motivated separate studies: 1) extend the peak temperature tolerance of backfill materials, which is ongoing; and 2) develop small canisters (up to 4-PWR size) that can be grouped in larger multi-pack units for convenience of storage, transportation, and possibly disposal (should the disposal concept permit larger packages). A recent result from the second line of investigation is the Task Order 18 report: Generic Design for Small Standardized Transportation, Aging and Disposal Canister Systems. This report identifies disposal concepts for the small canisters (4-PWR size) drawing heavily on previous work, and for the multi-pack (16-PWR or 36-BWR).

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Multi-pack Disposal Concepts for Spent Fuel (Rev. 0)

At the initiation of the Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) R&D campaign, international geologic disposal programs and past work in the U.S. were surveyed to identify viable disposal concepts for crystalline, clay/shale, and salt host media (Hardin et al., 2012). Concepts for disposal of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste (HLW) from reprocessing are relatively advanced in countries such as Finland, France, and Sweden. The UFD work quickly showed that these international concepts are all “enclosed,” whereby waste packages are emplaced in direct or close contact with natural or engineered materials . Alternative “open” modes (emplacement tunnels are kept open after emplacement for extended ventilation) have been limited to the Yucca Mountain License Application Design (CRWMS M&O, 1999). Thermal analysis showed that, if “enclosed” concepts are constrained by peak package/buffer temperature, waste package capacity is limited to 4 PWR assemblies (or 9-BWR) in all media except salt. This information motivated separate studies: 1) extend the peak temperature tolerance of backfill materials, which is ongoing; and 2) develop small canisters (up to 4-PWR size) that can be grouped in larger multi-pack units for convenience of storage, transportation, and possibly disposal (should the disposal concept permit larger packages). A recent result from the second line of investigation is the Task Order 18 report: Generic Design for Small Standardized Transportation, Aging and Disposal Canister Systems (EnergySolution, 2015). This report identifies disposal concepts for the small canisters (4-PWR size) drawing heavily on previous work, and for the multi-pack (16-PWR or 36-BWR).

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Unique Chernobyl Cranes for Deconstruction Activities in the New Safe Confinement - 13542

The devastation left behind from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (ChNPP) Unit 4 accident which occurred on April 26, 1986 presented unparalleled technical challenges to the world engineering and scientific community. One of the largest tasks that are in progress is the design and construction of the New Safe Confinement (NSC). The NSC is an engineered enclosure for the entire object shelter (OS) that includes a suite of process equipment. The process equipment will be used for the dismantling of the destroyed Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) Unit. One of the major mechanical handling systems to be installed in the NSC is the Main Cranes System (MCS). The planned decontamination and decommissioning or dismantling (D and D) activities will require the handling of heavily shielded waste disposal casks containing nuclear fuel as well as lifting and transporting extremely large structural elements. These activities, to be performed within the NSC, will require large and sophisticated cranes. The article will focus on the unique design features of the MCS for the D and D activities. (authors)

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Groundwork for Universal Canister System Development

The mission of the United States Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management is to complete the safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from five decades of nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research. Some of the wastes that that must be managed have been identified as good candidates for disposal in a deep borehole in crystalline rock (SNL 2014a). In particular, wastes that can be disposed of in a small package are good candidates for this disposal concept. A canister-based system that can be used for handling these wastes during the disposition process (i.e., storage, transfers, transportation, and disposal) could facilitate the eventual disposal of these wastes. This report provides information for a program plan for developing specifications regarding a canister-based system that facilitates small waste form packaging and disposal and that is integrated with the overall efforts of the DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy Used Fuel Disposition Campaign's Deep Borehole Field Test. Wastes to be considered as candidates for the universal canister system include capsules containing cesium and strontium currently stored in pools at the Hanford Site, cesium to be processed using elutable or nonelutable resins at the Hanford Site, and calcine waste from Idaho National Laboratory. The initial emphasis will be on disposal of the cesium and strontium capsules in a deep borehole that has been drilled into crystalline rock. Specifications for a universal canister system are derived from operational, performance, and regulatory requirements for storage, transfers, transportation, and disposal of radioactive waste. Agreements between the Department of Energy and the States of Washington and Idaho, as well as the Deep Borehole Field Test plan provide schedule requirements for development of the universal canister system. Future work includes collaboration with the Hanford Site to move the cesium and strontium capsules into dry storage, collaboration with the Deep Borehole Field Test to develop surface handling and emplacement techniques and to develop the waste package design requirements, developing universal canister system design options and concepts of operations, and developing system analysis tools. Areas in which further research and development are needed include material properties and structural integrity, in-package sorbents and fillers, waste form tolerance to heat and postweld stress relief, waste package impact limiters, sensors, cesium mobility under downhole conditions, and the impact of high pressure and high temperature environment on seals design.

