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At least 811 records · Page 45

Oppenheimer's Box of Chocolates: Remediation of the Manhattan Project Landfill at Los Alamos National Laboratory - 12283

Material Disposal Area B (MDA B) is the oldest radioactive waste disposal facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Operated from 1944-48, MDA B was the disposal facility for the Manhattan Project. Recognized as one of the most challenging environmental remediation projects at Los Alamos, the excavation of MDA B received $110 million from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to accelerate this complex remediation work. Several factors combined to create significant challenges to remediating the landfill known in the 1940's as the 'contaminated dump'. The secrecy surrounding the Manhattan Project meant that no records were kept of radiological materials and chemicals disposed or of the landfill design. An extensive review of historical documents and interviews with early laboratory personnel resulted in a list of hundreds of hazardous chemicals that could have been buried in MDA B. Also, historical reports of MDA B spontaneously combusting on three occasions -with 50-foot flames and pink smoke spewing across the mesa during the last incident in 1948-indicated that hazardous materials were likely present in MDA B. To complicate matters further, though MDA B was located on an isolated mesa in the 1940's, the landfill has since been surrounded by a Los Alamos commercial district. The local newspaper, hardware store and a number of other businesses are located directly across the street from MDA B. This close proximity to the public and the potential for hazardous materials in MDA B necessitated conducting remediation work within protective enclosures. Potential chemical hazards and radiological inventory were better defined using a minimally intrusive sampling method called direct push technology (DPT) prior to excavation. Even with extensive sampling and planning the project team encountered many surprises and challenges during the project. The one area where planning did not fail to meet reality was safety. There were no serious worker injuries and the minor injuries recorded were those common to construction type activities. Extensive monitoring along the site boundary demonstrated that no hazardous chemicals were released and radiological dose to the public was within administrative limits. More than three years of effort by the LANL project team went into the planning for remediation of Material Disposal Area B. Hundreds of historical documents were reviewed; retired personnel were extensively interviewed and noninvasive techniques were used to characterize the site. The information collected was incorporated into the safety requirements, cost estimate, schedule and primary execution plan for the project. Ultimately the waste volume managed by the project approached 40000 m{sup 3}, more than double the original project estimate. This increase had a major impact on both project cost and schedule. Nuclear safety requirements for the project were based on an estimated MDA B radionuclide inventory of 12 PE-Ci. When excavation was complete over 123 PE-Ci had been removed from the trenches. The radionuclide inventory at MDA B was an order of magnitude higher than estimated. Work at MDA B could not have proceeded without the safety basis exemption from DOE-HQ. The one area where planning did not fail to meet reality was safety. There were no serious worker injuries and the minor injuries recorded were those common to construction type activities. Extensive monitoring along the site boundary demonstrated that no hazardous chemicals were released and radiological dose to the public was within administrative limits. (authors)

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On-Site Oxy-Lance Size Reduction of South Texas Project Reactor Vessel Heads - 12324

On-Site Oxy-Lance size reduction of mildly radioactive large components has been accomplished at other operating plants. On-Site Oxy-Lance size reduction of more radioactive components like Reactor Vessel Heads had previously been limited to decommissioning projects. Building on past decommissioning and site experience, subcontractors for South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) developed an innovative integrated system to control smoke, radioactive contamination, worker dose, and worker safety. STP's innovative, easy to use CEDM containment that provided oxy lance access, smoke control, and spatter/contamination control was the key to successful segmentation for cost-effective and ALARA packaging and transport for disposal. Relative to CEDM milling, STP oxy-lance segmentation saved approximately 40 person- REM accrued during 9,000 hours logged into the radiological controlled area (RCA) during more than 3,800 separate entries. Furthermore there were no personnel contamination events or respiratory uptakes of radioactive material during the course of the entire project. (authors)

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Critical Drivers for Safety Culture: Examining Department of Energy and U.S. Army Operational Experiences - 12382