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Overview of nuclear energy: Present and projected use

Several factors will influence the contribution of nuclear energy to the future energy mix. Among them, the most important are the degree of global commitment to greenhouse gas reduction, continued vigilance in safety and safeguards, technological advances, economic competitiveness and innovative financing arrangements for new nuclear power plant constructions, the implementation of nuclear waste disposal, and, last but not least, public perception, information and education. The paper presents an overview of the current nuclear energy situation, possible development scenarios, of reactor technology, and of non-electric applications of nuclear energy.

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Recent Developments in the United Kingdom Geological Disposal Facility Programme - 17558

The United Kingdom Government remains committed to the policy of geological disposal. All major nuclear nations are actively pursuing geological disposal. It is internationally recognised that geological disposal represents the safest and most sustainable option as the end point of the management of high level waste and spent fuel considered as waste. Other countries that have also decided on a policy of geological disposal include Canada, Finland, France, Switzerland, Sweden and the United States of America. The United Kingdom Government continues to favour an approach to siting a Geological Disposal Facility that is based on the willingness of local communities to participate in the siting process. Construction and operation of a Geological Disposal Facility will be a multi-billion pound project that will provide skilled employment for hundreds of people over many decades. It will contribute greatly to the local economy and wider socio-economic framework. There are also likely to be spin-off industry benefits, infrastructure investments, benefits to local education or academic resources, and positive impacts on local service industries that support the facility and its workforce. It is also likely to involve major investments in local transport facilities and other infrastructure, which would remain after the facility had been closed. The United Kingdom Government published a renewed process for siting a Geological Disposal Facility in 2014 - the Implementing Geological Disposal White Paper. This paper discusses the status of activities in the 2014 White Paper that have been accomplished or are underway through to 2016. (authors)

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ITEAM - An international mechanistic approach to modeling glass behavior over geologic time scales - 15527

Vitrification is a common worldwide solution for radioactive waste immobilization. Although the excellent chemical durability of glass has been demonstrated in ancient man-made and natural analogues, the lack of an international consensus on a glass corrosion rate law limits the application of glass in high-level waste repository performance models. The contributions of physical and chemical processes controlling the long-term glass dissolution rate in geologic disposal remain uncertain resulting in this non-consensus. A thorough mechanistic understanding of waste form durability in geologic environments would improve public and regulator confidence. In addition, this understanding could lead to cost savings if it becomes possible to take credit for the true durability of the waste form itself in system evaluations rather than requiring expensive engineered barrier systems. To this end, five nations (US, UK, France, Japan, and Belgium) have joined together to formulate a joint plan for collaborative research into the mechanisms controlling the long-term corrosion of glass. Over the last five years, the coordinated research performed by these countries has produced a new level of understanding about the glass corrosion mechanisms, specifically as they apply to glasses similar in composition to the French R7T7 glass. Some recent results are presented as they relate to several mechanisms that are thought to control glass alteration at long time periods. It is important to understand the effects of each particular mechanism on the overall radionuclide release and the relative importance of each process model to the performance assessment calculation. In addition, a new series of experiments calls out potential sources of error due to the use of irregular shapes (such as crushed glass powder) in dissolution experiments. (authors)

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New High-Throughput Measurement Systems for Radioactive Wastes Segregation and Free Release - 16166

The European Metrology Research Program (EMRP) is a coordinated research-and-development program that pursues the closer integration of national research programs. The EMRP Metrology for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities 'MetroDecom' Joint Research Project ENV54 (JRP ENV54), a 36-month project started in September 2014, delivers research products addressing all aspects of the decommissioning process. This includes the characterization of waste materials present on the decommissioning site, pre-selection prior to free release or repository acceptance measurement, free-release measurement, the measurement of waste packages thermal power prior to the repository storage, and the monitoring of stored wastes and repositories in the very long term. This paper describes the track record of two JRP ENV54 working packages, which address the measurement facilities for pre-selection of waste materials prior to measurement for repository acceptance or possible free release (segregation measurement system); and free release (free release measurement system), based on a single standardized concept characterized by unique, patented lead-free shielding. The key objective is to improve the throughput, accuracy, reliability, modularity and mobility of segregation and free-release measurement. This will result in more reliable decision-making with regard to the safe release and disposal of radioactive wastes into the environment and, resulting in positive economic outcomes. (authors)

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Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTCs 1-2, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The corrective action sites (CASs) within CAU 539 are located within Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada National Security Site. Corrective Action Unit 539 comprises the following CASs: • 25-99-21, Area 25 Railroad Tracks • 26-99-05, Area 26 Railroad Tracks The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CASs within CAU 539 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Reviewed documentation on historical and current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Conducted radiological walkover surveys of railroad tracks in both Areas 25 and 26. • Collected ballast and soil samples and calculated internal dose estimates for radiological releases. • Collected in situ thermoluminescent dosimeter measurements and calculated external dose estimates for radiological releases. • Removed lead bricks as potential source material (PSM) and collected verification samples. • Implemented corrective actions as necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly disposed of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Implemented an FFACO use restriction (UR) for radiological contamination at CAS 25-99-21. The approved UR form and map are provided in Appendix F and will be filed in the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), Facility Information Management System; the FFACO database; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. From November 29, 2010, through May 2, 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 539. Assessment of the data generated from closure activities revealed the following: • At CAS 26-99-05, the total effective dose for radiological releases did not exceed the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at three locations. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. • At CAS 25-99-21, the total effective dose for radiological releases exceeds the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at eight locations. A corrective action was implemented by removing the lead bricks and soil above FALs at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Pieces of debris with high radioactivity were identified as PSM and remain within the CAS boundary. A corrective action of closure in place with a UR was implemented at this CAS because closure activities showed evidence of remaining soil contamination and radioactive PSM. Future land use will be restricted from surface and intrusive activities. Closure activities generated waste streams consisting of industrial solid waste, recyclable materials, low-level radioactive waste, and mixed low-level radioactive waste. Wastes were disposed of in the appropriate onsite landfills. The NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • Clean closure is required at CAS 26-99-05. • Closure in place is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A UR is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A Notice of Completion to the NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 539. • Corrective Action Unit 539 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

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Canada's Underground Research Laboratory (1980-2014) - 16274

In 1980, Canada initiated a long-term, comprehensive research and development program of geologic characterization and large-scale in situ geotechnical experiments in a subsurface facility, the Underground Research Laboratory (URL). The URL was excavated specifically to evaluate the concept of permanent disposal of used CANDU{sup R} nuclear reactor fuel in a deep geological repository (DGR) constructed in Canadian Shield granite. Key phases of the URL included siting, detailed site characterization and monitoring, construction, operation, decommissioning, and closure. Much collaborative research with international organizations was undertaken at the URL and continues, even after the closure of the facility, through the ongoing Enhanced Sealing Project (ESP). The ESP monitors the engineered performance of a full-scale composite shaft seal that was emplaced during URL closure to permanently seal the main URL access shaft across a sub-horizontal hydraulically active fracture zone. Currently the ESP is jointly funded by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) (Canada), Posiva (Finland), and Andra (France), and monitoring is planned to continue until the end of 2016. Decades of programmatic experience at the URL have shown that knowledge continuity is integral to supporting the development of a safe geological disposal facility for high level nuclear waste. This paper outlines the history of the URL and describes some technical lessons learned from its 30-plus years of construction, operation, and closure activities. (authors)