Evaluating operational incidents can provide a window into the drivers most critical to establishing and maintaining a strong safety culture, thereby minimizing the potential project risk associated with safety incidents. By examining U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) versus U.S. Army drivers in terms of regulatory and contract requirements, programs implemented to address the requirements, and example case studies of operational events, a view of the elements most critical to making a positive influence on safety culture is presented. Four case studies are used in this evaluation; two from DOE and two from U.S. Army experiences. Although the standards guiding operations at these facilities are different, there are many similarities in the level of hazards, as well as the causes and the potential consequences of the events presented. Two of the incidents examined, one from a DOE operation and the other from a U.S. Army facility, resulted in workers receiving chemical burns. The remaining two incidents are similar in that significant conduct of operations failures occurred resulting in high-level radioactive waste (in the case of the DOE facility) or chemical agent (in the case of the Army facility) being transferred outside of engineering controls. A review of the investigation reports for all four events indicates the primary causes to be failures in work planning leading to ineffective hazard evaluation and control, lack of procedure adherence, and most importantly, lack of management oversight to effectively reinforce expectations for safe work planning and execution. DOE and Army safety programs are similar, and although there are some differences in contractual requirements, the expectations for safe performance are essentially the same. This analysis concludes that instilling a positive safety culture comes down to management leadership and engagement to (1) cultivate an environment that values a questioning attitude and (2) continually reinforce expectations for the appropriate level of rigor in work planning and procedure adherence. A review of the root causes and key contributing causes to the events indicate: - Three of the four root cause analyses cite lack of management engagement (oversight, involvement, ability to recognize issues, etc.) as a root cause to the events. - Two of the four root cause analyses cite work planning failures as a root cause to the events and all cause analyses reflect work planning failures as contributing factors to the events. - All events with the exception of the Tuba City plant shutdown indicate procedure noncompliance as a key contributor; in the case of Tuba City the procedure issues were primarily related to a lack of procedures, or a lack of sufficiently detailed procedures. - All events included discussion or suggestion of a lack of a questioning attitude, either on the part of management/supervision, work planners, or workers. This analysis suggests that the most critical drivers to safety culture are: - Management engagement, - Effective work planning and procedures, and - Procedure adherence with a questioning attitude to ensure procedural problems are identified and fixed. In high-hazard operational environments the importance of robust work planning processes and procedure adherence cannot be overstated. However, having the processes by themselves is not enough. Management must actively engage in expectation setting and ensure work planning that meets expectations for hazard analysis and control, develop a culture that encourages incident reporting and a questioning attitude, and routinely observe work performance to reinforce expectations for adherence to procedures/work control documents. In conclusion, the most critical driver to achieving a workforce culture that supports safe and effective project performance can be summarized as follows: 'Management engagement to continually reinforce expectations for work planning processes and procedure adherence in an environment that cultivates a questioning attitude'. (authors)

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Hanford Site Beryllium Program: Past, Present, and Future - 12428

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has a long history of beryllium use because of the element's broad application to many nuclear operations and processes. At the Hanford Site beryllium alloy was used to fabricate parts for reactors, including fuel rods for the N-Reactor during plutonium production. Because of continued confirmed cases of chronic beryllium disease (CBD), and data suggesting CBD occurs at exposures to low-level concentrations, the DOE decided to issue a rule to further protect federal and contractor workers from hazards associated with exposure to beryllium. When the beryllium rule was issued in 1999, each of the Hanford Site contractors developed a Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program (CBDPP) and initial site wide beryllium inventories. A new site-wide CBDPP, applicable to all Hanford contractors, was issued in May, 2009. In the spring of 2010 the DOE Headquarters Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) conducted an independent inspection to evaluate the status of implementation of the Hanford Site Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program (CBDPP). The report identified four Findings and 12 cross-cutting Opportunities for Improvement (OFIs). A corrective action plan (CAP) was developed to address the Findings and crosscutting OFIs. The DOE directed affected site contractors to identify dedicated resources to participate in development of the CAP, along with involving stakeholders. The CAP included general and contractor-specific recommendations. Following initiation of actions to implement the approved CAP, it became apparent that additional definition of product deliverables was necessary to assure that expectations were adequately addressed and CAP actions could be closed. Consequently, a supplement to the original CAP was prepared and transmitted to DOE-HQ for approval. Development of the supplemental CAP was an eight month effort. From the onset a core group of CAP development members were identified to develop a mechanism for assuring that consensus was achieved on products developed as part of the CAP and the closure process. The original CAP was developed based on a large number of actions developed from the HSS report. This was essentially a 'bottoms up' approach. The revised CAP development team concluded that a more holistic, process-based approach was appropriate to assure that the resulting deliverable resulted in a best-in-class product. Consequently, issues and recommendations contained in the HSS report were grouped into 11 program areas, specific product deliverables were identified within each of the program areas, and a work breakdown structure (WBS) was logically applied to number the groupings. While the revised approach to product development utilizes a more holistic, 'top down' approach, the intent was still to incorporate specific recommendations and address specific issues contained in the HSS report. Through implementation of this new approach, a collaborative team has been established that works together using a consensus process for ensuring product completion. Benefits of the new approach include building a level of trust amongst all parties, quality of the products have improved, and acceptance by all parties of what action will truly meet the intent of the deficiency and make the beryllium program stronger. Open dialogue occurs amongst the core Be CAP team members, Hanford contractors, and DOE. It has been a learning process and will continue to be one, but everyone shares the common goal of reducing worker exposure to beryllium. (authors)

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High Dexterity Robotics for Safety and Emergency Response - 17104