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Chemical Compatibility of Conventional Geo-synthetic Clay Liners to Aggressive Low-Level Radioactive Waste Leachate - 17296

representative of leachates in low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facilities affected the hydraulic conductivity of a conventional sodium-bentonite (Na-B) geo-synthetic clay liner (GCL) used in composite liner systems. One leachate was highly alkaline (H-pH) and the other had a low abundance of monovalent cations relative to divalent cations (L-RMD). Tests were also conducted with a typical radioactive synthetic leachate (RSL) and with deionized (DI) water as control. Na-B from the GCL had a swell index of 24 mL/2 g in RSL, 22 mL/2 g in H-pH leachate, and 16 mL/2 g in L-RMD leachate, whereas the swell index was 36 mL/2 g in DI water. Hydraulic conductivity tests were conducted in flexible-wall permeameters using the falling headwater with an effective confining stress at 20 kPa. Hydraulic conductivity of Na-B GCL was low when permeated with RSL (1.8 x 10-10 m/s) and H-pH leachate (2.4 x 10{sup -10} m/s), but higher than the hydraulic conductivity to DI water (2.5 x10{sup -11} m/s). The GCL was two orders of magnitude more permeable when permeated with L-RMD leachate (7.9 x 10{sup -8} m/s). The higher hydraulic conductivity of the GCL to the leachates is attributed to reduced swelling of the Na-B in leachates with higher ionic strength solution (H-pH, RSL) or a predominance of divalent cations (L-RMD). Increasing the effective confining stress from 20 to 450 kPa reduced the hydraulic conductivity approximately two orders of magnitude for the L-RMD and H-pH leachates. (authors)

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HEPA Filter Disposal Write-Up 10/19/16

Process knowledge (PK) collection on HEPA filters is handled via the same process as other waste streams at LLNL. The Field technician or Characterization point of contact creates an information gathering document (IGD) in the IGD database, with input provided from the generator, and submits it for electronic approval. This document is essentially a waste generation profile, detailing the physical, chemical as well as radiological characteristics, and hazards, of a waste stream. It will typically contain a general, but sometimes detailed, description of the work processes which generated the waste. It will contain PK as well as radiological and industrial hygiene analytical swipe results, and any other analytical or other supporting knowledge related to characterization. The IGD goes through an electronic approval process to formalize the characterization and to ensure the waste has an appropriate disposal path. The waste generator is responsible for providing initial process knowledge information, and approves the IGD before it routed to chemical and radiological waste characterization professionals. This is the standard characterization process for LLNL-generated HEPA Filters.

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An underground laboratory in the context of salt disposal research - 15549

Evaluating the basis of need for an underground research laboratory for salt science and engineering is imperative because of the significant commitment of time and money involved. Decades of salt repository studies, numerous experiments, and sophisticated modeling capabilities underpin the scientific database that supports safe disposal of nuclear waste in salt. The safety case for disposal of non-heat-generating waste such as transuranic waste interred at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is robust, with the only long-term releases to the environment projected to be by way of human intrusion. The scientific evidence also favors safe disposal of heat-generating waste. Technical evaluations for disposal of heat-generating waste in salt experienced a rather long hiatus in the United States subsequent to certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and issuance of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendment that ended salt disposal research for the civilian program. Similar salt repository research in Germany was delayed by a ten-year moratorium that ended in 2010. In collaboration with German peers, the United States Department of Energy has reviewed and evaluated thermally driven processes in salt disposal and identified key technical areas in which to prioritize resources. The goal for disposal research in salt is to provide sufficient technical information to license a repository successfully. The necessity or utility of a salt underground laboratory is to be evaluated in the context of an overall research agenda that supports a license application. (authors)

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2008 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the Performance Assessments (PAs) and Composite Analyses (CAs) for each of the facilities, with the results submitted annually to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Headquarters. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) performed an annual review in fiscal year (FY) 2008 by evaluating operational factors and research results that impact the continuing validity of the PAs and CAs. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2008 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R&D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada Test Site relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R&D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs.