Recently, significant advances in robotics have led to increased use in industrial and military applications. For example, the military has used explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) robots to enable responders to remotely investigate hazardous environments. While EOD robots have saved many lives, their utility is hampered by: 1) limited ability to manipulate complex objects and mechanisms (e.g. open a car door, operate power tools or turn valves), and 2) the requirement for significant operator training using joystick-type interfaces. Most robots today have simplistic manipulators and cannot easily operate in environments designed for humans as evidenced by the recent Amazon Picking Challenge and the DARPA Robotics Challenge. Simple tasks that humans perform easily, such as picking up objects or operating a cutting tool, require customized rigs that are expensive and time-consuming to use. The specialized nature of these robots limits their utility in highly unstructured environments, for example during emergency situations where a robot may need to be rapidly re-purposed for an unanticipated situation (i.e. the Fukushima nuclear disaster). Robots are needed that can perform complex human-like tasks and are easy to use for everyday and emergency tasks. In 2005 the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiated the Revolutionizing Prosthetics (RP) Program with the goal of creating prosthetics as capable as the human arm and a human-machine interface enabling highly intuitive operation. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) created the Modular Prosthetic Limb (MPL), originally developed for amputees and paralyzed individuals as part of the RP Program, to replicate the capability of the human hand and arm to the extent technologically possible. With 26 joints and over 180 sensors, it is one of the most sophisticated and fully integrated robotic arms in the world. We have also demonstrated human-machine interface techniques that are highly intuitive requiring minimal training. While the MPL was originally designed as a prosthetic, it has also been incorporated into mobile robotic systems to project human capability. Using tele-operation, we have demonstrated the ability to perform dual-arm remote operations in complex environments. For nuclear facilities, high dexterity robots combined with tele-operation offer the potential to enhance worker safety, productivity and quality. Safety enhancements include enabling remote operation in hazardous environments, remote handling of heavy or dangerous materials, and elimination of injury due to repetitive motions. Because the MPL is designed to function like a human limb, the robot can work in environments designed for humans with limited need for specialized tools. When used for routine operations, it can also maintain a level of familiarity and confidence that effectively accomplishes reinforcement training for use in emergency situations, unlike a specialized robot that might sit unused for months or years at a time. In August 2016 we demonstrated the use of the MPL at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, Ohio. Two robotic platform technologies were demonstrated to familiarize the DOE Emergency Management's (EM) workforce on the potential benefits of this technology. Here we present the results of those efforts, highlight the lessons learned during 'EM Week,' and outline potential future developments that could further advance application of these technologies to enhance worker safety. (authors)

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Building the Future Nuclear Workforce Through Regional Partnerships - 17219

Industries across the United States of America are competing for highly skilled talent at a time when worker retirements are increasing and fewer students are pursuing science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) related fields of study. This specialized workforce is necessary for many industries, and it is essential for the processing and management of nuclear materials and operations of the nuclear security enterprise. Competition for STEM talent impacts the region that includes the Savannah River Site (SRS), a Department of Energy complex that is responsible for environmental stewardship, environmental cleanup, waste management and disposition of nuclear materials. SRS employs nearly 11,000 people and anticipates significant workforce attrition due to retirements over the next several years. In the SRS region, nuclear industry workers are also needed for the growing nuclear power industry as construction of four new nuclear power plants is taking place within an 80-mile radius of SRS. To address growing nuclear workforce needs in this region of Georgia and South Carolina, the SRS Community Reuse Organization (SRSCRO) established the Nuclear Workforce Initiative (NWI{sup R}) during 2009. Through NWI{sup R}, the SRSCRO has developed a network of partnerships with nuclear employers and regional educators to expand nuclear workforce development capabilities. Most notably, through NWI{sup R}, the SRSCRO established a partnership with five local colleges and universities and the Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management. Together, they have produced significant results. Recently, the National Nuclear Security Administration joined the partnership to help build the future nuclear workforce that includes scientists and engineers, but also skilled technicians, production operators, welders, nuclear quality specialists and other highly skilled professionals prepared to work in a secure and procedure-oriented environment. This paper highlights results from a successful partnership between a non-profit organization, academic institutions and the United States Department of Energy designed to expand the nuclear industry talent pool. (authors)

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Investigations of dual-purpose canister direct disposal feasibility - 15106

Direct disposal of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) could avoid the cost and complexity of re-packaging spent fuel into smaller purpose-built containers, avoid disposing of the DPC hulls as low-level waste, and potentially decrease worker dose. Technical objectives for disposal are: 1) safety of workers and the public, 2) engineering feasibility; 3) thermal management; and 4) criticality control after permanent closure of a repository. The postclosure safety case for DPC direct disposal would resemble that for any repository-waste isolation would be enhanced by choosing host geology in which radionuclide transport is diffusion dominated, and for which transport properties and pathways are insensitive to the expected temperature history. Containment functions would be assigned to the disposal overpack, and published data show that suitable materials exist for most possible disposal environments. Earlier studies showed that DPC-based waste packages would be only slightly larger and heavier than those proposed for a repository in volcanic tuff. Engineered solutions are available for transporting and emplacing them underground, although some could be the largest of their kind. The cost of DPC direct disposal in various geologic settings has been compared to options involving a change to loading standardized multi-purpose canisters, or continuing to load DPCs and re-packaging all of them for disposal. In general DPC direct disposal would cost tens of billions of dollars less, in packaging and disposal costs. Calculations for emplacement in hard rock and sedimentary rock show that host rock peak temperature targets of 100 to 200 deg.C could be met by managing fuel age and burnup, with repository closure at up to 150 years from reactor discharge. For disposal in salt, DPC-based waste packages could be emplaced at only 50 to 100 years from discharge, depending on burnup. Sedimentary media such as shales pose special challenges especially if they have low thermal conductivity. If backfill is used around DPC-based packages its peak temperature could be 150 to 200 deg.C. Without flooding of waste packages with ground water, criticality can never occur. However, some small number of disposal overpacks could fail within the postclosure performance period due to corrosion or disruptive events. Once flooded, the aluminum-based neutron absorber materials used in most DPCs would readily degrade. Analysis has shown that even without neutron absorbers, virtually all DPCs could be subcritical if flooded with chloride brines such as would occur in a salt repository. The licensing basis for existing DPCs involves criticality analysis that may be conservative compared to fuel that is actually loaded, and the difference provides uncredited reactivity margin. Uncredited margin can offset increases in reactivity associated with flooding and basket degradation. For flooding with fresh water, with loss of neutron absorbers, many DPCs have been shown to be subcritical using uncredited margin. Significantly fewer are subcritical if the fuel basket also degrades. Thus, the materials of DPC basket construction (e.g., aluminum or carbon steel) could be deleterious if they fully corrode, along with the neutron absorbers, during the performance period. Logistical simulations are used to better understand the relationship between the needed DPC decay storage time for disposal, and the timing of future events such as the repository opening date, or a transition to loading multi-purpose (disposable) canisters at nuclear power plants. Results show that the maximum benefit from implementing a new canister design, with respect to shortening the cooling time for all SNF including that in DPCs, is associated with the earliest repository start date. As time passes more of the total SNF inventory will be in DPCs such that the value of a transition to multi-purpose canisters will decline, and the remaining options are DPC direct disposal and re-packaging in purpose-designed disposal canisters. Fuel age at emplacement is of interest to evaluate potential impacts from future changes in the fuel management system that could place fuel age limits on dry storage or transportation. The minimum fuel age at emplacement (best-case) is obtained by re-packaging all DPCs into smaller canisters for disposal, thus drastically decreasing the needed decay storage time for any geologic disposal setting. If the industry transitions to smaller, multi-purpose canisters, and without re-packaging, the fuel age at emplacement would be comparable to the best case if: 1) the emplacement power limit is high enough, or 2) both the transition and the repository start date occur early (e.g., 2036 was analyzed). Technical feasibility evaluation continues to show that direct disposal could be safe and cost effective, for some DPCs and in some geologic settings. Direct disposal of a substantial fraction of existing DPCs, limited mainly by thermal management, uncredited criticality margin, materials of DPC basket construction, and the salinity of ground water in the disposal environment, could be part of the overall waste management system. (authors)

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Long-term stewardship - surveillance and maintenance at Hanford - 15155

In FY 2015, Hanford's Long-Term Stewardship (LTS) Program is tasked to complete the required entries into five cocooned plutonium production reactors (105-C, 105-D, 105-F, 105-H and 105-N), which sit adjacent to the Columbia River. The first reactor entered in October 2014, the cocooned plutonium production reactor, 105-F, signaled the LTS Program's entry into the Surveillance and Maintenance (S and M) era. Reactor entries at Hanford are conducted at 5-year intervals to assess the condition of the structures and evaluate potential deterioration of the reactor core, shield walls and roof. The cocooned structures are designed to protect the reactor core for up to 75 years while radioactive decay continues, ultimately making the structures safe for demolition and removal. The 105-F entry demonstrates that the LTS program at Hanford is shifting from a program focused on transitioning cleaned up land and waste sites to a program focused primarily on S and M activities. The entry process is carefully planned, choreographed and monitored to ensure safety of the workers and minimize the time the reactor structure is opened. The process includes controlled opening of the reactor, air quality monitoring, structural safety inspections, and radiological clearance. Once the structure is cleared for entry, assessments of the structural integrity and radiologic conditions are completed. Evaluation of the interior temperature and flood monitoring equipment is conducted. Facility visits by regulators and DOE personnel close out the process prior to welding the door closed until the next assessment, five years later. This paper will document execution of the entry work package, identify challenges overcome, and provide video documentation as reference material for future workers and the public. The current LTS program has responsibility for approximately 100,000 acres, over 200 waste sites and six cocooned reactors. Just over 5,600 documents have been identified, indexed and tagged for storage in the LTS document library. The program has successfully completed seven consecutive transitions since July 2011, with six more transitions planned in the next 18 months to support the U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office's (DOE-RL) near-term cleanup objectives to significantly reduce the footprint of active cleanup operations for the River Corridor. (authors)