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The Importance of Getting it Right - Lessons from the Failure and Subsequent Approval of the LLWR Environmental Safety Case - 16691

The Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR) in the UK submitted an Environmental Safety Case in 2002 which was rejected by the Environment Agency 3 years later. Almost a decade after the rejection, the LLWR submitted a completely different document which was approved in November 2015. This paper looks at the lessons learned from the failed submission and documents the strategy employed by the Site's new contractor to overcome both the challenging technical issues that led to the initial rejection and overcome the resistance to long term disposal by the local community. It will describe the journey it has taken to move from a flawed safety case, to a technically sound safety case, to one that is approved by the regulator, and accepted by the community. (authors)

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Large Cask, Small Building, AREVA's Safe MLLW Disposal Solution Despite Facility Limitations - 16295

In order to begin decommissioning of a 1950's research reactor, Class C Mixed Low Level Waste (MLLW) had to be removed from the facility and disposed of. The AREVA TN RAM cask, designed and licensed for shipping Type B waste packages, was chosen as the most appropriate shipping solution. Due to the building layout, crane capacity and pool size, the standard TN RAM cask loading process could not be utilized. Unique solutions and approaches had to be developed to complete the project. AREVA designed a smaller liner insert that would house the four MLLW components in a single waste package to solve the problems related to crane capacity and physical pool dimensions. AREVA also designed and fabricated a shield bell to provide radiation shielding while moving the liner insert from the reactor pool to the cask that was staged adjacent to the reactor pool. The AREVA team worked with the disposal facility to cover requirements for disposal of Class B MLLW. This included designing spacers filled with inert material to fulfill the requirement for maximum 10% void space in the waste package. This disposal method for Class C waste met the requirements of macro-encapsulation. Therefore, no additional treatment action was required when disposing of Class C MLLW. AREVA's solution provides a model for disposing MLLW requiring macro-encapsulation in a single waste package. This solution also provides a model for how to adapt large shipping casks and liners to smaller aging commercial, DOE or research facilities. (authors)

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Brine Transport Experiments in Granular Salt

To gain confidence in the predictive capability of numerical models, experimental validation must be performed to ensure that parameters and processes are correctly simulated. The laboratory investigations presented herein aim to address knowledge gaps for heat-generating nuclear waste (HGNW) disposal in bedded salt that remain after examination of prior field and laboratory test data. Primarily, we are interested in better constraining the thermal, hydrological, and physicochemical behavior of brine, water vapor, and salt when moist salt is heated. The target of this work is to use run-of-mine (RoM) salt; however during FY2015 progress was made using high-purity, granular sodium chloride.

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Individuals Who Build Solutions Across Boundaries for Environmental Remediation and Nuclear Waste Disposal - 16204

This paper profiles individuals who shifted from developing solutions primarily from within one organization to across multiple organizations for decisions requiring input from multiple parties. These individuals are engineers and scientists who work as government employees or government contractors. This paper contains six areas of discussion: 1. Why individuals build solutions across organizational boundaries, 2. The results they achieve, 3. Supporting skills and personal characteristics, 4. Means to build solutions across boundaries, 5. How they enlist others to participate, and 6. The importance of a catalyst. This paper is based on three sources of information. The primary source are interviews with nine engineers and scientists with direct experience building solutions across organizational boundaries in the fields of environmental remediation or nuclear energy/waste management and disposal. The second source are selected research studies. The third source is the author's experience both as a government employee and a consultant. The author's hope is that this paper will strengthen people's desire and ability to engage multiple parties in decisions requiring their input. (authors)

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