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ALARA on the radioactive waste management activities at NPP in Korea - 15189

This study examined and analyzed on-site experience to investigate the effect of the 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) principle on the level of radiation exposure management during NPPs' radioactive waste management activities. In particular, the ALARA principle was observed by various activities of radioactive waste management. According to 2012 data, workers' radiation exposure due to radioactive waste management activities in one light water reactor (LWR) unit amounted to a collective dose of 14.8 man-mSv, and this value corresponded to approximately 3.5% of the radiation exposure due to the NPP's total activities. The present study is expected to contribute to the reduction of workers' radiation exposure by analyzing and synthesizing field experience from the perspective of the ALARA principle during radioactive waste management, and transmitting the results to other NPPs. (authors)

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WIPP - February 2014 operational events and the compliance re-certification application (CRA) 2014 - 15293

On Wednesday, February 5, 2014, an underground mine fire involving a salt haul truck occurred at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). There were 86 workers in the mine when the fire occurred. All workers were evacuated. Nine days later, on Friday, February 14, 2014, there was an incident in the underground repository at WIPP which resulted in the release of americium and plutonium from one or more transuranic (TRU) waste containers into the environment. The release was detected by an underground continuous air monitor and then directed through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter banks located in the surface exhaust building. However, a measurable portion bypassed the HEPA filters via leakage through two ventilation system dampers and was discharged directly to the environment from an exhaust duct. No personnel were determined to have received external contamination; however, some individuals that were on site were identified through bioassay to have initially tested positive for low level amounts of internal contamination. Trace amounts of americium and plutonium were detected off-site.While significant to day-to-day operations, these events have no impact to the long-term performance of the repository. Because WIPP's re-certification is based solely on the post-closure performance of the repository (40 CFR 191, Subparts B and C), these recent events do not affect the long-term performance predictions or its technical and scientific basis. In this paper we will further explore the requirements for WIPP's re-certification, and the basis for our contention that the recent WIPP operational events do not impact long-term repository performance or have any implications on salt as a geologic disposal media, and that re-certification efforts should continue uninterrupted. (authors)

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Managing work flow and logistic at waste processing facilities using the waste compliance and tracking system - 15392

Work flow and logistics at a busy radioactive waste processing complex or permitted treatment, storage, and disposal facility (TSDF) can pose a monumental challenge. An efficient operation requires good communication between engineering, logistics, and waste operators. The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has implemented an application that facilitates seamless communication of work flow requirements, between engineering, logistics, and waste operations personnel in the field. The Waste Compliance and Tracking System (WCATS), a comprehensive waste management system designed at LANL, provides four key elements to support logistics: (a) the container work path, (b) directed unit operation requests, (c) notification of pending operations, and (d) real-time status tools for office and field workers. The combination of these elements allows everyone to function as a team, with a shared knowledge of what is needed to accomplish facility objectives. The first element is like a road map indicating which unit operations are needed and in what sequence they should be performed; this is referred to as a 'work path'. It automatically routes a waste item or container from operation to operation. For example, a given work path might indicate that waste items require radiological survey, radioassay, and a technical review, in that order. When the work path is assigned to a container, the system enforces the correct order of operations. Directed unit operation 'requests', the second element, fills a gap between pre-planned, formal 'work path' activities and the need for flexibility to direct preparatory operations or deal with unexpected issues, like staging or mining containers in preparation for a shipment or transferring containers from one storage unit to another to clear a path for building maintenance. Logistics engineers prepare these 'requests', and the system monitors the status and completion of the work. The third element, notifications, allows team members to subscribe to and receive notice that an operation is pending, initiated, or complete. This functionality supports a range of communication options, including e-mail, cell phone, pager, or application in-box messaging. Notifications allow waste operations personnel to multi-task, and remain in the loop on the status of facility-wide activities. Finally, the fourth element provides tools that communicate work path pending operations and directed requests to field workers on their mobile computer, allowing them to mine or pick containers from storage units, and leverage the capabilities of a bar-code scanner to avoid selection mistakes. Oversight and summary tools are provided, allowing logistics personnel to monitor work path and request task status, identify work-flow bottlenecks, and maximize the efficiency of waste operations. The Waste Compliance and Tracking System (WCATS) provides an innovative, comprehensive set of tools that allow large-scale radioactive waste processing facilities to manage logistics, maximize efficient use of the workforce, and create a team environment, where everyone from management to the waste handlers have an understanding of the work load and what needs to be accomplished. (authors)

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Deactivation of the K-27 building at the east Tennessee Technology Park - 15554

In 1942, nearly 24,280 hectares (60,000 acres) of east Tennessee landscape became part of the most significant defense strategy in the history of the United States - the Manhattan Project. Three methods of uranium separation were pursued at the site in the effort to end World War II. What became the K-25 site, now known as the East Tennessee Technology Park, focused on the gaseous diffusion method of uranium enrichment. This paper focuses on the deactivation of the second of five gaseous diffusion plants built on the site. The four-level, rectangular-shaped K-27 came online in 1945 and was tied to the site's original gaseous diffusion plant, K-25. K-27 extended K-25's enriching stages to increase production. The plant supported weapons production and other security strategies until 1964. K-27 spans 35,582 square meters (383,000 square feet) and contains approximately 92,903 square meters (one million square feet) of floor space. During deactivation, workers will use an assembly line process to tackle the 540 process stages housed in 90 cells. While often the less publicized, less visible aspect of building decontamination and decommissioning, deactivation takes more than three times longer than demolition. Crews work in high-risk, high-hazard environments - exposed to extreme temperatures, radiological and chemical contaminants, and deteriorating infrastructure. Therefore, worker safety becomes the most rigorous task performed. K-27 is the fifth and final gaseous diffusion building in the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Environmental Management program to be demolished. (authors)

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Advancements in the H-Canyon Exhaust Ventilation System Inspections at the Savannah River Site - 16030

A facility safety envelope requires management of activities to ensure no unacceptable radiological or chemical hazards to the public, site worker and environment occur. While appropriate design and construction methods ensure an initial physical plant configuration, what actions must an operating Facility take to ensure the physical plant continues to meet a safety configuration throughout Facility life? While a physical walk down of the plant is a tried and true method to confirm conditions, what other methods must be used when a walk down is not possible? What inspection methods are used when balancing budget pressures against obtaining inspection data? The periodic inspections of the H-Canyon Exhaust Tunnel are performed remotely. The 2015 remote Tunnel inspection has been the most successful inspection to date. This presentation highlights the continued lessons learned with the most recent 2015 remote Tunnel inspection. These lessons learned are applicable to Facilities considering or performing remote inspections. The Recovery Crawler Project was tasked with determining if the 2014 Inspection Crawler could be retrieved, perform the retrieval if feasible and complete the inspection of the remaining sections of the exhaust tunnel that were not previously performed. The objectives for the project were met, the Inspection Crawler was deemed unusable and left in place and the Recovery Crawler performed the complete 143 meters (470 feet) of tunnel inspection and an additional 55 meters (180 feet) of exhaust tunnel inspection not previously completed. The remote inspection of a 60+ year operating Canyon Exhaust tunnel is a complex endeavor requiring close coordination of multiple organizations, adherence to Conduct of Operations, Radiological Safety, Worker Safety, etc. principles as well as alignment with Facility Safety Basis requirements. This paper discusses the challenges, actions required getting ready for the 2015 recovery and continued inspection and the hazards encountered performing the actual recovery/inspection. (authors)

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Remote Geophysical Logging at the Hanford Single-Shell Tank Farms: Maintaining Efficiency and Reducing Personnel Hazards - 16190

Vadose zone characterization around groups of underground waste storage tanks (known as tank farms) at the US DOE Hanford Site in Washington State is conducted to assess the presence and extent of manmade gamma-ray emitting radionuclides. Boreholes around the tanks are characterized using a high-resolution spectral gamma logging system (SGLS). In the past, logging operations required workers to remain inside the tank farm boundary during data acquisition. This approach was effective; however, personnel were at risk of exposure to potential radiological hazards, chemical hazards, and/or vapor releases that can be associated with the tank farm environment. Limitations associated with this work environment necessitated a new approach in order to decrease the amount of time personnel spent in the farm without affecting work productivity and efficiency. In order to accomplish this, a new remote logging cable support (RLCS) was developed and implemented which effectively removed workers from the hazards associated with the tank farm environment. (authors)

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Regulatory Compliance Strategy For Recovery-Driven Underground Ventilation System Changes - 16355

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility is managed and operated by Nuclear Waste Partnership LLC (NWP) for the U.S Department of Energy (DOE). On February 14, 2014, a radiological event occurred in the WIPP facility underground repository, which resulted in the release of transuranic isotopes contaminating a portion of the underground primarily along the ventilation path from Panel 7, the location of the incident. The release was initially detected by an underground continuous air monitor (CAM) which caused an automatic switch of the ventilation system to filtration mode and ventilation was directed through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration banks located in the surface exhaust building. When the HEPA filtration was engaged, the underground normal ventilation was reduced from 425,000 standard cubic feet per minute (scfm) to 60,000 scfm. Since the event, all exhaust air is filtered through HEPA filters at 60,000 scfm to minimize the possibility of exposure to workers, the public and the environment. Ventilation of fresh air to the WIPP underground is a primary limitation to performing underground recovery activities; therefore, recovery-driven ventilation changes are needed. The safe recovery of the WIPP facility and resumption of normal waste emplacement activities require an increase in ventilation capacity to be accomplished in three phases: 1) Interim Ventilation System, 2) Supplemental Ventilation System and 3) Permanent Ventilation System. Each phase adds increased air flow to the underground and allows for underground activities to be performed concurrently. The regulatory strategy for ventilation recovery focuses on ensuring that needed changes to the WIPP facility are protective of human health and the environment. Recovery-driven ventilation changes are implemented using the procedures, processes, and regulations that are required by the two primary regulatory agencies for the WIPP facility: the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) as well as DOE requirements. Regulatory compliance is being achieved for the three ventilation phases to restore underground ventilation by providing the regulators and stakeholders opportunities for involvement during the design and development processes. A strategy for a tiered NMED permitting process and a plan for developing required EPA documentation are under consideration. The Project's objective is to resume normal waste emplacement activities with safety, protection of the public, the worker and the environment as the highest priorities. Important elements of ensuring that WIPP facility recovery and future waste emplacement activities occur as planned are transparency and communication with the regulatory community. (authors)

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Underwater Laser Cutting Technology - 16491

Underwater dismantling is advantageous for the highly radioactive apparatuses such as nuclear reactor internals. The most advantageous point of underwater dismantling is a radiation exposure reduction for workers. Underwater dismantling can take advantage of the water shielding. Then it can make the exposure reduction for workers and contamination reduction for work area be realized. And, underwater laser cutting technology has major three advantages. First advantage is lower action force. Therefore it can be possible that we can use a simple remote device for underwater dismantling operation. Second advantage is to reduce secondary waste. The cutting kerf size of underwater laser cutting is very narrow, so the amount of cutting dross is very small. Third advantage is very simple methods for dismantling. This advantage can reduce process time for cutting. On the other hand, the contaminated off-gas which generates during cutting should be taken care. IHl Corporation (IHI) developed the underwater laser cutting devices. The characteristic of IHI's laser cutting torch is that there is no air habitat. Therefore, the positions of the torch and the access to the narrow space have little limitation. Using the device the series of performance tests were performed in order to verify the ability of it. In the first Laboratory test at 0.2 meter depth of water, we evaluated the optimum cutting parameters. The next underwater demonstration test at 6 meters depth of water was performed. In the test the cutting performance, which the mild steel plate of the thickness of 12 mm can be cut at the speed of 300 mm/min with the horizontal and downward position of torch was verified. Then the hot bubble test using real radioactive test coupons was performed to evaluate the radioactivity carried as air borne and the decontamination factor (DF) of off-gas passing through water. This document provides an overview of the underwater laser cutting device that has been developed by IHI, and the advantage of these devices for the dismantling work of underwater apparatus. (authors)

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Self-Navigating Robotic Assistant for Long-term Wide Area Floor Contamination Monitoring - 18213

For Routine Contamination Testing (RCT) of an operational nuclear facility or one undergoing Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D), workers utilize specified travel corridors (enclosed hallways or areas designated with tape or rope in open spaces) to minimize the risk of spreading contamination. Radiation health technicians must continually monitor these areas for contamination to minimize worker dose and prevent its spread to uncontrolled areas. For many sites, it is impractical for the technician to adequately survey such areas. The Nuclear Robotics Group (NRG) at UT Austin has developed a self-navigating robotic platform equipped with radiation detectors to augment the technician to improve both survey coverage and frequency. While maintaining a controlled velocity and floor-to-sensor distance, the system takes radiation measurements to identify and/or localize contamination sources. Readings above background levels are reported to a remote workstation to allow technicians to then respond accordingly. The completion of these mundane tasks by a robot allows the trained technicians to focus instead on operational tasks, D and D, or responding to alarms. The robot generates a map using a Lidar range sensor with established Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM) techniques. Range data is then compared to previously generated maps for robot localization and autonomous navigation. To maximize coverage, the robot executes a Complete Coverage Path Planning (CCPP) algorithm using a static map that is discretized into cells to assure comprehensive yet efficient coverage. As the system executes the generated plan, it builds a radiation map of the area for the technician to validate and verify the results. If contamination is detected, the robot will minimize the spread of contamination by stopping, sounding an alarm, and alerting the remote technician. The proposed system allows for long-term deployment with minimal human intervention. It is robust to both highly dynamic obstacles (i.e. personnel) and low dynamic changes (i.e. temporally stored cart) in the environment. This is accomplished through continuous spatiotemporal updating of the static map, and the utilization of a supervisory controller that allows the system to reliably respond to unexpected events or states (i.e. low battery, closed door, etc.). While the supervisory controller can respond to temporary complications, the system also recognizes the environment can change slowly over time necessitating that the CCPP automatically be updated to account for observed 'permanent' changes to the environment. To do this, the robot uses intermediate probabilistic data to make intelligent planning decisions offline while still maintaining local reactive obstacle avoidance and safety features. The self-updating of the map allows the robot to run longer without the need to remake the map, leading to more consistent monitoring data and less maintenance from the human technician. This paper will review the current system hardware, the CCPP algorithm, the supervisory controller, the probabilistic algorithm for identifying permanent changes, and recent experiments at UT Austin to experimentally validate the reported sensor coverage. (authors)

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Radioactive Waste Disposal Strategies within the US Army Corps of Engineers FUSRAP - 18328

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (USACE) highest priority is the protection of human health and the environment and public and worker safety during the cleanup, transportation, and disposal of Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) material. In addition to following all appropriate federal and state rules and regulations, the USACE has its own safety program that ensures that we are being protective. One aspect of the USACE FUSRAP is the radioactive waste disposal strategies that we must consider. The USACE will only dispose of FUSRAP material in a facility that is licenses/permitted to accept it. The estimated exposures to facility workers and members of the public from the permitted disposal of FUSRAP wastes is evaluated as part of this process. The USACE uses the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) process to study and remediate FUSRAP sites. An evaluation is performed to decide whether it is best to manage the waste on-site or off-site and the requirements for disposal. The action selected must be protective of human health and the environment and must comply with regulations. When making the decision, there are several other factors taken into consideration including cost of the disposal and whether the public and state agencies support the action. Prior to determining disposal options, wastes must first be characterized. This involves an evaluation of both site history and analytical data. Determining the proper disposal requirements and subsequent disposal option involves: Characterizing the waste as stated above. This is important because there are several regulatory agencies which may oversee management of the waste. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), the US Department of Transportation, and state hazardous waste and/or radiation protection agencies may all have varying degrees of involvement. Identifying disposal requirements. Certain wastes must be disposed at licensed radioactive waste disposal facilities. Wastes containing US EPA regulated hazardous waste must be disposed at permitted hazardous waste disposal facilities. Certain wastes must be disposed at facilities licensed/permitted for both radioactive and hazardous waste. Some lower activity wastes may be accepted for disposal at other types of landfills. Considering acceptance criteria of the disposal facility. Radionuclides and/or hazardous constituents in the waste, as well as physical and chemical form of the waste, are evaluated to ensure they meet the acceptance criteria of the receiving facility's license and/or permit. If they don't, another disposal location must be used. Considering the accessibility and location of the disposal facility. Some facilities are able to accept shipments only by truck and others can accept material via railcar as well. The distance to a disposal facility impacts the risk of transportation accidents and efficient use of project resources such as the number of trucks required to perform the transportation. These factors are also important in evaluating whether material can be cost effectively shipped to a disposal facility. Evaluating the compliance status of the receiving facility. It is not assumed that just because a facility has a license or permit that it is acceptable for the USACE' waste. Prior to selecting a facility for disposal of FUSRAP waste, a site visit, audit and consultation with the US EPA is required to determine whether there are any known relevant violations at the facility. Facilities that have violations that negatively impact the USACE or US EPA approval of the facility are not used for disposal of FUSRAP waste. Once a facility is selected. The USACE procures contracts, or utilizes existing contracts, to facilitate the transportation and disposal action. Additionally, the USACE continues to consult with US EPA routinely to confirm the compliance status of the facility. Considering state acceptance of wastes to a facility. The USACE seeks to obtain written authorization from the facility state regulator indicating the action is compliant with existing licenses, permits, laws, and regulations. Each of these factors is considered by the USACE in selecting a FUSRAP disposal location. The goal is to provide safe, cost effective disposal which is protective of human health and the environment and which complies with all regulatory requirements. These steps all feed in to the disposal strategy consideration that USACE must go through for our FUSRAP waste streams. There are a number of challenges in the process to include In order to achieve the Congressional mandate of completing cleanup work under FUSRAP in a more cost effective, timely manner, while assuring protection of public health and safety. USACE must determine all disposal options that are available for the types of waste at each FUSRAP site. As a solution, completion of a disposal strategy document can help ensure this goal is met and will foster consistency across the FUSRAP. (authors)

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